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Lectures & Speeches
The Gulf: Searching for a New Balance
A lecture by Amb. Edward W. Gnehm, Jr.
Kuwait Professor for Gulf and Arabian Peninsula Affairs
The Elliott School of International Affairs
The George Washington University
Kuwait Chair Lecture
April 14, 2009
Four years ago I delivered my first lecture entitled "The Middle East Cauldron." It was 2005. I had just returned from Amman, Jordan where I served as Ambassador during our military intervention into Iraq and its immediate aftermath. The words I spoke then are an apt beginning for my lecture tonight.
Our entry with U.S. ground forces into the heartland of the Arabs and of Islam was a momentous and cataclysmic event — an opening of Pandora's Box Baghdad style. With this action what "was" is gone. What follows is unknown and very much unpredictable. The decisions we and others take — the actions that we and others take — or of equal consequence — do not take — will determine the future. The players influence but do not control events. And like the evils of old, the cross currents and counter forces of the issues that are in motion, themselves further complicate the uncertainty of the outcome.
April 8 marked the sixth year since that military intervention. The forces unleashed then remain very much at play. Tonight I want to examine how the major actors in the Gulf are reacting and maneuvering in an effort to insure that their interests are protected in the emerging new political order in that region.
The Old Order
Let us look briefly at the balance or order that existed in the Gulf region prior to our military intervention. Eight years of war between Iraq and Iran from 1980 to 1988 left both states weakened economically. Iran suffered enormous casualties as did Iraq. The U.S.-led coalition's defeat of Iraq after its invasion of Kuwait and the subsequent decade of UN sanctions left Iraq further weakened both economically and militarily.
Yet, the basic state structure remained in place as did traditional thinking of likely alliances among parties. One would still describe the overall political landscape as one in which Iran stood on one side of the Gulf balanced still by Iraq (even if weakened) and the Arab Gulf States allied with the U.S. and its large military presence.
U.S. military action in Iraq (and, importantly, similar U.S. military action in Afghanistan) dramatically altered the existing balance by removing two important actors from the scene — Saddam Hussein's Sunni dominated Iraq and a Taliban controlled Afghanistan. Both represented threats to Iran and were significant considerations in Iran's calculus — no longer necessary or at least not in the same way.
The Sunni-Shia Cleavage
From the destruction of Sunni dominated Iraq emerged an Iraq led for the first time by its Shia population. Sectarian fighting erupted between Sunni and Shia. Bombings, kidnappings and assassinations seemed to be shredding the very fabric of the state. Neighboring States supported their co-religionists with arms, money and fighters. Huge numbers of Iraqis were displaced as they sought refuge with those of their own religious persuasion.
The Sunni-Shia conflict goes far beyond its religious aspects and right to the question of power and influence. Shia Iran is seen by Sunni Arabs and Kurds as dominating the Shia world — in Iraq but also in the other Gulf states where there are significant Shia populations. There was and remains heightened concern among the leaders of the Arab Gulf States that Iran could use its influence with their Shia populations to destabilize their countries and perhaps even overthrow regimes. There is also concern that Shia religious extremists encouraged by Iran will try to convert Sunnis to Shi'ism — already a worry in Syria, Egypt, and Morocco. Anxiety over Iranian domination of the Shia world prompted Jordanian King Abdullah to warn the west of an emerging arc of Shi'ism, including Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon under Hezbollah.
Persians vs. Arabs
Since the U.S. military intervention in Iraq the long standing cleavage between Persians and Arabs has once again come to the fore. This ethnic issue factors into the behavior and interaction of the countries in the Gulf. Iran is primarily Persian and it harkens back to a legacy of empire and domination in the Middle East and in Iraq and the Gulf in particular. Iranians (or Persians) have a rich heritage that they rightfully and proudly proclaim — a heritage in poetry, art, music, law and literature. Persians will speak of their cultural superiority and, often in that context, convey their disdain for Arabs. On the basis of history and culture the Iranians see themselves as the "rightful" dominant power in the Gulf. This view of Iranian hegemony was as real in the days of the Shah as it is today in an Iran dominated by clerics. It is also a view widely held by the Iranian population. Iranian pride and nationalism is a key concept in understanding Iranian behavior. Arabs respond with a similar Arab pride and Arab nationalism.
Iran: Resurgent
Iranian policy toward the region is predicated on restoring Iran to its "rightful" place — to restore Iran as a dominant power and influence. The Iranian people view recent history as one in which outside powers trampled on Iranian sovereignty, intervened in the country's domestic affairs, and acted to isolate and weaken the state. Historically, they would have named Great Britain and Russia as the culprits. Today it is the United States.
All Iranians recall with considerable emotion the U.S.-staged overthrow of the popular elected Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953. The U.S. remains associated in the minds of Iranians with the coup as well as the restoration and survival of the Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. They interpret the U.S. tilt toward Iraq in the Iraq-Iran War as proof of the deep U.S. enmity toward Iran. In fact, they cite the failure of the international community to condemn Iraq for its use of chemical weapons during the Iraq-Iran war as evidence of the world's hostility to Iran.
Iran perceives the U.S. as an obstacle to achieving its ambitions; therefore, an important component in Iranian initiatives is to undermine the U.S. position in the region — in short to bring about our departure from the region and get the U.S. to acknowledge their pre-eminent role in the Gulf and the greater Middle East.
As one looks at Iran in this period from 2003 to present, one must assess that the Iranians have greatly enhanced their position in the region. They have done so through adroit policies and opportunistic responses to events. Foremost in Iraq, Iran has taken immediate advantage of geographic proximity and its religious ties with the Iraqi Shia community. Many members of this community and particularly a significant number of the current Shia leadership in Iraq spent considerable time in exile in Iran. Their affinities — at least initially — are favorable toward Iran. Iran hopes over the long-term to have a major influence in Iraq and, by doing so, to separate Iraq from its traditional ties with the Arab world and also to thwart any long term American presence. Clearly Iran wants to insure that Iraq remains a weak but united state that is not in the future the same military threat that it has been in the past.
Such influence is, in my opinion, unlikely to be as consequential as Iran desires. While the ties are real and there are some common interests, there are other factors that will balance the Iranian influence and might even lead to the very end that Iran fears. Already we have seen a hostile Iraqi reaction to Iranian financial and arms support to a variety of factions in Iraq. The Prime Minister himself has called on Iran to cease its meddling in Iraqi domestic affairs. The natural tendency for Persian Iranians to belittle their Arab neighbors — even their Shia brethren — is another inhibiting factor in the relationship. But by far the most important factors that argue against an Iranian ability to dominate Iraq are simply Iraqi nationalism and the interests of the Iraqi State. A good example was the Iraqi decision to conclude a SOFA with the U.S. in spite of concerted Iranian pressure.
Iran's nuclear program can be seen as a second area in which Iran has asserted its ambitions and power. Iran says repeatedly that its program is a peaceful program and that it has no intention whatsoever to develop a nuclear weapons capability. And no one believes them. Yet the program goes forward with announcements as recently as last week that Iran can now produce uranium enriched fuel. The Iranians press onward in defiance of UNSC resolutions and critical reports from the IAEA. The Supreme Leader himself, as well as other political figures, has made categorical statements that Iran will not give up a program that it has every right as a sovereign nation to pursue.
We can speculate on Iran's real intent but I want to focus on how this program supports Iran's desire to regain its power and influence. Pakistan and India have nuclear weapons. Is Iran any different, Iranians will ask? Simply said, having a national program to enrich uranium is prestigious and, if countries should happen to think Iran has a nuclear military capability — or could move easily in that direction, then it sends a useful message. "Neighbors beware."
Interestingly, there are conflicting attitudes toward Iran's nuclear program in the region. While privately many Arab Gulf leaders speak against Iran's nuclear program, in public they support the principle of Iran developing nuclear energy for domestic civilian consumption. Many governments want to emulate the program. There is enormous popular support in the Arab world for Iran's program. This support is driven in large part by public attitudes on the Palestinian-Israeli issue. The public views an Iranian nuclear capability as a welcome response to the Israeli nuclear program. In deed, they relish Ahmadinejad's defiance of Israel and the U.S.
That point leads right to another Iranian political initiative that has gained it much prestige and support in the region — Iranian success in identifying itself as a champion of the Palestinian cause. In doing so, Iran has seized the lead from key Arab states and rivals now seen by their "street" as having abdicated their responsibility. Whether it is a serious or even a genuine commitment to the cause is not the point. The fact is that Ahmadinejad has been able to present Iran to the Arab masses as active and aggressive while Arab governments in the region appear passive. From Teheran comes the steady stream of anti-Israeli rhetoric by Ahmadinejad as well as a constant propaganda barrage against the U.S. for its "bias" toward Israel. Iran champions assistance programs and diplomatic efforts to highlight the Palestinian cause — in ways that delight the Arab masses and embarrass Arab governments.
Israel's military action into Gaza in 2008 is a case in point. The Iranian Government has become the champion of Hamas and its resistance to Israel. Many Arab governments favor a peace process and see Hamas's position on Israel as an obstacle. Their policies, therefore, have tended either to get Hamas to alter its position or to get Hamas and Fatah to reach an accommodation. Iran, on the other hand, has encouraged Hamas's resistance to Israel. It was in the forefront of those condemning the savagery of Israeli actions and decrying the failure of other states in the region to take effective action in support of Gazans. Again, the issue is not the facts of the matter but the public perception in the Middle East that Iran is the leading force on behalf of the poor besieged Palestinian people.
No where is Iranian success more obvious than its support for Hezbollah in Lebanon. Riding the wave of public anger at Israel's 2006 invasion of southern Lebanon and the widely perceived view of excessive Israeli destruction of Lebanese infrastructure, the Iranian Government seized the moment to launch a massive propaganda attack. Its focus was, of course, on Israel and the U.S. (for its support of Israel); but Iran also attacked other Arab leaders for their failure to speak out in support of Hezbollah's "defense of the Arab cause." Hezbollah emerged in the minds of most people in the region as victors over the previously invincible Israelis. And Iran, its ally, enjoyed immense popularity for its unconditional support.
Saudi Arabia: Anxiety and a New Activism
In all the venues cited above, there is another important player — Saudi Arabia. Let's turn then to Saudi Arabia and its perspective on events. What are Saudi goals? How are they dealing with the various forces now at play, including Iran?
As custodian of the two most holy sites in Islam, the Kingdom clearly has a strong leadership position in the Islamic world. Its oil wealth brings enormous influence. In recent years the Saudi profile within the Arab world has grown following the collapse of Iraq and Egypt's more passive role. Closer to home the Gulf region is a vital area of interest for Saudi Arabia. Its major oil fields are located along the Gulf coast. The Saudis have long feared and opposed Iranian attempts to dominate the Gulf. Prince Turki al-Feisal, the former Saudi Ambassador in Washington, speaking to a forum in Jordan earlier this month, described Iran as "a paper tiger with steel claws" — a frail political regime with strong tools that enable it to achieve its "expansionist aspirations at the expense of Arab interests." Consequently, there is much competition for influence between the two with Iran focused on undercutting its main rival in the region in any way possible.
Saudi Arabia sees the world shifting around it — events unfolding that leave it fearful about the future and specifically its loss of power and influence in the region to Iran. It begins with Iraq. While Saudi Arabia had many concerns about Saddam Hussein, he was seen as a Sunni Arab bulwark against Iran's efforts to export its Islamic revolution. That was the basis for the enormous financial and political support that the Kingdom (and other Gulf Arab states) gave Saddam during the Iraq-Iran War. Even after Iraq's defeat by the coalition and years under sanctions (with its special non-existent weapons), Iraq was still there on the Arab (read Saudi) side of the equation.
America's overthrow of Saddam Hussein was the beginning of a Gulf Arab nightmare. It was not specifically the overthrow of Saddam, of course; but subsequent American actions that led to Shia domination of the new Iraq. Saudis could not believe that the U.S. could be so blind to the Iranian threat — to Iran's certain domination of a Shia-led Iraq. Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al-Feisal stated bluntly in a Council of Foreign relations speech in 2005 that "we were giving Iraq to the Iranians!" The two pillars of the Saudi state found common interest as events unfolded in Iraq. The Wahhabi religious establishment supported Sunni Arabs against the Shia. The political leadership focused on negating Iranian influence in a state that had been until then a major actor in the Arab cause.
The Saudis have watched events unfold in Iraq. While they have repeatedly mouthed a willingness to take actions in support of the new Iraqi government, they have in fact done little. They have not opened an embassy in Baghdad despite promising the U.S. and the Iraqis that they would do so. They have not forgiven the huge debt that Iraq owes from the Iraq-Iran War, as they promised they would do. And they are dawdling on border cooperation and regional security cooperation. The Saudis may be making a serious miscalculation for the long-term by not reaching out to the government in Baghdad and thereby giving that government leverage or balance against Iranian pressure.
The recent U.S. announcement of our plan to drawdown forces and ultimately withdraw from Iraq has only added a new level of concern. In short the Saudis remain anxious over our departure, believing it will result in more extensive Iranian domination and further undermine the Saudi position in the region. In fact the Saudis have a broader concern. Is the U.S. going to remain in the region as a guarantor of their security and that of the other Arab Gulf States? It may seem strange that, while our relationship with Saudi Arabia today in many ways is far less "special" than it was several years ago, the Saudis still count on a U.S. military presence for security.
Iran's aggressive policies in the region are even more fearful to the Saudis than might be apparent. Underlying most of Iran's actions is a constancy — removing the U.S. military presence from the region. It has some mass appeal derivative of Arab public hostility to U.S. policies toward the Palestinians, the 2006 Israeli military action in southern Lebanon, America's response to Israeli actions in Gaza, and, of course, our military intervention in Iraq.
Even Iranian proposals to Saudi Arabia for new security arrangements in the Gulf or their suggestion that the two sit together to work out accommodations are seen by the Saudis as Iranian ploys to force the Kingdom into a bilateral situation in which they are the weaker power. They would be present but without their protector and at the mercy of the Iranians.
If this concern were not enough, Saudi fears are exacerbated by their "certain" belief that any talks between Iran and the U.S. will be at their expense. They have many conspiracy scenarios — all bad. The U.S. will reach a deal with Iran that allows us to take our navy out of the Gulf. We will agree to remove all forces from Iraq. We will acquiesce in Iranian hegemony in the Gulf — all for a better relationship with Iran, stability in the Gulf (policed by Iran), etc. etc. These fears loop back to concern regarding American reliability as a security partner and lead the Saudis to take other actions that they believe will enhance their position.
One such initiative is to broaden their relationship with a host of other countries including China, Russia, and European states. (I readily admit that there are other factors that lead Saudi Arabia to enhance these relationships; but I believe the Saudi concern about their relationship with the U.S. is a key factor in all these cases.) The Saudis have a growing relationship with the Chinese in the oil sector including large investments in both China and Saudi Arabia. The Saudis are negotiating a large arms deal with Russia — no doubt hoping that an important commercial relationship with Russia might just lead to increased Russian willingness to pressure Iran on its nuclear program. Arms purchases from Europe have a similar objective.
In the region Saudi Arabia is in competition with Iran in Lebanon and on the Palestinian question as well as in the Gulf itself. In Lebanon the Israeli incursion into southern Lebanon in 2006 was an unmitigated disaster for the Kingdom. It left Iran's Shia ally, Hezbollah, as the champion of Arabs in fighting the Israelis. Iran's prestige skyrocketed. Within the internal Lebanese political scene Saudi Arabia found it supporting one faction with Iran and its Syrian ally supporting another. The assassination of their good friend and Prime Minister, Rafiq Hariri, (with strong indications of Syrian complicity) further undercut their position. The Saudis sought for a period of time to isolate the Syrians by supporting the UN investigation into the assassination as well as taking steps diplomatically to let the Syrians know they were well out of favor.
Recently however, the Saudis have taken the initiative to reach out to Bashir Assad even inviting him to Riyadh. Clearly the Saudis and the other Gulf Arab states are attempting to wean him away from his close ties to Iran or at a minimum to complicate that relationship.
Iran's success in co-opting the Palestinian cause from the Arab states and Saudi Arabia, in particular, has been the bitterest of issues. The Saudis know that a resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would serve their interests in the region. This conflict has most often led to strains in their relationship with their major security protector — the U.S. — as well as with their publics who criticize their leaders for close ties to the U.S.. While the Saudis support the Palestinian cause, they find the division between Fatah and Hamas a particularly difficult chasm to bridge. They insist the Palestinians come together in a unity government even though they fear a strengthened Hamas will encourage extremist religious opposition in their own countries. The Israeli action in Gaza with the large number of Palestinian deaths and the horrendous pictures of the aftermath undercut efforts to advance the peace process and gave the Iranians a major issue with which to attack the Arab states and be seen yet again as the champion of the Palestinian cause.
Other Gulf States: Other Players – Other Views
If all of the above were not difficult enough, Saudi efforts to thwart Iranian advances are actually undercut by divisions within the GCC states. While most of these states have concerns about their large neighbor to the east, their relationship with Iran can be quite nuanced — notably Qatar and Oman. Qatar has its own unique approach to its neighbors and often takes actions that are intended to enhance its profile and leadership role at the expense of others — very often Saudi Arabia. Qatar's invitation to the Iranian President to attend the GCC summit last year is the most flagrant example. In fact it led three GCC states to warn Qatar this spring that they would not attend a summit in Doha if Ahmadinejad was present.
One state, Bahrain, has a particularly serious issue with Iran. When that country became independent in 1972, the Shah claimed Bahrain was part of Iran. While he later recognized Bahrain's independence, the issue continues to surface, most recently in February when an advisor to Iran's Supreme Leader claimed Bahrain is an integral part of Iran, ruled on and off over the last several hundred years. It was only two years ago in July 2007 that the editor of Kayhan newspaper wrote that Bahrain was an "inseparable" part of Iran. Arab reaction to the most recent Iranian statement was swift and emphatic in support of Bahrain. President Mubarak and King Abdullah of Jordan flew to Manama to underscore their support. Other governments including Kuwait issued ministerial statements supporting Bahrain. Distant Morocco broke diplomatic relations with Iran following verbal exchanges over Bahrain; but the Moroccans also publicly charged Iran with Shia proselytizing.
Other considerations are at play among the GCC states. Many push back against Saudi dominance. All want to maintain their own direct independent relationships with the United States and other major powers. They also have their own unique relationships with Iran — for example, the UAE's very important commercial relationship as well as its dispute over several small islands or Qatar's co-share of the large gas fields between the two. Most have Shia minorities that they fear could be manipulated by Iran. Among the Gulf States Bahrain with its majority Shia population is particularly vulnerable. And finally there is, simply said, much competition among the six. Just this spring, for example, Qatar called a meeting on Palestine in obvious competition with a similar Saudi initiative.
Iraq: An Old Timer in New Clothes?
And then there is Iraq. It is after all a player in its own right. As Iraq seeks to deal with its internal problems, it too is seeking its new role in the region. It wants a good relationship with all its neighbors. It will not want to be suborned by any. I expect Iraq will react strongly to efforts by neighbors to dictate its foreign policy. It is certainly not going to let any other country, including Iran, dictate its oil policy! Iraq's own national interests will lead it to balance the influence of both Iran and Saudi Arabia — not to mention Turkey to the north and, for that matter, the U.S. as well. Iran will have to settle for much less than it probably desires and, if it pushes to hard, will in fact get considerably less than it could have had, especially once Iraq rearms.
This last point bears underscoring. Iraq will have an army ��� a military force to defend itself. A belligerent Iran and even an Iran developing a nuclear weapons capability could well be viewed by Iraq as a threat. History tells us that when a country feels threatened, it will take the steps it feels necessary to protect itself. A resurrected Iraq desirous to return to its traditional role as a major player in the region is, in my opinion, a given. It behooves the Saudis and other Arab states to take the steps now to rebuild their relationship with Iraq. That is in the end the best means for re-establishing Arab ties with Baghdad and thus balancing Iranian influence in Iraq.
What does all this mean for the U.S.?
First the maneuvering for a new balance or order among the regional states remains ongoing and undecided. How the process plays out will have significant consequences on U.S. interests. The actions that we take and the way we manage relationships will have a significant bearing on the outcome.
The U.S. has significant national interests in the Gulf — foremost the continued unhindered movement of oil from the Gulf to global markets. We cannot accept dominance of the Gulf by any power. Our interests require the maintenance of a meaningful military presence in the Gulf. I expect the U.S. Navy will remain as it has since the 1940s.
Secondly, U.S. interests argue for a better relationship with Iran. The President's outreach to Iranians with his Nowrouz greetings was an excellent initiative. Importantly, the President spoke about the Islamic Republic signaling U.S. acceptance of its legitimacy. Our subsequent interface with the Iranians at a meeting on Afghanistan, where we obviously have common interests, was a wise next step. Improving our relations with Iran will be difficult and frustrating but worth pursuing.
Thirdly, the U.S. must undertake a concerted and intensive effort with Saudi Arabia and our other Gulf allies to insure that they understand exactly how we are approaching the Iranians. We must exert maximum efforts to counter the concerns that we might make a deal with the Iranians that would undercut their security or would otherwise be at their expense.
Fourthly, ultimately the Iranians are going to be most interested in a security arrangement in the Gulf in which their role and their status as a Gulf power is validated and meaningful. A recently released RAND study on Saudi-Iranian relations put forward the suggestion of a conflict-regulating "concert" system for the Gulf, like the OSCE. Tackling Iran's nuclear program will be the toughest issue of all while being the most critical. Recognizing Iran's position and status in the region may be one means of enabling the Iranians to consider their nuclear program in a new context.
Finally, the U.S. position throughout the region, including in the Gulf, requires an active and engaged effort to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The President has enunciated the Administration's support for a two-state solution. Real and meaningful efforts must now follow.
In conclusion uncertainty and anxiety reign in this region as it continues to search for a new balance and to deal with a host of critical issues. I recall again the words from my earlier lecture. None of the players control events but their actions influence and have major consequence on the course of events. The U.S. has a prominent position in the Gulf region — an enormous influence on the course of events; but we need to utilize that influence wisely and thoughtfully. We must act in ways that demonstrate that we understand the contours of the issues and the concerns and fears of the other parties in the region. Close and meaningful consultations with allies and an open willingness to reach out to those with whom we have not had good relations are essential to our success. Our interests demand that we make the effort.
