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Introduction to African Security Issues
Seminar Hosted by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies
National Defense University
8 October 2009

International Perspectives: Involvement of Non-Western States

David H. Shinn
Adjunct Professor, Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University

Introduction

China is the most important non-Western actor in Africa today. For that matter, China has become the principal non-African presence — western or non-western — in a number of Africa's fifty-three countries. Other non-Western countries are also rapidly expanding their activities on the continent. Most notable in this regard is India, which has long-standing ties to eastern Africa and South Africa. A growing economic power in Latin America — Brazil — is coming on strong in Africa. Russia, better described as a developed country, is returning to Africa following its much reduced activity after the collapse of the Soviet Union and end of the Cold War. Iran has increased its engagement with a number of countries and Israel recently revived its attention. Turkey and several Gulf States are showing significant interest in Africa, especially the northeastern quadrant. Cuba, following major Cold War military involvement in Angola and Ethiopia, virtually absented itself from the continent but is slowly returning. Even countries like North Korea and Vietnam, which were never much involved in Africa, are beginning to make their presence known. Other non-Western countries in Asia and Latin America are giving Africa a closer look. The global financial crisis has caused a temporary slow down of the engagement in Africa by all these countries as well as involvement by Western states. I will limit my remarks to China, India, Brazil, Russia and Iran.

China

China has a long history in Africa; modern China shifted its focus from support for African liberation movements and ideologically like-minded governments that began in the mid-1950s to an emphasis by the mid-1990s on commercial ties and practical political collaboration. China has four principal interests in Africa:

• Maintaining and/or increasing access to oil, minerals, hard wood timber, and agricultural products.
• Developing good relations with all African countries so that China can count on their support in regional and international forums.
• Ending Taiwan's official diplomatic presence and replacing it with recognition of Beijing.
• Increasing significantly China's exports as African economies become stronger and Africans become wealthier.

Looking at these four interests in sequence, China imports about one-third of its total oil imports from Africa. It is important, however, to keep this statistic in perspective. China's imports constitute only about 10 percent of total African oil exports while the United States imports about one-third of Africa's total oil exports because of its much higher total demand. China is, however, interested in more than African oil. It imports about 90 percent of its cobalt, 35 percent of its manganese, 30 percent of its tantalum, and 5 percent of its hard wood timber from Africa. These imports of raw materials and those from other parts of the world sustain China's rapidly growing economy. Without strong continuing economic growth, the current leadership of the Chinese Communist Party would be hard pressed to remain in power. The global economic crisis has temporarily reduced Chinese interest in some African raw materials. This reduction will probably not last long. In addition, China has a long-term strategic interest in African natural resources and will increase its purchases from Africa as soon as China's economy resumes its spectacular growth.

Africa's fifty-three countries constitute well over one-quarter of the United Nations' 192 members. While China holds a veto power in the Security Council, Africa has three non-permanent seats on the Council. Africa is also well represented in organizations of interest to China like the UN Human Rights Council and the World Trade Organization. The Africans do not, of course, vote as a block, but China makes every effort to cultivate the maximum number of African countries on all issues of interest to Beijing that arise in international forums. In some cases like-minded African governments use the Chinese just as the Chinese use them, for example when contentious issues affecting China or a particular African nation arise in the Human Rights Council. When Tibet became an issue in 2008, China leaned on the Africans to remain silent or even make supportive statements. They did. African countries can depend on China to avoid raising controversial African human rights issues in the UN Human Rights Council and perhaps even to support them when they are criticized by Western countries. The recent outpouring of books and articles on China-Africa relations often understates the importance of this mutual political support.

The position of Taiwan in Africa is more important to China than most observers appreciate. Beijing has never retreated from the overwhelming attention it has given over the years to the "One China" policy. Equally important, China has never forgotten the fact that African states were instrumental in 1971 in replacing Taiwan with the People's Republic of China on the United Nations Security Council. Since then, Taiwan has witnessed a sharp decline in the number of African countries that recognize it. When Malawi switched in December 2007 from Taipei to Beijing, this left only four countries that still have relations with Taiwan — Swaziland, Burkina Faso, Gambia, and Sao Tome and Principe. China continues to work hard to convince the leaders of these countries to join the other forty-nine that now recognize Beijing.

In 2008, total China-Africa trade reached $107 billion. This was up from $55.5 billion in 2006 and $70 billion in 2007. China is now Africa's second largest trading partner, although only about 3 percent of China's global trade is with Africa. By 2010, China's trade with Africa is projected to exceed U.S. trade with Africa, making China Africa's single largest trading partner. In recent years, Africa has maintained a small trade surplus with China, but there are huge country-by-country disparities. Some fifteen African oil and mineral exporters have large surpluses with China, while most other African countries have significant deficits. The poorest African countries tend to have the largest trade deficits. Five African oil and mineral exporting nations account for 85 percent of Africa's exports to China.

While these are China's principal interests in Africa, they are not the only ones. Foreign investment is becoming more important. The West still accounts for about 90 percent of all foreign direct investment in Africa, but China has been more aggressive than Western countries in the last several years. It now has at least $20 billion in investment on the continent, most of it in oil and extractive industries. At the end of 2007, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China purchased a 20 percent stake of Standard Bank South Africa for $5.6 billion. China has made other banking arrangements to extend its financial reach on the continent. Chinese companies have also demonstrated a greater willingness than Western companies to take risks in Africa. This may be explained by the fact that most of China's larger companies are state-controlled.

One of the tactics for increasing its influence in Africa is a growing assistance program. China is not transparent with its aid statistics and it is often difficult to equate Chinese assistance to the OECD definition. By most estimates, however, Chinese OECD-type aid has been running at about $1.5 billion in recent years. One particularly successful program dating back to 1963 has been the sending of medical teams to African countries. China has sent more than 15,000 medical personnel to forty-seven different countries and treated, it says, 180 million patients. China has also started a program of sending volunteers that looks a little like the U.S. Peace Corps. It is important, however, to distinguish between Chinese aid activities and essentially commercial arrangements.

While China's grant aid to Africa is growing modestly, the headline grabbing deals are largely low interest loans tied to infrastructure projects implemented by large Chinese companies. African governments welcome the unconditional (except to agree to the One China policy and accept a high input of Chinese equipment and labor) low interest loans that are used to build infrastructure. But these loans often look more like commercial transactions than aid projects. In recent years China has provided Angola with $13 billion, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) $9 billion, Niger $5 billion and Ethiopia $2.5 billion in low interest loans. The Angolan government draws down the loans as it ships oil to China. The DRC loan functions similarly with minerals. The loan for Niger is based on the development of its oil fields. It is not clear how Ethiopia will pay off the loan as it exports to China only sesame seeds, hides and skins, and a little coffee. It will take a lot of sesame seeds and goat skins to repay $2.5 billion. There is always the possibility, of course, that China will eventually write off some of the debt. It has previously done so in the case of the poorest African countries. It has also been Chinese policy to have a close assistance relationship with countries like Sudan and Zimbabwe that are treated as pariahs by many Western nations.

The hallmark of China's relations with African countries is its excellent state-to-state ties. China has an embassy in forty-eight of the forty-nine countries that recognize Beijing. The only exception is Somalia where security conditions do not allow an embassy. Of the forty-nine, only the Comoro Islands does not have an embassy in Beijing. China relies heavily on high-level personal contact to consolidate its relations with African leaders. President Hu Jintao has made six trips — two as vice president and four as president — to Africa visiting multiple countries. He most recently completed a visit to Mali, Senegal, Tanzania and Mauritius in February 2009, when he promised to continue foreign assistance to Africa at promised levels in spite of the global financial crisis. Premier Wen Jiabao has been equally visible in Africa. Beginning in 1991, China's foreign minister has made his first overseas visit every year to Africa, a practice that has been noted and appreciated by African governments. All elements of Chinese leadership are frequent visitors to Africa. In turn, Beijing often invites African leaders to China. During the period from 2002 to 2005, Chinese Communist Party officials made sixty-four visits to Africa while African political party officials made sixty-nine visits to China.

China and Africa have formalized their relationship in the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC), which meets at the summit level every three years, alternating between Beijing and an African capital, and ministerial level in other years. The next summit meeting will take place in Egypt later this year. This has become an important and seemingly effective mechanism for coordinating the China-Africa relationship.

China also uses a range of soft power techniques for expanding ties with Africa. The official news service, Xinhua, has more than twenty bureaus in Africa. There are a half dozen Confucius Institutes and more are in the planning stage. China is stepping up its radio transmission to Africa in various languages, has a transmitting facility in Kenya, and various rebroadcast arrangements. It trains a variety of Africans, including diplomats and journalists, and increased to 4,000 in 2009 the number of scholarships that it offers to African students.

Compared to countries on its periphery, Europe and North America, Africa occupies a low security priority for China. Nevertheless, Africa is increasing in importance because of China's growing reliance on the import of raw materials from the continent. China has a policy of no military bases in Africa but has some security link, however modest, with all forty-nine African countries that recognize Beijing. There is a loose correlation between Chinese military cooperation and resource rich African countries. China's share of the African arms market in sub-Saharan Africa was about 18 percent between 2000 and 2005. High level exchange military visits are an important part of the security relationship.

Eighteen African countries have defense attachés in Beijing while fourteen Chinese defense attaché offices in Africa are accredited to some thirty African countries. China is playing a growing and constructive role in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. It currently has more UN peacekeepers in Africa than any other permanent member of the UN Security Council — about 1,600 compared to just over thirty for the United States. China sent two modern destroyers and a supply ship to join the international naval force that is trying to end Somali piracy in the Gulf of Aden. As China expands its presence into African conflict zones like the Niger Delta and Ethiopia's Ogaden, it is beginning to experience the same kinds of attacks that nationals from Western countries encounter.

China also faces some challenges in Africa. Although it has developed excellent relations with governments and done well with most of the business community, it has been much less successful with civil society, opposition political parties and labor unions. Areas where China's engagement in Africa draws criticism include:

• Democracy and good governance.
• Human rights practices.
• Transparency and corruption.
• Questionable environmental practices.
• Purchase of illegally harvested African hard woods, ivory, and endangered species.
• Poor worker safety and fair labor practices.
• Export to Africa of harmful and counterfeit products.
• Substandard corporate business practices.
• Reluctance to provide training and support to African manufacturing so that it can compete more effectively in the global market.
• Inadequate control over arms sales to Africa.

India

In some respects, India, the world's largest democracy, is more of a direct challenge to China in Africa than is the United States. There is a long history of Indian communities in parts of Africa. The eastern side of the continent borders the Indian Ocean, which India perceives within its sphere of influence. India has a common colonial experience with many African countries and has long ties with those that are members of the British Commonwealth. Like China, India was a strong advocate for the struggle against colonialism and a leader of the non-aligned movement. India's primary interest in Africa today, like China, is access to energy and minerals. Its most important trade relationship is with Nigeria where India-Nigeria trade is twice that of China's trade. India imports about 15 percent of its oil from Africa but its trade with Africa constitutes only about 5 percent of total Indian trade. It exports cheap manufactured goods to Africa, resulting in some of the same criticism that China experiences. India also seeks African support in international forums and maintains cordial relations with pariah states like Sudan and Zimbabwe.

India has some advantages over China. It is physically closer to Africa. Its form of government is more appealing to aspiring democracies on the continent. Indians speak a common language with English-speaking African countries. Indian culture, especially movies, are understood and appreciated in much of Africa. India's important private sector, which accounts for about 70 percent of its GDP, is an attractive feature in some African countries. Like China, India has an impressive GDP growth rate — about 8 percent — that is viewed with envy by many Africans. It sends far more peacekeepers to UN operations in Africa than does China. Indian communities in Africa have both plusses and minuses. While they are well-established, they have not always been well-received and are often accused by Africans of isolating themselves. India has a long standing policy of engaging people of Indian origin in Africa; China's policy towards people of Chinese origin is more ambivalent.

India has begun to formalize its collaboration with Africa, although not to the extent that China has done. The first India-Africa summit took place in New Delhi in April 2008. Attended by thirteen African leaders, this was well under the forty-eight who attended the 2006 FOCAC in Beijing. India's trade with Africa soared to $35 billion in 2008, but still remains only about one-third the level of Chinese trade with Africa. India anticipates that its trade with Africa will reach $100 billion in five years. The size of India's economy is well behind that of China, and it does not have the capacity to compete effectively with China because of the greater resources that Beijing can bring to the table. India also has fewer embassies in Africa: forty-eight for China compared with twenty-seven for India.

Some of India's policies towards Africa are similar to China's; others are different. India follows a "no strings attached" policy in its relations with Africa but does not highlight the policy as China does. Both countries have instituted a duty-free tariff preference scheme for exports from poorer African countries. India has extended a line of credit to African countries over the last five years valued at more than $2 billion and has promised to increase the amount to $5.4 billion over the next five years. New Delhi hosted in 2009 the Fifth EXIM Bank of India Conclave on India Africa Project Partnership. Indian investment in Africa targets Indian businessmen and joint ventures rather than tying the loans to large, state-owned companies as with China. Indian firms integrate into African domestic markets and tend to draw on local resources while Chinese firms tend to source imports from China.

Indian aid emphasizes training for 1,000 Africans annually through its Indian Technical and Economic Cooperation program. An additional 15,000 African students attend colleges and technical schools in India each year. India sends an impressive number of teachers to Africa. India plans to provide $500 million in aid to Africa over the next five years. The global economic situation could interrupt this goal.

Although selectively focused on Africa's Indian Ocean islands and countries bordering the Indian Ocean, India has a more aggressive security relationship with Africa than China. India has superior naval capacity in the Indian Ocean and is sensitive to Chinese naval expansion in the region. India has signed defense agreements with Kenya, Madagascar, and Mozambique and has initiated joint training programs with Kenya, Mozambique, Tanzania, and South Africa. Madagascar, Mauritius and the Seychelles cooperate on maritime surveillance and intelligence gathering. India provides training for African military personnel in Indian military academies and seeks to expand arms sales to Africa. India has developed a particularly close alliance with South Africa that also includes Brazil. Naval vessels from the three countries took part in a joint exercise off Cape Town in April 2008. Indian naval vessels have made regular visits to Eritrea since 2007 and India offers seven training positions annually to Eritrean military personnel. Indian ships have also joined the anti-piracy effort in the Gulf of Aden.

Brazil

Brazil is home to at least seventy million people of African descent. Many Brazilians trace their ancestry to Nigeria and Benin; African culture has survived in Brazil and helps strengthen ties to Africa. Nigeria is home to Brazilian communities concentrated in Lagos formed by the descendents of former slaves who returned during the 19th century. Although Brazil has a natural affinity with Africa's Lusophone countries — Angola, Mozambique, Sao Tome and Principe, Guinea-Bissau, and Cape Verde — , it has in recent years significantly expanded its involvement in Africa.

Brazil maintains embassies in twenty-eight African countries across the continent. It is a member of the twenty-four-state South Atlantic Peace and Cooperation Zone established in 1986 to encourage regional cooperation in the areas of development, peace, and security. Twenty-one countries in west and southern Africa belong to the organization. Brazilian President da Silva has made nine visits to Africa since he took office in 2003. During the most recent one in July 2009, he was a guest at the African Union summit in Libya. India, Brazil, and South Africa created in 2004 a strategic alliance known as the India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum that has potentially important implications for Africa. This association of three middle powers seeks to take advantage of existing international rules to promote a more just, representative, and equitable distribution of power in the international system. The three IBSA chiefs of state held their third summit meeting in Delhi in 2008.

Brazil's trade with Africa reached $25 billion in 2008. Brazil seeks African markets for its exports and investment opportunities for its companies. It depends heavily on Africa for minerals and energy to supply its expanding economy. Angola is Brazil's major African trade partner; Angola is one of Brazil's largest suppliers of oil and Africa's fourth largest importer of Brazilian products. Nigeria is also a major supplier of oil to Brazil, and the two countries have developed an important economic and political relationship. Nigeria even sailed two navy vessels to Rio de Janeiro in 2007. Brazil is developing a surprisingly strong relationship with Sudan and has a small number of peacekeepers assigned to the UN mission in southern Sudan. Brazil is in discussion with Algeria for the supply of liquefied natural gas. Early in 2009, Brazil's minister of development, industry and foreign trade led a large commercial delegation to Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco in order to promote trade and investment.

Brazil looks to Africa for help in obtaining a permanent UN Security Council seat. It solicits support from African countries, which, for example, strongly backed it in the World Trade Organization on a generic medicine dispute. The Brazilian Agricultural Research Corporation (EMBRAPA), Brazil's premier agriculture and bio-tech research agency, has opened four offices in Africa. African countries are turning increasingly to Brazil for technical and scientific assistance.

Russia

The Cold War witnessed major competition between the Soviet Union and both the United States and China in Africa. The collapse of the Soviet Union and decline of Russia's economy led to a sharp decline in Russian-African relations beginning in the late 1980s. At the end of the Cold War, Russia did maintain its diplomatic presence in most African countries and today still has embassies in forty of them. It has only been in the last several years, however, with the revival of the Russian economy that Moscow has returned to Africa as a major player. Former President Putin's September 2006 visit to South Africa, the first by a Russian leader, signaled new attention for the continent. The Russian prime minister followed Putin in March 2007 with visits to Angola, Namibia, and South Africa. President Medvedev traveled to Egypt, Nigeria, Namibia and Angola with a 100-strong business delegation in 2009.

In terms of engagement with Africa, Russia is well behind both the United States and China. Its trade with the continent has reached more than $7 billion. In 2008, Russia announced a preferential tariff regime for developing countries, which grants duty-free access for African products. Russia has invested since 2000 more than $5 billion in the purchase of African assets. In addition, Russian oil companies have signed exploration deals in Algeria, Nigeria, Angola and Egypt worth more than $3 billion. Lukoil purchased 63 percent of a field off the Ivory Coast in a production-sharing agreement with Nigerian owners. Russia's Gazprom is pushing for control of the Nigerian gas market. Russia is also expanding nuclear cooperation with South Africa. Russian companies are trying to extend their global reach while they have plenty of cash.

Business has become the central focus of Russian interest in Africa. In 2009, Egypt signed a ten-year strategic cooperation agreement that includes a proposal to build Egypt's first nuclear power plant. Russia tends to emphasize minerals such as nickel and gold in South Africa; aluminum in Guinea, Nigeria, and the DRC; and diamonds in Guinea, Sierra Leone, South Africa and the DRC. Russia is pursuing cooperative banking arrangements in Angola, Namibia and South Africa. It signed an agreement with South Africa to establish a command and control center for the Russian Space Agency, to train South African space personnel and to build communications satellites. It will launch a satellite for Angola.

Russian aid to Africa remains exceedingly modest although it did increase from $50 million in 2003 to $210 million in 2007. Moscow has cancelled $20 billion in African debt. Russia announced that it has committed more than $1 billion to aid the poorest African countries during the period 2010-2011 to fight infectious diseases and poverty and improve energy and education. While acknowledging the global financial crisis, Russia says it will try to provide $400-500 million of aid annually to Africa in the near future.

Russia has resumed large scale arms sales to African countries, much of it outside official channels, including charges that it is supplying arms to antagonists in the Great Lakes region. Between 2000 and 2007, Russia sold more than $1 billion of arms to African countries. Recent energy deals with Algeria included a $7.5 billion Russian arms sale. Russia is the largest supplier to Sudan, including a recent sale of twelve MiG 29s. Not surprisingly, Sudan publicly supported Russia's "legitimate" right to defend its citizens in Georgia. Ethiopia signed several military technical cooperation agreements with Russia in 2002 and continues to rely heavily on Russia for the supply of weapons.

Russia has not been a significant contributor of peacekeepers to UN missions in Africa, but its 350 personnel are still ten times the American contribution. Russia has concentrated its peacekeeping engagement in southern Sudan, where it has a team with four MI-8 helicopters. A Russian Air Force helicopter group is also supporting a peacekeeping mission to Chad to sustain a force along the Chad-Darfur border. It consists of four Mi-8 helicopters. Russia is training hundreds of African civilian policemen and law enforcement personnel for peacekeeping operations. Russian naval vessels are part of the anti-piracy campaign in the Gulf of Aden.

Russia's director for the Center of Russian-African Relations at the Russian Academy of Sciences Africa Institute commented early in 2008 that Russia must expand relations with Africa. He explained that Russia is experiencing a shortage of manganese, chromium, silicon, and other minerals that are too costly to mine in Russia. Then President Putin concluded in mid-2007, "Russia's cooperation with Africa has taken on a new dynamic in recent times. The level and intensity of contacts is increasing. We are carrying out ongoing work to expand and deepen our mutually beneficial cooperation in trade and the economy, science and technology, humanitarian and other areas." The global economic downturn does not seem to have had a negative impact on Russia's recently revived interest in Africa. Although Russia remains well behind China, it seems committed to regaining its influence in Africa.

Iran

While Iran has had an interest in Africa for many years, it stepped up its engagement about five years ago. Africa's 950 million inhabitants are almost half Muslim, but they are virtually all Sunni Muslim. Iranian Shiites do not have any inherent advantage in wooing Africa's Sunnis, and Iran has not limited its efforts to predominantly Muslim African countries. Iran established the Iran-Africa Cooperation Headquarters in 2004, which agreed to create four free trade zones in Africa, to develop banking ties with African countries, to form an Iranian-African Merchants Council and an Africa Research Center affiliated with Iran's Teacher Training University. Although it appears that Iran never followed up in creating these institutions, it still pursued African countries vigorously on a bilateral basis. President Khatami visited Nigeria, Senegal, Mali, Sierra Leone, Benin, Zimbabwe and Uganda in 2005. There have been numerous exchange visits between African and Iranian leaders ever since. Sudan has been the centerpiece of Iran's effort in Africa with cooperation at all levels, including the possibility of sharing nuclear technology and assistance to the military sector. Senegalese President Wade visited Iran in 2006 and 2008. He announced that Iran would build an oil refinery, chemical plant and an $80 million car assembly plant in Senegal. Iran has also been in talks with Nigeria, South Africa and Tanzania on defense cooperation and in 2009 sent warships to the Gulf of Aden to join the anti-piracy coalition.

In recent years, Iran has made a special effort to build ties with countries in northeast Africa in addition to Sudan. Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, Kenya, Uganda, Tanzania and the Comoro Islands have been the subject of considerable Iranian attention. Eritrean President Isaias visited Tehran in 2008, when the two countries signed four agreements. According to one unconfirmed report, Iran will renovate Eritrea's oil refinery at the Red Sea port of Assab in exchange for the deployment of Iranian forces there. Zimbabwe has been another focus of Iran's interest. Iran has also been active recently in Libya, Algeria, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon and Malawi. Most of this interaction with African countries has concerned trade and investment. In 2007, Iran exported $4.1 billion worth of goods to Africa but imported only $450 million from Africa. South Africa was by far the most important trading partner, although Morocco and Madagascar imported a significant amount of Iranian products. While there is probably more bluster than substance to Iran-Africa ties, it remains a relationship worth watching. Underscoring this point, President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad visited Kenya, Djibouti and the Comoro Islands in February 2009 when he signed five agreements in Djibouti, two in Nairobi and four in Moroni. Iran regularly requests and often obtains from its African interlocutors a public statement supporting its nuclear program. The Iranian leadership almost certainly is using these contacts to further its fundamentalist agenda.

Conclusion

The diplomatic playing field in Africa has become much more crowded. A growing number of non-Western nations are intensifying their contact with African countries. As the United States and West generally pursue their own agendas on the continent, they will have to take account of this new development.

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