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Specific Findings

6.1. Technical on-site Expertise to use GT

The ability to visualize and communicate is essential for field teams during a disaster. During the WTC response, field decision makers were responsible for allocating resources during critically short periods of time and under stressful conditions. Effectively managing the use of GTs requires some technical expertise. Apparently, too many GT products unconnected to mission success were generated during the WTC response. Although both ESF #3 Team leaders interviewed expressed a working knowledge of GT and the various GT products, their attention was focused on the actual operations. They did not have the time to consider the application of GT to their work and communicate these needs to a GT provider. Assignment of a technically skilled support person to the team who understands the practical availability of GTs and their operational application, as well as the tactical on-scene situations and conditions, could provide valuable counsel and support to the ESF #3 Team Leaders and improve information flow to and from the ESF #3 Team.

6.2. Availability and Timeliness of data and products

Availability of pre-event spatial infrastructure data is a key to successful mapping during emergencies. The rapid re-establishment of NYC EOC was remarkable. Much of the success in re-establishing GIS capability was based on strong, pre-existing, local partnerships related to data sources, contacts, and interagency agreements.

The Disaster Field Officer and the ESF#3 Team Leaders, however, received GT products late during their mission due to issues such as network connectivity, data licensing, or other practical issues. It took many days to get a T1 connection to the DFO at Pier 90 and there was no outside connectivity at the Javits Center. It is quite possible that not all of the imagery data that went to the City OEM at Pier 92 found its way to Pier 90. For example LIDAR data was available after September 17th. LIDAR data may have been useful to make more accurate debris estimates had it been acquired earlier but smoke and particulate matter clouds impeded its acquisition. Obtaining imagery very soon after the disaster is critical in estimating debris volume early on. Also, thermal data was not available until six weeks into the operations when its usefulness had all but passed.

6.3. Accuracy and usefulness of data and results

It can be inferred that given the very small but highly urbanized geographic area, and the massive presence of local response forces, the WTC operations did not require the full use and power of GTs.

Of the hundreds of standard map products generated by the mapping center at the NYC OEM, the vast majority served the primary purpose of communicating the daily and changing situation to the public. The map products were ubiquitous through the media and many were posted on the NYC public access website. Prior to Sept. 11, OEM had a web-based GIS (ArcIMS) application that let the people of NYC enter an address and see the location of the nearest emergency shelter in situations such as a hurricane or storm. The application also models the storm surge impacts on evacuation routes and shelter locations. After the attacks, this emergency management online locator system (EMOLS) was tailored to meet the residents’ needs for information such as locating restricted areas and finding out whether there were any utility outages.

As stated in Section 5.1 of this report, Jim McConnell, Manager of NYC OEM GIS Operations provided the GWU Team with a list of the most useful (from the NYC OEM perspective) standard mapping products. The list, included in the Appendix to this report, has been highlighted to indicate the mapping products, updated on a relatively regular basis, which could directly support the USACE ESF#3 missions.

The LIDAR data of the debris field was of insufficient accuracy to be used for debris volume and weight estimates so other methods such as GIS modeling were used. LIDAR and digital imagery were acquired and updated daily for the NYC and even if the data were accurate, the repeat coverage was much more frequent than the USACE required for this response. At some point, the DFO at Pier 90 was overwhelmed with the amount of remotely sensed data resulting in the need to assign an individual the task of sorting through the data to identify what was important to the mission.

The resolution of the vertical aerial photography was low but it helped determine the layout of the debris sorting and management of the landfill operations to some degree. High-resolution photographic records with periodic updating would improve estimating damage and the amount of debris. Satellite data is useful on a larger scale where multiple jurisdictions are involved but was not at the WTC operations. Imagery from commercial satellites was ruled out immediately due to its low spatial resolution. The USGS generated Digital Orthophoto Quarter-Quads (DOQQs), which the USACE typically uses as base maps during emergency response missions, were of little use at the WTC operations due to the relatively high margin of error (30 Feet).

Thermal data maps had limited use due to low accuracy and late availability.

The findings indicate that the 3D maps did not have much direct use for on scene operations but were very useful for communicating with non-response personnel with questions concerning the location of buildings, levels of damage to buildings, location of command posts, etc. The availability of these maps, which were posted for general viewing, helped reduce the amount of time and effort required to respond to questions.

The problems relating to the use of GT are predominantly data availability and/or compatibility related.

6.4. Interoperability issues – use of different platforms

Both ESRI ArcView and MapInfo were used by different agencies during WTC operations. Although MapInfo is the official software platform of FEMA, FEMA Regional offices use both MapInfo and ArcView. As of the date of this report, FEMA has begun working with ArcGIS. USACE personnel predominantly use ESRI products for their daily and response work, and in general are not highly proficient in using MapInfo. USACE personnel detailed to FEMA to support ESF#5 had laptops loaded with ArcView 3.2a and several ArcView extensions such as Transportation Network Analyst, Spatial Analyst, Image Analyst and 3D Analyst. The FEMA ESF#5 GIS coordinator recognized this potential problem and assigned the USACE GIS personnel appropriate tasks. He expressed his satisfaction with the USACE personnel and their ability to adapt to the different software. The mixture of GT software (ESRI and MapInfo) is not noted as a significant impediment but has the potential to slow down operations. Ideally, if FEMA and the USACE are to use different GIS software, those USACE personnel who may be detailed to support ESF#5 would be trained and proficient in both ESRI and MapInfo products. The USACE training initiative (Summer 2002) will provide USACE personnel familiarization with MapInfo. USACE should also consider pre-identifying and prioritizing those personnel who will potentially support ESF #5 for more in-depth training.

6.5. Form of data and products

The operational personnel were provided information in a variety of forms including maps, graphs, tables, briefing slides and text material. The timeliness, consistency and simplicity of the decision support material were the most important factors in assisting them in making decisions. Hard copy maps were deemed most practical for field operations and provided a medium for communicating the tactical situation in all weather and light conditions. The printed maps also provided an audit trail to look back at what was done and why. The USACE should think through issues such as map size, map material (waterproof and ability to mark up the map), and map colors (style guide), and develop policies to further maximize the utility of their products for operational personnel.

As recommended by NYC OEM personnel and at the May 3rd meeting at FEMA, a next logical step might be to reduce the hardcopy output and to provide portable electronic devices that allow operational personnel to view and mark up digital maps. Handheld devices (PDA) with map display capabilities using wireless and cell phone connections can be useful in future USACE operations. NYC is promoting the use of electronic maps in order to eliminate paperwork and provide custom and timely information. Any transition from paper based to electronic presentations will involve start up and periodic training for GT users.

6.6. Where should the data reside?

One of the lessons learned from the WTC is that the best infrastructure data resides at the local level. As stated by NYC GT personnel, the USACE should consider providing funding and/or technical assistance to the local communities to help them collect, catalog and manage their local data. The USACE should also share data with the local communities. The result of such efforts would be to establish pre-incident relationships between the USACE and the local communities, improve the local data, and make the USACE a partner with the local community. This appeared to be the case in NYC where the USACE District GIS person worked with the NYC GIS personnel. They stated that they worked well with him and that he understood their data. NYC OEM personnel questioned why he was not available to assist during the response operations. District level Corps GIS personnel are probably in the best position to interface with local GIS organizations before an event. During response operations it may be necessary to assign them to non-mission critical tasks due to the impact on the District USACE organization or for administrative reasons, but they should still have some role in dealing with the local GIS organization. Pre-existing relationships and local area knowledge can go a long way towards establishing and maintaining effective GIS support.

NYC OEM personnel made the point that their situation is not unique. Many municipalities possess accurate and relatively complete spatial data covering their infrastructure. The USACE could use this data in a response and needs to do whatever is necessary to develop relationships and support local communities. Such support relationships are resource intensive and should be prioritized according to a threat profile model that reflects the USACE’s missions.

Additionally, the USACE should keep track of and support as much as practical infrastructure data projects such as the work of Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level Database (HIFLD) and Joint Forces Command. There are many on going parallel efforts to collect and catalog infrastructure data. The USACE is a customer and stakeholder in all these initiatives and should centrally prioritize and coordinate the allocation of resources to such efforts.

	Home About ICDRM Graduate Programs Faculty and Staff Research Publications Events Links FAQs Contact Us	Home » Publications » Assessment of Geospatial Technology... Specific Findings 6.1. Technical on-site Expertise to use GT The ability to visualize and communicate is essential for field teams during a disaster. During the WTC response, field decision makers were responsible for allocating resources during critically short periods of time and under stressful conditions. Effectively managing the use of GTs requires some technical expertise. Apparently, too many GT products unconnected to mission success were generated during the WTC response. Although both ESF #3 Team leaders interviewed expressed a working knowledge of GT and the various GT products, their attention was focused on the actual operations. They did not have the time to consider the application of GT to their work and communicate these needs to a GT provider. Assignment of a technically skilled support person to the team who understands the practical availability of GTs and their operational application, as well as the tactical on-scene situations and conditions, could provide valuable counsel and support to the ESF #3 Team Leaders and improve information flow to and from the ESF #3 Team. 6.2. Availability and Timeliness of data and products Availability of pre-event spatial infrastructure data is a key to successful mapping during emergencies. The rapid re-establishment of NYC EOC was remarkable. Much of the success in re-establishing GIS capability was based on strong, pre-existing, local partnerships related to data sources, contacts, and interagency agreements. The Disaster Field Officer and the ESF#3 Team Leaders, however, received GT products late during their mission due to issues such as network connectivity, data licensing, or other practical issues. It took many days to get a T1 connection to the DFO at Pier 90 and there was no outside connectivity at the Javits Center. It is quite possible that not all of the imagery data that went to the City OEM at Pier 92 found its way to Pier 90. For example LIDAR data was available after September 17th. LIDAR data may have been useful to make more accurate debris estimates had it been acquired earlier but smoke and particulate matter clouds impeded its acquisition. Obtaining imagery very soon after the disaster is critical in estimating debris volume early on. Also, thermal data was not available until six weeks into the operations when its usefulness had all but passed. 6.3. Accuracy and usefulness of data and results It can be inferred that given the very small but highly urbanized geographic area, and the massive presence of local response forces, the WTC operations did not require the full use and power of GTs. Of the hundreds of standard map products generated by the mapping center at the NYC OEM, the vast majority served the primary purpose of communicating the daily and changing situation to the public. The map products were ubiquitous through the media and many were posted on the NYC public access website. Prior to Sept. 11, OEM had a web-based GIS (ArcIMS) application that let the people of NYC enter an address and see the location of the nearest emergency shelter in situations such as a hurricane or storm. The application also models the storm surge impacts on evacuation routes and shelter locations. After the attacks, this emergency management online locator system (EMOLS) was tailored to meet the residents’ needs for information such as locating restricted areas and finding out whether there were any utility outages. As stated in Section 5.1 of this report, Jim McConnell, Manager of NYC OEM GIS Operations provided the GWU Team with a list of the most useful (from the NYC OEM perspective) standard mapping products. The list, included in the Appendix to this report, has been highlighted to indicate the mapping products, updated on a relatively regular basis, which could directly support the USACE ESF#3 missions. The LIDAR data of the debris field was of insufficient accuracy to be used for debris volume and weight estimates so other methods such as GIS modeling were used. LIDAR and digital imagery were acquired and updated daily for the NYC and even if the data were accurate, the repeat coverage was much more frequent than the USACE required for this response. At some point, the DFO at Pier 90 was overwhelmed with the amount of remotely sensed data resulting in the need to assign an individual the task of sorting through the data to identify what was important to the mission. The resolution of the vertical aerial photography was low but it helped determine the layout of the debris sorting and management of the landfill operations to some degree. High-resolution photographic records with periodic updating would improve estimating damage and the amount of debris. Satellite data is useful on a larger scale where multiple jurisdictions are involved but was not at the WTC operations. Imagery from commercial satellites was ruled out immediately due to its low spatial resolution. The USGS generated Digital Orthophoto Quarter-Quads (DOQQs), which the USACE typically uses as base maps during emergency response missions, were of little use at the WTC operations due to the relatively high margin of error (30 Feet). Thermal data maps had limited use due to low accuracy and late availability. The findings indicate that the 3D maps did not have much direct use for on scene operations but were very useful for communicating with non-response personnel with questions concerning the location of buildings, levels of damage to buildings, location of command posts, etc. The availability of these maps, which were posted for general viewing, helped reduce the amount of time and effort required to respond to questions. The problems relating to the use of GT are predominantly data availability and/or compatibility related. 6.4. Interoperability issues – use of different platforms Both ESRI ArcView and MapInfo were used by different agencies during WTC operations. Although MapInfo is the official software platform of FEMA, FEMA Regional offices use both MapInfo and ArcView. As of the date of this report, FEMA has begun working with ArcGIS. USACE personnel predominantly use ESRI products for their daily and response work, and in general are not highly proficient in using MapInfo. USACE personnel detailed to FEMA to support ESF#5 had laptops loaded with ArcView 3.2a and several ArcView extensions such as Transportation Network Analyst, Spatial Analyst, Image Analyst and 3D Analyst. The FEMA ESF#5 GIS coordinator recognized this potential problem and assigned the USACE GIS personnel appropriate tasks. He expressed his satisfaction with the USACE personnel and their ability to adapt to the different software. The mixture of GT software (ESRI and MapInfo) is not noted as a significant impediment but has the potential to slow down operations. Ideally, if FEMA and the USACE are to use different GIS software, those USACE personnel who may be detailed to support ESF#5 would be trained and proficient in both ESRI and MapInfo products. The USACE training initiative (Summer 2002) will provide USACE personnel familiarization with MapInfo. USACE should also consider pre-identifying and prioritizing those personnel who will potentially support ESF #5 for more in-depth training. 6.5. Form of data and products The operational personnel were provided information in a variety of forms including maps, graphs, tables, briefing slides and text material. The timeliness, consistency and simplicity of the decision support material were the most important factors in assisting them in making decisions. Hard copy maps were deemed most practical for field operations and provided a medium for communicating the tactical situation in all weather and light conditions. The printed maps also provided an audit trail to look back at what was done and why. The USACE should think through issues such as map size, map material (waterproof and ability to mark up the map), and map colors (style guide), and develop policies to further maximize the utility of their products for operational personnel. As recommended by NYC OEM personnel and at the May 3rd meeting at FEMA, a next logical step might be to reduce the hardcopy output and to provide portable electronic devices that allow operational personnel to view and mark up digital maps. Handheld devices (PDA) with map display capabilities using wireless and cell phone connections can be useful in future USACE operations. NYC is promoting the use of electronic maps in order to eliminate paperwork and provide custom and timely information. Any transition from paper based to electronic presentations will involve start up and periodic training for GT users. 6.6. Where should the data reside? One of the lessons learned from the WTC is that the best infrastructure data resides at the local level. As stated by NYC GT personnel, the USACE should consider providing funding and/or technical assistance to the local communities to help them collect, catalog and manage their local data. The USACE should also share data with the local communities. The result of such efforts would be to establish pre-incident relationships between the USACE and the local communities, improve the local data, and make the USACE a partner with the local community. This appeared to be the case in NYC where the USACE District GIS person worked with the NYC GIS personnel. They stated that they worked well with him and that he understood their data. NYC OEM personnel questioned why he was not available to assist during the response operations. District level Corps GIS personnel are probably in the best position to interface with local GIS organizations before an event. During response operations it may be necessary to assign them to non-mission critical tasks due to the impact on the District USACE organization or for administrative reasons, but they should still have some role in dealing with the local GIS organization. Pre-existing relationships and local area knowledge can go a long way towards establishing and maintaining effective GIS support. NYC OEM personnel made the point that their situation is not unique. Many municipalities possess accurate and relatively complete spatial data covering their infrastructure. The USACE could use this data in a response and needs to do whatever is necessary to develop relationships and support local communities. Such support relationships are resource intensive and should be prioritized according to a threat profile model that reflects the USACE’s missions. Additionally, the USACE should keep track of and support as much as practical infrastructure data projects such as the work of Homeland Infrastructure Foundation Level Database (HIFLD) and Joint Forces Command. There are many on going parallel efforts to collect and catalog infrastructure data. The USACE is a customer and stakeholder in all these initiatives and should centrally prioritize and coordinate the allocation of resources to such efforts.	In This Section » Assessment of Geospatial Technology Applications by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers during World Trade Center Operations List of Acronyms Executive Summary 1. Introduction 2. The GWU Team Scope and Approach 3. The September 11, 2001 Attacks Revisited 4. Role of USACE at the WTC Response Operations 5. General Findings 6. Specific Findings 7. Conclusions and Recommendations 8. Bibliography 9. Appendix
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