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The Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University
February 26, 2004

The Possibilities for Democracy in the Arab World

By Saad Eddin Ibrahim
Professor of Sociology, The American University in Cairo and
Chairman of the Board, Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies

Saad Eddin Ibrahim (SI)

Since the tragic events of 9/11/2001, the Arab World has become more than a standard item in the T.V. networks news. It has become a battle- field for armed conflicts of all kinds: civil strife, inter-state wars, and the so-called war on terrorism. The U.S., and to a lesser extent, other Western coalition partners added spreading "democracy" to the list of objectives of their military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq. This, in turn, has triggered a heated debate among social scientists, politicians and laymen in the Arab World, revolving around the question: Could democracy be imposed by force from the outside? The examples of post world war II Japan and Germany are often cited by those who argue for the possibility and desirability of introducing democratic governance by all means to countries long ruled by autocratic regimes, in which peoples never had a fair opportunity to chose their political system. Others have argued that there is an Arab or Middle East "exceptionalism" i.e. whatever applied elsewhere does not necessarily work in this region. A multitude of historical, cultural, religious and structural factors are believed to underline such exceptionalism. Leading U.S. policy makers have recently challenged this exceptionalism. In his November 6, 2003 speech, President George W Bush stated:

"Our commitment to democracy is also tested in the Middle East, which is my focus today, and must be a focus of American policy for decades to come. In many nations of the Middle East-countries of great strategic importance-democracy has not yet taken root. And the questions arise: are the peoples of the Middle East somehow beyond the reach of liberty? Are millions of men and women and children condemned by history or culture to live in despotism? Are they alone never to know freedom, and never even to have a choice in the matter? I, for one, do not believe it. I believe every person has the ability and the right to be free.

Some skeptics of democracy assert that the traditions of Islam are inhospitable to the representative government. This "cultural condescension," as Ronald Reagan termed it, has a long history. After the Japanese surrender in 1945, a so called Japan expert asserted that democracy in that former empire would "never work." Another observer declared the prospects for democracy in post-Hitler Germany are, and I quote, "most uncertain at best"-he made that claim in 1957. Seventy-four years ago, The Sunday London Times declared nine-tenths if the population of India to be "illiterates not caring a fig for politics." Yet when Indian democracy was imperiled in the 1970s, the Indian people showed their commitment to liberty in a national referendum that saved their form of government.

Time after time, observers have questioned whether this country, or that people, or that group, are "ready" for democracy-as if freedom were a prize you win for meeting our own Western standards of progress. In fact, the daily work of democracy itself is the path of progress. It teaches cooperation, the free exchange of ideas, and the peaceful resolution of differences. As men and women are showing, from Bangladesh to Botswana, to Mongolia, it is the practice of democracy that makes a nation ready for democracy, and every nation can start on this path.

It should be clear to all that Islam-the faith of one-fifth of humanity-is consistent with democratic rule. Democratic progress is found in many predominantly Muslim countries-in Turkey and Indonesia, and Senegal and Albania, Niger and Sierra Leone. Muslim men and women are good citizens of India and South Africa, of he nations of Western Europe, and of the United States of America.

More than half of all the Muslims in the world live in freedom under democratically constituted governments. They succeed in democratic societies, not in spite of their faith, but because of it. A religion that demands individual moral accountability, and encourages the encounter of the individual with God, is fully compatible with the rights and responsibilities of self-government.

Missing from the current debate on democratization of the Arab World is the region's own modern legacies, one of which was a "liberal age", stretching for nearly a century — from the mid 19th to the mid 20th. It is this liberal age which provides both a test of the competing hypotheses over democratization as well as a collective memory and potential ground on which to build future democracies.

Fareed Zakaria has correctly argued that "liberalism" is a pre-condition for a sound democracy. He uses the term "liberal" in the nineteenth-century sense, meaning concern with individual economic, political, and religious liberty, which is sometimes called "classical liberalism", not in the modern, American sense, which associates it with the welfare state, affirmative action, and other policies (Zakaria, p. 19). He warned U.S. policy makers against the rush to electoral politics in Iraq, after the fall of Saddam Hussein (April 9, 2003).

By liberalism, Zakaria and others mean a socio-cultural framework and a way of life in which an open society for trade, free media, competent legal institutions, rule of law, and ethno-religious tolerance prevail, at least on the normative level. The proponents of this per-requisite contend that the above elements of liberalism tune individuals into the spirit, roles and actual behaviors of "citizenship". It equally predisposes groups, communities, and other collectivities to the rules of fair play. This in turn makes them not only receptive but also tolerant of unpleasant outcomes which are invariably built into electoral politics. It means, for example, that "losers" would not always contest the outcome or resort to violent means in such contestation. It equally means that "winners" will not totally disregard legitimate interests of the losers; nor would take advantage of their provisional majority to change the rules of the political game.

These and other restrains could not always be "legislated". They are to be learned and internalized by citizens. A period of liberalism is therefore needed for this kind of civic culture to strike roots before electoral politics are introduced into a country. It is also argued that the spread of civil society organization (CSO's) in a country could expedite its readiness to move into a full-fledged democracy, for it is in the latter that their members learn the skills of organizing, mobilizing, debating and compromising — all of which are necessary for sound democratic governance.

There is little doubt that CSO's enhance a sustainable democracy. Alex de Touqville noted this strong correlation in American democracy some 160 years ago. However, observers noted that in the Third wave of democracy starting with Portugal in 1977 and sweeping across more than 60 countries in the following quarter of a century, there are several cases of successful transition to democracy without passing through a liberal phase.

During the last two centuries, the Arab world went through successive and overlapping legacies: an early liberal, a colonial, a middle liberal, a populist radical, an Islamic, and a new liberal. Not every Arab country went through all six legacies; nor has the ones who experienced them did so in the exact sequence or intensity. But the principal Arab countries of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, and Tunisia have gone through enough of these successive legacies in approximately the same time that both the overall flavor and discourse warrant a number of generalizations.

Whatever the mounting internal pressures, it was an external factor that triggered the commencement of each of the six legacies. The encroachment of the French, British, Italians, Israelis, and the Americans on this or that Arab country brought about geneses of modernity as well as unleashed forces of resistance to these foreign powers. With the fading of one legacy and the onset of another, certain social formations (e.g. classes, occupations, and ethnic groups) decline and new ones rise. Thus each legacy was associated with a particular social formation both as a propeller and as a beneficiary. The landed bourgeoisie championed the first liberal age; the middle class manned the second; the lower middle class dominated the populist radical legacy; and a mix of the lower and lowest urban formations sustained the Islamic legacy. A coalition of Western educated professionals and businessmen are the current force pushing for the return of liberalism.

The articulation of various legacies into ideological "isms" is mainly a function of the 20th century. As the Moroccan historian Abdulla Laroui noted, there was a 50 to 100 year lag between the appearance of such "Isms" in the West and their adoption by Arab advocates (Laroui, pp 11-28). We contend that many of, if not all, the elements of liberalism had existed; and indeed helped in instituting Western - type democracies, first, in Egypt during the last quarter of the 19th century, and then again in a score of Arab countries during the inter - war period - roughly from the early 1920s to the mid-1950s. The seeds of liberalism were laid as early as the turn of the 1800's (Hourani, 1970 pp 1-60), in the manner we take up next.

When Napoleon's naval ships anchored in Alexandria in July 1798, it was the first encounter since the last Crusade in the 13th century that the Arab Middle East came into massive contact with the West. Like the rest of the eastern provinces of the Ottman empire, Egypt was stagnating in its Mediaeval traditional Islamic ways which had been reproducing themselves for the previous four centuries. These were the same centuries in which Europe made its great leaps forward in science, knowledge, technology, religious and political reformation. The French Revolution which had already broken out ten years earlier, was now present in full-dress on the banks of the Nile. Reading the Egyptian historian al-Jabarti, the French may as well have appeared as creatures from another planet. Their language, clothe, military gear, modern weaponry and organization warranted all of al-Jabarti's sense of utter amazement and admiration. Their openness impressed him the most:

"If any of the Muslims came to them in order to look around they did not prevent him from entering their most cherished places, and if they found in him any appetite or desire for knowledge they showed their friendship and love for him, and will bring out all kinds of pictures and maps, and animals and birds and plants, and the histories of the ancients and of nations and tales of the prophets. I went to them often, and they showed me all that" (al-Jabarti, p. 266).

Among the many things that the French Expedition brought to Egypt was the printing press, and new vocabulary - such as liberty, fraternity, equality, human rights and municipal councils. As it turned out, Egyptians revolted against the French; and with the help of the British and Ottomans forced them out of the country after three years. The French left Egypt, taking with them the guns but leaving behind the printing press and the revolutionary slogans. These would prove to be of more lasting impact on the emergence of a modern state and society in Egypt. As a matter of fact, many historians consider the arrival date of the French Expedition (1798) as a marker of Egypt's and the Arab World's modern history.

One of the young Ottman officers, stationed in Egypt at the time, Muhammed Ali, closely observed Napoleon and the French with great admiration. Shortly after their departure and with the help of the native Ulema (learned men of religion), Muhammed Ali maneuvered his way up to become Egypt's ruler; and to succeed where Napoleon had failed. Unlike Napoleon's short tenure of three years, Muhammed Ali's reign extended to forty four (1805-1849). While Napoleon was unable to pacify the Ulema or control the Mamlukes, Muhammed Ali manipulated the former and eliminated the latter. While Napoleon was unable to conquer all of Greater Syria, Muhammed Ali did, and went far beyond - e.g. Arabia, the Sudan and Southern Anatolia. It was Muhammed Ali's ambitious modern state-building that would unintentionally lead in the medium run to the gradual emergence of Egypt's modern civil society, and its first liberal experience.

To start with, Muhammed Ali dispatched a total of 311 of Egypt's youngest and brightest to France, Italy, Austria and Britain to learn and receive the latest training in all modern fields. He also brought to Egypt tens of European officers, engineers, doctors to train more Egyptians at home (Fahmy, pp 76-111). It is estimated that more than 2000 native sons benefited from this at-home training. Thus between 1818 and 1849, these modern educated Egyptians would become the backbone of a new middle class (NMC). From their ranks will emerge proponents of liberal values and practices. By early 1860's elements of this NMC began to establish modern CSO's newspapers, theaters and to advocate liberal politics. The presence of growing Syrian and other foreign communities (mostly Greeks, Italians and French) enhanced these liberal social and political practices.

By 1866, Kedive Ismail, a fairly enlightened Viceroy of Egypt responded favorably to these liberal aspiration. He decreed a constitution that allowed Egypt's first parliamentary elections. Ismail proudly wrote to a fellow Egyptian, Nubar Pasha, living in Paris at the time:

"At long last, elections were held all over the country, and the date of November 18 has been set to inaugurate the council. You will be interested to know that the election turn out was tremendous, despite the fact that the general standard of the people is still below that of Europe. But people seem to fully comprehend the benefits and advantages which will occur to them from the Council. The commoners say that from now on higher and lower officials alike will have to give up their arrogance and to observe a straight proper path in all their conduct. The elections, my dear Nubar, were conducted in full freedom, with all participating - Muslims and Copts with no religious discrimination whatsoever. Copts say that the government will no longer be biased against them. It will cease treating them as minors" (quoted in El-Said, p. 21).

In the same letter, Kedive Ismail could not hide his glee or sarcasm vis-à-vis his rival in Istanbul, the Ottman Sultan for being "so pathetically lazy in carrying out similar reform, that the future of the entire Sultanate will be hanging in the balance" (Al-Said, p 22).

That first parliamentary council was made of 75 members, elected by an assembly of rural and urban notables who were salaried or tax payers (Ouda, p. 5). Limited in its representation and legislative powers, that council was the crowning of the first cycle of Egypt's liberal quest. As the case often is, that first council which was quite timid in its early years would gain so much self-confidence to challenge the Kedive and be at the forefront of what came to be known as the "Urabi Revolt" of 1881. The deputies simply refused to rubber-stamp a new tax bill without a proper auditing of their own of the state budget (Ouda, 55). One of the more outspoken deputies invoked slogans of the American Revolution "No taxation with representation".

To quell this unexpected parliamentary defiance, Kedive Tawfik (Ismail's son) issued a decree dissolving the Council. To his surprise, the deputies refused to disband and baracaded themselves in the Council building. Another outspoken deputy invoked the French revolutionary Mirabeau's phrase in a similar situation, "on our dead bodies" (Ouda, 55). This act of parliamentary defiance triggered a similar army rebellion and a popular uprising demanding "a proper constitution", with complete separation of the branches of the state, and full accountability of the Executive to the Legislature. This chain of events prompted Kedive Tawfik to resort to external help to put down what was becoming a full fledged revolution. It ultimately led to the British occupation of Egypt in 1882, bringing the first sixteen years old democratic experiment to an end.

However, much of Egypt's other socio-cultural liberal elements endured under the British. Liberalism in Egypt may have been even more enhanced by instituting full measures protecting private land property, free trade and market economy - all of which would further empower both land bourgeoisie and the NMC. In due course these very social formations will become instrumental in resisting British occupation for political independence on one hand, and for constitutional democracy on the other hand. Both quests partly materialized, thanks to a famous popular uprising known by the Egyptians as the 1919 Revolution. Britain conceded in February 1922, by granting Egypt an independence; and King Fouad (son of Tawfik and grandson of Ismail) conceded to a liberal constitution in 1923. This ushered in the second political cycle of Egypt's liberalism - by then a century long.

Egypt's long liberal march was paralleled elsewhere in a score of Arab countries. Though few decades later, the pattern was roughly quite similar. Still nominally parts of the Ottman Empire, Iraq, Lebanon and Tunisia managed at different points in the 19th century to gain substantial autonomy, and under the leadership of ambitious modernizers they would institute large scale socio-economic educational reforms which within one generation created new middle classes (NMC's). With liberal values but initially apolitical, these NMCs would in due time become politically assertive, first against the Ottmans (from mid 19th century to WWI), then against Western occupying powers (e.g. Britain, France and Italy) during the inter - war period (1918-1939).

The liberal march for Iraq started with Dawood Pasha (1830) and continued under his successor Medhat Pasha (1869). Beside sending young Iraqis to study abroad, he brought in foreign trainers to newly created modern institutions. Medhat Pasha was in a hurry to emulate his Egyptian counterpart (Kedive Ismail). He proposed a constitution for Iraq in 1869 - just three years after that of Egypt. Though it did not materialize due to this untimely death, it was a clear indication of a prevailing trend among several rulers of the Arab provinces of the Ottman Empire. Obviously they were taking advantage of a declining center and as well as wanting to ward off encroaching Western colonial design (Hourani, 1983, pp 305-6).

The Egyptian and Iraqi liberal scenarios were also emulated by a Tunisian energetic reformer, Khyir Eldin (d. 1889); and by a local ruler in Mount Lebanon, Bachir al-Shihaby in the first half of the 19th century. The latter was so taken by the Egyptian model that he closely allied himself with Muhammed Ali and his son Ibrahim Pasha against the Ottman Sultan. His fortune ran out with the demise of the Egyptian rule in Greater Syria. Though never matured to the same political level of that of Egypt, whatever socio-cultural elements introduced by these reformers in Iraq, Tunisia and Syria have outlived their originators.

Among the most salient features of the first cycle of the Arab liberal age was the proliferation of civil society organizations (CSO's)of all kinds. Students of the subject mark the beginning of modern Western style Arab SCO's when the Greek expatriates living in Egypt established the Hellenistic Philanthropic Association in Alexandria in 1821. Soon after, native upper and middle class Egyptians followed suit. Active pioneers in this regard were Egyptians who studied in Europe and were familiar with the role of these organizations in complementing state institutions or filling in where such institutions were nonexistent or non-effective. By the end of the 19th century, some 65 CSO's had been established. By 1925, the number jumped nearly five folds to 300; and by 1950 to over 3000 (Ibrahim, 2002, p. 234).

Most of these early CSO's were devoted to providing services, i.e., welfare associations. Later on, some were established to perform developmental tasks; and over time they became known as Community Development Associations (CDA's). Still a third type took on advocacy functions - i.e. to promote and propagate specific causes or enhance certain interests. Some of these were public and registered - like cooperative, clubs, and trade unions. Like the previous other types, what made these CSO's effective is their voluntary membership (Ibrahim, 2002, p. 240). They reactivated older native traditions of "awkaf" (religious endowments), sufi orders, and guilds-albeit in modern secular forms.

Not so public were politically motivated secret societies. Initially, manned by Arab students abroad (e.g. Istanbul, Paris, Berlin and London), they were devoted to resisting Ottman rule from mid 19th century to WWI; and later on (1920s - 1950s) to resisting Western colonial powers. There were often public "legitimate CSO's" cover for these underground secret societies. Their significance draws from the fact that they were incubators for many of the leaders of independence movements (Ibrahim, 2000, pp. 13-20); and actually became the new rulers upon obtaining independence.

Equally significant in the flowering of the first and second cycles of Arab liberalism was the role played by the press. For an area of the world to whom the printing press was introduced as late as 1798, and still with a high illiteracy rate, it was remarkable that newspapers sprouted so rapidly. In Egypt, the number of newspapers grew from one in 1800 to 23 in 1900. In Lebanon, the number grew from 3 to 46 during the same century. They were not as much news-oriented as they were polemics and opinion-oriented in what was published in that century.

The media entrepreneurs in Egypt and the rest of the Arab World were disproportionately Lebanese Christians who had suffered from Ottman discriminatory practices through the 19th century. The ones who took refuge in Egypt started publishing houses, some of which lived on to the 21st century and whose names have become known worldwide - e.g. Al-Ahram and Al-Hilal. These publications preached liberal values and practices. The very fact that much of the content was polemical triggered protracted debates among prominent thinkers, politicians and laymen readers (Hourani, 1983, pp. 110-150). Among the topics of such heated debates were: Darwinism, Marxism, Secularism, Arab nationalism, Islamic reformation, women emancipation and unveiling. One such debate was triggered as late as 1876 about the Earth revolving around the Sun. Both Muslim and Christian clerics coalesced in refuting this claim, "which goes against indisputable divine text - verses of the Holy Quraan and Bible" (Al-Said, p. 67). To their credit, passionate as they were, the contenders in these debates maintained a climate of tolerance, abstained from abusive languages, slander, or inciting the public religious or political authorities against one another, as happened a century later*.

Thus, many of the values and practices associated with liberalism - as authors like Farid Zakariya noted as per-requisites for democratic governance did in fact exist in the Arab World as early as the second half of the nineteenth century. To be sure these liberal beliefs and practices were prevalent among a limited stratum of society - i.e. the modern educated Arabs. Strategically located at the time, it was that stratum which had manned the newly established institutions during the reign of early indigenous reformers in the 19th century - e.g. Muhammed Ali, Dawood Pasha, Bachir al-Chihabi, and Khyir Aldin (Hourani, 1991, pp. 306-7). It was also the stratum that led the resistance against Western colonial occupation in their respective countries during the first half of the 20th century till an independence was achieved. From the ranks of this very stratum, came the early rulers and state - builders after independence.

The form of governance partly chosen by the new native rulers and partly by the colonial or mandatory authorities, was a pluralistic, multiparty constitutional democracy. It was not surprising that Egypt, Iraq, and Jordan modeled theirs along a British-type constitutional monarchy. Nor was surprising that Syria and Lebanon would model theirs after that of their mandatory power, France (Hudson, 1977). Naturally, there were adaptations to the specificities of each country. Thus the questions of religion and identity were debated and handled somewhat differently in each case, as reflected in their respective constitutions. The 1923 Egyptian constitution, for example, skirted off the question of "national identity", but not that of religion. Though one of the articles asserted full equality of all Egyptian citizens before the law regardless of their race, religion, or creed; another article stipulated the "religion of the state is Islam".

The first Syrian constitution (1942) on the other hand, did the opposite, i.e. ignored religion of the state but not its national identity. An early article asserted that "Syria is an integral part of the Arab Homeland; and its people as an integral part of the Arab Nation". Lebanon and Iraq ignored both issues. Other than these country-specific feature, all Arab constitutions were quite on bar with their Europeans counterparts in terms of guaranteeing basic freedoms and human rights.

The governance dimension of the Arab liberal age came to an end in most of the countries, that had it, during the 1950s and 1960s, at the young ages of 30 to 40 years. Its early mortality was caused by several factors. The most immediate of these was the 1948 Arab defeat in Palestine at the hands of the newly established Jewish state of Israel. Brigades from seven Arab countries of varying sizes, training and battle readiness had been hurriedly ordered to march into Palestine to quell the would-be Jewish state. The Arab public opinion was primed by demagogic press that the mission would amount to "a one or two weeks picnic" (Ibrahim, 1999, p.13). It turned out to be a real war that lingered for several months; and ended in a humiliating defeat. The returning armies blamed the defeat on their liberal government. Allegations of corruption and treason were flown in all directions. This paved the ground for a series of military coups d'etat: Syria (1949), Egypt (1952), Iraq (1958), Sudan (1958) and Libya (1969).

But there is more to the discrediting of the liberal regimes than being scapegoated for the 1948 defeat in Palestine. One source of widespread discontent was the neglect of what was termed the "Social Question". From the 1930s on, Arab critics and foreign observers noted growing imbalances in the distribution of wealth and power among the various social classes. Such imbalances worsened in the 1940s as a result of higher rates of population growth, urbanization, the stresses and strains of WWII of which the Arab World was one of the two major theatres. With the post-war demobilization, the rates of unemployment skyrocketed in Arab urban centers. Fascist, socialist and Islamic movements had ample opportunities to exploit this state of affairs by fermenting anger among the growing disenfranchised new urban proletariat. The burning of Cairo on January 26, 1952 was the most dramatic case in point of all the above (for details, see Ayubi, pp 106-108).

The Arab countries that had civilian liberal governments were not fully able to act independently on their own. Nearly all were tied by practices, defense, or aid strings to their former colonial masters. One of these ties was in the form of foreign military bases on their soil. Four of them, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan and Libya, were constitutional monarchies. On paper, the monarch was to reign not to rule. However in all the four, each respective king meddled substantially in politics. Elected governments hardly acted independently from the throne. In the rare cases when they did, the elected government and its parliament were dissolved; and a minority or transitional cabinet was appointed until new elections were held. The non-elected minority and / or the transitional governments ruled in Egypt and Iraq longer than the majority elected parties during the so called Arab liberal age, because of this persistent machination of the throne and / or foreign powers. This state of affairs not only crippled elected governments but also cast doubt on the viability of the entire project of multiparty democratic system. Hence, when military regimes took over, dissolved political parties and did away with democracy there were hardly any tears shed.

Even though Syria was ahead in terms of military coup d'��tat in reaction to the Arab defeat in Palestine (1949), it was Egypt that provided a full-blown archetype for other military regimes, not only in the Arab world but also in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Early on, Nasser disdained the label of military coup d'��tat. In 1954, he authored a book titled The Philosophy of the Revolution, in which he asserted that what the Free Officers did on the night of July 23rd was in fact a revolutionary action. It had intended to go, and in fact went far beyond just changing the ruling regime, to transforming the entire society. In fact, the new Egyptian rulers undertook far-reaching distributive measures that dramatically affected the class structure, the educational system, and re-oriented economic life (Ayubi, pp. 135-138).

These measures were meant to address the "Social Question" for the benefit of the less privileged in society i.e. the long neglected by governments during the liberal age (1920s - 1950s). The initial response from the targeted constituencies was one of support and enthusiasm. Along similar lines the new regime addressed deep seated national sentiments and aspirations. Very early on, it declared its anti-colonialist, anti-Zionist and anti-communist orientations. The nationalization of the Suez Canal and the gallant resistance of the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion (1956) enhanced Nasser's charisma as a Pan Arab Leader. When Syria and Egypt were joined in what was called the United Arab Republic (UAR) in 1958, the credibility of Nasser's vision was enhanced. It came to be known by students of the Arab and Third World as a "Populist Social Contract" (PSC). It promised the fulfillment of all the desirable popular demands - e.g. social justice, free education, full employment, free health care, the liberation of Palestine, and Arab unification (Ayubi, pp. 196-224).

The PSC tantalized the Arab "masses" for much of the 1950s and 1960s. There was enough delivery on some of the promises to keep peoples' expectations alive if not soaring. More sober observers at the time questioned the price that was being asked of the "Masses" in return. The price was simply a suspension of basic political rights - namely democracy and other public freedom. Obviously there was an implicit mass endorsement of the PSC. It was clear that only members of the upper middle and upper classes, i.e., no more than 25% of the population, were the ones who were keen on democracy and basic freedoms.

However, this was to change substantially with the 1967 Arab defeat at the hands of Israel in the Six-Day War. The shock of the swift defeat paralyzed the Arab masses for several weeks. Investigating the causes of the defeat and putting the military commanders responsible on trials took several months. But as the public sensed attempts of cover ups, through lenient sentences, massive demonstrations broke out in all major urban centers, protesting, and demanding democracy. Nasser responded to the public anger by issuing "The February 28 Declaration" (1968) in which he re-iterated his regimen's responsibility for the defeat; and that "a major reason behind it was the absence of accountability, which could only be assured through democracy (Ibrahim, 1983, p. 112). He, therefore, would return to a full democratic system as soon as "the traces of aggression are removed". As it turned out, Nasser died two years later, and it took his successor, President Sadat, several more years to wage another war (1973) to remove those "traces of aggression", ( i.e. the Israeli occupation of Egyptian Sinai) and to begin the process of restoring democracy (1976).

Thus it was the 1948 defeat in the first Arab - Israeli War that expedited the demise of the first Arab liberal regimens, and it was another defeat in the 1967 third Arab Israeli war that ushered the beginning of the end of the Arab medical populist regimes. However it is noteworthy that while it took only a decade (1949 - 1958) for the liberal regimens to disintegrate, it is taking much longer for radical populist regimens to fall, or change substantially from within. Equally, it is taking much longer than previously anticipated and than elsewhere in the world for democratic systems to be re-instituted in the Arab countries. One possible explanation for this protracted transition is the unfolding role of another radicalism, i.e., political Islam.

In the aftermath of the 1967 defeat, it was not only liberal democratic forces that emerged to reclaim the mantle of societal leadership. There were others ranging from Arab radical left a la George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) to a variety of Islamic movements. The Arab radical left had short moments of capturing headlines in the late 1960s and early 1970s, mainly through the sensational hijacking of passenger airplanes or fomenting civil strife as in Jordan (1970) and Lebanon (1972-75). But in terms of regime change, this radical left had only one modest success in South Yemen (1968).

It was radical political Islam that seemed to have more staying power, both in the Arab World and other neighboring Muslim countries. To begin with, Islamic groups have challenged the Sadat regime in Egypt as early as April 1974, till one of them ultimately succeeded in assassinating him in October 1981. The challenge continued to his successor, President Mubarak, violently as in the 1990s or peacefully as represented by the Muslim Brotherhood afterward. Similar Violent Confrontations with militant Islamists took place in Saudi Arabia (Seisure of the Grand Mosque at Mecca and Tunisia at the town of Jafsa) at the end of 1978). But what made the Islamic alternative more credible was the success of the Iranian Islamic Revolution (IIR) in 1979.

The success of the IIR gave a tremendous moral boost to advocates of the Islamic vision in several Arab countries. Its proponents posed serious challenge to the entrenched populists regimes- e.g. Egypt, Sudan, Algeria and Yemen. Only in Sudan such proponents managed to seize power, through a military coup d'��tat in 1989. However, the bloodshed entailed in the Islamists' challenge to regimes in Algeria and Egypt; the harsh and backward implementation of Sharia by the IIR and Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990's led to disillusionment of those who were hopeful. Even the IIR had quickly run out of steam. Its "reign of terror" at home and adventurism abroad discredited its version of the Islamic vision (Sachedina, pp58-60). By the beginning of the 21st Century, the promising Islamic legacy in practice looked, after two decades, to be no better than secular populist autocracies in the region. In some ways, it proved to be much worse in so far as justifying its practices on scared religious grounds.

The horrendous suicide attacks on the New York's World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washington, September 11, 2001 had many far reaching consequences both in the US and abroad. One of these may very well turn out to be the beginning of the end of political militant Islam. Should this in fact occur, it will not be so much because of the devastating American military reaction but rather due to a painful collective reassessment of the entire Islamic legacy as projected in the last quarter of the 20th Century. It also means that the Islamic legacy will be cut down to a human size and to moderation.

In fact, we have begun to see this moderation already in Turkey, Morocco and Bahrain. All three countries held parliamentary elections at the end of 2002 and the beginning of 2003. In all three, Islamic political parties ran a campaign of moderation, tolerance and affirmation of utmost respect for the rules of democratic governance. While such appearance is not to be taken on face value, in politics what matters is actual behavior as perceived by the respective constituencies. The fact that the "Islamic Justice and Development Party" obtained the biggest bloc of voters in Turkey and the third biggest in Morocco and Bahrain is indicative of their credibility. Should this moderate trend continuous and expands to other Arab and Middle Eastern countries, the prospects of liberal democracies in the region will become brighter. An eminent Islamic thinker, Sheikh Gamal al-Banna, has been advocating that the current Islamic movements evolve into Muslim democratic Parties - akin to the Christian Democratic Parties in Western Europe (al-Banna, 2000, pp. 79-122). His writings on this issue and Islamic Reformation in general have resonated with wider circles since 9/11. His credibility is partly due to the fact that he is the only surviving brother of the famous Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brothers (1928), reputed to be the "Mother of all Islamic movements".

Over the last thirty years, namely since the 1967 defeat, one radical ideology after another displayed varying but definite signs of retreat. The first to do so is Egypt's Nasser quasi-socialist populist Pan- Arabism. Similar retreats have been underway to the radical regimes of Iraq, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Yemen and Sudan. The retreat of regimes, modeled after that of Nasser, did not all occur at the same time. It took nearly three decades for some of them. Nor did the retreat mean necessarily regime change or even its collapse. It simply meant toning down its rhetorical aggressive policies abroad, and loss of appeal to its original constituencies at home. In some cases, a radical Arab regime was replaced or succeeded by another radical regime. This was the case, for example, in Iraq, where the radical regime of A. Kassem was replaced by a Baathist radical regime in 1963: then by Araf's regime in 1963, and again by a Baathist from 1968 to 2003. Something similar occurred in Syria, Sudan and Yemen.

The most significant radical retreat is the one in the regime's own policies and practice. A case in point was that of the de-Nasserization of Egypt by a successor, Sadat (1970-1981). More along the same line was that off Numairy in Sudan, in which the same regime and the same leader's policies shifted from socialist to capitalist, to Islamic radicalism in 16 years (1969-1975). Libya's Qadafi has been, since 1969, the most radical of all - from an extreme Pan-Arabist, to an extreme Pan-Islamist to an extreme Pan-Africanists. Its most recent sharp turn is a rapid capitulation to his former Western foes (the U.S., U.K., and France) over previously contested issues of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction.

The recent fall of the Iraqi Baathist regime of Saddam Hussien at the hand of an American led coalition (April 9, 2003) was so dramatic that many observers predicted at the time the further retreat, if not the total demise, of similar radical regimes - e.g. in Syria, Libya, Sudan and neighboring non Arab, Iran. Few months later the predictions are materializing, at least with regard to swift retreat from radicalism by the Sudanese, Libyan, and Iranian regimes. By the end of 2003, all three had accepted to do what they had resisted for years e.g. removal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), agreeing to international inspections, or signing peace agreements to settle internal conflicts as in the Sudan.

With every defeat or retreat of Arab radicalism, whether secular or religious, the door opens for the return of liberalism. It is almost a zero-sum-game. This has occurred first in the economic sphere in Egypt and Tunisia in the 1970's, following the October war and the skyrocketing of Arab oil revenues (Ibrahim, 1982, pp. 10-73). Many of the poor Arab command economies began to liberalize, partly to attract deposits, remittances and investments from oil- rich Arab countries. The rulers who undertook economic liberalization measures may have not intended to go beyond that. But there are always the unintended consequences of human actions.

To be sure, no significant democratization took place immediately with or following economic liberalization but there were greater freedoms of expression and travel. Three years after the October war, Egypt re-instituted a limited multiparty system to replace the one-party that had been in effect for over 30 years. Each new party was allowed to have its own publications. The number of Egyptian newspapers jumped from four to fourteen between 1976 and 1986; and to more than four times that many (62) by 1996.

Two other wars seem to have contributed to the greater fluidity in the region- the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990) and the Iraq- Iran War (1980-1988) contributed in peculiar ways to the mushrooming of Arab media in diasporas, and enjoyed much greater freedom than its counterparts at home. Notably among these were Al-Hayat and Al-Sharq Al-Awsat Arab dailies. Though published in London, Paris or Cyprus, these newspapers found their way back to the home readership. With the Internet in the 1990's such readership jumped to the tens of millions.

The second Gulf War (1990-1991) to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation ushered in yet one more avenue of freedom of expression- i.e. Arab satellite TV networks. The most notorious of these is Al -Jazira, which transmits from the small Gulf state of Qatar. But there were others before (e.g. Orbit, MBC) and many after (e.g. Arabiya, Mustakila, Abu Dhabi, LBC and Al-Huriya). The new media opened up the Arab public space as never before. The competition for an ever-growing viewer ship has improved the professional quality and expanded the margins of freedom even in countries still controlled by the more repressive authoritarian regimes such as Syria, Libya and Iraq (till April 2003).

Arab monarchies have been, on the whole, more responsive than their republican counterparts to domestic demands for change and to regional and global developments. Despite rough starts in the 1950's and 60's, King Hussien of Jordan and Hassan of Morocco earned their tenure in the 1990's with significant political reforms. Both presided over steady democratization, which allowed at least three successive uncontested parliamentary elections (Ibrahim, 2000). Their successors to the throne, Mohammed VI and Abdullah II continued the practice of relatively fair and honest elections into the 21st Century. Opposition groups, including leftists and Islamists, have participated, won seats in those elections; and occasionally occupied cabinet positions. This seemed to have contributed to a marked political stability in both countries, despite the ups and downs of economic conditions. The young King of Morocco is equally leading a social revolution. In November 2003 he urged the Moroccan Parliament to approve a radical family bill which gives Moroccan women equal rights with men in all matters of marriage, divorce, children custody and the likest. On January 7, 2004 the King went an extra mile toward accommodation of victims of human rights violations during the reign of his father, Hassan II. He announced the establishment of a National Commission for Fairness and Reconciliation (NCFR)-similar to that established by Nelson Mandela in South Africa upon the fall of the white racist regime in 1994. These two measures have added significantly to the growing liberalization of Morocco as well as to the popularity of Mohamed VI.

Virtually evolving into constitutional monarchies, Morocco and Jordan have also become role models to other Arab royalists in Bahrain, Qatar and Oman. All three have moved in the same direction. Bahrain was the swiftest, not only in democratization but also in establishing political gender equality, the first in the Gulf. Even the most conservative Saudi Arabia has moved more forcefully toward more representative governance. A Saudi Sharia (consultative) Council was established shortly after the first Gulf War (1991), but remained with limited symbolic powers. Shortly after the Iraq war (2003), Saudi Arabia announced plans for municipal and local elections. Along this greater opening of the Saudi system, serveral new civil society organizations have formed and engaged the Crown Prince Abdullah in an active dialogue over socio-political- educational reform (Al-Shark Al Awsat daily: July 16, 2003, January 8, 3004).

Thus, it is the monarchies that are currently leading the newest cycle of Arab liberalization, while the weighty republics of Egypt, Syria, Tunisia, Algeria and Libya are reluctant and falling behind. It must be noted that this impulse for liberalization is not merely a function of the good hearts of these Kings. It is as much in response to growing domestic and external pressures. In the case of Morocco, for example, it is the mushrooming of NGO's from less than 20,000 in 1980 to more than 80,000 by 2003, many of which are human rights and women advocacy, pressure groups, networking with European counterparts, especially in France. In the case of the Arab Gulf states, the events of 9/11 and their aftermath focused Western, especially American attention on the need for overall socio-political reform, which converged with long standing domestic demands. This benign convergence tipped the balance against the old conservative forces, long using narrow interpretations of Islam to resist such changes. The battle is far from over; and occasional reversals are to be expected. But thanks to the steady rapid growth of the new middle classes (NMC), the pressure for sustainable reform now has substantial indigenous support. Since the 1970's oil revenues have helped build modern institutions, which expanded the NMC in all the Gulf States, including Iraq and Iran. The fall of the despotic regime of Saddam Hussien in Iraq (April 2003) has unleashed many suppressed forces and sent many signals to rulers and people in the region. In many respects, these forces would enhance liberalization and democratization - closing the deficits that the 2002 UN Arab Human Development Report (AHDR) dramatically highlighted.

However, the fact that regime change was brought about with the help of a coalition of Western powers that have remained, symbolizing "foreign occupation" is unleashing another set of patriotic-nationalist forces. The danger for the reformists is to be viewed by the conservative forces as agents, not of change, but of foreign occupation. Thus the fate of this latest cycle of Arab liberalization is contingent, among other factors, on how rapidly the visible symbols of foreign occupation could be removed. By the same token, because liberalization and democracy have been closely associated with the West, local detractors will continue to resist so long as other outstanding accounts from the colonial legacy have not been yet settled. The most potent and complicated of these is the Palestinian questions.

In conclusion, it is often said that for Middle Easterners, history never dies, but merely fades away temporarily, to come back full circle. At least this seems to e the case with "liberalism" in the Arab World. This time around, at least four things are new and different. New countries that had not even existed as states during earlier cycles, are jealously joining the latest wave. Socio-political formations that had previously flirted with radical populism or militant Islamism are either reacting or seriously revising their beliefs and practices to join or come closer to other liberal forces. Though somewhat impoverished in some Arab countries, the new middle classes are growing and steadily reclaiming liberal values and democratic ideas. Finally, with cold war over, Western powers seem more committed to advancing democratic system in the Arab World - at least in the hope that more inclusionary governance would serve as antidote to both religious extremism and terrorism. In short, there are more chances this time for sustainable liberal democracies in the Arab World than ever before.

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