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SECRET

December 23, 1974

The Secretary's Regionals' and Principals' Staff Meeting, Monday, December 23, 1974, 8:00 a.m.

- pp. 2-4 The Cyprus talks. The Secretary directed that the USG not be drawn into comments on every round of the Nicosia talks.
- p. 4 The Secretary asked E to warn Walter Levy against appearing to be a US spokesman or negotiator.
- pp. 5-8 The joint commissions and E's planned reorganization. The Secretary asked that he move ahead with Iran pointing toward a March meeting. The Saudi commissions and the Labor Department role.
- pp. 8-9 The Secretary asked to see the Chilean charge.
- pp. 9-10 The Secretary told Waldheim he would review the PRG office in Geneva issue until Tuesday. He asked that IO inform Waldheim we maintain our view.
- pp. 10-19 The PRG accession to the Laws of War Convention. The Secretary asked that he be informed by EB on the status of ex-POW Doug Ramsey. He asked that the note on PRG accession be rephrased and cleared with Saigon on an urgent basis.
- pp. 19-21 Kenyan request for military aid. The Secretary asked that consideration be given to lifting the Africa aid ceiling. He asked that PM review the possibility *for Kenya*.
- pp. 21-23 The Mali-Upper Volta border-scuffle. The Secretary asked to let it wait a day.
- pp. 24-35 Arms (TOWs) for Chile is still hung up in DOD, whose lawyers are studying commercial sales. The Secretary asked for a response by COB and indicated a willingness to contest the legislative position.

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- p. 36 The Secretary's planned speech on the Congressional role in foreign policy.
- pp. 37-39 The problem of recommended aid denial to countries forbidding emigration--how to explain it to Syria.
- pp. 39-41 The Dalai Lama, a possible visit, to be discussed.
- pp. 42-45 US bilateral aid and whether it can be counted as a contribution to the emergency fund we are staying out of. The Secretary asked for a draft speech on the UN problem in which the Scali line is to be incorporated. Bouteflika's request that we join the Fund Board of Governors. The Secretary approved a possible participation as part of the constructive section of his speech.
- pp. 45-49 EA undertook to have a new formulation to resolve the Korea UNC issue after the New Year.

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SECRETARY'S STAFF MEETING

Monday, December 23, 1974

PRESENT:

The Secretary of State - HENRY A. KISSINGER

MR. SISCO
MR. ROBINSON
MR. ALDRICH
MR. MAW
AMBASSADOR BROWN
MR. EASUM
MR. ROGERS
MR. HABIB
MR. STABLER
MR. ATHERTON
MR. HYLAND
MR. LORD
MR. ENDERS
MR. ANDERSON
AMBASSADOR McCLOSKEY
MR. VEST
AMBASSADOR BUFFUM
GOVERNOR HOLTON
MR. SPRINGSTEEN

P R O C E E D I N G S

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All right.

MR. SISCO: I'm seeing the Greek Ambassador today, at his request. Do you have any thoughts as to what I might underscore?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know how much he knows.

MR. SISCO: I make the assumption he doesn't know a great deal. He is not really clued in.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I wouldn't tell him a hell of a lot, then.

MR. SISCO: No -- I don't normally.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think it is going pretty well. If they are arguing about guarantees, that is the least contentious thing. First of all, it means they expect an agreement.

MR. SISCO: I see no problem with all five signing it, as the Turks are insisting on, also.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With the British as guarantors, how can you miss?

MR. STABLER: The only problem is this was a new issue which the Turks brought up out of the blue.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Esenbel mentioned it to me in Brussels, but not as something he was going to bring up. I don't see why they can't accept that.

MR. STABLER: Well, I don't think -- Clerides thought they could. But then apparently the Greek Ambassador in Nicosia, who is Makarios' man, put this thing to Athens apparently in a way to draw the negative. But we haven't seen what the reply is.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think we would make a mistake if we commented on every round between the Greeks and the Turks. And I think we ought to let that one go for a week. I don't think that is an insoluble problem. If it were bi-zonal against multi-zonal I would be worried. But let them spar about that one for a week.

MR. SISCO: They are going to come to it soon enough, Mr. Secretary, on a number of these issues.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't doubt it. But my instinct is that at least the Greeks are trying to settle it.

MR. STABLER: Bitsiosis much more relaxed after your message. I think their inclination is obviously to settle.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But what Makarios is talking about now is a far cry from what he talked about here.

MR. STABLER: A great deal of difference; this idea of the multi-regional, bi-communal, which can mean anything that you want. Multi-regional obviously is more than one. Clerides seems very pleased with that formulation, which is really his.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, I think it is going to go the way Bitsios suggested -- two or three cantons, with two of them very close to the big one.

Okay -- anything else?

MR. SISCO: No.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Chuck, do you have anything?

MR. ROBINSON: I am meeting with Walter Levy today at 1:30.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I catch him once more speaking for us, he is not going to enter this building again.

MR. ROBINSON: I will try to make that clear to him.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If there is one thing I don't need, it is a negotiator running around on oil questions. He should tell us about price, economics, anything else. And he tells us.

MR. ROBINSON: I will try to make that clear.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You better just hit him over the head with a mallet. I would rather do without him. He isn't all that valuable.

MR. ROBINSON: On the Syrian aid program, I think that Roy has come up with a proposal that meets your requirements. He will report on that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: A nuclear reactor for Syria?

(Laughter)

MR. ATHERTON: I was saving that for the next meeting.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That would get headlines.

MR. ATHERTON: It sure would.

MR. ROBINSON: On the commissions, I am convinced if that is to be made an effective tool, to carry out our political interests in the Middle East, that we are going to have to reorganize that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have been saying that for a year.

MR. ROBINSON: I have a definitive proposal.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Right now they are a playground for middle-level bureaucrats. They are not serious projects. Can we do that fast?

MR. ROBINSON: I will have a definitive proposal on --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Iran is the one we are controlling. So that is the one on which we can act without too much consultation. But their Finance Minister wants to come over here for the first meeting in March. So we ought to make that a target date for some big projects. Maybe I can see you for five minutes on that today. But I think we have to reorganize the Saudi one also.

MR. ROBINSON: Yes The Saudi one is bogging down,

primarily because manpower and development of manpower capabilities is your number one objective there, and the Labor Department has pulled out.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The Labor Department isn't going to pull out from anything that we understand. What do you mean the Labor Department has pulled out?

MR. ROBINSON: They claim they have no budget and therefore -- but that is part of this reorganization step that I feel is essential, to pull that into an effective effort.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: They are not going to pull out. You know, I am sure the labor movement is heavily influenced by Jewish pressure here. But if they are going to pull out, we are going to get our own people to do it. Why do you need the Labor Department?

MR. ROBINSON: I am not sure they are the ones that ought to be in there in the first place. But that is the way it has been organized.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would just as soon have them out, and let us do it with consultants. Because you get the Labor Department -- you have one more bureaucracy to clear it with. I can get them back in if you want them.

MR. ROBINSON: I haven't gotten into it far enough --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My instinct would be to keep them out. It makes one less bureaucracy to deal with.

MR. ROBINSON: I agree with that.

MR. BROWN: If you do that, Mr. Secretary, let's make it a generalized rule, because they don't want to be in this one, but they want to be in every other one. If they can't be in this one, the hell with them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't know who put them in to begin with. It's this compulsory palavaring that goes on here. Why do you have to have the Labor Department in on labor training? The Labor Department deals with domestic labor. I didn't understand they were in to begin with.

MR. BROWN: They are pretty active in the international field, through the whole labor attache program.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The labor attache program is a way to buy off the AFL-CIO. It has nothing to do with the Labor Department.

Well, if they want to withdraw, let's knock them off all the other commissions. I think that is a better solution than to force them back on the Saudi one.

MR. ROBINSON: I am not suggesting forcing them back. I am just saying this has resulted in some more confusion.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, you let me know whether

you want them back in, or whether we knock them all off the others. My preference is to get rid of them.

MR. BROWN: AID has a capability in the manpower training field -- theoretically.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let's get the Labor Department back on. (Laughter)

MR. BROWN: I thought that would stick you.

MR. SISCO: It's all relative.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay.

MR. MAW: The Labor Department is going to oppose any co-production.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let's knock them off.

MR. MAW: It is a question of where it is better to have them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let the President settle that sort of issue. I just don't believe in this palavaring all over the place. Our job is foreign policy. Let it go to the President if they have any complaint.

Carl.

MR. MAW: I have nothing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I want to see the Chilean Ambassador today for five minutes.

MR. ROGERS: The Charge.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well --whatever. Why the Charge?

have we broken relations with them, too?

MR. ROGERS: He went back for the holidays.

And he is probably not coming back.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He is not coming back?

MR. ROGERS: I don't think so. They finally realized they could be better represented.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who is he?

MR. ROGERS: He hasn't been nominated yet.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why was the Ambassador?

MR. ROGERS: Heitmann -- the large, imposing fellow -- with the German accent.

(Laughter)

MR. BROWN: What was wrong with him?

(Laughter)

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do you have anything?

MR. HABIB: Our French counterpart has arrived today for some routine talks about Asian affairs.

Did you get a chance to ask Waldheim about the note to the Swiss, asking him to set up a PRG office? Is he going to hold off?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I couldn't get that clear. He bled all over me, and I told him I would consider his concern and let him know on Tuesday. That will give

me a chance to say I considered it and we still have the same view.

MR. HABIB: Do you want to pass that to Scali?

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Yes. Or Bill could call him directly -- whichever is better.

MR. BUFFUM: Scali is not there.

MR. HABIB: I saw the last conversation Scali had with him also, and what his problem is. His problem is the Chinese, he says. At least that is what he said to Scali.

Finally, we have had an exchange --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But what is the problem if the PRG is represented on the humanitarian thing?

MR. HABIB: Well, it is the beginning of the opening of PRG offices within the UN framework.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So then they go into the specialized agencies.

MR. HABIB: That would be the next step. I think it is best to keep them as sanitized as possible.

Not a related problem, but a problem involving PRG has come up with respect to the accession of the PRG to the Laws of War Convention.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: To the what?

MR. HABIB: The Laws of War Convention. And it has created a big flap between ourselves and Saigon.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I thought we were opposed to that.

MR. HABIB: Well, they acceded. There is nothing we can do about that. Now we have got to take note of it some way, in terms of both the reservations --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How can it create a flap with Saigon if they acceded and we had nothing to do with it?

MR. HABIB: That is not the way it works.

MR. ALDRICH: They acceded last year. This is the way they tried to get into this conference in Geneva, the Laws of War, by becoming a party to the convention. And we simply have to at some point get a note to the Swiss rejecting the accession by the PRG.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In '73 they did it?

MR. ALDRICH: They did it in December '73. We were informed in January or February 1974. We have been handling it very deliberately, sir.

MR. HABIB: That is one of the problems.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If we are going to reject it, why didn't we reject it right away?

MR. ALDRICH: Well, we wanted to get the conference out of the way first, and keep them from being invited there. And then we had a long hang-up with the Pentagon for a long time in the language of the note of rejection. And the

reason why it finally was brought to the surface again was I realized we were going to be publishing our treaties in January, and I wanted the rejection by us of their accession to be reflected in treaties in force. And that is why I am trying to get it out before the end of the year.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Look -- I do not accept the proposition -- I have been saying it for as long as I am here -- that we conduct foreign policy by treaties among sovereign departments. If there is a hang-up, bring it to me and I will get it resolved. I just don't accept the proposition that we must compromise every issue. It is possible that we are right.

MR. HABIB: That part has been resolved -- the inter-departmental one. We now have a treaty between a sovereign embassy and the Department that we are engaged in.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Well, what's the problem there?

MR. HABIB: The inter-departmental problem has been solved.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The inter-departmental thing shouldn't take eight months.

MR. ALDRICH: It shouldn't. And that is partly our fault, that we didn't push hard enough. But the present problem is that Ambassador Martin does not want us to submit this note to the Swiss. At least he is disturbed

about the note, because he thinks it will be used by the friends of the PRG against us, and will upset --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How?

MR. ALDRICH: Well, it is a little hard for me to understand. His message is not very clear on that. But it seems to be based upon the idea that we are somehow, while rejecting the PRG's accession -- we restate our policy that we would treat the PRG people as prisoners of war, which is the way we handled it throughout the Viet-Nam war.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is his solution -- let them accede, and not treat them as prisoners of war?

MR. HABIB: He wants to ignore their accession. He doesn't appear to be taking cognizance of them at all. And that creates other problems.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What problems?

MR. ALDRICH: Well, it creates the basic problem, if we don't say anything, the normal assumption would be that we are therefore accepting their accession and their reservations, because that is what we do when somebody accedes and we don't have any problem -- we don't say anything.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is their reservation?

MR. ALDRICH: They have the usual Communist reservations, including that one to Article 85 that Hanoi

used --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am sure everyone here knows what the usual Communist reservations are, especially Article 85. But I don't, either.

MR. ALDRICH: It is very difficult to summarize that in a few words, and I am not sure it is worth your time, sir.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Just one sentence.

MR. ALDRICH: They have gone a bit farther --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is the usual Communist reservation, just to give me the flavor of it.

MR. ALDRICH: Okay. The key one has been that prisoners of war who are guilty of war crimes may be deprived of their prisoner of war status.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And what is Article 85?

MR. ALDRICH: Article 85 is an article which says that a prisoner of war convicted of a crime retains his status, protection as a prisoner of war, even after convicted. And the Communists have a reservation that says, no, he does not retain it.

MR. HABIB: They threatened to use this in the Viet-Nam war.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All they have to do is try prisoners for crimes, and put them outside the prisoner --

MR. ALDRICH: That is right. What the PRG has done is go even farther and say the mere accusation that a person is a war criminal is sufficient to deprive them of prisoner of war status.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Say, whatever happened to that fellow, that State Department official that was prisoner for five years, or four years?

MR. HABIB: You mean Phil Manhard? He is Ambassador to Mauritius.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No -- the younger fellow -- who was feted all over the place for three weeks and then dropped out of sight. He sat next to me at the Gridiron Dinner.

MR. HABIB: Doug Ramsey.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What happened to him? Is he being looked after?

MR. HABIB: I am sure he is. I will check on it and find out.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Dean.

MR. ALDRICH: At any rate, we have a message drafted to go back to Graham Martin, explaining why we need to have a note of this kind.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can't you phrase the note in

such a way that does not take cognizance of the PRG, and that basis it on the non-cognizance of the PRG? Or are you addressing the PRG in the note?

MR. ALDRICH: No, no. We address it to the Swiss Embassy.

MR. HABIB: Graham's concern is that by saying we will treat their prisoners - if we catch any of them -- we use the phrase -- George uses the phrase, the only legal phrase he can discover -- "personnel of the PRG." Graham argues that is a form of recognition that is going to create all hell.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can't you circumvent this? You don't have to say "personnel of the PRG". Can't you say "Personnal claiming to represent the PRG" or claiming to represent any group?

MR. HABIB: "The so-called PRG."

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can't you say any prisoners that are taken in Viet-Nam by us will be treated that way? You don't have to say where they are from.

MR. HABIB: Graham's point is since we are not going to put troops back in and take prisoners again, what difference does it make.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That I would not say. From

that point of view, the note makes good sense. But that thing we can avoid in phrasing. I wouldn't put "PRG" into our document.

MR. ALDRICH: The way we have it -- we have said in the draft cable -- in effect, to say, "Look, we will be prepared to rephrase this sentence that bothers you. Let's get together and talk about that."

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let's get together with whom?

MR. ALDRICH: Ask Martin to focus on what is the real issue.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You tell him how we are going to rephrase it, and give him 24 hours to comment, and then you send it. This is not a damned -- excuse me -- I was going to say "African tribe." (Laughter)

MR. EASUM: Lucky I'm here.

MR. HABIB: But you have a medicine man who is making this incantation. The messages he is sending are downright insulting to Aldrich. They make him look like -- they attempt to make him look like an idiot. You get these damned tempests in a teapot.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You can settle that later. But will you give him a draft of what we find acceptable -- and don't get into a long negotiation.

MR. HABIB: You haven't got the key element on this. The original note which was sent to the Swiss has already been delivered, by the time any of us knew what the hell was going on and it was focused on. I didn't see the damned thing --

MR. BROWN: Then what the hell are we talking about?

(Laughter)

MR. HABIB: I never saw the damned thing.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I must admit this compounds the drafting problem.

(Laughter)

MR. HABIB: No it doesn't. We can withdraw the note and submit another one. And that is what we are going to have to do.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It does add a new dimension.

MR. HABIB: I don't know why you were holding that to the last -- as a sort of dessert.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: He was hoping I would call on Buffum.

MR. ALDRICH: We put a hold on the thing, and it wouldn't go anywhere until we go to the Swiss about it. So we can rewrite it.

MR. HABIB: I just thought you would like to know about it, because there have been about four personal

messages -- which I hope your staff has been wise enough not to show you on this matter.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If they are substantive, I am in no danger of seeing them.

(Laughter)

MR. ALDRICH: I will write out a new last sentence and put it in here, and get it into that cable.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay.

We will take yours at the end.

Don.

MR. EASUM: A couple of military questions that are disturbing us. Kenya has asked us for military assistance. They say they need a squadron of F-5-Es, and police helicopters and small arms. Their concern is Somalia.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why is that disturbing to us?

MR. EASUM: Well, because we don't have any way of being responsive to them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think we better get the aid ceiling lifted on Africa.

MR. EASUM: George and I will talk about this.

MR. VEST: We will still have a problem of money, because we don't have the money, even if you lift the ceiling -- unless they are going to buy for cash.

MR. EASUM: No, they say they want it on grant or credit.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Look, a great country that cannot give military aid in these revolutionary situations is going to become irrelevant.

MR. EASUM: This is not a revolutionary situation.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Africa is a revolutionary situation.

MR. EASUM: Yes, the whole place. This is a case of fear of a neighbor, as is the case of Ethiopia.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: So we will become irrelevant.

MR. EASUM: A neighbor that may or may not have the intention -

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is totally irrelevant. For the United States, sitting 5,000 miles away, to give lectures -- if Kenya and Ethiopia fear Somalia, there must be some reason for it. And even if it all in their minds, it is still a factor of their politics. What are we answering?

MR. EASUM: We are not answering yet, because we don't know what to say. But we are surely not lecturing to them, either. We just received this request this weekend.

The other one is troublesome because -

SECRETARY KISSINGER: George, can you look at what we could do if we wanted to do something and --

MR. VEST: Yes.

MR. EASUM: The other case is a completely different kind of case. The Malians have attacked the Voltans, aruging over --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The who?

MR. EASUM: The Upper Voltans. The Malians on their north have attacked the Upper Voltans, in the upper part of Upper Volta.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Militarily?

MR. EASUM: Militarily. This is a ridiculous assertion, in our view, by the Malians. They are going back to a period of twenty years in this century, when they did have this particular area. They haven't had it since 1947. It is against OAU resolutions.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do we have to take a stand on that monumental issue?

MR. EASUM: Well, I have to say no to the Voltan Ambassador, when he comes in today and asks me for arms.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What does he want?

MR. EASUM: Anything. They can use tennis shoes,

uniforms, food, small arms.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am assuming the bureau has an ideological objection to giving arms to Africa.

MR. EASUM: No, sir. We want to look at this, though. It is again a case of not having the funds.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There are two problems. One is I have no interest whatever in the Mali-Upper Volta dispute. It is not an American problem. I don't think it is good for the United States to be in a position where on the issues that most concern some African countries, we either tell them they have no problem or we say we cannot do anything. But I don't know what we can do with Upper Volta. Nor do I know whether in the middle of a military situation we should get involved. Are they going to other countries, too?

MR. EASUM: No.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How are they going to pay --

MR. EASUM: You mean for arms? They will go everywhere they can.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How are they going to pay for it?

MR. EASUM: They have nothing to pay for it. These are the areas most hit by drought.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Where did Mali get its arms from?

MR. EASUM: They have had some for a long time from the Soviets. Earlier than that from the French. They are infinitely better armed than the Voltans are. They have also been in dire need of our economic assistance, and although one wouldn't lecture to them, one might suggest they are prejudicing a continuation of this kind of aid --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Who -- the Voltans?

MR. EASUM: No -- the Malians. --- by attack on the Voltans, which appears to be completely unreasonable and unprovoked.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: How much have they taken?

MR. EASUM: They are skirmishing across the border. Can't say yet they have taken anything as such.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let's give it a day and see what happens.

MR. HABIB: Are they taking it to the UN?

MR. EASUM: Not yet.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Let's let it go a day, shall we?

Bill, you were going to tell me today what we are going to do about Chile.

MR. ROGERS: Yes. We have a number of things worked out in terms of the TOW issue. The major issue is as yet unresolved, which is whether TOWs can be supplied on a commercial basis.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Can the President make that decision?

MR. ROGERS: Well, it is still in the bowels of the Department of Defense lawyers.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is coming out of there. I am going to call Schlesinger today. We are going to have it by the end of today or by tomorrow. If lawyers are like other human beings, they are going to make their decision in some two-hour period.

MR. ROGERS: The major question arises because evidently a part of the guidance system is manufactured in a government arsenal. Carl and I have been hassling about this.

MR. MAW: We have no problem with the sale, except getting it out of the government arsenal. We haven't figured out how to do that yet; that part that is in the government.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Getting it out of the government arsenal?

MR. MAW: Getting a sale from the government. That is the only legal problem. The rest has been cleared.

We have got to come up with a solution on this in the next day or so. It is partly political and partly --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is the political problem?

MR. MAW: Because we take the construction that the government may make this sale. It is against the literal wording of the statute, but within the intendment of the conference report. And we don't want to get a backlash too fast out of the Congress if we can help it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am perfectly willing to have a backlash from the Congress on the national interest.

MR. MAW: It is one man -- Kennedy.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am perfectly willing to have a backlash from the Congress, as long as we know it is right.

MR. MAW: It is right from the national interest. The only question is whether we can justify the legal construction we want to put on. His amendment is fuzzy and deliberately fuzzy.

MR. ROGERS: Well, look -- let's wait until we get the TOW answer today.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Are you going to get it today?

MR. ROGERS: Yes. If we don't have it by close of

business, we will come to you and say that we cannot get a decent answer out of them, let's go all the way. By the close of business we will come to you.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If we are going to be taken on in Congress, we will have to have a public fight about it. I intend to make a public fight about it anyway, over the aid to Chile question. I just do not think we can continue to let the Congress legislate in this manner, without the most dire consequences for our foreign policy. I don't see where a military government can go if we cut them off from arms, except either being overthrown or going to some radical group for arms. And that can't be in anybody's interest. If we hadn't had relations with the Chilean military when Allende -- I am not talking about the coup, but throughout the Allende period, we had to keep our relations with the Chilean military as a counterweight. We never cut off aid to them while Allende was there. So now while they are in power, we cut off aid to them. It is insane.

MR. ROGERS: It is insane. But, Mr. Secretary, it does reflect an extraordinarily strong feeling amongst the Congress, as you well know.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And therefore we have to take on that strong feeling.

MR. ROGERS: You can go to the mat on it now if you want to. And I predict you will have a hell of a fight on your hands come January. Or we can wait a little bit, hope to see the kind of progress on the human rights issue that they are promising us now, and have a better case on the question.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And then they will put on another restriction any time they want something else. It just proves their point.

MR. ROGERS: Yes. Congress is in the game now. There is no question about it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It depends on what Congress should be in the game on. Policy direction is essential. They have to be in the game. And it is our duty to keep them informed and bring them along. Day-to-day tactics, they must not be in. And many administrations are going to suffer from it if we keep caving on that. I tell you, this would never have happened if I had understood what was going on. I would have not permitted it to happen. I would have gotten the President and myself into the fight.

MR. MAW: Unfortunately we didn't get to the point until the conference report came out, and we got double-crossed there. Then it was a little late to do anything effectively. A veto wouldn't work.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why not?

MR. MAW: Because then we would have no bill.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is not the most effective threat. Two can play that game.

MR. MAW: We would have the same thing on a continuing resolution. They have the votes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I was told that about the Greeks, too.

MR. MAW: They demonstrated theirs on the roll call, which we tried to avoid. We had a deal with them, with the Greeks, if we didn't have a roll call, then they would give us a date yet to be negotiated --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: And we still won. We still got it.

MR. MAW: But the Greek thing, we also thought we had a deal.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I don't rely on deals with the Congress.

MR. MAW: Humphrey was in charge. And he says the only way to pass the bill --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If we take the position that we are going to do unreasonable things, that are clearly wrong, just because it is the best bargain we can strike, we are going to be driven back, and we are

never going to articulate the national interest, which is our job.

MR. MAW: We were to get the right to make sales - a statement in the conference report indicating that is the way the statute should be read. Unfortunately Kennedy got the word "sales" in the statute, and we couldn't get it out in conference. So we were stuck with something the last minute. Now we can construe, I hope, the statute in the line of the conference report, the fact that nothing was said on the floor of the Senate or House in derogation of this.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: My argument is this is a disastrous course no matter what we do on human rights. And to follow your road is to go exactly the wrong way from the long-term point of view, even if it might work with Chile. If my experience is any guide with the Congress, the minute you go back to them and say they have released 2,000, they will say when they release the next 5,000 they will do it.

MR. MAW: We should have gone right back to Kennedy.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You cannot go back to Kennedy on Chile. I know Kennedy. He can't afford to change.

MR. ROGERS: He won't change. And there are an awful

lot of Democrats on the Hill this coming session who want to go to the mat on the issue of human rights and want to make a fight about it. It is very hard to make a national interest argument on Chile.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Until there is a Communist government there, or a wildly nationalistic one.

MR. ROGERS: Even. And the human rights issue has caught the imagination up on the Hill, as you well know, Mr. Secretary, and amongst the American people. One image they see of Chile --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Now among the American people, when you present it correctly. Anti-foreign-aid has caught the imagination of the American people. So any argument that cuts off foreign aid to anybody, they are in favor of.

MR. HABIB: I think the Christian community is getting caught up in an organized way on the human rights issue with --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: For Korea, yes.

MR. MAW: Humphrey was convinced that he couldn't beat Kennedy on the floor by a long shot.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Of the Senate.

MR. MAW: Or the House. And that was --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If it happens in Chile now,

then it will be Korea next year. There isn't going to be any end to it. And if we are going to wind up in an unbelievable precarious position, in which no country can afford to tie up with us, unless it is a pure democracy, then we will find some other reasons.

MR. HABIB: We will get it in the Philippines, in Viet-Nam.

MR. ROGERS: My diagnosis of the reason they stuck it on the Department in this case is because they didn't think we were sincere on the human rights issue. That is what they all told me. And my suggestion is one way to be sure you maintain discretion in these areas and to avoid these kinds of amendments --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If I understood it, if it were a question of sincerity, I could have talked to some of them.

MR. ROGERS: I thought you were going to talk to Kennedy.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I talked to Kennedy and it was always clear to me -- I know Kennedy. You can't deal with him on Chile. Never had any intention of dealing with him on Chile.

MR. ROGERS: The others you would have had to convince are Gale McGee. I talked to him. He said, "We are stuck

with this. I can't lift a finger on this. We can't win this in the committee, on the floor, in the Congress."

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I think I can convince Gale McGee.

MR. ROGERS: I think if we said "You have to go to the mat on it," he would have done it. But he was absolutely persuaded he would have lost.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: There is a more fundamental problem. It is a problem of the whole foreign policy that is being pulled apart, pulling out thread by thread, under one pretext or another. And it is an absurd argument to say Chile doesn't make any difference, because Chile then affects two or three other countries. And the beauty of all these actions, as far as the Congress is concerned, is you pay three or four years down the road. We cut off aid to Turkey once or twice more and we might just as well write Turkey off, whether or not Congress puts it back in there, because the Turkish military are not going to put themselves in that position any more. They are going to look for alternative ways. It may take them.. two years to find one, at which time it is forgotten who did it. And all these beautiful congressional compromises, no one will ever do anything about. That is why we have to

make a stand now. If we lose, we lose. At least we will have defined what the issues are. I don't mind losing. I mind this compounding the issue by totally confusing what the problem is.

What is going to help human rights more in Chile -- if you are really concerned with human rights -- the United States copping out of it entirely and losing all position, then they take one of those options of going with the Arabs or with the Chinese -- what is our leverage then? And then they will spread themselves to Bolivia and other countries down there. I have never known a country that deliberately pushed other countries into opposition to itself for no reason that concerned it directly. That is a novel aspect of current American foreign policy.

Supposing the Chinese do deliver arms to Chile. Do you think that is a healthy development for the long-term evolution? Open up yet another game that everyone can play in Latin America? Even if you cannot demonstrate that it affects the national interest in the next five years.

MR. ROGERS: Well, no more healthy than the Soviet arms in Peru.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Exactly right. And for which we are also partly responsible. That exactly proves my point.

We didn't sell arms to Peru either for some reason -- that they shouldn't have arms. So they got Soviet arms.

MR. ROGERS: The very tanks that the Chileans were considering buying.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's right. The Chilean armed forces refused to buy Soviet arms that Allende wanted to buy, so now we cut them off. It is insanity. And I think it ought to be explained to the American public.

MR. MAW: We will get a paper out, because we have to meet this fairly head on soon.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That's fine with me. I know we will probably lose.

MR. MAW: We can go to Congress for legislation, or we can try to bull it through. In either event --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First we have to state what the issue is. We have to define the issue exactly. But whether we win or lose, somebody ought to be responsible for the consequences. Right now no one knows there are any consequences. All our foreign policy debate is conducted -- look at detente with the Soviet Union. They keep piling all these amendments on, and then when the Soviets turn, everyone is amazed. At least there we have a fairly good record of having warned against it constantly, but maybe not enough.

In retrospect, I deeply regret ever having gotten involved with Jackson in any drafting exercise. It was a great mistake. I knew it was a fraud. He knew it was a fraud. And I just don't think we ought to do it. We ought to say what is right. Then let the Congress vote, and let them be responsible for the consequences. Maybe some other administration can pick up the pieces then.

MR. MAW: We have got to go back to Congress on Turkey. We ought to have in mind what our program is going to be with respect to Chile. We are all right in Korea for this --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I am going to give a speech in January in which I am going to discuss all these issues, as examples of the problems we face, that have to be worked out with Congress. We can do it in a most conciliatory fashion. But we can point out what the consequences are, what can and cannot be done. We can say all that we want about human rights. But we can say this is not the way to do it.

MR. MAW: I think that is the way to turn the Chile thing around -- if you make that speech and then get legislation. We have to go back anyway.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: The great advantage is that

it makes me the villain.

MR. HABIB: Even if you lose in Chile, you might hold it off elsewhere. The Philippines is very important.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Look -- the reason I am fighting it in Chile -- first of all, it almost has to be reversed in Chile. But if we don't do it, if we lose it in Chile, if Chile does certain things, they will do it in the Philippines, Korea, South Viet-Nam, and we will be lost.

MR. MAW: We are going to need all of them in the next bill, in April or May. We have to lay the groundwork now.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Is somebody working on this?

MR. LORD: I had a draft yesterday. It is in very poor shape. We have to go back to the drawing board. We are working on it.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Am I going to see it?

MR. LORD: We will have it before Christmas. I don't think it is going to be satisfactory the first round. But I will get you something.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay.

Do you have something else?

MR. ROGERS: Castro, the Brazilian Ambassador, called me yesterday and said he had a letter from Silveira which he would like to deliver to you personally.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: All right. Tomorrow morning.

What is it about? I am sure you know by now.

MR. ROGERS: He mentioned Cuban participation at MFM.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay. What is their position?

MR. ROGERS: Well, I certainly expect it to be absolutely consistent with what Silveira told the Charge about two weeks ago. Essentially the position that we put to Vignes a couple of days ago.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Why don't you bring him in tomorrow morning.

Roy.

MR. ATHERTON: We also have a potential congressional problem on the aid to Syria.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: What is that?

MR. ATHERTON: It is the amendment put in from the House side -- a sense of Congress resolution that there should be no aid to countries that deny emigration. And the report singles out Syria. I think we have to think very carefully about how we explain this to the Syrians. We will have a recommendation up to you on that.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is not binding.

MR. ATHERTON: It is not binding. But when it is coupled with the other requirement, which is any

funds under the special requirements fund have to -- any projects under the special requirements fund have to be submitted to Congress and left there for thirty days and are subject to veto by concurrent resolution, they could make an issue of this. It could become in effect a veto by the Congress.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: It is another one we have to fight.

MR. MAW: There are a whole series of them.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Look -- anyone who knows the Syrians knows that \$25 million cannot be an issue for them.

MR. ATHERTON: Of course.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Therefore, if they take aid from us, it is to have a counterweight to the Soviet Union. That is the only motive they have. It is not to get the money. So if we then start putting restrictions on it, we might just as well -- we are better off not doing it. Because we are just going to prove the Soviet case. Because if we do that for \$25 million, what are we going to for \$100 million?

MR. ATHERTON: I agree. I think it could in the end blow up the Syrian aid program.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is another one we have to raise. The disproportion between the means they give us and what they want us to achieve for the means is unbelievable. If they had given us \$1 billion for the Soviet Union, we might have had a chance at the emigration. But \$75 million a year, and for that to change the internal policy of a super-power is unbelievable. Twenty-five million to get emigration from Syria. That is childish and dangerous.

Wells, do you have anything?

MR. STABLER: No.

MR. ATHERTON: I have one other thing, Mr. Secretary. Phil Habib and I sent you a memo some time ago about the desire of the Tibetan Foundation ^{to have the Dalai Lama visit.} You said no. I think we have reached the point where we have to go to the Tibetan Foundation and tell them this.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I have a meeting today on China policy. We can raise that that. I don't see what good the Dal^ai Lama does us in this country.

MR. HABIB: He is visiting elsewhere. He has been to England, France. There is some interest in this country in bringing him here, on purely religious grounds, on the promise he will engage in no politics.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I can't imagine there is an overwhelming demand for his religious competence in this country. Are there many Tibetan Buddhists here?

MR. HABIB: There are a lot of Buddhists, but not just Tibetan. He has a wider interest than just Tibetans.

MR. ATHERTON: We indicated just about a year ago it would be favorable, and this will be a change of signals. We have to let them know, because they want to come this coming spring.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Tell them to come in an election year, when we are lining up all the religious minorities.

(Laughter)

Why did we tell them a year ago?

MR. ATHERTON: Well, I went back to the files. There was a recommendation to Mr. Rush, who was then Acting Secretary, while you were in the Middle East.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is what I figured.

Okay. We will discuss it later. But I am not very sympathetic.

MR. ATHERTON: We are not pushing this very hard. We just think we ought to weigh whether or not it is going to cause a problem with the Chinese.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: With whom is it going to cause a problem?

MR. HABIB: The Chinese.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If he comes here?

MR. ATHERTON: Yes.

MR. HABIB: That is the only consideration.

MR. ATHERTON: Because there will be some criticism.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Will you gentlemen do me a favor, and fight a little harder next year, and just take the position when Congress -- I mean not on this one -- when Congress raises issues, that we are here to defend the national interest, and not to see what deal we can strike with this or that Congressman. Besides, you will be able to strike better deals this way. My experience has been -- I went through that for five years in the Viet-Nam war. We have seen it again now. If you take them right down to the wire, something has to give. If you want to give, that is the time to give, not early in the negotiations. For every compromise you make, you are going to have to make another one when it gets to the wire. And they will bleed all over you. But it never works.

MR. MAW: You can't compromise --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Besides --the only strength we have is that we stand for what we think is in the national

interest, or in the world interest. And that we can defend that to the public. If we lose this, if we get drawn into what is the price that we are willing to pay, we are lost, because that way we can never make an issue any more.

That is why I don't want to fight the Greek-Turkish issue on how many kilometers they should give up around Famagusta. I want to fight it on the ground of whether they want to push Turkey out of a military relationship. Once we got it on that level, they started getting nervous. Without Brussels we couldn't have done it. But at any rate, they started getting nervous. The newspapers came around before Brussels.

Okay -- Bill -- can we run through the two issues.

MR. BUFFUM: Two closely-related issues. First, Waldheim asked on Saturday --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: On the PRG?

MR. BUFFUM: On the PRG -- I would be glad to call him --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Wait until tomorrow, so we can say we considered it.

MR. BUFFUM: He asked if we could count any of our bilateral aid contribution towards a UN emergency program -- we could make some general statement.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: No. I think, if I understood him -- which is not always guaranteed -- well, I suppose that is a fair statement. What he wants is to -- we can continue to do bilateral aid, but claim that in some way or another it was inspired by the UN emergency program. Isn't that right?

MR. BUFFUM: That is essentially it. And he wants us to do that at the moment for a current contribution. I think that is very difficult, because we never justified it on the Hill that way. Our whole record is in terms of our traditional program. Where I think we can move in this direction, Mr. Secretary, if we want to, is for the Special ^{VNGA} Session next fall, reviving that \$4 billion type program that you approved at one point, which you recall Schultz was in Guam, and we never did get it through in time for the last special session. I think we are much better off reserving it, as part of a comprehensive approach to assistance in the most seriously disadvantaged countries, rather than piecemeal now.

Secondly, the related issue --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: You are doing a speech for me on the general problem of the UN.

MR. BUFFUM: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: In which the Scali part should be about a third, and then it should have a constructive part of what can be done, what we are prepared to do in the right environment. And this could be an example.

MR. BUFFUM: Yes.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Okay.

MR. BUFFUM: The second issue was Bouteflika's request that we reconsider our unwillingness to join the Board of Governors of the so-called Special Fund that was set up at the special session last spring. We have opposed the Fund from the beginning because we don't want a new type of machinery under General Assembly auspices managing aid programs abroad. We don't think it is effective or efficient. It is duplicative. And we think it is in a sense dishonest for us to appear to be going along with that type of arrangement, when we have never had any intention of contributing and have said so from the beginning.

It is a 36-member body, which is no way -

MR. BROWN: Nobody else has contributed.

MR. BUFFUM: I think it is a more honest position to stay off. And again, I think if we are to reconsider what we have publicly announced, it ought to be a part of a comprehensive response to the way the whole UN system

is going.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I would put that down -- saying we are willing to reconsider it if at least in a limited way.

Okay.

Bouteflika also made a point about Korea, saying he thought that could be worked out.

MR. HABIB: As a matter of fact, we are working now on something. I was going to raise it the next time we had one of these meetings. I don't want to take too much of your time this morning. But the Koreans themselves have also raised with us the proposition that we ought to shift our gears now. You will recall President Park mentioned to you that he would like to get out of this business of having it debated every year in the UN -- even if you win the debate. And basically it involves getting rid of the UN Command under controlled conditions.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: That is in effect what Bouteflika said. And I think we could cooperate in getting it done.

MR. HABIB: We will come up with something and have it ready for you by the time you get back, on how we might approach this.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Do you want to share that with me?

MR. HABIB: Basically, what it amounts to is getting rid of the UN Command but providing for an armistice agreement. We have to find the formula for the armistice agreement. The formula for getting rid of the UN Command is very simple. I think that is easy. We can work that through the Security Council, because on the basis of the resolution --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But the two have to be linked.

MR. HABIB: They must be. That is the problem -- getting the other side to link the preservation of the armistice agreement with the resolution that we got through the UN this year.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: One possible solution is we have asked that we become co-signatories of the armistice agreement.

MR. HABIB: We want the Chinese to -- the Chinese are already co-signatories. By asking us, for us to be co-signatories, we don't require the other side to do anything.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: I understand that. But that seems to be the hang-up.

MR. HABIB: Not necessarily. What the North

Vietnamese want to do, or stated they want to do, is negotiate separately with us with respect to the armistice agreement, and relate it to the removal of our forces, which is an unacceptable --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But if South Korea, for example, signed the armistice agreement, and then we made a bilateral arrangement with South Korea for their security, that would equally meet the point.

MR. HABIB: Except that the other side wants us to be involved in the process, because they want to relate it to the withdrawal of our forces. That is the hang-up.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: But that is their problem. We don't want it to be related to the withdrawal of our forces.

MR. BUFFUM: Also their statements relate to withdrawal of UN forces.

MR. HABIB: But you notice what the North Vietnamese want to do -- they are relating the withdrawal to our forces as well. That is where we have to move them off --

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If we take ourselves out of the discussion and make our presence in South Korea a bilateral issue between South Korea and us, and have

South Korea sign the armistice agreement, essentially the same point can be achieved.

MR. HABIB: That has always been our position, but it is not accepted by the other side. Technically our forces are not under the UN Command. They are under the bilateral agreement. And they know that. As a matter of fact, they resist that definition of the presence of our forces. That is the area in which we are going to have to find a meeting of the minds with the other side.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: First we have to have a meeting of minds with our side, which is if they are content with having South Korea sign the armistice agreement, there exists a legal document. Under what legal formula we then keep our forces in South Korea is between us and South Korea, and not between them and us. And that is what I thought Bouteflika was saying on Saturday.

MR. HABIB: If Bouteflika is prepared to go that way, I would like to see exactly how that is stated. Because that is a departure from the previous position of the North Koreans. If he has some basis for that, then we have a new opening.-

SECRETARY KISSINGER: Besides, it takes it out of UN voting,

MR. HABIB: Well, the whole thing would disappear,

if you didn't have a UN Command.

SECRETARY KISSINGER: If we take the position that our forces are there as a result of bilateral agreements, then the UN can vote as much as they want to, and it is not effective -- if we then abolish the UN Command.

Okay.

(Whereupon at 9:10 a.m. the meeting was adjourned.)