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ower and Partnership with Pyongyang: A Precarious Balance

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A product of both the division of the Korean peninsula and international isolation, the present situation in North Korea exhibits a familiar pattern of threats and brinkmanship. The policy options for Washington vary from military action, to awaiting the collapse of the North Korean regime, to offering inducement—as was the case in 1993-94—but the only long-term solution is multi-track diplomacy. As a creative alternative, multi-track diplomacy includes all of the regional players and encourages relations in several layers, from grassroots organizing through NGOs and businesses, to governmental relations in a multilateral setting. Peace and stability will only be achieved through connecting North Korea to the international community via political, cultural, economic, educational, and civil society ties.¹

Through the latter half of 2002 and into 2003, North Korea gained increasing attention in the news, and Kim Jong-Il, chairman of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), appeared on the cover of several of the United States' most prominent magazines. From the announcement of a secret nuclear program in violation of international agreements to the discharging of United Nations weapons inspectors to impassioned rhetoric threatening first strikes, Pyongyang continued to intensify the bellicosity of its threats toward its neighbors and the United States. Kim Jong-Il first admitted to the kidnapping of 15 Japanese citizens, and then admitted to the existence of a nuclear weapons program less than a month later. Although not surprising to those familiar with North Korea, these admissions caught many off-guard, and analysts scrambled to explain the DPRK's intentions. Since then, the

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North Koreans have fired several short-range missile tests, but finally agreed to come to the bargaining table within a multilateral framework. However, the inconclusive meetings in Beijing show that finding a solution will take more time.²

In this assessment, we offer policy recommendations to address North Korea's nuclear program and the current tensions in Northeast Asia.³ The analysis first examines the origins of today's situation in order to find the most practicable solution. A closer look at the events of the North Korean crisis of 1993-94, a period similar to the troubled times of today, can provide lessons to guide future policy. We then turn to the current situation and assess why it presents a problem for regional and global interests. After establishing parameters for inherent problems, this paper will examine the North's original motives, considered "varied and diverse," for beginning its weapons program.⁴ The assessment will then provide an overview of recently espoused policy options, most of which are less than appealing.

Our recommendations seek to expand problem-solving beyond United States diplomacy, while still appreciating the central role the U.S. will play in any resolution, and beyond the current nuclear situation, including the origins of North Korean actions as a foundation. Former Defense Secretary William Perry has recommended the need for a "creative and aggressive program in diplomacy" to address the existing North Korean nuclear program and related diplomatic tensions.⁵ Our final recommendations provide a creative alternative based foremost on multilateral and multi-level interaction.

Divergence on the Korean Peninsula

History must provide the context for any assessment of today's situation. Prior to the division of the Korean peninsula, Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910 had left its mark. Korean intellectuals began to consider and debate the possibilities for an independent Korean nation during the Japanese colonial period.⁶ The old elites were interested in maintaining their status, while others felt a more egalitarian, socialist system could lead Korea. While there clearly were ideological differences within Korea, the division became geographic following the Japan's surrender during World War II and then political after the Korean War. The partition of Korea into North and South along the 38th parallel was, and remains, problematic. The country was not only physically divided, but also ideologically separated during the Cold War. Both divisions have had lasting effects.

With the onset of the Soviet Union's domination of the North, a young leader who had fought against the Japanese emerged to carry the Communist flag. The charismatic Kim Il-Sung was only 33 years old when he took center stage. Chosen by the Soviets, he succeeded in purging any opposition to his position by the end of the 1960s, and later, in a dynastic move, appointed his eldest son Kim Jong-Il as his successor. A family cult emerged and the rule of the Kims became shrouded in secrecy. In an important ideological innovation, the elder Kim developed a North Ko-

rean ideology of self-reliance, or *juche*, socialism.⁷ Since its inception, this ideology has served as the intellectual basis of the North Korean regime. However, Kim Il-Sung's intentions to turn the tide with his new socialist spirit were not limited to the North; he had always meant for *juche* socialism to ultimately extend to a unified Korea.⁸

With the tacit approval of the Soviet Union, the "Fatherland Liberation War" was launched in 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea. The South Koreans and forces fighting under the UN banner repelled the invaders and pushed into North Korean territory, but were driven back from the North when the Chinese entered the war. Despite the aid of Chinese forces, the North was ultimately forced to concede at the 38th parallel. While a demilitarized zone was established along this line, there was no peace treaty. Each side declared victory, and the division between the two Koreas has continued to the present day.

Northeast Asia-DPRK Relations

North Korean relations with other regional powers have been defined by Cold War politics. The Soviet Union assumed responsibility for restoring North Korea following WWII. The DPRK received significant aid from the USSR, especially in industrial development and energy production. Its recognition as a Communist state allowed Pyongyang to have special trade relations with other nations in the Eastern bloc. In addition to the Soviet Union, the North's other major ally was the People's Republic of China (PRC). Even though the relationship between the two nations has cooled considerably since the time when former PRC chairman Mao Zedong called it "as close as lips and teeth," the words "friendship" and "cooperation" are still used to describe PRC-DPRK relations.⁹ Politically, economically, and militarily, North Korea has benefited from maintaining this relationship, especially after the collapse of Sino-Soviet relations in the mid-1950s, after which North Korea successfully played the two countries against each other for decades.

To the south and east of North Korea lie the allies of the U.S. camp. Despite the strained political relations between South Korea (Republic of Korea, ROK) and Japan, their alliances with the United States have ensured ongoing cooperation. ROK-Japan relations deepened in the 1960s as economic ties began to build between the two nations. Under heavy U.S. pressure, the ROK and Japan normalized relations in 1965 despite continued tensions over Japan's pre-war and wartime occupation of South Korea.¹⁰ These two sets of trilateral relations (ROK-US-Japan and DPRK-PRC-USSR) effectively maintained a political balance in the region until the end of the Cold War, and even earlier with the onset of vastly unequal regional economic development.

Economic Reversal

Economic development on the Korean peninsula began before the end of WWII, when the Japanese used Korea as a source of both food and industrial goods to contribute to its war effort. The geographical locations of these sectors are significant to later economic growth patterns. About two-thirds of the industrial manufacturing occurred in the North, which was closer to the railroads connected to northern China, whereas the agricultural sectors were based in the South. Thus, when Korea was split by the allied powers, North Korea was substantially more advanced in terms of industrialization.

At the time, North Korean development far outpaced that of the South, and Kim Il-Sung embraced Soviet industrialization policies. The North's economic policies became linked with the *juche* ideology, placing emphasis on heavy industry and minimizing foreign trade. In accordance with *juche*, agriculture was collectivized as a measure to increase efficiency. The North launched several three-, five-, and seven-year plans, which increased output in many areas but then lost steam in the 1970s. Subsequent economic plans were constructed to attain the missed goals of previous plans.¹¹

Meanwhile, the South Korean economy, which had been stagnant, began to take off under the 1960s industrial policy of Park Chung-Hee. President Park had clear goals for modernization and allowed for the creation of *chaebol*, conglomerates that developed across several industries, beginning with heavy industry.¹² South Korean economic development grew at such a rate that it was dubbed an "economic miracle." By the mid-1970s the South Korean economy rivaled and then surpassed that of the North. As the ROK's economy grew at a tremendous rate, North Korea's allies began to seek out economic relations with South Korea.

While the ROK's economy boomed in the 1980s, the DPRK's economy headed toward disaster, which was hastened by the collapse of the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union ended its trade partnership with North Korea, which had provided about 40 percent of DPRK imports. Russia then began calling for the repayment of debts. As for China, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping began a series of economic reforms that were inconsistent with the Chinese Communist policies of the past. Kim Il-Sung, due to his strict belief in the socialist system, denounced China's reforms. However, by the early 1990s, the North Korean economy had collapsed, and Kim Il-Sung reluctantly turned to China for assistance.¹³

The economic collapse of North Korea was well documented.¹⁴ The materials submitted to the International Monetary Fund in late 1997 indicated that it was not North Korea's agricultural industry that initially failed—it was the once-vaunted industrial sector.¹⁵ As the situation in North Korea worsened, many nations contributed aid to the struggling nation. Significantly, China was and remains by far the greatest donor of food and crude oil. The famine of the 1990s did not cause the collapse of the North Korean regime, as many had predicted. But it did contribute to

instability in the region.

Origins of the North Korean Threat

The fact that the Korean War did not end in 1952 is persistently troublesome, not only for the two Koreas but also for the region as a whole. Both the North and South have maintained standing armies along the demilitarized zone for the past 50 years. In addition, the United States has kept a force of about 37,000 troops in South Korea.¹⁶ The DPRK has one of the largest standing armies in the region with an estimated one million troops. Moreover, despite food shortages and other economic problems, North Korea has continued to sustain its military. However, the size of the military alone is not the largest security threat emanating from North Korea. As recent events have shown, there is also the looming issue of a nuclear weapons program.

As North Korea's economic base began to fail, so did its security. The problem was twofold. First, unable to feed its people, the North was forced to look to external relations for help. Although this did not necessarily defy the *juche* ideology, to maintain legitimacy, it was still imperative for the regime to keep the North Korean people from learning the extent of the famine. Second, the economic growth that had occurred in both Japan and South Korea caused North Korea's two allies, China and Russia, to seek better relations with those two nations. A threat to the security of the DPRK regime was thus created both internally from economic decay and externally from weakening alliances. The additional constraint of having to alter its security practices to fit global standards was imposed on North Korea when it joined the United Nations in September 1991. Earlier, in order for the DPRK to prove itself as a responsible nation, it had signed the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).¹⁷ Together, these actions created international pressure for North Korea to abide by international norms, or at least to maintain the appearance that it was doing so.

In 1993, the culmination of these various pressures resulted in the first nuclear crisis between North Korea and the United States. Until this time, external factors in the region had been pushing the DPRK toward reconciliation with the South. For example, a surprise visit to Beijing by U.S. President Nixon in 1972 restored diplomatic relations between the U.S. and China. This was followed by a reconciliation agreement between the North and the South. Then, after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, the two Koreas signed the Basic Agreement. Relations seemed to be moving forward until the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found suspicious traces of missing nuclear material in 1993.¹⁸ In response to increasing pressures to halt any nuclear program, North Korea announced its withdrawal from the NPT.¹⁹

The nuclear crisis with North Korea in the early 1990s mirrors the present situation in two aspects. First, instead of responding to international, and predominantly U.S., pressure in a diplomatic manner, the DPRK demanded unilateral concessions as a pre-condition for negotiations. Second, the regime took an aggressive

stance, raising the stakes of the crisis to the level of war. Although not all of the North's demands were met, in 1994 the United States and North Korea signed the Geneva Agreed Framework. The DPRK agreed to dismantle its nuclear program in return for long-term economic assistance in the form of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), which would also involve South Korea and Japan.²⁰ Additionally, the Framework laid the foundation for North Korea to rejoin the NPT.²¹

While the mid-1990s saw some improvements in North Korea's regional relations, the signing of the Agreed Framework did not signify the end of the North Korean threat. Kim Jong-Il assumed power in 1997 and seemed to follow the leadership style of his father, albeit without his father's charisma.²² In 1995, North Korea requested help from the World Food Programme for the first time. Then in 1997, the Four Party Talks took place in Geneva with the United States, China, and the two Koreas. By this time, KEDO's light water nuclear reactor project had also been launched. But by 1998, things had again begun to fall apart. Delays in U.S. delivery of heavy fuel oil (part of the Agreed Framework) and fading prospects of the U.S. lifting sanctions imposed during the 1993-94 crisis caused the North Koreans to threaten to halt the canning of spent fuel rods. The United States responded by warning them against reprocessing the rods.²³ Again, the North escalated the crisis by launching an intermediate-range Taepodong missile over Japan in 1998.²⁴

The missile launch was clearly a threat to the Japanese, who promptly rescinded food aid and any contributions to the development of KEDO. It also affected the Agreed Framework by weakening U.S. will to continue to maintain the agreement. However, in terms of North-South relations, South Korea's election of Kim Dae-Jung, a vocal proponent for moving toward reconciliation, allowed inter-Korean dialogue to continue. South Korean President Kim's famed "Sunshine Policy" of engaging the North and building relations through local exchanges was tested and held fast, even with the discovery of a North Korean submariner in South Korea in 1998.²⁵ The "Sunshine Policy" reached a peak in 2000 with the historic June summit between the two Kims, for which South Korean President Kim Dae-Jung received the Nobel Peace prize. Relations again seemed to be moving along a positive track. But in the last decade Northeast Asia has experienced the familiar pattern of crises initiated by North Korea followed by negotiations.

The 2002-2003 Crisis

Despite improvements as of the year 2000, including the Kim-Kim Summit, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's Pyongyang visit, and the presence of a unified Korean team at the 2000 Olympics, the counterproductive pattern of North Korean diplomacy has emerged again.²⁶ The drastic devolution of diplomacy into nuclear weapons threats, diplomatic chaos, and rebuked international agreements substantially resembles the situation of the early 1990s. In his 2002 State of the

Union address, President Bush defined an “Axis of Evil,” which included North Korea. Although an immediate DPRK media response to this characterization was surprisingly absent, other regional governments, especially Beijing, Moscow, and Tokyo, opposed such an isolation of Pyongyang.²⁷ A North Korean response came soon after when television broadcasts described the address as “a slew of reckless remarks that indiscriminately picked on us, saying that our country develops and possesses weapons of mass destruction.”²⁸ Then, in October 2002, soon after Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi held a historic Pyongyang Summit with Kim Jong-Il, U.S. State Department representatives visited North Korea and confronted North Korean officials with intelligence on the DPRK’s enriched uranium weapons effort. At the time, Pyongyang officials asserted their right to “possess not only nuclear weapons but any type of weapon more powerful.”²⁹

Since then, a high-profile brinkmanship strategy has characterized U.S. and North Korean rhetoric and interaction. The U.S. ended fuel aid, increased reconnaissance flights, and forward deployed bombers to the Pacific in preparation for a North Korean contingency. Pyongyang, in turn, kicked out IAEA inspectors, reactivated the nuclear power plant at the Yongbyon facility, renounced the NPT, threatened first strikes on U.S. soil, test-fired ballistic missiles, and shadowed a U.S. reconnaissance flight.³⁰ The regime also spouted rhetoric implying the commencement of spent fuel rod reprocessing, a requirement for weapons-grade plutonium development.³¹

At the same time, brinkmanship has been tempered by limited track-two discussions between U.S. and North Korean representatives, as well as by the efforts of regional governments, including South Korea and Japan, to talk directly with Pyongyang. New Mexico Governor and former UN Ambassador Bill Richardson met with North Korean officials in New York in January and February 2003 to maintain a channel of track-two dialogue. Later, U.S. Special Envoy Jack Pritchard continued these low-level, back-channel meetings.³²

Meanwhile, North Korea continued to demand a non-aggression pact before official talks could begin, while the U.S. required an end to the DPRK nuclear program as a precursor. In addition, North Korea’s view of the regional balance of power placed the U.S. at the apex.³³ As such, Pyongyang refused to negotiate with any state other than the U.S., although DRPK media characterizes the U.S. as pursuing a “policy of evil against the Korean nation, its reunification and peace.”³⁴ The U.S., on the other hand, required any official talks to occur in a multilateral setting, involving other regional players.³⁵

The Problem

Even now, as the multilateral and non-preconditional talks have advanced through April 2003 and will likely expand in the early Fall, Pyongyang’s nuclear program remains a complicated policy problem for the region.³⁶ Officials continue to find a solution difficult and may face more brinkmanship on both sides. This

problem involves more than the security interests of the U.S.: it is both multilateral, applying to regional and world actors, and multifaceted, addressing more than solely military security threats. Japan is concerned both with regional stability and the safe return of the families of Japanese citizens abducted by the North Korean government over the last 40 years.³⁷ China and Russia have an urgent interest in maintaining stability and DPRK regime security, in order to both maintain diplomatic relations with Pyongyang and to prevent a refugee crisis or a nuclear confrontation.³⁸ China has hosted U.S.-North Korea talks,³⁹ while Russian leaders have publicly expressed waning patience with North Korean tactics⁴⁰ and promoted the U.S.-backed multilateral forums.

On the peninsula, South Korea's new President Roh Moo-hyun inherits the North-South tension. Maintaining stability on the peninsula and reconciling popular anti-American sentiment with security necessities will dominate his concerns.⁴¹ South Korea is pressured by North Korean requests for the South's support in its confrontation with the U.S., and strained U.S.-South Korean relations weaken the South's position in the region.⁴² The imminent redeployment of all U.S. troops 100 miles south of the DMZ (south of Seoul) adds another layer of complication to the Washington-Seoul-Pyongyang triangle. President Roh has advocated the postponement of this redeployment until resolution of the North Korea nuclear issue, while Washington has refused.⁴³

While not the sole concern of the parties to the crisis given the multifaceted nature of the North Korean challenge, military security remains the most significant factor in the current situation. The Taepodong missile test over Japan in 1998 demonstrated Pyongyang's ballistic missile range. Based on that test, analysts estimated that the 1998 technology could reach Beijing, Seoul, Tokyo, and much of southeast Russia. With improvements over the last five years, today's range likely includes much of eastern Russia, all of China, Southeast Asia, and some of the western United States.⁴⁴ Beyond the actual threat of a direct strike, North Korean nuclear weapon development could cause destabilization of the Korean peninsula and surrounding states, leading to a nuclear arms race in the region. One possible scenario starts with North Korean nuclear development, which in turn leads to the initiation of a South Korean nuclear program, and then to Japan responding with its own nuclear program. A regional fear of Japanese nuclear capability could then lead to enhancement of nuclear development in China.⁴⁵ For years, even Japan's strong preference for nuclear energy sources as a substitute for oil has concerned neighbors because this technology makes development of nuclear weapons easier.⁴⁶ An arms race would be disastrous to Asia's interests, as well as to the world's interest in Asia's economic sustainability and political stability.

Another security-related risk, given the fiscal straits of the North Korean economy, is the possibility of nuclear arms sales to non-state actors, specifically to terrorists. The alleged North Korea-Pakistan link for uranium enrichment technol-

ogy alludes to a “murky relationship” between Pakistan’s A.Q. Khan Nuclear Research Labs and the North Korean military. Although this connection is unconfirmed by the U.S. government, those who have reviewed this intelligence characterized some of North Korea’s technology as having “‘Made in Pakistan’ stamped all over it.”⁴⁷ This connection shows the ease of nuclear technology trade between government-backed entities. The threat from non-governmental actors is even more acute. Even analysts who downplay the North Korean threat admit that “the only nuclear threat to the United States from North Korea is indirect, in the potential transfer of such capabilities to third parties. Pyongyang has shown no aversion to selling weapons to anyone with the hard currency or barter to pay for them.”⁴⁸ Beyond purposefully selling these capabilities, poor technical expertise and weak safeguards on existing North Korean weapons could pave the way for accidental or unintended use of nuclear capabilities by untrained technicians or disillusioned military leaders.

North Korea’s violation of a number of international agreements has also put the credibility of those agreements at risk. The NPT regime increases “states’ confidence about the limits of their potential adversaries’ nuclear programs,” while the IAEA “creates monitoring capabilities and enforcement incentives” to support that confidence.⁴⁹ Some analysts fear that the example of North Korea going nuclear “would erode the basis of the global nonproliferation regime.”⁵⁰ Further complicating any solution to the security situation, this region comprises one-third of global trade.⁵¹ A worldwide interest in the continuity and stability of the region’s economic links is primary in any consideration of addressing North Korea’s nuclear program.

Motivations

Many of the early and mid-1990s international agreements with North Korea were motivated by fears of the economic, security, and political ramifications of a nuclearized Korean peninsula. However, throughout early 2003, the DPRK regime has withdrawn from these commitments, most notably the 1991 peninsula agreement to maintain non-nuclear status on both sides of the DMZ.⁵² U.S. intelligence sources estimate that nuclear weapons development efforts began in North Korea as early as the 1950s. In 1955, the two nations signed an “Agreement on Science and Technology Cooperation Between the USSR and the DPRK,” which allowed for the training of North Korean specialists in nuclear research.⁵³ The first Soviet-supplied nuclear reactor arrived in the DPRK in 1965. The North’s research capabilities continued to grow, and by the late 1980s Yongbyon was capable of processing significant amounts of plutonium.⁵⁴ The motivations for these early efforts to develop nuclear capabilities came in response to the build-up of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on the southern side of the 38th parallel following the Korean War, and later, uncertainty in relations between the North’s two closest allies—the Soviet Union and China.

This security motivation still drives much of DPRK policy today, especially given the shifting economic balance of power in favor of South Korea and the loss of

Soviet support. In 2000, as officials advanced relations with South Korea and the U.S., the North was still moving forward with its uranium enrichment project, an indication of the regime's overriding emphasis on security. In October 2002, Pyongyang blamed its nuclear program continuation on the U.S.: "As far as the nuclear issue on the Korean Peninsula is concerned, it cropped up as the U.S. has massively stockpiled nuclear weapons in South Korea and its vicinity and threatened the DPRK... for nearly half a century."⁵⁵

However, in addition to these realist motivations of military power balance, domestic and normative concerns are often equally strong reasons for countries to pursue nuclear proliferation.⁵⁶ Domestic concerns plague the struggling DPRK regime. Strong absolute military power and an impression of strength relative to the ROK and the U.S. are really the only mechanisms legitimizing the rule of DPRK leaders, especially as recent economic hardship has prevented any economic legitimacy. Fear of the regime and indoctrination, both institutionalized in the military, seem to be the only methods for maintaining its legitimacy on a domestic level.

Second, analysts note that even over the last several years, "North Korean leaders appear to have placed considerable importance on improving relations with the United States."⁵⁷ Indeed, recognition by the United States is seen as a significant motivation for Pyongyang: "For North Korea, the recognition that would come from sitting across the table with the world's superpower would be priceless."⁵⁸ Without the economic wherewithal to prove global power, nuclear weapons represent an alternative in the minds of North Korean leaders, who employ a largely realist ideology when conducting foreign affairs. Whether recognition is a key motivation or not, increasing brinkmanship behavior, just as in the mid-1990s, serves as a "ubiquitous tool of diplomacy and a flexible support system for the North's overriding goal of regime preservation by drawing attention to the North, providing access to much-needed foreign investment and political relations, and establishing a firmer power basis for... Kim Jong-Il."⁵⁹ The various announcements and the North's actions are largely aimed at "escalating the pressure on Washington to begin direct talks."⁶⁰

Current U.S. Policy Prescriptions

Despite North Korea's motivations and the varied interests of the key Northeast Asian players, many of the policy options offered by the academic and policymaking communities in the U.S. have revolved around narrow solutions that only address security concerns. These options can be categorized in three types: military action, awaiting/causing state collapse, and inducements or concessions. After addressing each of these choices, we will propose a more creative and aggressive option.

Military

The 2002 U.S. National Security Strategy proclaimed:

America will act against...emerging threats before they are fully formed. We cannot defend America and our friends by hoping for the best. So we must be prepared to defeat our enemies' plans... History will judge harshly those who saw this coming danger but failed to act. In the new world we have entered, the only path to peace and security is the path of action.⁶¹

Preemption offers a clear option for action against North Korea. Michael O'Hanlon of the Brookings Institute specifies two levels of preemption: tactical and strategic. Tactical preemption in the North Korean case would involve a surgical strike on the Yongbyon facilities to preempt Pyongyang's ability to extract plutonium. This action would resemble the Israeli strike on Iraq's Osirak nuclear facilities in 1981. Key concerns with this strike are the possibility of releasing radioactivity and the response from North Korea, including possible conventional attacks on Seoul or Tokyo. Strategic preemption, however, sets the primary goal as the overthrow of the DPRK regime. Regime change would require a war that would likely devastate to the surrounding area. It is expected that casualties would include hundreds of thousands of people, especially around Seoul.⁶²

Other military options currently discussed are equally objectionable because they provide no proactive initiative to stop the current nuclear build-up in North Korea. Former Secretary of Defense William Perry recommends increasing deterrence in the region to provide a credible threat of U.S. action if North Korean development of nuclear weapons continues. Perry also suggests a red line for defense activity: the commencement of plutonium reprocessing at Yongbyon.⁶³ However, North Korea announced in mid-April that this reprocessing was already underway, demonstrating that this line may have already been crossed.⁶⁴ As another military option, noted columnist Charles Krauthammer has recommended the nuclear arming of Japan as a deterrent response to North Korean nuclear development.⁶⁵

State Collapse

Beyond military action, several policies have been presented to either encourage or await the collapse of the North Korean state. The early policy of the Bush Administration after Kelly's October visit was to take no concrete action. According to Ivo Daalder, the Administration "decided not to declare it a crisis in the hope that it would therefore go away."⁶⁶ There was also an early effort to isolate the North Korean regime through passive diplomacy, whereby regional actors worked together to refuse to engage the regime. However, cooperation among states with fairly divergent interests—especially in light of China's and Russia's diplomatic relations with North Korea—has proven difficult. Neither of these governments wants North Korean regime collapse.⁶⁷

The third option geared toward state collapse is tailored containment, which is really a combination of pressure and isolation. This option argues that a series of benefits provided to the North Korean government, including fuel oil, could be taken away. This strategy also calls for coordinating regional pressure on the regime and instituting additional “sticks,” such as enhanced economic sanctions. Former Secretary of State James Baker has recommended tailored containment, favoring rigorous economic and political sanctions as a “more muscular policy approach.” The memory of “caving” to North Korea in 1994 only to have its nuclear programs resurface makes today’s policymakers want to avoid a similar situation.⁶⁸

Inducement

Since the entire output of the DPRK economy equals only 4 percent of the U.S. defense budget, the effects of sticks such as economic sanctions are negligible. Victor Cha describes the benefits of inducements over injunctions: “Carrots can be effective sticks later on, particularly when you have a country like North Korea, which doesn’t have very much.”⁶⁹ Providing certain concessions to the North Korean leadership to assure an end to the nuclear program revisits the 1994 policy choice. Nonetheless, because it solved the 1994 tensions, if not the core problems, inducement is a popular option.

The first type of inducement involves removing U.S. troops from South Korea. This policy option is popular with many American citizens who see little value in placing American troops at direct risk while protecting a country “on the other side of the world.” Moreover, this option has the potential to solve some existing problems with the U.S.-South Korea relationship, especially South Korean protests over U.S. troop behavior.⁷⁰ Troop removal would obviate such protest, while also removing a direct threat from North Korea’s borders.⁷¹ Lacking that direct threat, some analysts assume North Korea would back down from its hostile posture. Recent Pentagon announcements of scheduled U.S. troop withdrawal from the DMZ signal some effort in this direction. However, the accompanying Pentagon rhetoric indicates that these troop redeployments are geared toward war strategy, not toward easing tensions.⁷²

The second inducement option is to appease the North Koreans with tangible concessions such as a non-aggression pact from the U.S., energy and food aid, economic development assistance, and corporate investment by Japan and other sources. All of these potential concessions have all been discussed during back-channel negotiations and formal meetings between the U.S. and North Korea.⁷³

Policy Options: Assessment

The above options are not necessarily the best solutions as they all have specific flaws. For example, any option involving military action, be it tactical strikes or a full-scale strategic invasion, invites retaliation. Kim Jong-Il’s domestic legiti-

macy and credibility as a ruler would depend on his reaction to any strikes, and would likely cause him to order a retaliatory strike on South Korea or Japan.

Options involving brinksmanship, increased deterrence, or the nuclearization of Japan are flawed as well. In the past, the North Koreans have given no indication that they are willing to step back from the brink; on the contrary, their strategy usually features further escalation. The window of opportunity for a deterrence approach fades every day, as the North Koreans move closer to having nuclear weapons. If the U.S. and its allies do not attack when Kim is building his weapons, they are unlikely to attack when he has nuclear weapons deployed and ready for action. Furthermore, a nuclear-capable Japan would do nothing but further destabilize the region, since so many other countries are suspicious of a strong Japan. Lastly, the inducement-based solutions to the 1993-94 nuclear crisis with North Korea and the subsequent failure of those solutions indicate a poor record of success for using carrots when negotiating with Pyongyang.

The current crisis begs for a creative and comprehensive solution that will prevent the same dilemma from arising in five years. There is also a need to engage Kim Jong-Il and the North Koreans so that they do not resort to more drastic measures to get the attention of the U.S. Strong evidence points to the conclusion that the North Koreans have two nuclear weapons, and their recent activity suggests that they will soon be able to build more at an accelerating rate.⁷⁴

Multi-Track Diplomacy: A Creative Alternative

The goal of the U.S. and its allies should be to ensure that the North Korean objective does not become large-scale proliferation, building 5-10 weapons each year, as some Western experts claim is possible.⁷⁵ In negotiations, it must be clear to the North Koreans that more is gained through engagement than through nuclear blackmail or the sale of WMDs to terrorists. To achieve these goals, the situation calls for an integrated solution addressing the many areas of unease. Multi-track diplomacy refers to a systems approach to peace building that integrates traditional government-to-government negotiations as well as the participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), business groups, private citizens, and the media to create a mutually reinforcing cycle of increasingly productive engagement.⁷⁶ It is this type of systems-oriented solution that holds the greatest hope for resolution of the Korean dilemma.

Ties between states are relationships that exist on numerous levels. Political, cultural, economic, educational, and civil societal dimensions reinforce the inter-state relationship as a whole. When a political row occurs, the existence of the other dimensions keeps the relationship strong. Multi-track diplomacy creates deeper relationships than traditional state-to-state diplomacy and gives nations more incentives to abide by agreements. It also makes the diplomatic process more durable and flexible. By cultivating multiple, simultaneous strands of diplomacy this method ensures that a dialogue continues even when disputes and temporary cessations of negotia-

tions occur between governments. Moreover, this approach makes room at the negotiating table for more stakeholders. The problems North Korea faces are mixed—economic, social, and humanitarian—so the current crisis is not just a problem for governments. There are numerous underlying factors that have led North Korea down the nuclear path, and multi-track diplomacy addresses several factors simultaneously and comprehensively. It also has the added advantage of laying the foundation for North Korea's future participation in a host of international agreements, from environmental treaties to extradition pacts to weapons agreements, ultimately embedding North Korea in the international community.

Extra-governmental strategies can also ease the perceived bias of the negotiating structure. North Korea has repeatedly claimed that the United States has been unfair in its demands. It can easily be argued that the U.S. approach to diplomacy is unpredictable, given the fact that its direction is subject to change with administrations every four to eight years. Furthermore, it can be claimed that at times the U.S. ignores international criticism in pursuit of a unilateral agenda. This diplomacy-through-strength can create satisfactory short-term solutions for all nations involved; however, in the long run the failures of this approach become apparent. Citizens' groups, businesses, and other interests that can establish relations with counterparts in North Korea can work toward goals that are in the best interest of all nations, crafting mutually beneficial initiatives. Therefore, if North Korea sees the position and demands of the U.S. as unreasonable, several other avenues are available for action. Multilateral actors also tend to be more innovative and willing to take risks than governments.

A Need for Multilateral Involvement

Coordinating these various strands is easier said than done, however. Given the complexity of this approach and the necessity of incorporating various interests and perspectives, the most effective administrative body would be an oversight panel including diplomatic experts and representatives from Japan, South Korea, Russia, China, and the United States. Delegates from North Korea would also be involved in order to ensure transparency and increase trust. Such a panel would facilitate a singular, coordinated negotiating agenda. This panel would monitor and coordinate the activities of all the groups involved in the multi-track process. It is extremely important that all of the aforementioned nations participate because they can each offer unique contributions, owing to their respective histories with North Korea and their own domestic experiences. The division that has led to the North Korean problem is more than a half-century old and has involved each of the nations mentioned; thus, any initiative must take the history of conflict, existing mistrust, and coexistence into consideration.

Also important are the experiences of each of the participants and their existing relationships to North Korea. For example, China's experience transitioning to

capitalism and opening its markets to the global economic system make Chinese officials well-positioned to assist North Korea with its own economic challenges facing North Korea. Russia, as former benefactor to North Korea, has a history of cooperation and political influence with the DPRK. South Korea shares a heritage and culture with the North, and knows the habits, customs, and expectations of the North better than any other actor. Lastly, the United States, as the most powerful nation in the world, can add legitimacy to the process, provide funding and other resources, and eventually grant the recognition that the North desires. A collaborative, multinational approach would allay fears that the process is U.S.-dominated and would build confidence among North Koreans. Moreover, involving several nations in negotiations may have a peer-pressure effect; North Korea has stronger ties with China and Russia than it does with any other nation. These ties can be used to further the multi-track solution.

The political structure of North Korea presents unique challenges and unique opportunities. The nation has been characterized as Stalinist, totalitarian, and even Orwellian. It cannot be denied that Kim Jong-Il exercises overwhelming if not absolute control over his state. Defectors have described a police state characterized by a parastructure network of informants and secret police that, along with the million-member army, serve Kim and his caprices. Not only is Kim the supreme ruler, but he also serves as chief diplomat. Therefore, principles of psychology may be especially useful in this dilemma. For instance, creating a timeline of engagement may provide a reinforcement schedule for the leader, encouraging his state's entry to and participation in the global system.

Multi-Track Procedure

This multi-track process should be staged and incremental, allowing time to evaluate and modify, and to establish a conditioning and reinforcing effect on the behavior of the North. However, starting all these initiatives at once could be overwhelming to the DPRK. The contacts and trust necessary to effectively pursue multi-track diplomacy might not exist at the outset of the process. Therefore, multiple, semi-independent actions undertaken simultaneously could undermine one another and jeopardize the entire process.

The first stage should assess and address the humanitarian needs of the North. This should occur simultaneously with nuclear talks, but should not be conditional upon their result. By addressing humanitarian concerns early, the coalition can build trust with the North Korean people while easing the desperation that may be causing Kim to act. It should be made clear to the North Koreans that food is not a bargaining chip, and humanitarian aid will not be used as tied aid in a carrot-stick type arrangement. By starting off slowly and building confidence, the process will avoid shocks to the North Korean system. Once engaged with the rest of the world, Kim will be especially sensitive to destabilizing influences that might weaken his grip on power.

After the immediate domestic crises are addressed, however, Kim may be ready for broader engagement. Assuming this is the case, then the participants in this multilateral initiative could pursue more advanced business and socio-cultural ties with the DPRK. For example, companies from Japan, China, Russia, South Korea, and the United States could pursue investment opportunities in North Korea, including forming partnerships and joint ventures. Multilateral lending institutions such as the World Bank and Asian Development Bank could also be enlisted in these endeavors. Civil society groups from each of the five nations could also be enlisted in the process.

Finally, a huge advantage in resolving this conflict is the cultural commonality between the North and the South. This commonality served as the basis of the Sunshine Policy of the 1990s and should be an aspect of any engagement. In this regard, South Korea is uniquely positioned to take the lead, and should be encouraged to do so.

Conclusion

When the Soviet Union existed, North Korea had a role and a sponsor in world affairs. In the post-Cold War era, the viability of the country and the legitimacy of its leadership has become more tenuous. North Korea's aggressive tactics find basis in an absence of ties to the current world powers and in a history of conflict and confrontation. Intractable policies from Washington and ineffective efforts by Seoul and Tokyo have slowed the pace of negotiations, allowing Kim to continue to push the nuclear envelope. With each unit of uranium that is enriched, with each plutonium fuel rod that is reprocessed, and with each missile that is tested, the possibility of a major accident, such as a misfired missile or a mishap at a reactor, increases. The international community, led by the U.S., must actively design an approach and create an environment in which this will not happen. There is good reason to believe that North Korea poses a credible threat. Numerous examples have shown that punitive sanctions will not work against an adversary with a strong central government.⁷⁷ Thus, it is imperative to create a more efficient and less dangerous way for North Korea to meet its own security and economic needs.

Meetings between the United States, North Korea, and China in Beijing were a step in the right direction despite the negligible outcomes, and broader multilateral dialogues this fall may add promise to the situation. The next step is to identify the needs of the North and formulate a timeline for increasing engagement. Kim has shown a willingness to open up to outside investment and trade and seems to understand that the future of his country depends on its relations with the outside world. But the United States and its allies must be sensitive to the anxieties of an absolute ruler worried about his regime's future. It is up to the United States to provide creative, forward-looking alternatives. Empowering non-state actors in the reconciliation process focuses energies on the underlying social and economic problems at the root of North Korean malaise. An incremental, comprehensive approach of multi-

track diplomacy will allow for constant re-adjustment and re-evaluation and will create and reinforce a feeling of mutual trust that is conspicuously absent from the North-South dialogue today.

NOTES

¹ This paper was first presented at Columbia University as part of the Graduate Student Conference on East Asia, 6 February 2003. The authors wish to thank Dr. Banning Garrett for his advice and support in the preparation and development of both the presentation and, therefore, this paper.

² The meetings in Beijing between China, North Korea, and the U.S. took place from 23-5 April 2003.

³ This assessment addresses the specific problem in Northeast Asia and its solution, not the relative situations between Iraq and North Korea.

⁴ Michael J. Mazarr, "Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea," *International Security* Vol. 20, No. 2 (Autumn 1995): 92-122.

⁵ William Perry, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C. From transcript, Brookings Leadership Forum: Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, 24 January 2003. Available at <http://www.brook.edu>; 4 February 2003.

⁶ The Japanese colonization of the Korean Peninsula lasted from 1910-45.

⁷ *Juche* socialism has two main characteristics: the idea that Koreans are the masters of their environs and that North Korea, in this case, is the main subject. This does not equate *juche* with subsistence. Rather, the nation is subject and master so long as it is not dependent on any one other nation or power. Kirk W. Larsen, interview by authors, George Washington University, Washington, D.C., January 2003.

⁸ Hy-Sang Lee, *North Korea: A Strange Socialist Fortress* (London: Preager, 2001), 15.

⁹ Robert A. Scalpino, "China and Korean Reunification: A Neighbor's Concerns," in Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings, eds., *Korea's Future and the Great Powers* (Seattle: The National Bureau of Asian Research in association with the University of Washington Press, 2001), 107-24.

¹⁰ Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, "Japan and the Unification of Korea: Challenges for U.S. Policy Coordination," in Nicholas Eberstadt and Richard J. Ellings, eds., 125-63.

¹¹ Marcus Noland, *Avoiding the Apocalypse: The Future of the Two Koreas* (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 2000), 59-73.

¹² *Ibid.*, 19-22.

¹³ It is difficult to verify the real state of the North Korean economy since independent observers in North Korea have been few, and the government has not released much information except for that which was needed for the World Food Programme.

¹⁴ United Nations World Food Programme, "World Hunger-Korea (DPR)." Available at: http://www.wfp.org/country_brief/index.asp?region=5. 30 January 2003. The documentation was presented per North Korea's request for food aid from the United Nations.

¹⁵ Noland, 69-70.

¹⁶ The United States had 37,743 active duty personnel in South Korea as of 30 September

2002. United States Department of Defense, "Department of Defense, Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country (309A), 30 September 2002. Available at: <http://www.dior.whs.mil/m05/hst0902.pdf>; 7 June 2003.

¹⁷ Both the DPRK and the ROK joined the United Nations in the same year. United Nations, "List of Member States." Available at: <http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html>; 30 January 2003.

¹⁸ Upon its entry into the NPT, North Korea had agreed to allow inspections by the IAEA to ensure its compliance with the agreement.

¹⁹ Scott Snyder, *Negotiating on the Edge: North Korean Negotiating Behavior* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1999), 69-76. Snyder has used this as an example of North Korean crisis diplomacy.

²⁰ The KEDO project involved the United States, South Korea, and Japan in aiding North Korea to build light-water nuclear reactors for energy.

²¹ Snyder, 117-18.

²² Kim Il-Sung died on 8 July 1994, however, his son Kim Jong-Il did not assume leadership until 1997 after a three-year mourning period. Available at: <http://nk.chosun.com/english>; 23 May 2003.

²³ Many analysts at the time were convinced of North Korea's imminent collapse. The slow pace of heavy fuel delivery and the KEDO project were a result of such thinking.

²⁴ L. Gordon Flake, "The Geneva Agreed Framework and the Ryugyong Hotel: Lessons in Maintenance," 1999. Unpublished; cited with permission from the author.

²⁵ North Korean submariner ran aground in South Korea in September 1996. Thirteen South Koreans and 24 North Koreans were killed during the manhunt that ensued. CNN, "Timeline: Tensions on the Korean Peninsula-Apr. 22, 2003." Available at: <http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/02/14/korea.timeline>; 23 May 2003. There have been other border transgressions and terrorist acts by the North. Notably, President Park's wife was killed by a North Korean during an assassination attempt on the President and several tunnels leading to the South were discovered during the 1970s.

²⁶ Ambassador Wendy Sherman, United States Institute of Peace, Washington, D.C., 6 March 2001. Available at: <http://www.usip.org/events/pre2002/transcripts/sherman030601.html>; 2 January 2002.

²⁷ The day after the 2003 State of the Union address, FBIS reports noted that DRPK media sources "have not been observed to report or comment on President Bush's State of the Union address." FBIS Daily Report, "FYI: DPRK silent on Bush Address," 30 January 2002 [FBIS-EAS-2002-0130]. FBIS Daily Report, "Japan, Russia Oppose Isolating DPRK," *Xinhua*, 5 February 2002 [FBIS-CHI-2002-0205].

²⁸ FBIS Daily Report, "DPRK Commentary Assails U.S. President's Address," Pyongyang Korean Central Television, 5 February 2002 [FBIS-EAS-2002-0205].

²⁹ FBIS Daily Report, "Conclusion of non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for," KCNA Release of 25 October 2002 Foreign Ministry Statement, 10 April 2003. Jon Wolfsthal, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "North Korea's Nuclear Breach," *Carnegie Analysis*, 17 October 2002. Available at: <http://www.ceip.org>; 20 October 2002.

³⁰ See mid-April overview of 2002-2003 brinksmanship history. Victor Cha and David Kang, "Hold the Bullets," *Australian Financial Review*, 17 April 2003, 57.

³¹ Glenn Kessler and Doug Struck, "North Korean Statements Jeopardize New Talks," *The*

Washington Post, 19 April 2003, A01.

³² Barbara Demick, "North Korea Concedes on Talks," *Los Angeles Times*, 13 April 2003, 1.

³³ In late October, North Korean officials began requests for a non-aggression pact as a basis for further negotiations: "If the U.S. legally assures the DPRK of nonaggression, including the nonuse of nuclear weapons against it...the DPRK will be ready to clear the former of its security concerns." From FBIS Daily Report, "Conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for."

³⁴ "North Korea says U.S. has 'policy of evil,'" *Reuters News Service*, 4 February 2003. Available at: <http://news.ft.com>; 5 February 2003.

³⁵ Amanda Batt, U.S. State Department Spokesperson, "There is widespread recognition that this issue must be addressed in a multilateral forum," as quoted in Demick, 1.

³⁶ As of late April 2003, talks hosted by Beijing and attended by U.S. and North Korean officials were underway. Karen DeYoung and Doug Struck, "Beijing's Help Led to Talks; U.S. Cuts Demands on North Korea," *The Washington Post*, 17 April 2003, A01.

³⁷ "Kora no Kikoku mo Jitsugen o Rachi Higaisha Kazoku" ("My Child's Homecoming Will Occur, Says the Family of an Abductee"), *Asahi Shimbun*, 10 October 2002. Available at: <http://www.asahi.com>; 12 October 2002.

³⁸ Center for Strategic and International Studies, "A Blueprint for U.S. Policy Toward A Unified Korea," *CSIS Working Group Report* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, August 2002), 33-9.

³⁹ DeYoung and Struck, A01.

⁴⁰ Michael Wines, "Warning to North Korea on Nuclear Arms," *The New York Times*, 12 April 2003, A5.

⁴¹ Victor D. Cha, "Focus on the Future, Not the North," *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 26, no. 1 (Winter 2002-03): 91.

⁴² Jay Solomon and David Cloud, "Cold Front: A Split with Seoul Complicates Crisis over North Korea," *The Wall Street Journal*, 2 January 2003, A1.

⁴³ Howard French, "Official Says U.S. will Reposition its Troops in South Korea," *The New York Times*, 3 June 2003, A6.

⁴⁴ Wolfsthal.

⁴⁵ China's nuclear development would come at the expense of leaders' recent support for arms control institutions linking the region and the world to less proliferation. Banning N. Garrett and Bonnie S. Glaser, "Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control," *International Security* Vol. 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995-96): 528-45. Japanese proliferation would likely require a reevaluation of China's strategic structure that places the country farther from arms control ideals.

⁴⁶ Roger Gale, "Nuclear Power and Japan's Proliferation Option," *Asian Survey* Vol. 18, no. 11 (November 1978): 1117-33.

⁴⁷ David Sanger, "In North Korea and Pakistan, Deep Roots of Nuclear Barter," *The New York Times*, 24 November 2002, A1.

⁴⁸ Cha and Kang, 57.

⁴⁹ Scott D. Sagan, "Why Do States Build Nuclear Weapons?" *International Security* Vol. 21, no. 3 (Winter 1996-97): 72.

⁵⁰ Ashton B. Carter and William J. Perry, "Back to the Brink," *The Washington Post*, 20 October 2002, B5.

⁵¹ Asia comprises roughly 30 percent of world economic output. Author's calculation from

U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, *Survey of Current Business* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Commerce, September 2002), 72-4.

⁵² "The Explosive Mr. Kim," *The Economist*, 4 January 2003, 9.

⁵³ During the Cold War, having nuclear power was a symbol of status in the international arena. Several other agreements and the establishment of several nuclear research facilities followed this agreement. Although these industries were set up by the Soviet Union in order to promote North Korean industry and nuclear energy capabilities, it is conceivable that such knowledge may have been used for the development of weapons technology. Alexander Zhebin, "A Political History of Soviet-North Korean Nuclear Cooperation," in James Clay Moltz and Alexandre Y. Mansourov, eds., *The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia* (London: Routledge, 2000), 27-37.

⁵⁴ Michael J. Mazarr, "Going Just a Little Nuclear: Nonproliferation Lessons from North Korea," *International Security* 20, no. 2 (Autumn 1995), 92-122.

⁵⁵ From FBIS Daily Report, "Conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between DPRK and U.S. called for."

⁵⁶ Sagan, 55.

⁵⁷ Center for Strategic and International Studies, "Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula," *CSIS Working Group Report* (Washington, D.C.: CSIS, August 2002), 26.

⁵⁸ Scott Snyder, "Ending North Korea's Guerilla Tactics," *Financial Times*, 2 February 2003, 25.

⁵⁹ Mazarr, 100.

⁶⁰ Solomon and Cloud, A1.

⁶¹ Office of the President of the United States, *United States National Security Strategy*, September 2002.

⁶² The Brookings Institution, "Challenge for the Bush Administration: Dealing with a Nuclear North Korea," 14 January 2003.

⁶³ Perry.

⁶⁴ Kessler and Struck, A01.

⁶⁵ Charles Krauthammer, "The Japan Card," *The Washington Post*, 3 January 2003, A25.

⁶⁶ The Brookings Institution, "Challenge for the Bush Administration: Dealing with a Nuclear North Korea," 14 January 2003.

⁶⁷ David Shambaugh, "China and the Korean Peninsula: Playing for the Long Term," *The Washington Quarterly* Vol. 26, no. 2 (Spring 2003): 43.

⁶⁸ James A. Baker, III, "No More Caving on North Korea," *The Washington Post*, 23 October 2002, A27.

⁶⁹ "Washington to Offer Carrots to North Korea," *Korea Times*, 17 October 2002. [Lexis/Nexis, 2 December 2002.]

⁷⁰ Doug Struck, "Resentment Toward U.S. Troops is Boiling Over in South Korea," *The Washington Post*, 9 December 2002, A17.

⁷¹ Cha, 91.

⁷² Howard French, "G.I.s Will Gradually Leave Korea DMZ to Cut War Risk," *The New York Times*, 6 June 2003, A01.

⁷³ "North Korea Says U.S. has a 'Policy of Evil,'" *Reuters*, 4 February 2003. [Factiva News Service, 6 February 2003.]

⁷⁴ Guy Dinmore and Andrew Ward, "Reprocessing of Fuel Rods," *Financial Times*, 16 July

2003, 9.

⁷⁵ William J. Perry, "It's Either Nukes or Negotiation," *The Washington Post*, 23 July 2003, A23.

⁷⁶ Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy, "Mission Statement," 1992. Available at: <http://www.imtd.org>; 12 December 2002.

⁷⁷ Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliott, *Economics Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy* (Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990), 91-115.