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Document
1
August 11, 1960
Pressure of the Mexican Left on the Administration
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential despatch
In this lengthy analysis of the current political situation, the
Embassy notes the growing strength of the Mexican left, which has
managed to successfully bear the mantle of the revolution while the
PRI has slowly distanced itself from the revolution's original radicalism.
Former president Lázaro Cárdenas has provided symbolic
leadership to this rising momentum of the left: he has spoken openly
in favor of the Cuban revolution and there are rumors that he may
intend to form a "socialist" party. Attempting to co-opt
this leftist pressure, the government has provided visiting Cuban
president Osvaldo Dorticós with a fawning welcome and has openly
declared itself a government of the "extreme left." Yet
the Embassy fears that the government's actions may be counterproductive:
they have tended to embolden rather than mollify the left, and the
government's evident need to placate the left has indirectly revealed
the left's strength.
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1508, Folder 712.00/4-160
Document
2
June 22, 1961
Membership of Cárdenas in PRI
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, official use only despatch
The controversy provoked by Cárdenas' recent declaration that
he belongs to "no political party" led the State Department
to request clarification of the comment. In response, the Embassy
outlines Cárdenas' current political positions, which are often
to the left of the PRI, concluding that Cárdenas is "more
of the stripe of the Partido Popular Socialista (PPS) than of the
PRI" and is "becoming increasing[ly] independent from the
present PRI leadership." Nevertheless, the PRI has not taken
the step of formally expulsing Cárdenas, perhaps fearing the
powerful national hero might subsequently create his own party and
thereby challenge PRI dominance. The PRI has thus preferred "to
maintain a semblance of party unity by ignoring Cardenas' deviations
from national policy than to create an open break with one of its
most outstanding members."
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1509, Folder 712.00/5-361
Document
3
June 29, 1961
[Mexican government concerned over possible growth of communist
activities]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
Ambassador Thomas Mann urges Washington to reconsider plans to send
a high-level envoy to Mexico and Central America now, due to the "unsettled
condition" that exists. Recent events indicate that political
polarization is heating up as the Mexican government becomes more
concerned about the possibility of "Communist activities."
The regime has permitted large anti-communist rallies to continue,
has catered to former president Abelardo Rodríguez, a militant
anti-communist, and has apparently given the green light for the formation
of an anti-communist organization "intended serve as counter-force
to communist activities including organized street mobs." Mann
suggests that a visit by President Kennedy might be arranged instead,
but carefully timed to reward rather than precede tough anti-communist
measures.
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, General 1/61-5/62, Box 141
Document
4
July 17, 1961
[Proposal to tie loans to anti-communist measures]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
Concerned with the leftward drift of Mexican domestic and foreign
policy, Ambassador Mann envisions a "quiet program of action"
to contain the Mexican left: Taking advantage of the fact that Mexico
needs to request a $400 million loan from the United States, Mann
suggests that economic assistance could be conditioned on anti-communist
measures such as quietly purging "known members of the Communist
Party" from government posts and clamping down on communist advances
in organized labor. If Mexico is unreceptive to this approach, Mann
suggests "we could withdraw from discussions in friendliest and
most relaxed manner…and then simply put a 'slow man' on job
of passing on Mexican requests for assistance."
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, General 1/61-5/62, Box 141
Document
5
August 31, 1961
Political Polarization of Left and Right in Mexico
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential despatch
The Embassy describes the official formation of the Movimiento
de Liberación Nacional (MLN) under the moral leadership
of Cárdenas. The Embassy sees both Cárdenas' political
rejuvenation and the creation of the MLN as part of a broader resurgence
of the Mexican left in the aftermath of the Cuban revolution, which
"offered the pretext for the stepping up of leftist agitation
and propaganda." Pressure from the left has also brought about
a corresponding backlash from the right: an anti-communist campaign
bolstered by the church and conservative politicians has gained strength
in recent months.
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1509, Folder 712.00/7-761
Document
6
December 6, 1961
[Proposed responses to Mexico's vote in OAS]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
Following Mexico's December 4 decision to oppose the call for collective
action against Cuba made in the Organization of American States (OAS),
the U.S. ambassador reveals his frustration with Mexico's "independent"
position in the Cold War. Although Mexican officials "privately
hope Castro regime will fall of its own weight," the tradition
of non-intervention and the need to acknowledge the domestic left
are strong factors in determining Mexico's refusal to openly denounce
Cuba. As a subtle retaliation, Ambassador Mann suggests postponing
President Kennedy's visit, originally scheduled for late January,
since a trip so soon after the OAS meeting "would be interpreted
by many as U.S. approval of Mexican policy of 'independence' of both
blocs with its appearance of softness on Castro-communism" and
would "strengthen those elements leading López Mateos
to the left."
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, General 1/61-5/62, Box 141
Document
7
December 7, 1961
National Liberation Movement Meeting Held in Tijuana
U.S. Consulate in Tijuana, confidential despatch
This document reveals U.S. government officials' conceptualization
of the MLN as one communist front among many, permitting the leftist
penetration of the country through the organization of "cells."
Describing an MLN meeting held in Tijuana, the Consul claims that
"members of the Communist Party themselves have been given instructions
to push the MLN as a social organization" and mentions in passing
that the San Diego FBI has been monitoring the MLN.
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1511, Folder 712.00/7-761
Document
8
December 18, 1961
[Memo of conversation with President López Mateos]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
A lengthy description of a conversation between President Adolfo
López Mateos and Ambassador Mann captures the complexity of
the two countries' negotiations over Cuba. Mann upbraids López
Mateos for refusing to vote to sanction Cuba in the upcoming Punta
del Este meeting of the OAS. López Mateos, in turn, assures
Mann that the OAS vote should not be taken as "sympathy for Castro
or Communist doctrine," but is nevertheless unmoved by Mann's
anxious predictions that communism will spread from Cuba throughout
the hemisphere. Although U.S. officials will continue to lobby for
their position, Mann predicts that the simple fact of the two countries'
unequal relations will eventually tip the scales as "light [will]
begin to dawn on Mexico…that Mexico needs U.S. more than we
need Mexico."
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, General 1/61-5/62, Box 141
Document
9
December 26, 1961
Conservative and Communist Forces in Mexico Prepare for the Next
Presidential Elections
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential despatch
Ambassador Mann provides an extensive analysis of how Mexico's current
political polarization may affect the presidential elections of 1964.
Although the PRI has traditionally had both "left" and "right"
wings, the recent rise of organizations outside of the official PRI
ranks have put additional pressure on the party from both political
extremes. Now the question is whether these groups - the MLN on the
left and the Frente Cívico, directed by former presidents
Miguel Alemán and Abelardo Rodriguez, on the right - will try
to influence the PRI's choice of candidate in the 1964 elections,
or challenge the PRI directly by forming their own parties. The next
elections will therefore be a fundamental test of the PRI's power
to contain challenges.
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1509, Folder 712.00/11-161
Document
10
May 10, 1962
Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas Unable to Lecture at University
of Pennsylvania
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential airgram
This brief note reveals that the Department of State had considered
asking the University of Pennsylvania to retract its speaking invitation
to Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas, presumably because of his affiliation
with a "communist front" group such as the MLN.
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1510, Folder 712.00/4-262
Document
11
May 26, 1962
Communist Plan to Protest the [Mexico City visit of] President
Kennedy
Central Intelligence Agency, secret telegram
Describing the various leftist organizations that will attempt to
protest Kennedy's June state visit to Mexico, the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) characterizes the MLN as a "rabidly anti-United
States, pro-Cuba Communist front" (a delineation that appears
almost verbatim in subsequent documents) and describes Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas as the group's "secret head."
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
Trips and Conferences: President's Trip to Mexico 6/62, 5/11/62-5/31/62,
Box 237
Document
12
May 31, 1962
Communist Activity Related to Forthcoming Visit by President Kennedy
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
As Kennedy's state visit approaches, the Embassy begins more intensive
reporting on the "trouble-makers and Communist agitators"
who may disrupt the visit with protests, particularly the MLN. Here
the Embassy ascribes the creation of a widely circulated leftist leaflet
to a prominent member of the MLN and notes that the Mexican police
have been instructed to "follow closely the movements of MLN
members."
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
Trips and Conferences: President's Trip to Mexico 6/62, 5/11/62-5/31/62,
Box 237
Document
13
June 20, 1962
[Leftist general designated as Kennedy's escort during visit]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
In this odd window onto diplomatic intrigue, the Embassy warns the
Secretary of State that two men apparently of leftist pedigree have
been assigned to escort and translate for Kennedy during his visit.
The Embassy hypothesizes that this may constitute an indirect nod
to Cárdenas and the Mexican left, by permitting details of
the conversations between the two heads of state "to leak to
Cárdenas and leftists."
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
Trips and Conferences: President's Trip to Mexico 6/62, 6/13/62-6/20/62,
Box 237
Document
14
Circa June 25, 1962
Briefing Book: The President's Trip to Mexico, June 29-July 1,
1962
White House, confidential papers
The following documents are excerpts from the briefing book prepared
for President Kennedy shortly before his June 29-July 1 state visit
to Mexico City.
1. Scope Paper (June 22, 1962)
This briefing paper describes the political polarization that has
occurred in Mexico following the Cuban revolution. As the MLN (here
again described as a communist front group) attempts to pressure the
government by uniting the various factions of the left, the PRI has
also been faced with growing opposition on the right. In particular,
the Frente Cívico and the Catholic Church have led an intensifying
anti-communist campaign.
2. Background Paper: Communism in Mexico (June 19, 1962)
In an assessment of communist strength, this briefing argues that
"Mexico has a significant communist problem," and that communists
have penetrated many sectors, including organized labor, the university,
and the government itself. Listing those groups that "openly
avow communist affiliation," the authors include the MLN alongside
the PCM, the Socialist Party (PPS), and the Peasant-Workers' Party
(POCM), and report that the PCM is "making a determined effort
to gain full control of the MLN"
3. Biographic sketch of Lázaro Cárdenas del Río
(June 1962)
This brief description of Cárdenas was one of many biographies
of leading Mexicans provided to Kennedy before his state visit, and
indicates that the CIA kept an active intelligence file on the former
president. According to the bio, Cárdenas, "one of Mexico's
most controversial personalities," has drifted to the left of
the PRI fold, yet retains relations - albeit occasionally strained
- with President López Mateos.
Although the document is over forty years old, the CIA continues
to withhold a substantial portion as classified. The National Security
Archive has appealed the denial.
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
Trips and Conferences: President's Trip to Mexico 6/62, Briefing Book,
Box 237
Document
15
June 23, 1962
[Communists plan to disrupt presidential visit]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
The Embassy now claims that the Mexican Communist Party (PCM) has
received explicit instructions from the Soviet Union to disrupt Kennedy's
visit by using "students and other pawns" to create disturbances.
In this telegram Ambassador Mann warns that if such protests manage
to convince the U.S. press that Kennedy's visit was unwelcome, this
will be a coup for the Soviets. On the other hand, he notes with confidence
that the Mexican police have already begun rounding up dissidents
and that the Mexican press, "which is largely controlled by government,"
can be reliably expected to downplay any unrest.
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
Trips and Conferences: President's Trip to Mexico 6/62, 6/13/62-6/20/62,
Box 237
Document
16
June 29, 1962
Communism in Latin America
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret memorandum
These notes of a meeting between Kennedy and López Mateos
reveal the fundamental differences between how the two presidents
view the roots of the Cold War. López Mateos sees severe economic
deprivation pushing countries to the left, while Kennedy views political
infiltration and military action by Cuba and the USSR as the main
catalysts for the spread of communism. Thus during the meeting Kennedy
"returned again and again" to the question of how to deal
with the danger of expanding communist influence in Latin America
and "López Mateos each time repeated his view that rapid
economic and social progress was the answer."
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
Trips and Conferences: President's Trip to Mexico 6/62, 6/29/62-8/9/62,
Box 237
Document
17
July 5, 1962
Progress, Operation Mongoose
Secretary of Defense, top secret memorandum
Despite the cool reception given by López Mateos to Kennedy's
insistent warnings about Cuba, General Edward Lansdale - head of Operation
Mongoose (a covert action program created under Kennedy to overthrow
Castro) - assesses the recent presidential visit in glowing terms.
Lansdale argues that the trip "fulfilled U.S. plans to impress
upon Castro that Mexico, upon whom the Castro regime counts as an
ally, is solidly with the United States and the West." The document
again makes clear that US-Mexico relations were deliberately utilized
by the United States as leverage against the Cuban leader.
National Security Archive, Cuban Missile Crisis [Microfiche Set]
Item No. CC00238
Document
18
July 19, 1962
Has the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional chosen Baja California
as a Beachhead for its Campaign against the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional?
U.S. Consulate in Tijuana, confidential airgram
The consul general of Tijuana tells a long, complex story of political
machinations in Baja California as elections near. According to the
consul, the MLN has "created" a third-party contender in
local elections by purposefully isolating a well-known campesino
leader, Alfonso Garzón, from the PRI. After a series of complex
maneuvers, the MLN has the PRI backed into a corner in which, according
to the consul, it may now be forced to cut a deal under the table
with the MLN: In exchange for the MLN convincing Garzón to
abandon plans to run for office, the PRI will reportedly appoint Cuauhtémoc
Cárdenas to a local political post in the state government
of Baja California.
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1510, Folder 712.00/1-162
Document
19
July 30, 1962
[Rumors Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas may be appointed to
head Mexicali Valley Irrigation District]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
In response to the news that Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas may
be named director of the Mexicali Valley Irrigation District, Ambassador
Mann requests permission from the State Department to communicate
to President López Mateos that the U.S. government disapproves
of this choice. Aside from simply raising the profile of the MLN,
such a move would mean that U.S. funds would indirectly finance "launching
Cuauhtémoc and his communist sympathizers in politics on national
scene."
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1510, Folder 712.00/7-262
Document
20
August 2, 1962
[Possible appointment of Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas to
lead Salinity Commission]
Department of State, secret telegram
In response to Mann's request, the State Department gives the Embassy
permission to tell López Mateos "indirectly and informally"
that it disapproves of this choice given Cuauhtémoc's involvement
with the MLN.
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1510, Folder 712.00/7-262
Document
21
August 8, 1962
[Cuauhtémoc Cárdenas will not seek Mexicali appointment]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
The Embassy sent word to President López Mateos on August
3 that it disapproved of Cuauhtémoc's appointment for the Mexicali
Valley post. Ambassador Mann now reports that the President, who professed
surprise at the developments, arranged to speak to Lázaro Cárdenas
several days later and "as result López Mateos conversation
with Cárdenas it is now definitely agreed that Cuauhtémoc
will withdraw his intention seek Mexicali office."
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1510, Folder 712.00/7-262
Document
22
September 8, 1962
[Mexico fears becoming isolated on Cuba issue]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
The U.S. ambassador has heard through an informant that the Mexican
government has begun negotiations with Brazil on whether both countries
should break relations with Cuba. This consideration does not reflect
any rethinking of the reasons behind Mexico's support of Cuba, but
rather a pragmatic fear that Mexico "may be caught in isolated
position of apparent friendship for Cuba if there should be a showdown
between United States and Cuba in future." Mann recommends that
the U.S. exploit this fear by giving the impression that some military
action against Cuba is possible, regardless of what the U.S. government's
current plans are.
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
Country: Mexico, General, 6/62-9/62, Box 141
Document
23
September 13, 1962
Implications of President Kennedy's Visit to Mexico
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential airgram
In this analysis of the presidential visit, the Embassy notes that
the Mexican government employed new repressive techniques in order
to prevent the leftist opposition from effectively mounting demonstrations.
These included utilizing the anti-communist group Frente Cívico,
which "supplied thousands of its members and sympathizers to
be deputized as special security agents along the march route."
The Embassy notes that the inability to disrupt Kennedy's visit has
demoralized the left, giving an "impression of disunity and political
impotence" on the part of the Mexican communists, and leaving
a lingering fear of more effective state repression during future
protests.
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
Trips and Conferences, President's Trip to Mexico 6/62, 9/62-10/62,
Box 236
Document
24
September 18, 1962
[Memo of conversation between Mexican Ambassador to the United
States and U.S. Secretary of State]
Department of State, secret telegram
In a meeting with the Mexican Ambassador Antonio Carrillo Flores
just one month before the Cuban missile crisis, U.S. Secretary of
State Dean Rusk urges Mexico to "review its position on Cuba."
Claiming that other Latin American countries are perturbed by travel
to Cuba via Mexico, the Secretary delicately suggests Mexico might
take certain covert steps - such as increasing its surveillance of
travel to and from the island - as well as publicly convey the impression
it is "deeply concerned" with the problem. The Mexican ambassador
replies that Mexico is "limited by own political situation and
upcoming Presidential election. [President Lopez Mateos] seeking avoid
open fight between extreme left and right. Steps by Mexico on Castro
regime therefore would have serious political consequence."
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
Country: Mexico, General, 6/62-9/62, Box 141
Document
25
September 24, 1962
Economic Nationalism and Current Lopez Mateos Maneuvers to the
Left
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret airgram
Surveying what seem to be many major concessions to the left in recent
weeks (as well as occasional nods to the right), the Embassy surmises
that this in fact normal procedure for Mexican politics, which "require
of a politician that he adopt a 'zig-zag' course in order to prevent
irreparable schisms from occurring in the one-party structure,"
particularly in the period leading up to presidential elections. Still,
the Embassy claims that, on balance, the PRI is drifting to the left.
This trend is visible in the "harassment" of the private
sector, the expansion of the public sector, and the continued support
of Cuba, despite "knowledge in high quarters, and in the hands
of López Mateos himself, of Cuban subversive activities within
Mexico."
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1510, Folder 712.00/9-162
Document
26
September 24, 1962
Recent Developments - Garzón and the Movimiento de Liberación
Nacional
U.S. Consulate in Tijuana, secret airgram
The challenge to PRI rule in Baja California has been dissipated
with strong-arm tactics, as the U.S. Consul in Tijuana reports in
this frank recognition of the government's willingness to resort to
force. Local peasant leader Alfonso Garzón has backed out of
elections after a military officer gave him two choices: "(1)
either quieting down and fading into the background or (2) becoming
a national figure in Mexico, along with Rubén Jaramillo [a
peasant leader killed by government troops in March]. Garzón
chose the first alternative, after some hesitation, being persuaded
by the assurance that in his case, he would be martyrized [sic] by
hanging rather than simply being shot."
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1510, Folder 712.00/9-162
Document
27
January 3, 1963
Communist Inspired Attack on Local Authority in Iguala, Guerrero
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential airgram
In a foreshadowing of the armed insurgency that would soon overtake
the southern state of Guerrero, the Embassy reports on a clash between
the army and members of the local group Asociación Cívica
Guerrerense (ACG) after contested elections in which the ACG
ran candidates against the PRI. The Embassy reads this skirmish as
evidence that the MLN has infiltrated local-level politics: "It
seems fairly clear that the ACG is one of the local state parties
or 'civic groups' being developed by the MLN to oppose the PRI at
the municipal and state levels while itself continuing to claim that
it is simply a 'civic organization' loyal to the PRI without any desire
to become a political party." Génaro Vásquez Rojas,
one of the ACG leaders, escaped capture in Iguala and went on to create
one of the most important guerrilla groups in Guerrero.
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1511, Folder 712.00/12-362
Document
28
January 7, 1963
[Central Campesina Independiente holds first meeting]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
Reporting on the first meeting of the MLN-backed campesino
organization, the Central Campesina Independiente (CCI),
the Embassy suspects the MLN has launched this organization as a front
for a "new Communist-controlled political party," since
the government reportedly prevented the MLN in 1962 from creating
a party. The leaders of the CCI include two veterans of the Baja California
struggle: Alfonso Garzón and former Baja Governor Braulio Maldonado.
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1512, Folder 712.00/1-262
Document
29
Circa January 8, 1963 [incorrectly dated January 1, 1963]
[The formation of Central Campesina Independiente challenges PRI]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
Analyzing the formation of the CCI, the Embassy sees the group as
the "most dangerous threat [of] recent years to PRI structure,"
given the widespread discontent in the countryside and the possibility
that rural restlessness might be channeled into support for the radical
left. Nevertheless, the strong identification of Cárdenas with
the CCI may prevent President López Mateos from the fiercer
attack he might have launched on lesser-known organizers.
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, General 10/62-2/63, Box 141
Document
30
January 11, 1963
[Government will deal quietly with CCI]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
The Mexican government has apparently decided not to use open force
against the CCI. Instead, the administration, congress, and the press
rail against Cárdenas publicly while the PRI applies other
forms of pressure privately. A CCI official who recently resigned,
for example, was "perhaps first of [a] series to be bought off
or coerced."
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, General 10/62-2/63, Box 141
Document
31
January 23, 1963
[Cárdenas speaks in support of CCI]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential telegram
Cárdenas publicly defends the CCI, perhaps heartened by the
apparent PRI decision to not immediately repress the organization.
In this telegram, Ambassador Mann acknowledges the long-standing problem
of rural poverty in Mexico, and criticizes the PRI for adopting only
short-term palliatives when prodded by the leftist opposition. This
response "does nothing to immobilize leading Communist agitators
who can wait in the wings, if CCI does disappear, for new opportunity
to exploit unresolved long-term problems posed by rising population,
mounting unemployment and growing hunger and discontent in agrarian
sector."
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1512, Folder 712.00/1-262
Document
32
January 29, 1963
New Peasant and Farmer Organization (CCI) Culminates National
Liberation Movement's Efforts at Political Action
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, confidential airgram
In an overview of the MLN's various activities since its formation,
an Embassy analyst notes that the MLN has been more successful in
promoting local, often agrarian-based challenges to the PRI than in
directly confronting the PRI at the national political level. Claiming
that the Mexican Communist Party was behind the MLN's decision to
form the CCI, the analyst describes the various actions taken by the
López Mateos administration to weaken the CCI, yet notes that
the widespread problem of agrarian poverty will be more difficult
to eradicate.
National Archives, RG 59, 1960-63
Box 1511, Folder 712.00 (W)/7-761
Document
33
March 4, 1963
[Memo of conversation with President López Mateos about
Cuba]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, confidential telegram
In a visit to López Mateos' home during a trip to Mexico,
White House spokesman Pierre Salinger expresses President Kennedy's
gratitude for Mexico's support during the Cuban Missile Crisis. During
the conversation López Mateos notes that Cuba may be headed
for financial trouble and predicts Central America will be the next
Cold War battleground.
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, General 3/63-6/63, Box 141
Document
34
April 3, 1963
[Mexico begins greater surveillance of travel to Cuba]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
Mexico has begun to implement tighter controls on travel to Cuba.
These measures include placing special stamps on passports of those
traveling to Havana, requiring non-Mexican nationals to obtain a special
authorization to enter Mexico from Cuba, and photographing those passing
from Cuba through Mexico to a third country.
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, General 3/63-6/63, Box 141
Document
35
July 30, 1963
Progress Report on Presidential Race
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret airgram
As reports of various potential presidential contenders surface,
the Embassy surmises that a conservative will probably be named as
the next PRI candidate, indicating that the MLN and other groups on
the left have not accrued enough power to affect the choice of presidential
front-runners. Instead, López Mateos seems to have successfully
played off both left and right and "there are many observers
who believe that Lopez Mateos now has sufficient power to select his
successor almost at will."
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, General 7/63-11/63, Box 141
Document
36
November 5, 1963
[Díaz Ordaz will be PRI presidential candidate]
U.S. Embassy in Mexico, secret telegram
The nomination of conservative Gustavo Díaz Ordaz, current
Interior Secretary, as the PRI's presidential candidate is now almost
certain and has produced "a certain amount of euphoria in Mexico
City…especially among Americans," and a sense of relief
at the Embassy. Despite a few remaining loose ends, such as the vocal
opposition of some segments of the left, Díaz Ordaz's victory
seems virtually guaranteed.
John F. Kennedy Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, General 7/63-11/63, Box 141
Document
37
Circa February 18, 1964
Meeting of Presidents Johnson and López Mateos in California,
February 20-22, 1964
White House, secret papers
The following documents are excerpts from a briefing paper prepared
for President Lyndon B. Johnson in anticipation of a meeting with
outgoing President López Mateos.
1. Background Paper: Politico-Economic Situation (February
12, 1964)
This overview of Mexico's political and economic situation predicts
smooth sailing for the last year of López Mateos sexenio, and
praises the choice of Díaz Ordaz as the next presidential candidate,
a decision that has "engendered confidence in the continued stability
of Mexico's unique political system." The major foreign policy
issue of the day continues to be Cuba, where government leaders are
caught between a general antagonism toward U.S. intervention on the
one hand, and the country's overwhelming economic dependence on the
U.S. on the other.
2. Background paper: Communism in Mexico (February 12, 1964)
Analyzing the communist threat in Mexico, this briefing paper notes
that the "most serious effort which the Mexican Communists have
made in recent years to obtain mass support was the formation in 1961
of a pro-Castro front group," the MLN. Yet the MLN has "failed
to materialize as a serious threat," and the presidential nominee
Díaz Ordaz is a tough anti-communist who harshly repressed
communist-led strikes and protests and ensured communist leaders long
prison sentences while serving as Interior Secretary (Gobernación).
Now that the PRI has proved resistant to a frontal, electoral attack
on its power, the analysts pinpoint lower-level organizations such
as peasant associations and trade unions as the most critical areas
of communist "infiltration."
Lyndon B. Johnson Library, National Security Files
CO-Mexico, Briefing Book - Mateos Visit, 2/20-2/22/64, Box 61