
VIII. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY COLLECTION ACTIVITIES AGAINST IRAQ'S WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

(U) The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence focused its work in reviewing U.S. intelligence on the quality and quantity of intelligence analysis, the objectivity and reasonableness of the Intelligence Community's (IC) judgments, and whether any influence was brought to bear to shape that analysis to support policy objectives. The Committee also examined the role of intelligence collectors in providing the fundamental information upon which the intelligence analysts based their assessments of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities. To understand how intelligence collectors worked to obtain information on Iraq's WMD capabilities, what the IC's collection efforts entailed, and whether those efforts produced tangible results, Committee staff interviewed the Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Collection (ADCI/C) and various members of the National Intelligence Collection Board (NICB)³². Committee staff also interviewed Iraqi collection officers in the Central Intelligence Agency's (CIA) Directorate for Operations and National Security Agency (NSA) Iraqi signals intelligence analysts to gain further insight into the IC's post-Gulf War human and signals intelligence collection strategies for Iraq. Committee staff also reviewed the National Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection Directives on Iraq, which are intended to prioritize and guide collection, to determine where IC collectors were requested to focus their collection efforts.

(U) The NICB told Committee staff that prior to the Gulf War there had been a robust, U.S., all-source intelligence collection program against Iraq and its WMD programs. After the Gulf War, however, most of the IC's knowledge of Iraqi WMD programs was obtained from, in conjunction with, and in support of the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM) inspections. NICB members and IC analysts told Committee staff that information from UNSCOM provided a significant portion of the information the IC had on Iraq's WMD programs and capabilities. One NICB representative told Committee staff, "it's very difficult to overstate the degree to which we were focused on and using the output from the U.N. inspectors."

(While inspectors were in Iraq from 1991 through 1998, the IC was not aggressively pursuing collection against the WMD target and most of the assets tasked for Iraqi

³²The NICB comprises the most senior collection managers from each intelligence discipline (human intelligence [HUMINT], signals intelligence [SIGINT], imagery intelligence [IMINT], and measurement and signature intelligence [MASINT]).




(U) In 1998, a new ADCI/C led a major effort to examine worldwide end-to-end collection.³⁴ To undertake this effort, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) established the Collection Management Task Force. Led by the ADCI for Collection, the Collection Management Task Force identified both the successes and challenges of the IC's collection activities and made several recommendations to improve collection, including bringing "the collection disciplines together in a more synergistic way," looking for "innovative ways that improve collaboration and innovation across the Community," and establishing a center to examine the IC's most intractable intelligence problems and develop new ways to improve collection. In 2000, the Collection Concepts Development Center (CCDC) was created to achieve these goals and took on Iraq's WMD capabilities for its first study.


In the CCDC study, collectors and analysts within the IC worked together to identify collection gaps and develop new, unilateral collection strategies designed specifically to target Iraq's WMD programs. The study looked at all four aspects of WMD (nuclear, biological, chemical and delivery) and recommended ways to address the collection gaps. The CCDC released its report, titled, *Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: Recommendations for*

³³Iraqi Weapons of Mass Destruction: Recommendations for Improvements in Collection. The Collection Concepts Development Center, June 2000.

³⁴End-to-end collection refers to the collection cycle which entails the development of collection requirements, allocating tasks to specific collection assets, collecting, processing, exploiting, and then disseminating the information that is collected.


Improvements in Collection, in June 2000. Immediately after the report was released, the IC began to implement the CCDC's recommendations to improve intelligence collection in all disciplines (human intelligence [HUMINT], signals intelligence [SIGINT], imagery intelligence [IMINT], open source intelligence [OSINT] and measurement and signature intelligence [MASINT]) against Iraq's The NICB briefed Committee staff on the how these recommendations were implemented and how intelligence collection improved as a result of these efforts.
A. Human Intelligence (HUMINT)
In order to more fully understand why the CCDC recommended certain changes to the Intelligence Community's (IC) HUMINT collection activities, Committee staff interviewed HUMINT collection officers in the CIA's Directorate of Operations, including collection officers in the Near East (NE) Division and the Counterproliferation Division (CPD). These officers briefed Committee staff on the IC's HUMINT collection posture against Iraq from the end of the Gulf War until the beginning of Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). CIA officers told staff that the IC's HUMINT collection efforts throughout this period were dedicated to
the IC obtained human intelligence on a variety of issues. Most of this information obtained through CIA's sources was related to political and military issues, not WMD, however. The CIA had no dedicated WMD sources on the ground in Iraq until the late nineties.
. The CIA did not have any WMD sources in Iraq after 1998. When asked about the lack of sources with access to WMD, the Deputy Chief of CPD told Committee staff that "despite an intense, vigorous recruitment campaign against Iraq WMD targets we were never able to gain direct access to Iraq's WMD programs."
(A CIA officer from NE told staff that when he came to his position in 2001, the CIA had four Iraqi sources reporting on non-WMD topics.
- 260 -
- 260 -






(After this push to improve HUMINT collection, the CIA made contact, through other sources,
(Gramatically picked up the pace" of HUMINT collection according to a CIA collector.
CIA officials told Committee staff this resulted in
or more sources reporting by March 2003. Just prior to the start of OIF,
None of these sources provided information on Iraq's biological, chemical or nuclear weapons programs.
Committee staff asked why the CIA had not considered placing a CIA officer in the years before Operation Iraqi Freedom to investigate Iraq's WMD programs. A CIA officer said, 'because it's very hard to sustain it takes a rare officer who can go in and survive scrutiny for a long time."
- 263 -

B. Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)





•								
		,						
	(U) Incre collection	ease the use on satellites	e of comm	ercial ima	gery to sup	plement in	nagery from U	J.S. intellige
			-					
					_			
Mea	asuremei	nt and Sign	atures In	telligence	(MASINT))		
gran MD,	n. The C) The IC al CDC study	so develor found that	oed MASI at there wa	NT collecti s negligible	on strategi e use of M	es to target Ir ASINT senso	aq's WMD rs against Ira
VID,			The st	udy recom	mended tha	at MASIN	T assets be us	ed more
ective		nat MASIN	T concord	ha inarasa	nalyyyaad	. The CC	DC study also	0
JIIIII	ichaea ti	lat MASIN	1 Selisois	be increas	ingry used			
() The NICF	3 said that	the IC im	plemented s	several rec	ommendation	ıs to improv
SIN	T collect	ion,						
				- 2	266 -			

The NICB told Committee staff that from Jun to January 2003 these collection efforts resulted in over 200 chemical-related reports, ov biological reports, and over 800 nuclear-related reports, which, the NICB said contained positive and negative information on activity related to WMD. When asked by Committ which of these reports contained positive hits, the vice deputy director for MASINT and Technical Collection at DIA said that were	er 60 both
A NICB representative said of the reports were available to analysts via INTELINK.	that all
E. Impact of Increased Collection on Analysis	
Representatives from each collection discipline reported to Committat collection increased significantly in their areas after the recommendations of the CCI implemented. Committee staff asked the collectors how they work with the all-source are make sure that when they see a large increase in collection, that they understand that the is a result of an increase in collection, not necessarily an increase in activity by the Iraqis analyst who worked on the Iraq WMD CCDC study told Committee staff that WMD and regularly participated in NICB meetings on all WMD collection issues. This analyst note "there was a constant feedback mechanism available throughout this period from certainly through the present that enabled [analysts] to get a gauge of whether this was a collection if it was new collection or if it was a scale-up in activities." This same analyst also noted some places, [the IC] was collecting that had been under way for questions that had been under way for questions and frequently the reporting would show that."	DC were nalysts to increase. An lysts led that ly 2001 in bias or I that "in s [the
Comments from analysts to Committee staff, however, suggest that some WMD analysts did not believe that collection had increased significantly as a result of the improved effort against Iraq's WMD. A CIA BW analyst told Committee staff, "we increased collection efforts, but that did not necessarily equate to increased collection. We tried thard to focus them to collect on areas we thought were most important, but it did not necestranslate into us getting more collection." Two analysts from CIA's office of Near East a South Asia Analysis (NESA), told Committee staff that they did not notice an increase in collection as a result of the CCDC.	eased d very essarily


G. CIA HUMINT Compartmentation

(U) IC officials provided Committee staff with reporting from a number of sensitive CIA HUMINT sources who reported on Iraq's WMD programs before Operation Iraqi Freedom. The reporting from these sources was restricted to a limited list of recipients within the IC, or was handled in special access programs (SAP). SAPs limit distribution to a small group of IC personnel who have been formally granted access to the intelligence based on their need to know the information being reported. When the IC provided these reports to the Committee, they told

Committee staff that they could not be sure that they were providing all of the limited distribution and special access reporting on Iraq's weapons programs, because of the difficulty of searching for reports across the different special access compartments.

H. Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Collection Conclusions


Conclusion 77. The Intelligence Community relied too heavily on United Nations (UN) information about Iraq's programs and did not develop a sufficient unilateral collection effort targeting Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs and related activities to supplement UN-collected information and to take its place upon the departure of the UN inspectors.




(U) Conclusion 78. The Intelligence Community depended too heavily on defectors and foreign government services to obtain human intelligence (HUMINT) information on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction activities. Because the Intelligence Community did not have direct access to many of these sources, it was exceedingly difficult to determine source credibility.



(U) Conclusion 79. The Intelligence Community waited too long after inspectors departed Iraq to increase collection against Iraq's weapons of mass destruction programs.



(U) Conclusion 80. Even after the departure of United Nations (UN) inspectors, placement of human intelligence (HUMINT) agents and development of unilateral sources inside Iraq were not top priorities for the Intelligence Community.



(U) Conclusion 81. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) continues to excessively compartment sensitive human intelligence (HUMINT) reporting and fails to share important information about HUMINT reporting and sources with Intelligence Community analysts who have a need to know.

Conclusion 82.				
		. The lack	of in-country h	uman
gence (HUMINT) collection	on assets contril	outed to this col	lection gap.	