5. Summary of Findings

1. The response system designed for natural disasters was effective for managing the consequences of a terrorist attack. This system includes local Incident Management built on the principles of the Incident Command System (ICS), Unified Command, and Mutual Aid and mobilization and integration of Federal and state resources in accordance with the Federal Response Plan (FRP). Arlington, Fairfax, and Alexandria Counties drew upon 20 years of mutual aid experience. The Arlington County Incident Commander, for example, used a Fairfax County mobile command vehicle as the site for the Unified Command Center. The ability of the Arlington County Fire Department (ACFD) to rapidly establish an ICS based organizational structure was the key to success. The ACFD and other local fire departments use the ICS for all operations. “Everyone knew that Arlington County was the Incident Commander” and  “everyone in the ICS structure knew this is not about turf, it’s about getting the job done ” were among the comments recorded in our interviews.
2. Unified Command works well for coordinating multiple disparate assets. The Unified Command of ACFD, FBI, Arlington County Police, DOD Military District of Washington and the FEMA USAR Incident Support Team were established during the first day. While most fire services practice ICS, they rarely exercise or actually use Unified Command. A clear learning curve for UC implementation and use was evident during the initial operational periods during the Pentagon response, and was successfully accomplished in part due to the openness to advice of ACFD command staff, and the UC experience of some of the senior mutual aid and federal responders.
3. Federal assets and teams, were obtained through the Federal Response Plan structure, and were effectively used. Federal resources mobilized for the Pentagon and the World Trade Center included search and rescue teams, disaster mortuary teams disaster medical teams, medical response teams EPA Hazmat teams, US Army Corps of Engineers debris removal teams and American Red Cross mass care resources. Some of these resources (e.g. DMORTS, DMATS were mobilized but not deployed to the Pentagon since they were not needed to support responders). The mobilization of federal resources occurred despite the fact that senior Federal and State emergency managers were isolated in Big Sky, Montana at an emergency management conference. The federal response organization was created and the federal mobilization was successfully executed by skilled mid and upper level managers. The Catastrophic Disaster Response Group, the interagency group of senior managers tasked with resolving problems during a disaster response, was never needed nor convened.
4. The Pentagon response was effective: An effective on-scene response organization was rapidly created. Goals were defined and met. The response required the local first response organization (Arlington County Fire Department) to coordinate a complex meta-organization consisting of organizations from different communities: emergency response (fire, rescue, EMT), emergency management, law enforcement, and the military. The Unified Command created and executed response plans and coordinated these plans with FEMA, the FBI, and DOD. The Arlington County EOC was established within 30 minutes of the event, and supported the first responders through the Incident Command System. The FBI and FEMA established a Joint Operations Center at Fort Myers that effectively coordinated with the on-scene incident command. Co-location of Incident Command off-site at a JOC was demonstrated to be sub-optimal despite a good-faith effort to make it work.
5. The complex organization that evolved was based upon “ICS”, but creativity and coordination resulted in a flexible, effective organization. “Management” rather than “Command” approaches may have contributed to the success of the effective coordination of multiple disparate organizations such as fire services, DoD, FBI, and US&R. Very few of the responders and managers participating in the response to the Pentagon had ever responded to a terrorist attack. The fact that this attack took place in metropolitan Washington, and was on the headquarters building of the U.S. military meant that many organizations would be involved and many organizational issues that were totally unanticipated by response planners would occur. Issues such as the relationship between military and local responders (the ACFD was in charge) and the responsibility for identification of remains (DOD was in charge) were handled professionally and rapidly. The incident management structure was a point of departure for creative, effective management … not a strait jacket.
6. Effectively coordinating organizations with the diverse organizational cultures of first responders, military, medical, and law enforcement in a complex disaster response is a difficult issue for incident managers. As asked by one senior participant: “How do you, beyond ICS, blend the cultures of local assets and military assets?” More than one interviewee pointed out that pre-established relationships between federal law enforcement and local responders greatly eased potential organizational problems. Unified Command is a concept used in the United States for major hazardous material incidents and technological accidents, but has not been formally incorporated into the Federal Response Plan. Organizational familiarity with each other was a key factor in the successful coordination of response organizations. Personal relationships appeared helpful, but not as critical as familiarity with the organizational roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of each other’s assets.
7. Information Management and Media Relations are critical to actual and perceived success. The response was hindered in the early hours by conflicting and uncertain external information. For example, rescue operations were suspended and the site evacuated based on rumors of an additional incoming plane. On site communications were established using radios (common frequencies pre-established through mutual aid agreements) and cell phones (assisted by “cells on wheels”). “Media management was a ‘huge’ issue in this incident” according to a senior manager. Very early in the process, a media site was established at a gasoline station / mini-mart within camera view of the site, and periodic media briefings were provided. This minimized, but did not eliminate, erroneous and conflicting information in media reportage.
8. Perimeter control is key to establishing effective management systems and must be a formal objective and process in any incident. This is particularly critical during the response to a terrorist attack when the first responders themselves are a secondary target.

During the Pentagon response, a complex management situation involving very disparate entities under severe stress responded surprisingly well. Unfortunately, this is unlikely to be the last time that first responders and emergency managers face the challenge of managing the consequences of a deliberate mass terrorism event. The fact that systems worked is important. Documenting why they worked and communicating that knowledge is essential to organizational learning for the entities that responded and for response organizations throughout the United States. The United States faces an uncertain future, and improving consequence management systems to meet the terrorist threat is a national priority. The organizational issues discussed in this report should continue to be identified, studied, and documented as our response system evolves in the aftermath of the tragedy of September 11, 2001.