Saudi Arabia: Legacy, Stability, and Destiny
A lecture by Amb. Edward W. Gnehm, Jr.
Kuwait Professor for Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Affairs
The Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University
Kuwait Chair Lecture
March 5, 2008
Saudi Arabia — the Arabian lands of the al-Saud — is one of the most important partners for the U.S. in the Middle East. Yet the Kingdom remains even today an enigma to most people. What is Saudi Arabia? Why such an important relationship? Can this relationship survive the post 9/11 tensions and the differences that exist over important foreign policies in the region? Tonight I want to explore this Kingdom and ally and the relationship between it and the United States. In my view the relationship remains profoundly important and yet troubled.
I will discuss first two major historical factors that remain vital to understanding the Kingdom today — the Wahhabi religious movement and the House of Saud and their symbiotic relationship. I will then focus on the longstanding basis for the close Saudi-American relationship — “oil for security” — and look at Saudi foreign policy and specifically U.S. ties with Saudi Arabia in the post 9/11 world.
Understanding Saudi Arabia – the Wahhabi-Al-Saud Alliance
One cannot understand Saudi Arabia today without understanding its past.
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is a relatively new political entity. Created in 1932 the country is barely 75 years old. Saudi history, however, did not begin in 1932 but several centuries before. In the 1740s in the middle of essentially barren desert lands and multiple oases the family of the al-Saud led forces to dominate the interior of the peninsula. Twice the al-Saud’s lost control — once to Egyptian forces sent by the Ottoman Sultan and later to another tribal leader as a result of internal family feuding over succession. Today’s Saudi Arabia is the third Saudi state.
At the same time in the mid 1700s an Islamic teacher, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, launched a movement to reform Islam. Essentially he preached the need to return to the basic tenets of the Islamic faith. He defined these tenets literally — according to the exact words of the Prophet as spoken in his lifetime — and demanded behavior accordingly. He was intolerant of many existing practices seeing them as un-Islamic, such as the veneration of saints, the marking of graves including that of the Prophet, smoking in public and even laughing. He saw all non-Wahhabis, even other Moslems, as ‘infidels’ and called for jihad to convert them to the true faith! Adherents to his teachings are commonly known today as Wahhabis.
Both the al-Saud family and Ibn Abd al-Wahhab faced problems in achieving their goals. They found the solution in an alliance between the two. The al-Saud needed a popular cause to gain legitimacy and rally the people. What better cause than reform of Islam! The Wahhabis needed political protection and, more importantly, the ability to enforce their vision of an Islamic state with the coercive authority of the state. The alliance between these two formed the basis of power and influence for both and it has endured for two and a half centuries.
The relationship between the two has undergone important evolution. The family established clearly its dominance in politics (and diplomacy). The Wahhabi religious establishment realized that without the political and military protection of the al-Saud, they lost influence and power — a lesson they learned with the collapse of the second Saudi state. As a consequence, the Wahhabi ullema has been loath to confront the family if such a confrontation might lead to instability or political turmoil. This element of pragmatism has often led ‘radical’ Wahabbis, who demanded uncompromising implementation of Wahhabi tenets, to actually challenge the religious establishment. Several scholars of al-Qaeda point out that the militants who have joined Osama bin Laden are descendents of this radical wing of the Wahhabiya.
On the other hand the al-Saud family has continued to rely on the Wahhabi religious establishment to legitimize controversial actions by issuing religious rulings — fatwas. Two examples come to mind. In 1979 religious leaders issued a fatwa authorizing the Saudi Government to use force to expel religious extremists who had seized the holy mosque in Mecca taking a considerable number of pilgrims hostage. In 1990 religious authorities agreed that it was acceptable for the King to invite U.S. and other western forces into the Kingdom if that was necessary to defend the country. In both cases the religious authorities probably opposed what they in fact were agreeing to but did not want to destabilize the internal situation by opposing the political authority.
The Al-Saud Family
Fighting within the Saud family over succession led to their defeat and exile to Kuwait in 1891. In 1902 Abdul Aziz al-Saud led forces out of Kuwait to recapture the capital, Riyadh, re-establishing Saudi political dominance as well as restoring the authority of the Wahhabi religious establishment.
In the years between 1902 and 1930 Ibn Saud, as he was called, expanded his control over all of central Arabia, the eastern (Shia) areas, the Asir region north of Yemen and finally the Kingdom of the Hejaz that included the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina. With this acquisition the ruler became the custodian of the two holiest sites in Islam — an important basis of Saud power and legitimacy. Trouble was not long in coming. The Ikhwan, religious forces which had spearheaded the new state’s expansion and spread Wahhabi views, challenged the al-Saud’s political dominance. Ibn Saud moved against the Ikhwan destroying their power, once again with a fatwa from the religious establishment that said the Ikhwan had deviated from their Islamic faith.
Mindful that the family had lost power once before due to internal squabbling and aware of the ambitions of others, such as the Ikhwan, Ibn Saud was determined to preserve power to his family, specifically to his sons. He named his oldest son, Saud, as his successor and made his other sons swear that the succession would pass from the next eldest down through all his sons. His objective was to minimize any internal family dissention over succession that might weaken Saud family control of the government. During his life Ibn Saud tolerated no other centers of power that could threaten family control — excepting of course the Wahhabi religious establishment.
The Saud family remains dominant in Saudi Arabia. The succession has progressed as Ibn Saud had planned. There have been considerable differences in the capabilities of the monarchs who followed him; but the family has remained relatively unified or at least accommodating on matters of succession. Many pundits have predicted trouble and often point to the aging of the sons of Ibn Saud and lack of clarity on how succession will move to the next generation. King Abdullah, recognizing the need, recently issued a law that establishes a process to resolve succession problems. (Note: It establishes a commission that includes representatives of each of the families of the sons of Ibn Saud. On the death of the King the commission meets to name the Crown Prince as King. Within 10 days the King must send a letter to the commission with the name of the person he has chosen as Crown Prince or alternatively with a request that the commission nominate a Crown Prince. This process will become operative after the current Crown Prince Sultan succeeds to the throne.)
In my opinion the Saud family remains secure as the central authority in the Kingdom. While accusations of corruption toward some family members definitely undermine its reputation, thus far widespread recognition of the family’s important role in the country underscores its continued legitimacy.
The U.S. and Saudi Arabia: Oil for Security
OIL
The seminal event in U.S.-Saudi relations occurred in 1945 when President Roosevelt hosted King Abdul Aziz al-Saud on board the American naval ship, the USS Quincy, in the Suez Canal. From that encounter came an informal understanding: Saudi Arabia would provide oil and the U.S. would provide security. Both countries would benefit from this partnership. Whether or not there was a written agreement, it matters little for in fact both parties acted in accordance with its intent.
Oil was discovered in the eastern province of the Kingdom in 1930s. A consortium of American companies organized to develop the oil fields — creating ARAMCO, the Arabian American Oil Company, a company that would make enormous contributions to the development of the Kingdom and solidify a strong U.S. presence in the Kingdom’s modernization. For most of the period since World War II, Saudi Arabia has been a reliable and dependable supplier of crude for the world market. The two notable exceptions were oil embargos consequent to Arab-Israeli wars. But beyond that, we have repeatedly witnessed decisions by the Saudis to increase production to offset other production cutbacks, as occurred at the time of the Iranian Revolution and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. They remain a moderate voice in OPEC circles, most recently at the OPEC summit where they thwarted the efforts of several members led by President Chavez (of Venezuela) to make the organization more political.
Oil remains central to our ongoing relationship. Saudi Arabia is by far the most important crude oil producer in the world. Its proven oil reserves represent almost a quarter of known global reserves. It can produce at current levels far longer than any other producer, including Russia. Saudi Arabia also has the fourth largest natural gas reserves in the world. As important, Saudi Arabia is the only oil producing country in the world with excess production capacity — meaning that Saudi Arabia can increase production to respond to increased global demand. Simply said, there are no rivals! These facts give the Saudis a confidence and a unique ability to view the oil market and its issues with a long term perspective. In other words they can, and they do, make short-term decisions, including actions that reduce immediate revenue, in order to protect their long-term equities.
Finally, an important fact is the global nature of the oil market. The U.S. may not obtain a significant portion of its crude from Saudi Arabia; but we still must be alert to any threat to Saudi production. A loss of supply in the global market impacts on the price of crude in every market and for every buyer.
SECURITY
On the security side of the equation World War II saw the first significant military cooperation between the US and Saudi Arabia with the establishment of an air force base in Dhahran. That base was closed in 1962 as our physical presence on Saudi territory became an increasingly tendentious issue. Nevertheless, through subsequent decades our military cooperation expanded and deepened as both countries saw it in their interest to have such a relationship. In the 1970s, for example, the Nixon Administration supported a so-called “Twin Pillar Policy” that looked to the Shah’s Iran and Saudi Arabia to provide security in the Gulf. There were extensive sales of military equipment to both countries. In the case of Saudi Arabia there was a recognition that given its small population it would be difficult to maintain a substantial force structure; therefore, there was an agreement for the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to construct a series of military facilities that could accommodate U.S. forces should a threat arise requiring their deployment.
That threat came with the fall of the Shah and the collapse of one of the twin pillars. In response the U.S. deployed the air force. Our loss of Iran as an ally required new thinking about security in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia became even more important. When revolutionary Iran again threatened Saudi Arabia, President Reagan announced that the U.S. would never allow a hostile power to take over the Kingdom. It was the first public commitment by the U.S. to Saudi security.
In August 1990 Iraqi forces invaded and occupied the State of Kuwait and Iraqi forces deployed along the border with Saudi Arabia. The U.S. reacted immediately sending then Secretary of Defense Cheney to Riyadh to brief King Fahd on the threat and to urge the King’s immediate agreement to the dispatch of U.S. forces to the Kingdom. The Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia and the subsequent decision to deploy U.S. forces into the Kingdom was a watershed development. King Fahd approved the U.S. deployment; but as I mentioned above, the King felt the need for religious approval to insulate him from an expected conservative backlash to the deployment of ‘infidel’ forces into the Kingdom. The religious authorities granted the approval and issued a fatwa but not without much misgiving and considerable opposition.
Virtually all commentators on Saudi-American relations emphasize the momentous impact of this deployment of U.S. forces onto Saudi soil — most especially its consequence on the Saudi domestic scene. The backlash internally evoked criticism that challenged the very legitimacy of Saudi rule — highlighting the government’s inability to protect the state, the squandering of considerable state funds on a military unable to defend the country, and, of crucial importance, the failure as the protector of Islam by permitting in (and relying on) infidel forces.
Cheney told King Fahd in August 1990 that U.S. forces would only remain in the Kingdom as long as necessary and not one day longer. U.S. forces were still there 12 years later in spite of numerous signals and polite interventions that they hoped our forces would leave. Finally in 2002 the Saudis made their desire explicit and our forces were moved to other locations in the region. Had U.S. forces left soon after the liberation of Kuwait as we implied they would, perhaps things would have developed differently. That point is debatable. What is not debatable is the U.S. insensitivity to the rising opposition in Saudi Arabia, not just to the U.S. military presence, but also to the special relationship that the Saudi Government had with the United States. Some of this opposition was religious based but considerable levels came from citizen hostility toward U.S. policies in the region.
For most of the period from 1944 to 1990, Saudi-American security relationship relied on forces “over the horizon” — essentially on the back of the navy. That policy served our interest well though it never satisfied the U.S. military desire for a physical U.S. military presence in the region similar to that which we have in Europe and Asia. We have now reverted to this concept of an “over the horizon” security relationship, at least as it applies to Saudi Arabia. It is important to note that in spite of the several issues I described above the Saudis continue to work very closely with us on a large number of security issues vital to both out countries.
Saudi Foreign Policy
Two words describe Saudi concerns: Security and Survival. Both have a domestic as well as an external dimension; and they are very much intertwined. The Saudis have long since gauged their strengths and their vulnerabilities. Their foreign policy, as you would expect, is aimed at maximizing the former and minimizing the latter.
Gerd Nonneman, a British writer on the ME, describes Saudi policy as “omni-balancing.” He notes a century old pattern of managed dependence — reliance on multiple approaches and relationships. This description is an excellent framework for understanding Saudi actions.
Essential was a strong relationship with a major power — first the UK and subsequently the U.S. Such an association served to protect the state from global threats and more powerful regional states. In entering these relationships the Kingdom did so without ceding sovereignty and minimizing dependency to the maximum extent possible.
The security relationship with the U.S. remains as important today as it did earlier. It is, however, more difficult to sustain. Let me note three developments. First for almost 50 years Saudi Arabia was a major ally in combating communism. The Wahhabi religious establishment was dedicated to the same cause — combating this atheist concept — and thus gave support to Saudi Government cooperation with the U.S. That common cause is no longer there. Secondly, recent U.S. actions in the region — intervention in Iraq and bellicose threats toward Iran — leave Saudi leaders concerned that U.S. actions may actually undermine the Kingdom’s security, for example, Iranian military strikes on Saudi oil facilities in retaliation for U.S. military attacks on Iran. The third point may well be the most serious. Public opinion in the Kingdom has turned increasingly negative toward the U.S for a number of reasons. This public hostility in turn leads to significant pressure on the Government to end the close relationship with the U.S.
At the regional level the Saudis learned from the collapse of the first Saudi state that forces in the region could undermine — even destroy — the state. It was critical, therefore, to work relationships in such a way that no hostile state or cause (such as Arab nationalism) became triumphant. In practical application this required considerable efforts to maintain good relations with as many states in the region as possible. If that effort failed to contain the threat, the Kingdom allied itself with one group or another to check and balance the influence of the hostile states. At one point, for example, the Saudis were allied with Nasser against the Hashemite monarchies to the north. The most obvious example was Saudi support for Iraq in its war with Iran.
Saudi foreign policy has faced a second challenge emanating from the politics of the region. Saudi policy must actively head off or ameliorate any looming crisis that might place their regional obligations in contradiction to their security relationship with the U.S. The most obvious examples of such crises arise from the Arab-Israeli conflict. War and major confrontations inevitably result in calls within the region for actions against the U.S. The Saudis are caught between public pressure to take harsh actions against the U.S. and the need to maintain the security relationship. The result which ever way it goes is costly. It was in precisely these circumstances that the Saudis joined the Arab oil boycott in 1973.
Another arena where we see “omni balancing” is in the international sphere. Saudi Arabia has joined a number of international organizations such as the UN, regional groupings like the Gulf Cooperation Council, and special focus entities like OPEC. Active leadership in Islamic forums such as the Organization of Islamic Conference underlines the importance of the King and the country as Protector of the two holiest sites of Islam. Again through active membership in these organizations Saudi Arabia aims to maximize its influence on issues of critical concern and thus effect the direction of events before they reach crisis levels.
The Saudis have traditionally favored low key and quiet diplomacy to any limelight. Behind the scene mediation or the use of financial inducements have been means to reduce tensions and effect compromises. They are not adverse, however, to very public initiatives when they calculate that such an approach serves their interest. In fact the Saudis have been more active — even assertive — in recent years than in the past. The most obvious such initiative was that of Crown Prince Abdullah (now the King) at the Arab Summit in Beirut in 2005. Through his efforts the Summit unanimously endorsed a bold plan to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. While some parties have disagreements with aspects of the proposal, it did offer full diplomatic recognition and normal relations with Israel by all member states in return for Israeli withdrawal from all lands occupied in the 1967 war.
The Issue of Terrorism
The events of 9/11 certainly impacted adversely and significantly on Saudi attitudes toward the U.S. just as those events did the same for U.S. views of Saudi Arabia. The fact that 15 of the 19 hijackers were Saudis is just that — a fact. That the political situation and social system in the Kingdom produced a culture of terrorism is not accurate. Nonetheless, the public remarks in the U.S. about Saudi Arabia and the Saudis as a people hurt very deeply. Subsequent U.S. actions, especially those that curtailed travel to the U.S., seemed to condemn all Saudis for the actions of a select group. There seemed to be no recollection in the U.S. that al-Qaeda was as much opposed to the Saudi Government as it was to the U.S. and its presence in Arabian lands. U.S. statements also seemed to be dismissive of other important aspects of the relationship.
Much has happened since September 2001. The focus of both countries has indeed moved back to the issues that are truly important to us both — stability in the region, oil, and Iran to mention a few. Domestically, Saudis have faced several attacks by operatives sympathetic, if not members, of al-Qaeda. The bombing of the compound in Riyadh in November 2003 undercut public support both for al-Qaeda and for the use of violence as a weapon. All the victims were Arab and most were Moslems. We saw a similar change in public attitudes in Jordan following the hotel bombings in December 2005.
The Saudi Government is today a partner in global efforts to deal with terrorism. With public support authorities acted forcefully and effectively to capture those who carried out the bombings in the Kingdom. Radical preachers were told to moderate their rhetoric. The Saudi Government took actions to control the flow of money to terrorists. The Financial Action Task Force, which is a multilateral group focused on money laundering and terrorist financing, concluded in July 2004 that Saudi Arabia was “compliant or mostly compliant” with international standards. The Government also froze the assets of a major Islamic charitable organization over concern that its funds were reaching terrorist group. The Saudi Government’s cooperation is clearly in recognition that it is in their interest as well as the international interest to fight terrorism.
The Culture – Rapid Change
As we think about oil, security, and terrorism, it is important to note the social context in which we discuss Saudi Arabia today. Consider population. It doubled in the 15 years from 1980 to 1995. Forty percent of the population is under the age of 15 (2005) and 60% are 25 or younger. Think what this means for the future be it further population growth, employment, or income.
We forget how much has changed in such a short time. When I was in Riyadh in 1976, I was often reminded that even into the late 1950s all foreigners in Riyadh had to leave the walled city at dusk. Only in the 1980s did the Saudi Government permit the diplomatic community to reside in its capital. Up to then all diplomats were required to live in Jidda following a long held view that infidels should not be allowed in the heartland of the Kingdom!
The urbanization of the Kingdom dramatizes the rapidity of change. In 1970 only 49% of Saudis lived in urban areas. By 2001 that figure was 87%! Think of what that means in the way of change from basically a rural, tribal-based society to city dwellers with water, health care, and education. Physical change, we should all keep in mind, comes faster than mental change. An American educated minister in the government in 1977 (by the way with an American wife) told me that when his father visited him in Riyadh, he pitched his tent in the villa’s front yard saying, “I’ve never slept in a house before and never will!”
My point is that rapid change lies beneath many of the issues that the Kingdom faces today. Fifty years ago the country was still essentially isolated. Today its population travels the world. Many Saudis have western educations. The business elite is as capable as any in the world in business, banking and trade. Saudis run their oil establishments. Yet there are huge segments of the population that do not have this global dimension. And on balance the nation remains very conservative and the religious establishment a powerful element in the state, a status it is likely to maintain for some time.
Change is underway both in political and social terms. The National Dialogue sponsored by King Abdullah when he was Crown Prince provided a forum and an opportunity for Saudi citizens to discuss issues important to their future and that of the state. Elections were held for municipal councils. New laws aim to reform the judicial system and education. The King himself has spoken about the important role that women must play in the Kingdom. He has even noted publicly that the issue of women driving is not a religious issue but a social one — a remarkable observation that challenges those who do argue the issue in religious terms. The King noted that some changes will take time and that the gradual approach is the best. Many of the reformers and other Saudi leaders speak in these same terms. Saudi Arabia remains a very conservative country and change must come within that context.
In conclusion I would emphasize that the Saudi-American relationship remains vitally important. There are significant areas of agreement as well as areas of disagreement. Both the Saudi and American governments understand the value of the relationship. Peoples in the two countries generally do not. What is most critical today in my opinion is the need in the first instance for leaders in both Saudi Arabia and the United States to understand better the issues that the other country is facing and the domestic as well as the global setting in which each must operate. It is then incumbent on leaders in both countries to articulate our common interests and, in doing so, convince both our peoples of the criticality of the relationship and the need to sustain it in the future regardless of challenges and difficulties.
