

The Meaning of Multilateralism:
Alliances, Coalitions, and the Multinational Prosecution of Wars

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I. Introduction

Military alliances are highly consequential in shaping the landscape of the international system. The factors that culminate in the formation of alliances, be they power or threat (Waltz 1979, Walt 1987, Weitsman 2004), are generally forces in the international system that alter the basic context of international life. In other words, the variables that culminate in the formation of alliances shape the constellations of states in the system, driving the ways in which states act and interact with one another. Further, once formed, military alliances have a profound effect in shaping the patterns of interaction in the system. This may be true as a consequence of the identity politics that surround an alliance once established (e.g., Williams 1997, 1998; Williams & Neuman 2000; Pouliot 2006) or because of the increased systemic threat that is created to nonmembers once an alliance is formed (Weitsman 2004).

The importance of alliance politics is well understood in the field of international relations. Less well explored, however, are the dynamics of wartime alliances and coalition warfare. Even less well examined is the importance of these operations for our understanding of multilateralism. The military sphere is an area in which institutional approaches are of the utmost importance, yet rarely married. The most consequential realm of multilateral action is in the area of military operations; yet, scholars and policy makers think nothing of dismissing coalition operations as unilateral if one country takes the lead in decision making. This is problematic. Any multinational operation requires coordination in command and control, mutual cooperation in idea and action. This article explores the idea of multilateralism from the perspective of alliance and coalition

operations in war. Wars prosecuted by more than one state constitute singularly important multilateral endeavors.

Building on previous work (Weitsman 2003, 2004), I analyze the differences in the way alliances operate in peacetime and wartime, and the differences between wartime alliances and wartime coalitions. I argue that the complexity of wartime alliance dynamics cannot be understood through the frameworks established to understand peacetime alliances, and that alliance operations during wartime are different from coalition operations. There are costs and benefits associated with fighting wars through preexisting alliances as opposed to ad hoc coalitions constructed to fight a specific war. The purpose of this paper is to draw out these arguments in detail, and then establish their veracity in the context of two cases, the first Gulf War coalition and NATO in Kosovo.

This paper proceeds as follows: section I provides an overview of the concept of multilateralism. This section is followed by a discussion of wartime alliance versus wartime coalition dynamics. I then contrast peacetime and wartime alliance politics before moving into an analysis of the cases of the first Gulf War and NATO's war in Kosovo.

II. The Meaning of Multilateralism

Multilateralism refers to collective responses to international problems. Instead of acting alone, more than two states consult and confront a foreign policy situation together. Unilateralism, by contrast, refers to a situation in which one state acts alone to confront a foreign policy problem either by choice or necessity. This is different from unilateralist posturing, when a country appears to eschew the values of international consultation and behaving in concert with other states, and rejects international institutions, customs, or norms. International institutions are both manifestations of and vehicles for

multilateralism. The broader debate within the field has centered on internationalism versus isolationism, or unilateral versus multilateral strategies (Corbetta & Dixon 2004). The avenues of inquiry include whether multilateralism or unilateralism is the better approach to foreign policy (e.g., Keohane & Nye 1985; Urquhart 1986-87; Gallarotti 1991; Lake 1992; Ruggie 1993; Stewart & Forman 2002). Other scholars have addressed the question of whether or not a multilateral framework enhances the legitimacy of action (e.g., Barnett 1997; Hurd 1999; Cronin 2001; Johnston 2001). Ruggie (1993) provides the most detailed discussion of the meaning of multilateralism. He powerfully argues that multilateralism is not simply institutional design, but principle as well. Principles give meaning and life to the institutional arrangement at hand. In other words, multilateralism contains within it a commitment to acting in concert with others, “without regard to the particularistic interests of the parties or the strategic exigencies that may exist in any specific occurrence” (Ruggie 1993, 11). Ruggie’s ideas are foundational to the idea of ideological multilateralism. But what happens to the cases of states acting in concert with one another because they believe that will serve their interests best? This is not unilateralism—states are not acting alone or even autonomously. In addition, Ruggie argues that “multilateral is an adjective that modifies the noun institution” (1993, 14). Yet, this leaves less formal institutional arrangements such as coalitions unexamined.

In the eight years of the Bush administration, much more scholarly attention was paid to unilateralism than multilateralism. For example, Brooks and Wohlforth (2005) cogently argued that the Bush administration used multilateralism only strategically, never as an end in and of itself, at great potential cost: the possibility of counterbalancing against the United States; a reduction in potential gains that could be realized from

institutionalized cooperation; and the reduction in the international legitimacy of American hegemony (509-519). The concept of strategic multilateralism is very important—I return to this idea below. Carter (2003) argued that the perils of unilateralism included reduced credibility abroad, increased resentment by allies and adversaries; and a reduction in the likelihood of U.S. foreign policy success (17-21). Buzan (2004) catalogues American unilateralism from the Reagan administration through the second Bush administration, arguing that unilateralism is not simply correlated with unipolarity (167-170).

While Brooks and Wohlforth suggest that multilateralism and unilateralism are two opposite points on a spectrum (2005, 509), most treatments of the concepts suggest a dichotomy between them. Carter and Buzan both list examples of American unilateralism. For the former, rejecting the Kyoto Protocol, the Ottawa Convention, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, verification procedures of the Biological Weapons Convention, and participation in the ICC, among many others serve as illustrations (2003, 17). For Buzan, the ICC, refusing to abide by the 1949 Geneva Conventions with regard to prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay, tariffs on steel and subsidies on agriculture; the decision to go to war against Iraq without a UN Security Council resolution authorizing the action serve as examples (2004, 169). Yet in the absence of clear analytical understandings of what exactly unilateralism or multilateralism mean, the process of declaring an administration overly unilateralist or multilateralist with anecdotal examples is problematic, and the counter argument can always be made.

The paradox of American unilateralism in the Bush era is the administration was widely perceived by the international community as unilateralist, and yet in the most important arena of foreign policy making, the prosecution of the wars in Afghanistan and

Iraq, the United States opted – at great cost, at least in Iraq – to fight via coalition (Weitsman 2006)². This implies several important points. First, the labels of multilateralist or unilateralist may indicate the general orientation of an administration in its approach to foreign policy making, in essence, how consultative an administration is with the rest of the international community, and how concerned it is perceived to be with the interests of other states—regardless of the actual decisions the administration makes to act alone or in concert with others. In other words, the labels of multilateralist or unilateralist may be used to indicate the general perception of the international community of a country in the international system, or the general perception the country wishes to project, rather than the actual behavior of the country in question. Even if a country tends to act in concert with others, the perception of it in the international system may nevertheless be unilateralist. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, while the meaning of multilateralism may be action taken by more than two states in the international system to address a foreign policy issue, it is often construed as something broader and deeper than that. Reading between the lines of public opinion polls and scholarly literature on multilateralism, the concept of multilateralism is often constituted more as an ideology—an ideology of collective action, with an emphasis on shared norms and values, and a belief that acting through international organizations in the system is preferable to organizing collective action outside the main *global* institutions in the system. A genuine desire on the part of the international community to deal with an issue in the international system collectively constitutes ideological multilateralism. In these coalitions, burden sharing is less likely to

² The Pew Global Attitudes Project tracks international public opinion. It has tracked a pervasive unilateralist image of the United States abroad, and a sense that the United States fails to take into account other states' interests as it formulates its foreign policy. See the reports at <http://pewglobal.org/reports/>, especially "US Image Up Slightly, But Still Negative" (6/23/05) and "Global Unease with Major World Powers" (6/27/07).

be a problem than in strategic multilateral frameworks, which may be initiated by one country to serve that country's interest. In these strategic multilateral coalitions, the burden will principally be assumed by the country's whose interest is being served. As Brooks and Wohlforth observe (2005, 509), multilateralism is strategic when "doing so is easier or especially advantageous, but never as an end in itself, and certainly not one whose pursuit merits bearing high costs." In other words, strategic multilateralism represents a course of action taken for calculated, self-serving reasons. It is not undertaken out of a sense of commitment to the international community or a desire to forge international consensus, but rather a means undertaken for wholly strategic ends.

Multilateral warfighting may represent either ideological or strategic multilateralism. Warfighting may take place via collective defense organization, such as NATO, or through a global organization, such as a UN sanctioned coalition. In fact, both of these actions would be multilateral, yet UN sanctioned coalitions are more likely to be perceived as more legitimate than collective defense operations. In other words, UN sanctioned operations may manifest ideological multilateralism, while the military alliance missions may represent strategic multilateralism. In addition, a coalition forged by one country to serve its national interest, and which offers incentives for participation is considered ideologically unilateral, even if in practice it is multilateral in nature. Again, this I consider strategic multilateralist, not unilateralist. States do not generally opt to conduct military operations for purely ideological reasons. However, the way in which they choose to fight them, however, may be.

In essence, there is an analytical and a practical difference in the way in which countries fight wars multilaterally. In ideologically multilateral coalitions such as the UN

sanctioned one in the First Gulf War, the international community is more likely to rally around the cause. In strategic multilateral coalitions which miss the ideological component, such as the American led coalition in the current war in Iraq, the sanction of the international community will be missing, and little legitimacy from embarking on the war multilaterally will be yielded. In addition, understanding the nuances in multilateralism also helps us understand the profound differences between fighting wars via long standing alliance as opposed to ad hoc coalition.

Just as multinational war efforts have largely been ignored in the context of studies of multilateralism, so too have military alliances been neglected in the context of understanding the way international institutions work (for a review see Weitsman 2004). And yet, war prosecution and alliance institutionalization are highly consequential and worthy of scholarly attention. Since coalitions are generally formed with an eye to a specific mission, their purpose is more limited than long standing alliances, even if their effects are consequential. Given the importance of the topic, it is surprising how few comprehensive studies of coalition warfare exist. The most important work on coalition warfare has explored the way coalition politics have played out in specific wars (especially Bensahel 2003. See also Bennett, Levgold, & Unger 1994; Bennett, Levgold, & Unger 1997; Daalder & O'Hanlon 2000; Martin & Brawley 2001; Lambeth 2001; Weitsman 2003; Biddle 2005/2006).

III. Wartime Alliances versus Wartime Coalitions

Not all wartime partnerships are created equal. In some cases, an alliance concluded during peacetime is called upon to prosecute a war. In other instances, once war is imminent or

has already begun, states come together in an ad hoc coalition designed for the express purpose of fighting. Preexisting alliances benefit from preexisting decision making structures and joint planning; yet coalitions benefit from being tailored for the express purpose for which they are being used. In terms of effective fighting capability, military alliances have the advantage of opportunities for joint war planning, stable relations among allies, the opportunity for creating effective command, control, and information structures, and agreed upon mechanisms for decision making. All of these factors should make coordinating action during wartime easier than in coalition operations. Yet because alliances that operate in war are usually created during peacetime, the transition is not so easy. This is true for several reasons. First, egalitarian decision making structures which foster cohesion during peacetime create onerous procedures not well suited to quick, decisive action necessary during war (Bensahel 2003). Second, not all alliance partners will be equally threatened, nor will they be likely to all desire wartime action equally. In other words, fears of entrapment are likely to outweigh fears of abandonment during wartime (Snyder 1984, 1997, Weitsman 2004). And finally, threats that are compatible during peacetime do not necessarily translate into compatible threats during wartime.

Coalitions and wartime alliances are both subsets of multinational operations, which may include other forms of multilateral cooperation, such as peacekeeping missions.

Coalitions are ad hoc multinational understandings that are forged to undertake a specific mission, and dissolve once that mission is complete. They are not wholly analytically distinct from wartime alliances, although the latter may have a greater degree of institutionalization and may pre-exist a specific wartime operation. *Wartime alliances are formal or informal agreements between two or more states intended to further (militarily)*

*the national security of the participating states, usually in the form of joint consultation and cooperation to prevail in war against a common enemy or enemies. Such alliances are usually concluded in peacetime in order to prevent or prevail in war, but continue to operate under wartime conditions. States augment their joint planning, consultation, and sometimes integrate their forces as their plans for war unfold and are implemented. Member states usually expect the alliance will endure beyond any specific war or crisis.*³ There is a range of commitment levels that alliances may provide. I identify six: 1. A promise to maintain benevolent neutrality in the event of war; 2. A promise to consult in the event of military hostilities with an implication of aid; 3. Promises of military assistance and other aid in event of war, but unilateral and without pre-prepared or explicit conditions specified; 4. A promise to come to the active assistance of an ally under specific circumstances; 5. An unconditional promise of mutual assistance, short of joint planning, with division of forces; and 6. An unconditional promise of mutual assistance in the event of attack with pre-planned command and control and the integration of forces and strategy (Weitsman 2004, 35).

Coalitions forged to combat a specific threat come in various forms. Contemporary coalitions formed by the United States to fight in the first Gulf War, Afghanistan, and Iraq have many features in common, yet many differences as well. The advantage to creating such coalitions is that they can be tailored to the specific needs of the mission at hand. Some of these coalitions – namely the first Gulf War – are forged from ideological multilateralism, a genuine desire to collectively address the wishes of the international

³ Peacetime alliances are just formal or informal agreements between two or more states intended to further (militarily) the national security of the participating states, operating when the signatories are not at war. If war begins and the alliance does not dissolve, it transitions to a wartime alliance. If the alliance endures beyond the war, it reverts to a peacetime alliance.

community.⁴ In other instances – the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq – the coalitions are forged as a consequence of strategic multilateralism—a means toward objectives that serve the interest of one nation above all, even if the coalitions in the end do not actually serve the interest of the principal state; in reality, contemporary coalitions are often constructed in ways that are not always conducive to the U. S. national interest.

First, the large scale of contemporary coalitions may actually reduce fighting effectiveness by creating additional complexities in regard to decision making, interoperability, and burden sharing. Second, contemporary coalitions are being formed with eye to legitimizing international operations, rather than to increasing war fighting effectiveness (which occurs only rarely), even if those efforts at establishing legitimacy may meet with varied success.

Fighting effectiveness of multinational forces requires clear chain of command, decision making, interoperability, equitable burden sharing, technology, human power, and resources. The larger the coalitions, the more difficult it becomes to maintain effectiveness along these lines. In addition, as the size of a fighting force grows, the more difficult it becomes to manage the differences in rules of engagement. For example, during the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, 14 Australian Hornet pilots defied the orders of their American commanding officers. These pilots independently aborted 40 bombing missions at the last minute because they believed that the objects of attack were not valid military targets or that dropping their bombs would result in an alarming number of civilian

⁴ Or out of a desire to craft a response to an international crisis in a way that strengthens global institutions such as the UN so that it might become more effective in other issue areas as well. I am grateful to Nora Bensahel for this point.

casualties. None of the pilots were reprimanded—they were following Australian rules of engagement (Walker 2004).

Contemporary coalition warfare differs from its historical counterparts in that coalitions formed in the post Cold War and post 9-11 eras by the United States contain a significant number of American allies. Because the experience of NATO in the former Yugoslavia revealed that the unwieldy nature of the decision making structure was seen as at odds with the need for quick decisive action during wartime, the United States opted to construct coalitions in the succeeding missions. Even with its longtime allies, the United States concluded bilateral agreements rather than using the preexisting multilateral framework available through NATO (Bensahel 2003). This has the advantage of fighting with allies with shared experience in training and enhanced interoperability, yet with the flexibility in decision making arrangements available through coalitions.⁵

These hybrids, part alliance, part coalition, make the distinction between alliances and coalitions blurry. One objective of this article is to determine the efficacy of such fighting arrangements.

IV. Peacetime versus Wartime Alliances—Balance of Power versus Balancing Act?

Military alliances are often formed in order to enhance the security of the member states in some fashion. Security may be enhanced through the guarantees codified in the alliance treaty, through the intended or unintended consequence of keeping the peace among allies, or through the prospect of deterring one's enemies from encroaching on a core value. During peacetime, alliances are generally forged to prevent war from happening—wars among allies may be deterred, or wars between the alliance partners and

⁵ This is a strategy that is not without costs—those alliances may be undermined by an unsuccessful or conflict-fraught wartime mission.

external enemies. Yet, once wars occur and alliances do not dissolve, the way in which the alliance functions is profoundly altered.

Peacetime military alliances vary a great deal in the degree to which states coordinate their military strategies—in other words, the degree to which they prepare for joint fighting. For example, despite the fact that the alliance preceded the First World War by 35 years, the Central Powers' joint war planning prior to war was minimal. The Entente Powers, in contrast, had consulted and coordinated their military planning prior to the First World War much more closely (Weitsman 2003).

Contemporary military strategists understand the importance of close consultation and coordination. As a consequence, NATO became the most institutionalized alliance in history. For 50 years before its first active mission, NATO member states consulted on a command structure and developed detailed integrated military plans in the event of war. Despite this detailed planning, once NATO embarked upon its first wartime mission in the former Yugoslavia, the decision making structure proved itself to be more appropriate to peacetime than wartime functioning. The onerous decision making structure was not well suited to quick and responsive action necessary during war, especially since it was not the same war as that for which they planned (Bensahel 2003, 16).

Because the dynamics of alliances are so different in peacetime as opposed to wartime, the perquisites of cohesion are different as well. During peacetime, cohesion will result from the different levels of threat, both within the alliance, and external to it (Weitsman 1997, 2004). During wartime, cohesion is more complicated. Threats that are compatible during peacetime may not be during wartime. For example, two states equally threatened by an external alliance may balance together and form a cohesive alliance

during peacetime. Once war comes, exactly from where the threat derives matters powerfully. A compatible external threat during peacetime may not be so during wartime—for example, Austria-Hungary and Germany were threatened by the Franco-Russian alliance in the pre-WWI period. Yet once war came, the fact that Austria-Hungary was principally threatened by Russia and Germany by France created enormous problems for the Central Powers in maintaining the cohesion of their alliance (Weitsman 2003). When states face external threats in peacetime, alliance cohesion will be easy to foster and maintain. Yet, during wartime, the source of the threat matters. Table 1 outlines the relationship between peacetime and wartime alliances and the source of threat.⁶

Table 1: Effect of Same or Divergent Threats on Cohesion of Peacetime and Wartime Alliances

	Same external threat	Different external threat
Peacetime	Balancing alliances—cohesion generally high	When compatible external threats, balancing alliances—cohesion generally high
Wartime	These war-fighting alliances will have a common <i>raison d'être</i> which will foster and maintain cohesion, though differences may exist on how to prosecute the war, making cohesion more difficult to forge and maintain in wartime than peacetime	These wartime alliances will be fraught with conflict over how to confront the adversarial state, alliance, or coalition

In addition, capability asymmetries within alliances during peacetime matter much less in fostering cohesion than they do during wartime. While burden-sharing affects cohesion in both peacetime and wartime, during wartime the costs are much greater in

⁶ Cohesion derives from internal threats as well. Here I am looking exclusively at external threats. Another caveat: I am examining alliances under conditions of threat. I do not mean to imply that alliances are not interesting under conditions of low or nonexistent internal or external threats, but that is not my focus here.

terms of lives and treasure (Weitsman 2003). Table 2 outlines the different effects of symmetry in capabilities on peacetime and wartime alliances, *ceteris paribus*.

Table 2: Effect of Capability Distribution on the Cohesion of Peacetime and Wartime Alliances

	Symmetrical Capabilities	Asymmetrical Capabilities
Peacetime alliances	Some jockeying for preeminence in alliance which creates problems for cohesion, especially in pluralistic alliances	Alliance is controlled by most powerful state, cohesion is fostered by security benefits provided to smaller states
Wartime alliances	May be conflict over war aims, but when burden sharing is relatively egalitarian, cohesion is enhanced	Lack of symmetry gives rise to more dependence on most powerful country, creating problems for achieving and maintaining cohesion

Since this article focuses on wartime alliances versus wartime coalitions, I will examine three propositions:

First, because long standing, highly institutionalized alliances are usually established during peacetime, their wartime operation may be unwieldy and problematic. These alliances generally have rigid alliance structures unsuitable to effective or efficient wartime operation. Further, the demands on member states in regard to integration of forces are high, creating a natural tension with states' desires to maintain national control of their troops. Hence, longstanding military alliances will be less cohesive in wartime than ad hoc coalitions.

Second, during wartime, power asymmetries will be felt more acutely in alliances than in coalitions, since ad hoc coalitions are driven by an immediate threat that will foster cohesion and make internal power disparities less important than in preexisting alliances

with decision making structures that have been constructed during peacetime. Peacetime alliances that function during wartime are going to experience threats in a more diverse and diffuse way than ad hoc coalitions. This will undermine their wartime effectiveness.

Third, ideological multilateral operations will generate more cohesion from the participating countries than strategic multilateral operations. Ideological multilateralism will generate a more profound sense of mission and shared fate than a strategic multilateral operation will. As a consequence, it will be easier to generate and maintain cohesion in the former than the latter.

V. First Gulf War

The Coalition

Formation

United States Central Command (CENTCOM) was established during the waning years of the Cold War. Following the Iranian hostage crisis, it became clear to US decision makers that to have a rapid deployment force that could be dispatched around the globe quickly in response to such developments was necessary. In 1983, the newly established Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) was transformed into a permanent unified command. Its area of responsibility was the Middle East, East Africa, and Central Asia. Once the Cold War ended, USCENTCOM commander-in-chief (USCINCCENT), Norman Schwartzkopf, began focusing on regional threats; when Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in 1990, CENTCOM responded quickly by dispatching troops to Saudi Arabia to deter an Iraqi attack (USCENTCOM 2008).

In the immediate aftermath of Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the United States spearheaded an effort to construct a multinational coalition to

respond. The United Nations played an important role; the UN Security Council passed a series of resolutions condemning the invasion, demanding Iraq's withdrawal, establishing sanctions, and authorizing the use of force if Iraq did not comply (U.S. Department of Defense 1992, 60). With unanimity in the international community condemning the invasion, and enormous effort on the part of President George H.W. Bush and Secretary of State James Baker, a large coalition of states was forged. The coalition was built beyond countries who were threatened by the invasion, though Iraq's attack did pose a tremendous threat to many countries. In the region, Saudi Arabia was especially vulnerable to attack. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait, were alarmed and reacted strongly against the invasion. As Cairo became a center for Kuwaiti refugees, Egypt also responded with alacrity to the invasion. Tensions had already been running high between Egypt and Iraq concerning Egyptian workers in Iraq; the attack on Kuwait deepened tensions. Syria was also threatened by the attack and responded quickly to the crisis, deploying troops in October. (U.S. Department of Defense 1991, 62-64). The attack was also perceived as highly threatening to Western countries highly sensitive to the vagaries of the oil markets. This high level of threat effectively galvanized the international community, as did President Bush.

President Bush was instrumental in forging the coalition. He used personal diplomacy and on-going relationships with world leaders to bring the member states together. Despite Bush's centrality, the coalition manifested ideological multilateralism. While Bush took a leadership role, there was widespread sentiment in the international community that action needed to be taken and taken collectively. The decision was

sanctioned by an affirmative vote in the UN Security Council, and despite the fact that forging a coalition complicated the operational mission, there was pervasive support in the international community for action. Almost 50 countries contributed to the first Gulf War in some capacity. By the end of the operations (both Desert Shield and Desert Storm), 38 countries including the United States contributed nearly 800,000 troops to the coalition. There were over 300 combat and combat support battalions, over 225 naval vessels and nearly 2800 fixed wing aircraft (USCENTCOM 1991, 1). Many countries contributed to the coalition financially—in addition to billions in economic aid to affected countries, an estimated \$54 billion was given the United States to offset the projected incremental costs of \$61 billion (Department of Defense 1992, 59-60).⁷ The level of threat posed by Saddam Hussein's invasion was instrumental in bringing about the formation of the coalition poised to deter and repel his attack. The high level of threat perceived by the international community was also instrumental in fostering cohesion in the coalition.⁸

Cohesion

A behavioral conceptualization of cohesion, as the ability of states to agree on goals and strategies toward attaining those goals, would suggest that the ability of coalition members to agree on their objectives, and their ability to construct an effective command and control system that would allow them to pursue those objectives. It was relatively easy to come to agreement on deterring the Iraqis from invading Saudi Arabia. It was slightly more difficult to achieve consensus on pushing Saddam Hussein's forces out of Kuwait and back into Iraq.

⁷ Appendix P of this report, p. 723-731 provides detailed information about the financial and in kind assistance contributed by coalition partners.

⁸ I operationalize cohesion as I do in Weitsman (1997, 2004), borrowing from Holsti et al. (1973, 16) as the ability to agree on goals and strategies to attain those goals.

However, ultimately consensus was reached and cohesion maintained. The command and control system that emerged enabled the coalition to pursue those objectives effectively, thereby enhancing the cohesion of the coalition.

A Joint Directorate of Planning (JDOP) between the United States and Saudi Arabia was established in the two weeks following Saddam Hussein's invasion. A Coalition, Coordination, Communication and Integration Center (C3IC) was established and became the cornerstone of the combined operations. It provided the link between the two parallel command structures as well as the place where conflict could be aired, negotiated, and resolved (Bensahel 1999, 50). At first, too few experienced personnel, an absence of mutual operating procedures and inadequate communications interoperability posed problems, and these relationships changed continuously as more and more countries deployed troops to Saudi Arabia in advance of Operation Desert Shield (USCENTCOM 1992, 6).⁹ The United States took the lead in planning and executing the operations. As Peter de la Billière, Commander in Chief of the British forces in the Gulf War reported, Norman Schwarzkopf was the person who "got things done...efficiently, and helped and enabled us to win this war" (de la Billière 1992, 303).¹⁰

Ultimately, command and control of coalition forces was established with "separate, but parallel lines of authority with US and Saudi Arabian forces remaining under their respective national command authorities" (USCENTCOM 1992, 7).¹¹ French land forces remained under French command, but were under the operational control of the Saudis.

⁹ For a flowchart explaining these relationships, see Maxwell 1992, 22 and Khaled bin Sultan 1995, 244-247.

¹⁰ Khaled bin Sultan reports that "working in parallel, Schwarzkopf and I were often in close and instant agreement. Sometimes, however, we disagreed significantly, and at other times we were obliged to negotiate with each other to reach a compromise. He was not an easy man to deal with, but neither was I" (191. See also 200-204).

¹¹ These were parallel, though not equivalent, since the United States' force commitment was so much larger than anyone else's. See Khaled bin Sultan (1995, 193-197).

British forces remained under British command, but operational and tactical control of air and ground forces were given to the United States. Eventually Egyptian and Syrian divisions were integrated into the defense (USCENTCOM 1992, 7-9). The headquarters for CENTCOM, as per its request, were located in the same building as the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation to facilitate coordination of the two staffs (Bensahel 1999, 50, n67).

A separate planning cell was established to begin planning Operation Desert Storm. A planning team with representatives from the United States, the United Kingdom, Egypt, and France were at the heart of the planning effort. "As with everything else in this war, the development of this plan was a team effort involving literally hundreds of people at every echelon of command across the entire coalition" (USCENTCOM 1992, 11). However, the process did not always proceed smoothly (Yaeger 1992, 61). In addition, much of the work was done by the United States, with one British representative in the planning cell (Bensahel 1999, 73).

The parallel command structure allowed Arab and Islamic countries' troops to remain under Islamic Arab control and the Western countries maintained control of Western troops. Enormous pains were taken to ensure cultural sensitivities were maintained. For example, US personnel deploying to Saudi Arabia had to undergo extensive indoctrination programs aimed at educating them about the history, customs, religions, and laws of the region. Alcohol was prohibited in CENTCOM area of operation, and a civilian dress code was established as well. Broadcasts on the US Armed Forces radio and television services were monitored to avoid offense. American women were briefed extensively regarding Islamic and Saudi expectations of female conduct, although the Saudis did lift the prohibition against women driving, providing it was part of their official

duty (USCENTCOM 1992, 570). Tending to cultural differences was essential in fostering and maintaining coalition cohesion. Further, as the coalition shifted from Desert Shield to Desert Storm, the parallel decision making structure was augmented by upping the number of liaison officers and they made changes to the Coalition Coordination Communication and Integration Center (C3IC) which strengthened it and made it more effective (Bensahel 1999, 60-61, U.S. Department of Defense 1992, 494, 559).¹² The United States and its coalition partners worked very hard to keep the coalition together. The consequences of failure loomed. The “inherent fragility” of the coalition meant that a great deal of effort had to go into negotiating, compromising, and maintaining its cohesion (Bensahel 1999, 90; Bush and Scowcroft 1998, 342). Tension surfaced among the force commanders in particular who did not always agree on operational or tactical implementation decisions. In the end, however, the coalition maintained cohesion because of the efforts undertaken by the main coalition partners (Khaled bin Sultan 1995, 32, 265).¹³

The first Gulf War revealed the challenges posed by coalition warfare in regard to command and control in another important way: friendly fire. Coalition partners must communicate effectively at all levels to prevent lethal friendly fire – the accidental killing of other allied units occurs frequently in coalition warfare. The United States killed as many British soldiers during the first Gulf War as the enemy did. Nearly a quarter of all American casualties during the Gulf War were a consequence of friendly fire (see Weitsman 2009). In subsequent wars, Afghanistan and Iraq in particular, friendly fire has made task cohesion on the ground more difficult than ever.

¹² Bensahel (1999) compellingly argues that one of the most important reasons the coalition worked was because of the ineffectiveness of Iraqi troops on the ground.

¹³ Cf. Khaled bin Sultan’s account of his “duels” with the French Minister of Defense Chevènement (1995, ch. 26).

Balance of Power and Burden Sharing within the Coalition

The power distribution within the coalition was relatively asymmetrical. This is apparent by examining the Correlates of War data for 1991 for five countries that contributed the most troops, which shows iron and steel production (irst), military expenditures (milex), military personnel (milper), energy consumption (energy), total population (tpop), urban population (upop), and annual value for the Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) Annual values as a rough indicator of power.¹⁴

Table 3: Power Capabilities of Top Five Contributors of Troops to First Gulf War Coalition

stateabb	irst	milex	milper	energy	tpop	upop	cinc
USA	79738	2.62E+08	2110	2607325	252618	64814	0.136481
SAU	1850	35500000	191	221723	16545	5372	0.013034
UKG	16632	40430000	301	293874	57801	46681	0.02589
EGY	2541	1650000	434	50847	54531	17654	0.008457
FRN	18432	37340000	554	183698	57055	9920	0.020871
SYR	63	4500000	408	23911	12529	4231	0.004824

Source: Correlates of War Data, version 3.02. See Singer 1987.

¹⁴ CINC is a measure “computed by summing all observations on each of the 6 capability components for a given year, converting each state's absolute component to a share of the international system, and then averaging across the 6 components.” <http://www.correlatesofwar.org/>

The United States had roughly 10 times the capabilities of the second largest contributor of troops in the coalition. In terms of burden sharing within the coalition, however, the power disparity was not felt quite as keenly as it could have been.¹⁵

According to the U.S. General Accountability Office, by September 1992, the United States had received about \$54 billion in aid to offset the incremental costs to the United States of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. Table 4 provides a country by country summary.

Table 4: Foreign Government Pledges and Contributions to the United States

Dollars in millions

Contributor	Pledges			Contributions		Total
	1990	1991	Total	Cash	In-kind	
Saudi Arabia	\$3,339	\$13,500	\$16,839	\$12,809	\$4,046	\$16,855
Kuwait	2,506	13,550	16,056	16,015	43	16,058
United Arab Emirates	1,000	3,088	4,088	3,870	218	4,088
Japan	1,680	8,332	10,012	9,441c	571	10,012
Germany	1,072	5,500	6,572	5,772c	683	6,455
Korea	80	275	355	150	101	251
Others*	3	26	29	8	22	30
Total	\$9,680	\$44,271	\$53,951	\$48,065	\$5,684	\$53,749

*includes Italy, Oman, Qatar, Bahrain, Belgium, Denmark, Norway, and Luxembourg

Source: U.S. General Accountability Office, Report to Congress: Financial Management Fiscal Year 1992 Audit of the Defense Cooperation Account, GAO-NIAD-93-185, August 1993.

The incremental costs to the United States, estimated by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) were \$61.1 billion (U.S. GAO 1992, 2).¹⁶ In terms of funding the war, burden

¹⁵ This is not to say that asymmetries were not felt or perceived by coalition partners. See Khaled bin Sultan (1995) who wrote that he saw one of his key roles was “making sure our all-powerful American allies did not swallow us up” (32) and wanted to resist a situation in which an “American was the all-powerful supreme commander who could do what he liked” (37). To this end, Khaled insisted that every meeting he had with Schwarzkopf take place in Khaled’s office (192-193). See chapter 18 for his discussion of being the “junior” partner in the war.

¹⁶ Incremental, rather than total, costs are a better estimate of costs incurred by the United States. Total costs include those things the United States would be paying for even if Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm had

sharing was handled very effectively. The United States provided the largest deployment of troops by far—540,000 out of the nearly 800,000 total (USCENTCOM 1991, 1). Saudi Arabia was the next largest contributor with troop levels around 50,000, followed by the UK with approximate 45,000 troops (see Terasawa & Gates 1993 for troop deployments by country). Other contributions to the coalition included observing the embargo against Iraq, despite significant lost revenues (Terasawa & Gates 1993).

While opinions vary on the equity of burden sharing in the Gulf War (Terasawa & Gates 1993), of the post Cold War coalitions formed by the United States, the first Gulf War coalition was funded most broadly. In contrast to the first Gulf War, the United States has had to pay its coalition partners in the current war in Iraq for their continued participation (see Weitsman 2006).

Studies of burden sharing in the Gulf War also universally acknowledge the importance of the position of the United States in successfully constructing the coalition. Terasawa & Gates, for example, argue that intense lobbying by the United States culminated in Germany and Japan contributing more to the coalition than their return would warrant. Similarly, Bennett, Leggold, and Unger (1994) argue that alliance dependence makes states receptive to contributing to coalitions beyond the immediate gains they may reap. What this suggests is that even in ideological multilateral endeavors, a powerful state's influence and regard in the international system may be essential to success in forging such coalitions—threat alone is not enough.

not been undertaken, e.g., regular pay of active duty military personnel. Incremental costs are those costs that are incurred specifically because of the operations, e.g., imminent danger pay to reservists, less normal drill pay. See U.S. General Accountability Office, *Operation Desert Shield/Storm: Update on Costs and Funding Requirements*, GAO-NSIAD-92-194, May 1992, p. 2. See Khaled bin Sultan (1995, ch. 17) for a discussion of the unique contributions of Saudi Arabia and, in contrast, Schwarzkopf, 1992, chapters 19-20.

The Gulf War coalition experienced challenges of interoperability, and took a great deal of effort on the part of the United States to maintain. Careful thought went into crafting the decision making structure—a system that could absorb differences of opinion, resolve them, and keep avenues of communication open. The Gulf War coalition was extremely effective—in large part because of the conscious efforts on the part of the United States and its key partners. Certainly conflict occurred within the coalition, but in the end the clear political and military objectives and a resilient coalition structure – as well as a weak enemy – enabled the partners to prevail.

VI. KOSOVO

In late February 1998, government forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) and Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) began to clash. As the KLA began making advances in June and July of that year, the government launched a major counter-offensive, which continued through September. Over a quarter of a million people were displaced, thousands of homes destroyed, and the makings of a humanitarian disaster confronted the international community (House of Commons 1999, 8). Despite attempts to negotiate a cease fire through the Holbrooke Agreement in October 1998 and negotiations at Rambouillet, France in February 1999, the fighting on the ground in Kosovo escalated in March 1999 (House of Commons 1999, 8-19). By January 1999, NATO had empowered its Secretary General, Javier Solana, to authorize airstrikes with the intention of compelling Milosevic into compliance (Lambeth 2001, 10).

U.S. and NATO planning for war began earlier, in 1998. By early spring of 1999, over 40 air campaign options had been considered (Lambeth 2001, 12). It was clear that the United States in particular was unwilling to commit ground forces and plans for fighting an

air war were a political necessity (Clark 2002, 168-169).¹⁷ On March 23, 1999, Operation Allied Force began. The air campaign lasted until June 10, and ended with Serbian capitulation.¹⁸

Cohesion

It was a challenge to develop and maintain cohesion of NATO during the Kosovo campaign. Despite the fact that NATO was a preexisting alliance with a command structure and decision making structures, the Kosovo campaign was NATO's most active mission, and only its second offensive military mission, in its 50 year history. The 19 NATO¹⁹ member states ultimately agreed that ending Milosevic's brutality in Kosovo was necessary, but even coming to that agreement was difficult. In fact, the General Accountability Office (2001, 6) identified the absence of clear military objectives as one of the principal departures from military doctrine in Operation Allied Force. The ambiguity of the alliance's goals was the result of divergent perspectives within the alliance. It reported that all of the member states had different perspectives on the conflict and on what and how action should be taken.

One member nation, which shared religious and cultural backgrounds with the Kosovar Albanians, was sympathetic to their plight, while another nation had historic and religious ties to the Serbian Yugoslavs. Another NATO nation was led by a coalition government, where part of the coalition supported the NATO alliance operation while the other part of the coalition did not want the bombing campaign to continue and said that it would withdraw from the government if the NATO alliance used a ground

¹⁷ The decision to fight an air war was highly consequential, resulting in exacerbated conflict on the ground. See Ignatieff 2001, 96 on Clark's failure to anticipate this response.

¹⁸ Daily reports on developments during the campaign can be found at <http://www.nato.int/kosovo/all-force.htm>.

¹⁹ Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The three newest member states, Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland, became full members of NATO less than two weeks before Operation Allied Force began.


force. Even within the United States, there was not a consensus of support for this operation. Although the three newest members of the NATO alliance supported the operation, the level of support expressed by their governments varied. For example, although one nation offered NATO forces the use of its air space and military airfields, it was concerned about Yugoslavian retaliation against a minority population in Yugoslavia that was ethnically related to this nation. (GAO 2001, 4).

The alliance struggled to agree on exactly how to stop the Serbian government. In other words, while alliance partners agreed on a general goal, it was difficult to agree on strategies toward attaining those goals. The alliance operation represented strategic multilateralism—using NATO for this mission was the only way to approach the issue, no one country was willing to take action alone. Further, it offered NATO an opportunity to bolster its image in the early post-Cold War years, when its mission and continuance were being questioned. It also gave the United States a chance to strengthen the alliance in the aftermath of the Bosnia experience.²⁰ A unilateral approach to the Kosovo crisis would have proved far costlier than any country was willing to bear; in this case multilateralism was easier, more advantageous. It was not a shared or deep ideological commitment to multilateralism that sparked the operation—although an important aspect here was a commitment to NATO and keeping the alliance active. Because of the reluctance on the part of the countries to act alone, acting via NATO was the only viable and least costly option.

Because of resistance on the part of the United States in particular to place its troops under the command of others, a parallel command structure evolved (see Figure 1 below). Unlike the parallel command structure in the Gulf War, despite the fact that many individuals in the structure served two masters, there was less structured interface between the two. The chain of command was confusing with unsuitable organizational

²⁰ Thanks to Nora Bensahel for pointing this out.

structures and insufficient staff integration (Lambeth 2001, 207). In the end, although NATO was necessary to prosecute the war, it “came at the cost of a flawed strategy that was further hobbled by the manifold inefficiencies that were part and parcel of conducting combat operations by committee” (Lambeth 2001, 185).



Source: Benjamin S. Lambeth (2001) *NATO's Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment*. Rand, Washington, D. C., p. 208.

Because NATO decisions have to be made by consensus, waging war collectively was extremely difficult. At the start of the campaign, only 51 targets had been approved by the

allies. By June 1999, the list included 976 targets. Each additional target had to be proposed, reviewed, and approved by NATO and national authorities before it could be added to the list (Peters et al. 2001, 25-26). Target requests were denied by some of the allies and the United States. Delays were common by the United States in approving target requests, as well as other states in the alliance. In some cases, targets were subjected to a domestic legal review to guarantee compliance with international law (Peters et al. 2001, 28). In fact, according to Paul Strickland, a member of the NATO Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC), in the initial 40 days of the campaign, a number of fairly insignificant targets were bombed repeatedly into rubble because of an absence of new approved target sets (see Strickland 2000). The Pentagon estimated that some 80% of the targets hit in the first month of the campaign had been hit at some point before (Peters et al. 2001, 26).

In some instances, the United States withheld information about missions involving the use of “F-117s, B-2s, and cruise missiles, to ensure strict U.S. control over those U.S.-only assets and to maintain a firewall against leaks from any allies who might compromise those operations” (Lambeth 2001, 185). This created potentially dangerous situations when, for example, U.S. aircraft showed up on NATO radars without advance notice (Peters et al. 2001, 40). Even when the United States opted to share information, the process was complicated and cumbersome, hampering the alliance’s ability to act effectively (Peters et al. 2001, 40).

In addition to being unwieldy and slow, the alliance suffered from other troubles as well (Bensahel 2003; Lambeth 2001, 204-208). According to Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Wesley Clark who led NATO’s campaign, leaks were a constant source of trouble. As early as October 1998, one of the French officers working at NATO headquarters had

leaked key portions of the operational plan for the campaign to the Serbians (Clark 2002, 175-176).

The fissures in the alliance were especially clear in the dispute over the Pristina airport in June 1999, after the NATO air operation had concluded. As the NATO led Kosovo force (KFOR) was deployed to Kosovo to occupy Serbia, Russia, fellow Slavs and in collusion with the Serbians, moved to occupy the Pristina airport and enlarge a sphere of influence in the north, which would putting KFOR's mission at risk (Clark 2002, 385). Fearing an expanding sphere of influence for the Russians, or a partition, Clark requested entering troops block the runways at the Pristina airport, and seize the airport ahead of the Russians. Sir Michael Jackson, the British general in charge of the operation, balked at the orders (Fitchett, 1999). According to Clark (2002, 396), Jackson told Clark that Jackson "would no longer be taking his orders from Washington." When Clark countered by saying the orders did not come from Washington, but rather from him as SACEUR, Jackson responded by telling Clark he did not have that authority. When Clark responded that he did have the authority, Jackson told Clark that he would not be starting WWII for him. Jackson told Clark that as a 3 star general he should not have to take orders from Clark; Clark's response was that he himself was a 4 star general and indeed Jackson did have to take orders from him (Clark 2002, 396). The difference resulted in numerous phone calls to various British and American officials. The French also backed out of the operation at the behest of the British (Clark 2002, 396-399). Above all, the incident reveals the difficulties among the allies in agreeing on goals, and strategies toward attaining those goals. It also illustrates the problems associated with multinational command structure, even in longstanding, highly institutionalized alliances, such as NATO.

In sum, the alliance was fraught with conflict and difficulty achieving consensus on how to prosecute war, and ultimate objectives. NATO cohesion was extremely difficult to achieve. According to the General Accountability Office, cohesion was so difficult to maintain that it resulted in profound departures from U.S. military doctrine (GAO 2001), further complicating the campaign. This illustrates one of the many inherent challenges to alliance war-fighting.

Balance of Power and Burden Sharing within the Coalition

The top three contributors to Operation Allied Force in terms of sorties and aircraft deployed were the United States, France, and the United Kingdom.²¹ During the operation itself, most of the contributions by allies were made in terms of allied airfields, overflight rights, logistical support and peacekeeping troops after Operation Allied Force concluded (Tirpack 1999). Thirteen of the 19 member states contributed aircraft to the operation. Of the approximately 38,000 sorties flown, including those flown by airlifters, the United States flew over 29,000 while deploying more than 700 aircraft; France deployed about 100 aircraft and flew approximately 2,414 sorties; the United Kingdom was the second largest contributor of aircraft, and flew about 1,950 sorties; the Netherlands flew approximately 1,252 sorties; Italy was the third largest contributor of aircraft and flew about 1081 sorties; Germany flew about 636 sorties (Peters et al. 2001, 18-24). Table 5 summarizes the power capabilities data for the top six contributing nations to Operation Allied Force.

²¹ A normal day during Operation Allied Force saw perhaps 500 aircraft taking off from 47 bases across Europe, refueling midair, undertaking bombing missions, refueling again, returning, and taking off for another bombing mission for a total of some 35,000 sorties (Kitfield 1999).

Table 5: Power Capabilities of Top Six Contributors to Operation Allied Force

stateabb	irst	milex	milper	energy	tpop	upop	cinc
USA	97427	2.92E+08	1490	2986821	276218	70642	0.149701
FRN	20200	37811000	421	336803	58886	10402	0.022813
UKG	16298	36368000	218	332333	58744	52666	0.024657
NTH	6075	6193000	54	118954	15735	4880	0.005624
ITA	24878	22664000	391	238877	57343	15940	0.019634
GMY	42062	31182000	331	461193	82178	25304	0.02941

Source: Correlates of War Data, version 3.02. See Singer 1987.

While the United States is still by far the most powerful country in regard to capability share of the six, the power differentials are not nearly as divergent as in the first Gulf War.

Operation Allied Force cost the United States \$3.1 billion in incremental funds (General Accountability Office, Military Operations 1999, p.2) The United States provided about 70% of the aircraft for the operation and about 60% of the sorties during the operation (GAO-01-784 Kosovo Air Operations, 1999 p. 3) while the Europeans provided 56-70% of the peacekeeping troops after the air campaigns (GAO 2001, GAO-02-174, p.1).

The Europeans, in summary,

have consistently provided the majority of ground troops to support NATO operations and paramilitary specialists who are trained for post-conflict crisis interventions. European allies have also led efforts to support nonmilitary interventions, such as development assistance and personnel to support multilateral operations. Of the almost \$15 billion, disbursed to the Balkans region from 1993 through 1999, the European Commission (EC) and European allies contributed about \$10.2 billion, primarily to fund humanitarian and reconstruction programs such as rebuilding airports, bridges, and roads. During this same period, the U.S. distributed about \$1.2 billion, primarily for emergency relief and institution building. European allies have consistently provided a large number of civilians to support multilateral institution-building programs in the Balkans, including more than 2,000 U.N. civilian police. (GAO-02-174 European Security, p. 51)

Burden sharing in NATO more generally has been an issue of contention during the history of the alliance. As the Department of Defense reported in its annual assessment of allied contributions to defense, the United States pays one quarter of the NATO common-funded budgets in which all 19 members participated at the time of Operation Allied Force (DoD 2001, chapter II).

NATO's Common-Funded Budgets – 2000*
2000 Dollars in Millions – 2000 Exchange Rates

Member	NATO Security & Investment Program	% of NATO Security & Investment Program	Military Budget	% of Total Military Budget**	Civil Budget	% of Total Civil Budget	TOTAL NATO Common Budgets	% of TOTAL NATO Common Budget**
Belgium	23.2	4.3%	13.9	3.1%	3.6	2.8%	40.7	3.6%
Canada	20.4	3.7%	25.6	5.7%	7.0	5.4%	53.0	4.7%
Czech Republic	3.1	0.6%	4.5	1.0%	1.2	0.9%	8.8	0.8%
Denmark	18.6	3.4%	8.2	1.8%	1.9	1.5%	28.7	2.6%
France	29.1	5.3%	28.2	6.3%	20.0	15.3%	77.3	6.9%
Germany	126.7	23.2%	76.9	17.1%	20.2	15.5%	223.8	19.9%
Greece	5.4	1.0%	1.9	0.4%	0.5	0.4%	7.8	0.7%
Hungary	2.3	0.4%	3.3	0.7%	0.8	0.6%	6.4	0.6%
Iceland	0.0	0.0%	0.2	0.0%	0.1	0.1%	0.3	0.0%
Italy	46.2	8.5%	29.7	6.6%	7.5	5.8%	83.4	7.4%
Luxembourg	1.1	0.2%	0.4	0.1%	0.1	0.1%	1.6	0.1%
Netherlands	25.7	4.7%	13.9	3.1%	3.6	2.8%	43.2	3.8%
Norway	15.9	2.9%	5.7	1.3%	1.4	1.1%	23.0	2.0%
Poland	8.6	1.6%	12.4	2.8%	3.2	2.5%	24.2	2.2%
Portugal	1.9	0.3%	3.2	0.7%	0.8	0.6%	5.9	0.5%
Spain	13.8	2.5%	17.6	3.9%	4.6	3.5%	36.0	3.2%
Turkey	5.8	1.1%	8.0	1.8%	2.1	1.6%	15.9	1.4%
United Kingdom	61.1	11.2%	80.4	17.9%	22.5	17.3%	164.0	14.6%
United States	136.3	25.0%	115.6	25.7%	29.2	22.4%	281.1	25.0%
Total	545.2	100.0%	449.6	100.0%	130.3	100.0%	1125.1	100.0%

*Due to rounding, the numbers shown may not add up to the totals.

**Calculation does not include contributions to the NATO Airborne Early Warning and Control Program.

Source: Department of Defense, Allied Contributions to Defense 2001.

The absence of a strong European strategic transport and logistics capability alone meant that the United States had to undertake the lion's share of the Kosovo campaign. Operation Allied Force also revealed a serious technology gap between the United States and Europe:

More than 70 per cent of the fire-power deployed was American. Only a handful of European allies had laser-guided bombs, and only Britain was able

to contribute cruise missiles. Barely 10 per cent of European aircraft are capable of precision bombing and of the European members of NATO, only France was able to make a significant contribution to high-level bombing raids at night. Only the United States could contribute strategic bombers and stealth aircraft for enhanced power projection. European allies also critically lacked reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft. (Sloan 2001, 4)

The United States' superiority in information systems made it difficult to communicate with their allies (Sloan 2001; Peters et al. 2001, 56-57). In other words, despite the fact that NATO was a long standing alliance, interoperability issues were nevertheless critical.

VII. FINDINGS

The proposition that long standing, highly institutionalized alliances will be less flexible and overly rigid for effective wartime operations was supported by the cases of the Persian Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign. In the first, a large, ad hoc coalition of countries of widely disparate capabilities and cultures produced a more cohesive and effective war fighting mechanism than the largely Western, long standing military alliance of mostly great powers represented by NATO in Operation Allied Force. Because the former coalition could be tailored to the direct needs of the countries in question for the mission at hand, the member states were able to come together in a unified way. The immediate threat posed by Saddam Hussein's invasion was the galvanizing force that produced an effective response. The parallel decision making structure, communication between the two decision making hierarchies, and meticulous attention to cultural sensitivities all served to facilitate the effectiveness and cohesion of the coalition.²²

²² It is also important to note here that NATO member states played an important role in the Gulf War coalition and no doubt facilitated the effectiveness of the coalition. The NATO decision making structure was

The parallel decision making structure in NATO did not work as well. It signaled to the U.S. long standing allies that the United States stood apart from the NATO hierarchy. Part of the problem was that while the Gulf War coalition could operate with countries acting in tandem, rather than in an integrated fashion, NATO had no such possibility. Further, the NATO chain of command was ineffective in action, SACEUR Wesley Clark was unable to command the authority he would have been able to command had the operation been executed solely by the Americans.²³ The decision making procedures were highly ineffective, not at all conducive to a crisis or wartime situation.²⁴

The propositions regarding symmetry within alliances and coalitions are countered by the evidence of the cases. The relative symmetry within NATO in comparison to the coalition prosecuting the Gulf War gave rise to more challenges in the command structure once war came. Further, the symmetry within NATO is manifest in the egalitarian decision making procedures, which ultimately slowed the alliance down and made it operate slowly and ineffectively. Given the great power status of the allies, American superiority in technology and capability actually fostered resentment.

The security threat posed to the coalition members in the first Gulf War in contrast to the humanitarian challenge posed to NATO in the Kosovo campaign also affected operations. The security threat galvanized the coalition, gave the member states a clear objective, and helped the member states understand their central goals and decide on strategies for attaining their central goals. The humanitarian threat in Kosovo did not

not used in the coalition, but nevertheless the long standing relationships of some of the states in the coalition should be recognized. On the issue of cultural sensitivities, see Schwarzkopf 1992, chapter 18.

²³ Each member state retained a significant degree of national control, which is not simply an indictment of the command structure per se, but speaks instead to the challenges of joint war-fighting in general.

²⁴ As Bensahel (2003) argues, it is the experience in Kosovo that gives rise to bilateral agreements between the United States and its allies in fighting its subsequent wars.

culminate in a similar benefit for NATO member states. As the alliance faced a humanitarian crisis in its own backyard, in the aftermath of the Cold War, on the eve of its 50th anniversary, there was a belief that something needed to be done to show that the alliance’s utility was enduring. However, defining clear objectives, let alone strategies for attaining those objectives was difficult. The United States really was the only country with the capability to undertake the mission, yet it did not want to commit ground troops. The European states wanted control of the situation, but were technologically not in a place to do so. What the Kosovo campaign did was reveal fissures in the alliance, rather than provide a template for its future.

Table 6: Summary of Findings

	Threat	Power distribution	Burden Sharing	Coalition or Alliance	Ideological or Strategic Multilateral Operation	Cohesion
First Gulf War Coalition in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm	Immediate threat perceived by top contributors to coalition	Asymmetrical	US largest contributor, especially in terms of forces, but other countries offset US incremental costs in terms of money to fight war.	Coalition	Ideological	Cohesion relatively easy to maintain and sustain
NATO in Operation Allied Force	Humanitarian crisis that did not pose immediate threat to member states	Somewhat asymmetrical, although top contributors were all major powers	US bore brunt of costs to Operation Allied Force, though European allies bore brunt of peacekeeping costs in the wake of Operation Allied Force	Alliance	Strategic	Cohesion more difficult to maintain and sustain

Operation Allied Force struggled more with cohesion than the first Gulf War coalition. The absence of a clear and present threat felt equally by all and the alliance apparatus worked to the detriment of the cohesion of the coalition. The Gulf War coalition, despite the fact that it was an ad hoc coalition with possible interoperability problems, definite asymmetries within the coalition, and a lack of experience in working together, was effective and cohesive. The coalition worked effectively, despite some interoperability challenges, as a consequence of the clear objectives that allowed the parallel decision making structure to work.

VIII. CONCLUSIONS

Military alliances – and coalitions – are complex in their operation during wartime. Decision making structures that foster cohesion and consensus during peacetime hinder wartime operations. The institutionalization of alliances that enhance transparency and facilitate cooperation in peacetime may serve to undermine fighting effectiveness during wartime. Further, alliances that are created in peacetime that operate during wartime may nevertheless suffer from significant interoperability issues.

Coalitions that are constructed when war is imminent to address a clear and present threat, a threat that is perceived keenly by participating states, may operate effectively when designed appropriately. In the case of the first Gulf War, cultural sensitivities culminated in a decision making system that worked effectively, especially since attention was paid to staff integration and communication. The absence of political infrastructure in coalitions, ironically, makes operational military cooperation easier. More flexibility and adaptability in design are possible. Strong states can then use coalitions when they want to fight wars efficiently and alliances when they are more concerned about managing broader

political issues. E.g., the United States may choose NATO as its vehicle in Kosovo and Afghanistan because it wants Europe to be invested in state building, more so than fighting an enemy that, militarily, is quite weak.²⁵ In addition, one reason that wartime alliances struggle more with cohesion, especially in regard to strategies, not necessarily end goals, *is that they generally require a greater level of integration than do coalitions*. The demands on such an institutional structure are far greater, and likely to create more difficulties in implementing plans for war. While in the Kosovo case, these conflicts did not frustrate NATO's ability to achieve its goals, the path toward achieving them was difficult.

The lessons here bear on the nature of multilateralism and the design of contemporary coalitions (see Bensahel 2003). Cohesion is fostered and maintained during wartime by clear objectives, threats that are perceived similarly by member states, when attention is paid to cultural differences, and even in the absence of a unified chain of command, effective staff integration is manifest. Above all, ideological multilateral operations are likely to yield more cohesion and fighting effectiveness. The implications here are that NATO is a highly effective alliance with great utility during peacetime, but during wartime, more flexible and adaptable institutional structures are necessary for effective war prosecution. Studies of military alliances in international relations tell us a great deal about the way these alliances are formed, maintained, and managed. We still need to work to better understandings of how those alliances, once formed, operate during war, and how they differ from ad hoc coalitions formed to perform specific missions. This article is one step in that direction.

²⁵ My thanks to J. Samuel Barkin for underscoring this point.

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