|
American Society in the Age of Terrorism
Prepared By:
Amitai Etzioni (1)
Introduction
There is a silver lining on the cloud that terrorism
has cast over America since September 11. Our society
has become significantly more communitarian, though
not quite in the expected ways. Our main findings are:
- Americans have become more committed to family - and not just in lip service.
- Americans have become more spiritual - but not more active in organized religion.
- Americans have remained tolerant of people who are different - including Muslim Americans.
- New safety measures have increased Americans' support for personal rights and freedoms - far from
undermining their rights.
- Trust in government - especially the federal government - has increased, surprisingly more
so among Republicans than among Democrats.
- Americans have become more public-minded and have shown increased respect for professions
that serve the public (and not just firefighters and police) - but not for athletes and
entertainers.
- Americans have expressed great interest in volunteerism, though this interest is being
dissipated due to insufficient opportunities.
- Americans have shown stronger feelings toward nation and community than toward political
parties or religious groups, and are expressing higher levels of patriotism.
All these effects have begun to recede, and are predicted to decline further if no new
attacks occur, but are unlikely to return to the lower pre-September 11 levels. The
attacks have also made Americans more fearful and more communitarian as far as the
eye can see. If, as expected, more attacks occur, they will serve to cement these
changes in American society.
These observations rest on our analysis of a large variety of public opinion polls
conducted since September 11, 2001 (and in some cases before the attack on America),
including polls by American Demographics to be released on September 5, 2002. Before
the findings are presented, the usual caveats need to be mentioned. Polling data is
affected by numerous factors, such as the ways in which the questions are worded,
the order in which the questions are asked, etc. Hence, we relied on several polls
whenever possible.
II. Family Recommitment: Beyond Generalities
Measurements of strong pro-family sentiments have remained steady over time. In November
2001, over six in 10 Americans (62 percent) felt a need to spend more time with family
members as a result of the attack on America,(2) increasing to
seven out of 10 Americans (70 percent) in May 2002.(3) When asked a
slightly different question about family (also in November 2001), 60 percent said that they had decided to spend more time with
their family than before September 11.(4)
Concerning actual behavior, in October 2001, more than half (52 percent) of those in New York City
reported spending more time with family and close friends than before the attack.
(5) The proportion of all Americans was not far behind. In a
mid-October 2001 poll, 46 percent of Americans were spending more time with family
members.(6) Another poll conducted at the end of October 2001
found that 35 percent of Americans were spending more time with family and close friends,
with a negligible portion (one percent) spending less time.(7)
The proportion remained relatively steady through December 2001, when 31 percent indicated they were spending more
time with family and friends since the September 11 attack.(8)
Asked in a fall 2001 poll whether they were looking for more exciting things to do after
September 11 or whether they were staying home more and spending time with family and friends,
half of Americans said they were "staying home more and spending time with family and friends,
"while only 15 percent indicated they were "looking for more exciting things to do."(9)
This is of special interest because one could just as easily expect that many people, made more aware
of their mortality, would adopt the "let's eat, drink, and be merry" attitude, a party-going,
hedonistic orientation.
The same positive attitude toward family is reflected in the ways people have planned to spend
their holidays. In October 2001, of those who indicated they planned to celebrate the upcoming
holiday season differently, 50 percent responded that "I will spend more time with my extended
family."(10) In a November 2001 poll, 37 percent of Americans said
they were making more of an effort to see family during the holiday season as a result of the
terrorist attack.(11) Even more recently, in June 2002, an overwhelming
percentage of Americans were planning to get together with family for Independence Day. As the holiday
drew closer, 82 percent of Americans indicated they were planing to get together with family members,
compared with 76 percent in 2001.(12)
Americans report numerous other ways they have planned, or are planning, to go about pursuing
this enhanced commitment to family in their life. Twenty-nine percent of Americans indicated
that they have planned to call family members more often(13) and 16 percent have planned to
re-establish contact with some family members who have lost touch.(14) Still others said they
are more likely to show more appreciation to loved ones(15) and have an increased appreciation
for their family.(16)
Most compelling, Americans went from plans to action. In September 2001, 60 percent said close
relationships with family and friends became stronger as a result of the terrorist attack, and
61 percent had kept in closer contact with relatives.(17) By November 2001,
30 percent of Americans said they had reestablished contact with family members or friends with whom they had not spoken
for a long time,(18) and two-thirds of Americans had told family members they
loved them as a result of the terrorist attack.(19) More recently, in the
spring of 2002, 53 percent of college students said that they kept in closer contact with family
members as a result of the terrorist attack.(20)
Changes also occurred in parenting behaviors. In October 2001, more than half of parents (52 percent)
responded that they planned to be more aware about the television children watch.(21) Forty-two
percent reported they had done so by June 2002.(22) In October 2001, 40 percent of parents indicated
that they planned to "designate more 'family time' with my children during the week,"(23) and, a
month later, 54 percent planned to make efforts to spend time with their children.(24) By June 2002,
35 percent of parents indicated that they had "designate[d] more 'family time' with my children during
the week.(25)
Americans also believed that those under 30 years of age have been touched, if not transformed,
by the attacks. Based on their own experiences and people they knew, more than half of Americans
(52 percent) thought that those under age 30 have become "more serious about marriage and
relationships because their lives could end at any time," while only 16 percent thought they
have become "less serious about marriage and relationships and reluctant to make commitments
at a time of uncertainty."(26) Again, commitment has won over hedonism, family over playing
around.
III. Stronger Spiritual and Religious Beliefs:
Mainly Not Expressed Via Organized Religion
Since September 11, there has been an increase in the proportion of Americans who profess
a strengthening of or increased focus on religious and/or spiritual beliefs as a result of
the terrorist attack. However, there has been no noticeable increase in traditional measures
of religiosity (either the frequency or recency of attending a religious service) during the
same time period.
A number of polls conducted throughout the fall of 2001 show an increased focus on spirituality.
In an October 2001 poll, 38 percent of Americans indicated that their spiritual and religious
beliefs had been strengthened by the events of September 11.(27) In the following month, 57
percent of Americans said they had thought more about the spiritual parts of their lives since
the attack.(28) In another November 2001 poll, nearly half (47 percent) of those surveyed responded
that they had personally "focused more on [the] religious or spiritual side of life."(29) While
the percentage of those who said they were more religious or spiritual was much smaller in a third
poll, the direction of the change was the same. Eight percent responded they were more religious
or spiritual, still an increase, when asked the open-ended question, "How has your life changed
since the September 11th terrorist attacks?"(30) Meanwhile, among the 18 percent of Americans
who planned to celebrate the holiday season differently in 2001, 34 percent indicated that they
planned to "put more emphasis on the religious aspects of the holiday."(31)
However, these increased feelings of religiosity were not expressed in ways we would traditionally
expect - through organized religion. Polling data on the frequency of church or synagogue attendance
shows no significant increase after September 11. In fact, the percentage of those attending services
"more than once a week," "once a week," "once or twice a month," "a few times a year," "seldom," or
"never" has remained basically the same in recent years. For example, 39 percent of Americans said
they attended religious services "once a week" or "almost every week" in June 1996, and 43 percent
did in March 2001.(32) After the attack on America, the percentage of those attending religious
services "once a week" or "almost every week" remained basically unchanged - 42 percent of Americans
reported they attended that often in November 2001,(33) and 40 percent said they attended that often
in February and March of 2002.(34)
While responses were organized somewhat differently in another poll, the results were similar.
In March 2001, 35 percent attended religious services "at least once a week" and nine percent
attended "almost every week."(35) In August 2001, it was 32 percent and 10 percent
respectively.(36)
In October 2001, Americans reported similar rates of religious service attendance - 31 percent attended
"at least once a week" and nine percent "almost every week."(37) Two months later, in December 2001,
it was 34 percent and 11 percent respectively.(38) In March 2002, 34 percent of Americans reported
attending religious services "at least once a week" and 12 percent "almost every week."(39) In May
2002 it was 31 percent and 10 percent respectively.(40) Thus, there has been no significant change
in church attendance since September 11.
Findings about the recency of religious service attendance were similar, though they did show a
slight increase in September 2001. In February 2001, 41 percent of Americans said they had attended
a "church or synagogue in the last seven days."(41) The month of the attack, the percentage peaked,
with nearly half of Americans (47 percent) having attended religious services in the last week.(42)
The percentage declined to 41 percent in December 2001,(43) and increased slightly to 44 percent
in March 2002.(44) In this instance, there was an immediate increase in the recency of religious
service attendance the month of the terrorist attack; but, once again, there have been no lasting
changes in Americans' behavior in the realm of organized religion.
These findings fit trends observed before September 11. To the extent that Americans experienced
a religious revival, much of it was not institutionalized. It should also be noted that just because
religious and spiritual beliefs are not expressed in terms of organized religion, it does not mean
that Americans did not become more spiritual after September 11. In fact, recent polling data from
late winter and early spring 2002 show that Americans do perceive spirituality and religiosity
(or religion) differently from each other, and that they place more emphasis on spirituality. A
January 2002 poll asked people to identify statements about their beliefs with which they agreed
most. Half of Americans indicated they were religious, 33 percent said they were spiritual, but
not religious, and just four percent identified themselves as both religious and spiritual.(45)
A few months later, in the early spring of 2002, slightly fewer than one in four Americans (24 percent)
said that "doctrines and beliefs are the most important part of religion," while nearly seven in 10
(69 percent) said that "an individual's spiritual experience is the most important part of
religion."(46)
A typical marker of the much more spiritual American (especially after the September 11 attack)
is not that one rushes to express his or her intensified feelings in a building or an institution,
but rather that one expresses them in a proliferation of sidewalk shrines made out of flowers,
pictures, and candles, which dotted many American towns in the weeks following the attack on America.
IV. More Tolerance for Diversity - Including for Muslim Americans
One could have readily expected that after September 11 there would be a greater demand for Americans
to unify and rally behind the flag, matched by less tolerance of differences in general, and of Muslims
or Arab Americans in particular. This is hardly what happened.
Most Americans perceive the nation's diversity as a strength. Prior to September 11, diversity garnered
less support than it did after the terrorist attack. In March 2001, Americans were asked, "In your view,
does the increasing diversity in the U.S. that is created by immigrants mostly improve American culture
or mostly threaten American culture?" Forty-five percent said the increasing diversity mostly improves
American culture, while 38 percent thought it mostly threatens American culture.(47) (Eight percent responded
it "doesn't make any difference."(48)) In March and April 2002, a different picture emerged. Americans
were asked whether the country's growing diversity was a "source of strength and vitality to individual
religious beliefs" or a "threat to individual religious beliefs." More than three-quarters of Americans
(76 percent) agreed that religious diversity adds "strength and vitality to individual religious beliefs,
" while only 13 percent felt such diversity is a "threat to individual religious beliefs."(49)
Racial relations in New York City were also assessed positively in the months following the attack.
In June 2002, a majority of New York City residents said that racial relations in the city were
generally good. In particular, 53 percent of blacks, 56 percent of Hispanics, and 69 percent of
whites characterized racial relations as good.(50) In contrast, only two years ago, in the spring
of 2000, racial relations in New York City were strained. At that time less than half of all races
surveyed characterized racial relations as good.(51) (For instance, in April 2000, only 21 percent
of blacks, 25 percent of Hispanics, and 36 percent of whites characterized racial relations as
good.(52))
When asked to express their attitudes about religious groups, Americans' views of
Muslim Americans have remained relatively steady since the year 2000 and, in fact, initially
became more favorable in the wake of the terrorist attack. A year before the attack, in September
2000, Muslim Americans were viewed favorably by 50 percent of Americans, and unfavorably by 21
percent.(53) Six months later, in March 2001, 45 percent viewed Muslim Americans favorably and
24 percent viewed them unfavorably.(54) Two months after the attack (and the first time the data
on this topic was provided after September 11), the proportion of those who viewed Muslim Americans
favorably increased to 59 percent and the proportion who viewed them unfavorably decreased to 17
percent.(55) A few months later, in February and March 2002, the percentages changes only slightly -
54 percent of Americans viewed Muslim Americans favorably and 22 percent viewed them
unfavorably.(56)
Jews, Catholics and Protestants have received higher favorable ratings, above 70 percent, since
the attack on America.(57) However, another religious group had favorable ratings similar to those
of Muslim Americans - evangelical Christians were viewed favorably by 55 percent of Americans and
unfavorably by 18 percent in February and March of 2002.(58) Atheists, in contrast, were viewed
favorably by only 34 percent of respondents and unfavorably by 54 percent.(59) In short, Muslim
Americans were viewed quite favorably and were not viewed worse than several major American religious
groups.
One should not conflate views of "Muslim Americans," who have been treated after September 11 as
Americans, with views of "Muslims," a term which largely brings to mind those who live overseas.
When asked, in February and March 2002, about their opinion of "Muslims," respondents still viewed
the religious group quite positively, though not as positively as "Muslim Americans." Forty-seven
percent viewed "Muslims" favorably (compared with 54 percent who viewed "Muslim Americans" favorably)
and 29 percent viewed them unfavorably (compared with 22 percent who viewed "Muslim Americans"
unfavorably).(60)
When Americans were asked about their opinion of Islam, more Americans responded that they viewed
it favorably than unfavorably. Here again, a larger percentage of people viewed Islam positively
immediately after the attacks, and since that time, the percentage has decreased. In October 2001,
immediately after the attack, 47 percent viewed Islam favorably, 39 percent unfavorably, and 13
percent espoused no opinion.(61) By January 2002, those who viewed Islam favorably decreased to 41
percent, those who viewed it unfavorably decreased to 24 percent, and those who had no opinion
increased to 35 percent of respondents.(62) By February and March of 2002, 38 percent of Americans
had a favorable opinion of Islam, 33 percent had an unfavorable one, and 29 percent still responded
"no opinion."(63)
Meanwhile, Americans have admitted that they know little about Islam. In October 2001, only 34 percent
said they had a "good basic understanding of the teachings and beliefs of Islam," while 65 percent said
they did not.(64) In November 2001, 38 percent said that knew "a great deal" or "some" about the "Muslim
religion and its practices," and 61 percent said they knew "not very much" or "nothing at all."(65) More
recently, in February and March 2002, 34 percent responded that they knew "a great deal" or "some" about
the "Muslim religion and its practices," while 65 percent still responded they knew "not very much" or
"nothing at all."(66)
Over time, the majority of Americans have said that the attack on America has not made them more
suspicious of, or have negative feelings toward, people of Arab or Middle Eastern descent. Two days
after the attack on America, 43 percent of Americans thought that the attacks would make them become
more suspicious of people of Arab descent.(67) But given a few weeks, Americans overwhelmingly said
they had not become more suspicious. For instance, only 24 percent of Americans in the latter half
of September 2001 said they had negative feelings towards Arabs because of the attacks.(68) At this
same time, 28 percent of Americans said that they were more suspicious of people of Middle Eastern
descent.(69) When similar questions were asked in the first half of October 2001, 24 percent of those
in New York City said they had negative feelings towards Arabs because of the attack.(70) A larger
percentage (38 percent) of people nationwide said they were more suspicious of people of Arab descent
during this same time period,(71) but this was still far from being a majority of Americans.
In the area of the American public's perception of Muslim and Arab sympathy for terrorists and
anti-American sentiments, one might expect to have seen strongly negative views emerge after September
11. While some negative views are evident in the data that follow, they are not nearly as negative as
some might suspect, especially in the time period shortly after the attack on America. In a poll
conducted in the fall of 2001, 62 percent of Americans agreed that "most Arab-Americans and immigrants
from the Middle East are loyal to the United States," while only 27 percent disagreed.(72) A few months
later, in February and March 2002, Americans were asked "What's your impression - how many Muslims
around the world are anti-American?" Eighteen percent responded "almost all" or "most," 18 percent
responded "about half," and 45 percent said "some" or "just a few."(73) When the same question was
asked about "Muslims in this country," only nine percent thought "almost all" or "most" Muslims in
this country were anti-American, while 11 percent thought "about half" were, and 62 percent said
"some" or "just a few" were anti-American.(74)
When asked about sympathy for terrorists, Americans overwhelmingly viewed Arab Americans and Muslim
Americans, first and foremost, as Americans. A September 2001 poll asked, "Do you think Arab Americans
are more sympathetic to terrorists than other American citizens are, or not?" Slightly more than
one-quarter of Americans (26 percent) said Arab Americans were more sympathetic to the terrorists,
while 62 percent said they were not more sympathetic, and 12 percent said they did not know.(75) A
poll conducted in New York City the following month showed that residents of the city perceived
Arab Americans to be only slightly more sympathetic to terrorists than other Americans - 31 percent
thought Arab Americans were more sympathetic to terrorists, while 47 percent thought they were not
more sympathetic and 22 percent said they did not know.(76)
In November 2001, when Americans were asked whether most Arab Americans and immigrants from the
Middle East were more sympathetic to the terrorists' cause than other Americans or about the same
as other Americans, only 20 percent thought they were more sympathetic to the terrorists' cause,
and 73 percent thought Arab Americans and immigrants from the Middle East felt about the same as
other Americans.(77) The results were exactly the same when respondents were asked how they thought
most Muslim Americans feel about the terrorists' cause.(78) Similarly, when asked about sympathy to
the terrorists' acts, only 18 percent thought that Arab Americans and immigrants from the Middle
East were more sympathetic to the terrorists' acts, 77 percent thought they felt about the same as
other Americans.(79) The results were slightly different when Americans were asked about Muslim
American sympathy toward the terrorists' acts. Here, only 12 percent thought Muslim Americans were
more sympathetic to the terrorists' acts and 81 percent thought they felt the same as other
Americans.(80)
There is other evidence to support this surprisingly benign response - the small amount of
scapegoating, and the willingness of Americans to separate the terrorists (although they all,
so far, have been Muslims) from the followers of the Prophet Mohammed. A survey of the media
conducted by us shows that even relatively conservative or right-wing publications and columnists
did not engage in bashing or demonizing Muslims in general, and especially not American Muslims
in particular. (These include publications such as the Washington Times, National Review, and
Weekly Standard, and columnists such as Charles Krauthammer, Robert Novak, and Pat Buchanan.)
There were a number of deeply regrettably attacks on Muslim Americans in the immediate days following
the September 11 attack. Some 90 incidents were reported in September 2001.(81) By February 2002,
the FBI had initiated over 300 hate crime investigations (with eight persons being charged for federal
crimes and some 70 for state and local crimes).(82) More recently, in July 2002, reports indicated
that there were more than 400 investigations of hate crimes nationwide.(83)
While every incident is troubling, it should be noted that the rate of violence is not very high
given that there are an estimated 2 million American Muslims associated with mosques(84) and
larger estimates of American Muslims in general. (However, one should note that since there are
no official population figures, even from the Census Bureau,(85) the estimated number of American
Muslims varies greatly depending on the source - in many instances ranging from around four
million to seven million people.(86)) Yet, the number of actual hate crime incidents against
Muslim Americans this year does not appear to have been much higher than the number of anti-black
incidents (especially church burnings) and anti-Semitic incidents (especially the desecration of
graves and synagogues) that have taken place year in and year out.(87) Moreover, in response to
these violent acts, quite a few Americans volunteered to ensure the well being of Muslim Americans.
In Seattle, citizens took vigil shifts in front of mosques to help ensure safety,(88) and more
recently, in Columbus, people have offered money, space, and other forms of support for Muslim
Americans who recently had their mosque vandalized.(89)
In sharp contrast to the massive detention of Japanese Americans during World War II (which
was ruled constitutional by the Supreme Court at the time), there was not a single serious
suggestion that the same actions should be taken with regard to all Muslim Americans. Long
before the fires were out in the World Trade Center and the remains cleared from the site,
the President and major media outlets appealed to America's religious traditions and its history
as a nation of immigrants to call upon Americans to prevent expressions of anger against the
terrorists from spilling over to the religious group from which they hail. Overwhelmingly,
Americans have done so.
Recently, in other countries, including democratic ones, the open expression of hate has been
much more common. For instance, in Europe, there have been recent demonstrations calling for
"death to the Jews" and publications in which Israeli soldiers have been referred to as "the
Zionist SS."(90) In the United States, on the heels of September 11, there was not a single
demonstration calling for the death of any one group nor were any tarred as Nazis.
Even in discussions about terrorists themselves, the anger of Americans has been oddly muted.
There have been many deliberations focused on understanding why America is hated, where America
went wrong, and why it was that America was not better prepared. There also has been considerable
discomfort when the President talked about the terrorists as "evil doers."
It is not obvious why Americans have become, by and large, so hyper-tolerant. There is some
evidence, especially in Alan Wolfe's works, that most Americans have become very morally
tentative and non-judgmental.(91) There are other reasons as well. There is considerable guilt
about the way we treated Japanese Americans during World War II, and the media have consistently
given civil libertarians an outlet to voice their concerns. Still other reasons may well have
been at work, but there can be little doubt that, by and large, the American people were decidedly
low key in their expressions of anger at those who attacked us. Thus, they did not scapegoat
Muslim Americans in general. The twenty-first century begins with a much more tolerant America
than the twentieth century was - an America which has been tested and found surprisingly liberal
on this front.
V. Rights vs. Safety
After September 11, important segments of the press reported a tug of war between Attorney
General John Ashcroft, who fielded and justified ever more security measures, and civil
libertarians, who maintained that these measures were eroding American liberties. The p
ublic seems to have taken a stand which is the opposite of what civil libertarians have
argued. As various safety measures have been introduced, the public gradually began to feel a
bit more reassured, and has been willing to again increase (though gradually) its support for
civil liberties.
A. Airline Traffic: A Measure of Fear
A reasonable measure of the initial scope of the public's safety concerns and the extent
to which they declined after September 11 is provided by statistics on domestic airline
traffic within the United States, based on behavioral data, which are considered more
reliable than attitudinal data, to which I will have to turn shortly. Airline traffic
precipitously fell in the brief period immediately following the attack, and has gradually
been recovering, though it has not returned to pre-September 11 levels.
Between January and August of 2001, airlines experienced a slight increase of a little
less than one percent in enplanements over the year 2000. In August 2001, passengers
boarding flights increased by three percent over the previous year. (A year-high 56.14
million passengers boarded U.S. carriers for domestic flights in August 2001, 54.38 million
did so in August 2000). In September 2001, which includes the 10 days before the attack,
enplanements dropped 34 percent from September 2000. (In September 2000, 47.74 million passengers
boarded planes, compared with the 31.41 million who did so during the month of the attacks,
when airports across the country were shut down).(92)
Traffic began a slow but steady increase during the remainder of the year, though enplanements
remained considerably less than what they were during the same months in the year 2000. In
October 2001, air carriers experienced 21 percent fewer enplanements than the previous year
(a decrease from 50.53 million to 39.82 million). As the highly-traveled holiday months approached,
the drop in enplanements continued to recede. In November 2001, there were 19 percent fewer
enplanements than the same month in 2000 (a decrease from 50.93 million to 41.50 million), and
December 2001 saw a 13 percent decrease over the 2000 holiday season (down from 46.69 million
to 40.45 million).(93)
The first four months of the year 2002 followed the same pattern, showing people slowly but
steadily returning to air travel. January 2002 enplanements were down 13 percent compared
with 2001 (a decrease from 43.83 million to 38.13 million), and February 2002 saw 11 percent
fewer enplanements compared with February 2001 (a decrease from 47.56 million to
42.43 million).(94) Through March and April 2002, the decreases remained basically steady.
In March 2002, there were nine percent fewer enplanements than the same month last year
(a decrease from 52.82 million to 48.02 million), and April 2002 enplanements were down
11 percent from the previous year (a decrease from 52.10 million to 46.45 million).(95)
In short, as numerous new airline safety measures were introduced, one new attack
(by a so-called shoe-bomber) was successfully foiled, and no others took place, the
public's fear of air travel was gradually curtailed.
B. Re-commitment to Rights
In June 2000, a full year before the attacks, 46 percent of Americans thought the government
threatened their "own personal rights and freedoms," while 54 percent did not view the
government as a threat.(96) Two months after the attack, in November 2001, the percentage
of Americans who viewed the government as a threat to their rights and freedoms decreased to
30 percent and the proportion of those not viewing the government as a threat increased to
67 percent.(97) A month later, in December 2001, Americans were asked to again comment on
this matter, but the question was posed differently. In this instance, 59 percent said the
federal government did not pose a threat to their constitutional rights, 18 percent viewed
the government as posing a threat, albeit not a serious one, and 21 percent viewed the
government as posing a serious threat to their constitutional rights.(98) (By that time
several measures to enhance safety had been introduced and public fears had begun to subside.
Regrettably, we were unable to find data on this topic for the days immediately after the attack.)
Thus, we see that as fear began to subside - in the end of 2001 - the proportion of the public
concerned with governmental threats to their rights and freedoms increased from only 30 percent
in November 2001(99) to nearly one out of two (49 percent) in December 2001.(100)
Table 1 shows that a clear majority (59 percent) of Americans were willing to give up some
liberties after what was, in retrospect, a small attack - the bombing of the federal building
in Oklahoma City in April 1995. When the same question was asked about willingness to give up
liberties a month later, people had already begun to calm down, and their willingness to
support reductions of liberty declined to 52 percent. After the 2001 attack on America,
two-thirds of Americans were willing to sacrifice some liberty to fight terrorism. (When
the question was worded differently, the percentages were even higher-75 and 78 percent.)
Sources:
a ABC News Poll, 20 April 1995.
b ABC News/Washington Post Poll, 10-14 May 1995.
c Los Angeles Times Poll, 3 August-6 August 1996. This poll
was conducted a few weeks after the explosion of TWA flight 800 and the
bombing at Centennial Olympic Park during the 1996 Summer Olympics in
Atlanta. The poll also contained the response "depends on which liberties,
" chosen by 13 percent of respondents (which is not included in Table 1).
d ABC News/Washington Post Poll, 11 September 2001.
e NBC News Poll, 20 September 2001. The actual breakdown of those
who expressed willingness and unwillingness to giving up civil liberties was
38 percent "very willing," 37 percent "somewhat willing," nine percent
"somewhat unwilling," and 11 percent "very unwilling."
f Gallup Poll, 28 January-22 March 2002. Responses to the question
included "strongly agree" (29.5 percent), "agree" (48.8 percent), "disagree"
(13.6 percent), and "strongly disagree" (8.1 percent).
Questions about "necessity" instead of willingness to give up liberties (Table 2)
reveal a similar pattern. In April 1995, following the attack on the Oklahoma City
federal building, nearly half of Americans (49 percent) thought it would be
necessary to give up some civil liberties in order to curb terrorism. Within
a month, it decreased to three in 10 persons. Immediately after the September
11 terrorist attack, more than six in 10 Americans agreed that it was a necessary
to give up some civil liberties in order to fight terrorism. Two months later,
in November 2001, the number fell to a bit to more than five out of 10 Americans.
More recently, in June 2002, 46 percent thought the average person would have to
give up some liberties in order to fight terrorism. Thus, as new safety measures
were initiated, fewer Americans maintained that they would have to give up some
civil liberties in order to fight terrorism.
Sources:
a Los Angeles Times Poll 26-27 April 1995.
b Pew Research Center for the People and Press News Interest Poll, 28-31 March 1996.
c Pew Research Center for the People and Press News Interest Poll, 3-6 April 1997.
d Los Angeles Times Poll, September 13-14, 2002.
e Pew Center for The People and Press, Poll, 13-17 September 2001.
f Princeton Survey Research Associates/Newsweek Poll, 20-21 September 2001.
g CBS News Poll, 8 October 2001. Responses included "will have to" (79 percent) and "will not" (17 percent)
h National Public Radio/Kaiser/Kennedy School Poll on Civil Liberties, 31 October 2001-12 November 2001.
i Pew Research Center for the People and Press News Interest Index Poll, 9-13 January 2002.
j Pew Research Center for the People and Press News Interest Index Poll, 19-23 June 2002.
k Princeton Survey Research Associates/Newsweek Poll, 27-28 June 2002. Responses includes "yes" and "no"
Notes:
* Responses include "necessary for the average person to give up some rights and liberties"
(51 percent) and "we can curb terrorism without the average person giving up rights and liberties"
(46 percent).
** Responses include "yes" (58 percent) and "no" (39 percent).
When was asked about support for specific measures (Table 3), the picture remained consistent: as
fear subsided, support for safety measures, even at the cost of liberty, remained high, even as
warnings about more attacks, including ones with dirty bombs and bioterror agents were standard
media diet. While more than two-thirds of Americans were initially willing to sacrifice rights on
seven out of the 10 measures, support has declined over time for all of the measures.
Source:
Harris Poll, 19-24 September 2001; and Harris Poll, 13 -19 March 2002.
The results were similar when the same issue was raised in a different manner.
Table 4 shows that the percentage of Americans who held that the government went
too far in restricting civil liberties to fight terrorism remained consistently
small, but increased from eight percent to 13 percent as America experienced no
new attacks and numerous new safety measures were introduced.

Source:
Princeton Survey Research Associates/Newsweek Poll, 27-28 September 2001;
29-30 November 2001; 31 January-1 February 2002; and 27-28 June 2002.
Note:
* The June 2002 question uses the phrase "proposes to do in response
to terrorism" rather than "is proposing to do in response to terrorism."
Meanwhile, surveys which worded questions on this topic in a slightly different way
yielded similar responses. For instance, a November 2001 poll asks, "Do you think
the Bush administration has - gone too far, been about right, or not gone far enough -
in restricting civil liberties in order to fight terrorism?" Ten percent thought the
administration had "gone too far," 60 percent thought the actions had "been about right,"
and 26 percent said the administration had "not gone far enough."(101) Several months
later, in June 2002, 12 percent thought the administration had gone too far, 60 percent
thought its actions were about right, and 25 percent thought they had not gone far
enough.(102)
In response to overarching questions (such as, "Overall, how confident do you feel that
U.S. law enforcement will use its expanded surveillance powers in what you would see as
a proper way, under the circumstances of terrorist threats?"), we have seen the beginning
of a shift, a decline in those who are very confident law enforcement will use such powers
properly, which is less problematic than a significant increase in those who are not confident
at all. In March 2002, the percent of people who felt "very confident" that law enforcement
would use their new expanded surveillance powers properly fell to almost one-third of what
it was in September 2001 (a decrease from 34 percent in September 2001 to 12 percent in March
2002). Meanwhile, those who were "not confident at all" increased by a mere two percent (from
four percent in September 2001 to six percent in March 2002).(103)
All in all, there can be little doubt that the relationship between safety and rights is the
reverse of the one that civil libertarians assume is true. Thus, the adoption of safety measures
(although, of course, not every measure) produces greater support for civil liberties, personal
rights, and freedoms - it does not undermine them. In contrast, the quickest way to get the
public to support harsh and extreme measures is not to provide the public with the security it
craves and deserves, which, in effect, is the first responsibility of every state.
VI. Trust in Institutions Is Up and Views of Government and Governmental
Officials Remain More Favorable than of the Business Community
While in the past "government," "Washington," and "bureaucracy" were terms of derision and
sources of mistrust, trust and confidence in the government surged after September 11, has
subsided a bit since then, but it still remains high.
Immediately after the attack on America, the public expressed a significant increase in
confidence in institutions. The percentage of those who expressed "great confidence" in the
executive branch of the federal government and in Congress more than tripled. In 2000, 14 percent
of Americans had great confidence in the executive branch.(104) In the weeks following September
11, 52 percent nationwide had "great confidence" (48 percent did in New York City).(105) The
results for "great confidence" in Congress were similar, with 13 percent of Americans indicating
they felt that way in 2000.(106) In September 2001, "great confidence" in Congress soared to 43
percent nationwide (and 44 percent in New York City).(107)
A poll conducted after the terrorist attack of September 11 showed a surge in favorable opinions
of institutions. For instance, the percentage of those viewing the federal government in Washington
favorably soared from 50 percent in July 2001 to 78 percent in October 2001. Meanwhile, the percentage
of those who viewed the federal government unfavorably fell from 45 percent in July 2001 to 16 percent
in October 2001.(108) Congress saw a similar surge in favorable opinions. In July 2001, 58 percent of
Americans held "very favorable" or "somewhat favorable" opinions of elected officials, including members
of Congress, and a month after the attack, In October 2001, 71 percent viewed them
favorably.(109) Appointed federal officials fared the same, with 60 percent of Americans viewing
them favorably in the summer before the attacks and 79 percent viewing the appointees the same
way in October 2001.(110) Finally, federal workers earned more favorable ratings: up from 69 percent
in July 2001 to 76 percent in October 2001.(111)
Since then, there has been a slow ebbing of favorable opinions toward institutions. In May 2002,
the federal government was viewed favorably by 60 percent of people, down 18 percent from October
2001.(112) Favorable ratings for elected officials, including members of Congress, slipped to 62
percent and for presidential appointees it fell to 69 percent in May 2002.(113) Federal workers
saw their favorable ratings slide by seven percentage points to 69 percent in May 2002.(114) For
three out of the four institutions, favorable ratings in May 2002 still remained higher than what
they were before September 11, with the government up 10 points from July 2001, elected federal
officials, including Congressmembers, up four points, and presidential appointees up
nine points.(115) Federal workers remained steady with 69 percent of Americans giving them favorable
ratings in both July 2001 and May 2002.(116)
In other areas, such as trust in government, the surge and decline pattern is present as well.
Here, trust in the government to do what is right remains at levels which are higher than what they
were before September 11. Two months before the attack, only 29 percent of people trusted the government
to do what is right "just about always" or "most of the time."(117) It surged to 64 percent in a
September 2001 poll,(118) fell slightly to 57 percent in October 2001,
(119) and more recently, in May
2002, it has decreased to 40 percent,(120) a level still significantly higher than what it was before
the attack. (One should also note that another group which has indicated it has a notable level of
trust in government after September 11 is young adults, or those between 15 and 25 years of age. A
January 2002 survey of this age group indicated that 62 percent trusted the government to do what
is right, while 37 percent possess little or no trusted in the government.(121))
When the September 2001 findings about trust in government (64 percent of Americans trusted
government "about always" or "most of the time" in September 2001, while only 30 percent did
in spring 2000(122)) were divided along party lines, the effects of the attack on America turned
out to be particularly profound: Republicans, historically most suspicious of government, turned
into the most trusting political group, compared with Democrats and Independents. In the spring
of 2000, only 25 percent of Republicans trusted the government "about always" or "most of the
time," compared with 42 percent of Democrats and 27 percent of Independents.(123) Within three
weeks of the attack, the percentage of those trusting government soared for both parties, but
increased much more for Republicans, to the point that more Republicans trusted the government
than Democrats: 73 percent as opposed to 61 percent. Sixty-two percent of Independents trusted
the government at this time.(124)
The difference between Conservative Republicans and Liberal Democrats is also worth mentioning.
In the spring of 2000, only 22 percent of Conservative Republicans trusted government compared
with twice as many Liberal Democrats (44 percent).(125) In September 2001, the picture changed
drastically. Three in four Conservative Republicans (75 percent) expressed trust in the government,
compared with 55 percent of Liberal Democrats.(126)
The change in trust, though, was limited to how the government handles security issues. For
instance, a January 2002 polls showed that 68 percent of Americans trusted the government "about
always" or "most of the time" when handling national security and the war of terrorism. (An additional
30 percent trusted the government "sometimes" or "never.")(127) When it came to trusting the government
to handle "social issues like the economy, health care, Social Security, and education" a different
picture was apparent. Only 38 percent trusted the government "about always" or "most of the time,"
while 61 percent trusted the government "sometimes" or "never."(128)
Other measures of trust show that Americans continue to hold much more positive views of government
than they did prior to September 11. This argument stands for the trustworthiness of elected officials.
In October 1997, 44 percent agreed that "most elected officials are trustworthy."(129) In May 2002,
the proportion was a good deal higher - 52 percent.(130) Also in May 2002, more people (54 percent)
agreed that "the government is really run for the benefit of all the people."(131) Less than half
(48 percent) had agreed with that statement in 1997.(132)
Particularly remarkable has been the improvement in the public's opinion of the federal government
compared with state and local government. The general trend, present in the data collected in 1997,
was for the public to view governments closer to them more positively. For instance, in 1997, only
a little more than one-third of Americans (38 percent) viewed the federal government as "very favorable"
or "mostly favorable," while two-thirds (66 percent) viewed their state government that way and about
the same proportion (68 percent) viewed their local government favorably.(133) In November 2001, though,
there was a remarkable reversal in Americans' views of the federal government: 82 percent viewed the
federal government as "very favorable" or "mostly favorable," higher than the percentage of those who
viewed their state and local governments that way (77 percent and 78 percent, respectively).(134)
Another notable finding has been that Americans have held much more favorable opinions of government
than of business corporations both initially after September 11 (78 percent held favorable opinions
of government while 65 percent held them of business in October 2001(135)) and in the following months,
when corporate scandals became an issue of national concern (60 percent held favorable views of
government while 56 percent held them of business in May 2002(136)). Indeed, the public has also
dramatically reversed its view of the government and business in terms of their ethical standards.
In March 1995, heads of major corporations were given "very high" or "high" ethical ratings by 33
percent of the public, while only 18 percent gave public officials in Washington such a rating.(137)
Seven years later, in March 2002, the percentages came close to flip-flopping: 34 percent gave public
officials in Washington "very high" or "high" ratings on ethical standards, compared with only 24
percent for heads of major corporations, and 25 percent for members of large corporations' board of
directors.(138)
Military leaders, who already received "very high" or "high" ethical ratings from 63 percent of
those surveyed in March 1995,(139) were given high ratings by more Americans in May 2002 - 70
percent.(140) It is also worth mentioning that in September 2001, "great confidence" in the military
doubled both nationwide and in New York City over what it was the prior year. (In 2000, 40 percent
had "great confidence" in the military.(141) It soared to 77 percent nationwide and 68 percent in
New York City after the attacks.(142))
VII. More Public-Minded
Since September 11, Americans have placed greater emphasis on serving others and less on
materialism. (See also the data from the volunteerism section.) Likewise, we have also seen
an increase in the prestige of a variety of occupations which serve the public, and not just
an increase in the prestige of police and firefighters.
Shortly after the September 11 terrorist attack, Americans were asked to identify whether or
not selected activities meant more to them now than before the terrorist attack. They were
asked the same question again nine months later in June 2002. Overwhelmingly, respondents
indicated that serving others meant more to them after September 11, and it continued to mean
more to them nine months after the terrorist attack, but the levels have subsided as time has
passed. Among the activities that people identified as meaning more in September 2001 were
"spending time with family" (77 percent), "helping others" (73 percent), and "serving the
country" (67 percent).(143) By the summer of 2002, the levels had fallen a bit, though Americans
still indicated that selfless activities meant more to them than they had before the terrorist
attack. In June 2002, 70 percent of Americans responded that "spending time with family" meant
more to them now than before the September 11 attack, 66 percent said "helping others" meant
more, and 60 percent said "serving the country" meant more.(144) In September 2001, more
materialistic options such as "getting ahead" meant more to only 30 percent.(145) Similarly,
"making lots of money" only meant more to 19 percent.(146) By June 2002, Americans indicated
that these more materialistic options were only slightly more important to them. Thirty-two
percent said that "getting ahead" meant more, and 22 percent said "making lots of money" meant
more.(147)
Occupations which gained greater prestige in the wake of September 11 were ones which served
the public. Through June of 2002, such occupations were still viewed as having greater prestige.
In September 2001, 79 percent held that firefighters had greater prestige, 74 percent thought
soldiers did, and 74 percent believed police officers did. Doctors (58 percent), teachers (46 percent),
and politicians (33 percent) were also viewed as having greater prestige.(148) The two occupations
which Americans thought had less prestige initially after the attack on America were athletes and
entertainers - 28 percent and 27 percent of Americans thought they had less prestige,
respectively.(149)
More recently in June 2002, when Americans were once again asked which occupations had greater
prestige and which had less prestige, those occupations that served the public, by and large,
were still viewed as having greater prestige. For instance, 79 percent thought firemen had greater
prestige (same as in September 2001), 78 percent thought soldiers had greater prestige
(up four points from September 2001), and 72 percent thought police officers had greater
prestige (down two points from September 2001).(150) Doctors and teachers were still viewed
by many as having greater prestige as well - 40 percent thought doctors had greater prestige
(down from 58 percent in September 2001), and 39 percent thought teachers did (down from 46
percent in September 2001).(151) In June 2002, some occupations were viewed as having less
prestige. In particular, 32 percent thought investment bankers had less prestige (compared
with 13 percent in September 2001).(152) Thirty percent viewed politicians as having less
prestige (compared with 16 percent in September 2001), 22 percent thought athletes had less
prestige (down from 28 percent in September 2001), and 21 percent thought entertainers has
less prestige (down from 27 percent in September 2001).(153) Thus, those jobs which, generally,
did not directly serve the public were viewed as having less prestige after September 11.
The one notable exception was in the way the public viewed politicians, a group which obviously
serves the public. In September 2001, 33 percent thought politicians had greater prestige;
but, by June 2002, the results were nearly the opposite - 30 percent thought they had less
prestige.(154)
These public-minded sentiments were also evident among college students. In January 2002,
56 percent of young adults (ages 15 though 25) said they would "at least be somewhat likely
to consider working for a community service organization,"(155) and 49 percent would be "at
least somewhat likely to work for an organization that focuses on a particular issue."(156)
A poll conducted in March and April 2002 asked, "Do you think there will be a shift toward
an interest in careers that may benefit society or the public interest, such as education
and public health, as a result of the terrorist attacks?" Two-thirds of college students
(67 percent) responded that they thought there will be an increase in interest in careers
that may benefit society, while 32 percent thought that there will not be an increase.(157)
However, only 20 percent thought that there will be a shift away from "careers that may
offer greater financial rewards such as business and finance," while 79 percent did not
think such a shift will occur.(158) Nonetheless, these public-minded sentiments are also
clearly expressed when college students were asked whether or not they agreed with the
statement, "I think my generation will come to be known as the 'us' generation, meaning
that we'll be more oriented toward community well-being rather than ourselves." Sixty-percent
of college students agreed with that statement, while only 26 percent disagreed, and 10 percent
remained neutral.(159)
VIII. Volunteerism Dissipated
Initially after September 11, Americans contributed large amounts of money and time to New
Yorkers and to various causes. Soon the focus shifted to President Bush's call to service,
especially for each American to give 4,000 hours or two years of their time to a public cause,
a very communitarian idea. However, this call was not followed with clear and compelling
opportunities for service and, thus, much of the new readiness to serve has dissipated.
Immediately after the terrorist attack, polls indicated that about half of Americans (and
those who live in New York City) had given money, clothing, or other items to charity.(160)
Interestingly, those who live in New York initially donated or tried to donate blood more
often than people nationwide (35 percent in New York City, 24 percent nationwide).(161) The
same was true for those who did extra work for an organization. Eight percent of Americans
nationwide indicated they participated in such an activity, while 15 percent of New Yorkers
did immediately after the attack.(162)
In the following month, October 2001, Americans were asked, "Have you personally donated money,
blood, your time, or made some other contribution to a charity or non-profit organization in
response to the September 11th terrorist attacks?" Seventy percent responded that they had
volunteered in some fashion, including 58 percent who donated money, 13 percent who donated
blood, 11 percent who donated time, and six percent who did "other" types of volunteering.
Only 30 percent responded that they had not volunteered or made donations.(163) These results
were similar to those reported of New York City residents in October 2001. Sixty-five percent
of New Yorkers had made contributions or donations to an organization assisting the victims of
the terrorist attack, 13 percent of New Yorkers gave blood, and an additional 18 percent tried
to give blood but were unable to do so.(164)
A survey conducted in early January 2002 showed that volunteer activities were slipping, at
least among young people ages 15 through 25. The percentage of young adults who volunteered at
least once a month decreased slightly from 30 percent in April 2000 to 27 percent in January
2002.(165) A larger decrease was seen in those who volunteered anywhere between every two or
three months to "less often than once a year, but sometimes" - down seven points since April
2000 to 31 percent of young adults.(166) Those who never volunteered also increased by 10 percent
since April 2000, from 27 percent to 37 percent.(167) The same survey also showed that 18 to 24
year-olds were less likely to donate money, clothes, and food, as well as join clubs and volunteer
at community organizations, than were young people of the same age in 1998. For instance, 72
percent said they donated clothes, money or food in 2002 compared with 86 percent who did so in
1998,(168) and 40 percent said they volunteered at a community organization in 2002, compared
with 50 percent who did so in 1998.(169)
Later in January 2002, Americans expressed their interest in volunteering again. Following the
President's call for Americans to commit 4,000 hours or two years to service of nation and
neighbor, those surveyed overwhelmingly favored the initiative. The night of the State of the
Union address, eight in 10 respondents said that they were personally willing and able to meet
the President's challenge, only 19 percent said they were not willing and able.(170)
A few weeks later, in late February and early March 2002, Americans took their commitment to
service a step further. When they were asked if they favored or opposed "requiring all young
men [and young women] to give one year of service to the nation - either in the military forces,
or in non-military work here or abroad, such as the Peace Corps, AmeriCorps, or in a local
community or city service program," half of Americans favored the requirement for young women
and 61 percent favored it for young men.(171) This is the highest percentage to support such a
requirement for women. (Forty-four percent favored the requirement when the question was asked
in 1987, 41 percent did in 1976, and 44 percent did in 1969.(172)) For young men, this was the
highest percentage favoring the requirement in over two decades. (Fifty-five percent favored
mandatory service in 1987, 60 percent in 1979, 62 percent in 1976, 65 percent in 1973, 68
percent in 1971, and 78 percent in 1969.(173))
This willingness of Americans to volunteer more now than before September 11 has posed two
challenges. The first challenge has been providing much-needed expanded outlets, and second,
providing opportunities to serve in what has been, by far, the most mobilizing cause -
homeland security. Instead of meeting these challenges, the White House rearranged the "voluntary"
furniture, so to speak, and placed the only new service - and the only one that speaks to homeland
security, the Citizen Corps - among other old, government-run, volunteer services. The newly
created volunteer entity was entitled the USA Freedom Corps. It includes the Peace Corps,
AmeriCorps, Senior Corps, and Citizen Corps. In whatever limited drives followed to promote the
Citizen Corps (by a tiny staff), they did not come close to meeting the needs.
As a result, even if one accepts the official figures, most of the new urge to volunteer is
being dissipated. During the time from the State of the Union Address through May 2002, Peace
Corps applications rose only by 18 percent over the past year.(174) During this same time,
online applications for AmeriCorps did rise a great deal more - up 75 percent over the previous
year.(175) More recently, the administration reported that online applications for AmeriCorps
had risen 90 percent over the previous year.(176) (One should note, though, that not all of
those who apply will actually serve.)
Some 45,000 Americans have signed up online to be a part of the Citizen Corps.(177) However,
this is a far cry from the millions needed to serve as first responders in the case of a
massive attack - Americans needed to supplement local police, fire, and medical personal,
and to act as eyes and ears of the public in patrolling essential assets, such as water
resources, bridges, tunnels, and electrical and nuclear plants. If those few who signed up
are not soon given meaningful assignments, their commitment will also be greatly diminished.
IX. Community, Neighbors and Patriotism - Closer and Better
After September 11, Americans held more positive views of community, neighbors, and Americans in
general. For instance, immediately after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon,
Americans came to view people as more fair, helpful and trustworthy. In 2000, 52 percent of
Americans thought people were "fair," 46 percent thought they were "helpful," and 35 percent
said they were "trustworthy."(178) A few weeks after the attack, in September 2001, 63 percent
thought people were "fair," 67 percent thought they were "helpful," and 41 percent thought
they were "trustworthy."(179) In New York City, an even larger percentage characterized people
as fair - 69 percent.(180) The improvement in how Americans view each other has, so far, had a
lasting effect, although it has been receding. More recently, in July 2002, 41 percent of
Americans thought that most people can be trusted,(181) compared with 35
percent in 2000,(182) and 34 percent in 1996.(183)
Confidence in neighbors also grew in New York City. In 1997, only 43 percent had "a lot" of
confidence that neighbors would help them in an emergency.(184) In October 2001, 60 percent
had "a lot" of confidence,(185) and 50 percent still had "a lot"
of confidence in June 2002.(186)
Also in June 2002, 69 percent of Americans said they felt good about the "morals and values" of
people in their community, while 31 percent either did not feel good or were
not sure.(187)
Other questions addressed whether or not people felt closer to their community after the terrorist
attack. In October 2001, half of Americans (50 percent) said that they felt closer to their
community, and the same percentage indicated they felt that way in June 2002.(188) In October 2001,
42 percent of Americans said that they planned to be more closely involved in their community as a
result of the events of September 11.(189) When asked in June 2002 whether they had actually become
more involved in their community, 20 percent responded affirmatively.(190)
After the September 11 attack, Americans initially felt more closely aligned with their fellow
Americans than with any other group and, according to more recent polls, continue to feel closely
aligned with them, though at levels lower than what they were in October 2001. In the fall of
2001, when asked to identify the community to which they felt most closely aligned, more than half
of Americans (51 percent) replied "my fellow Americans." Thirty percent indicated they felt most
closely aligned with "the people who live around me." Only 14 percent identified "the people who
share my faith," and five percent said "the people who share my political ideas."(191) More recently,
in June 2002, Americans' perceptions appeared to have shifted somewhat. Forty percent state that
they felt most closely aligned with "the people who are around me," 38 percent with "my fellow
Americans," 15 percent with "the people who share my faith," and six percent with "the people who
share my political ideas."(192) One nation, under attack, indivisible .
Expressions of patriotism have also become more commonplace. Through the winter of 2001, Americans
said that after September 11 they became more patriotic and enjoyed their freedoms more.(193) These
sentiments can also be seen in the fact that few Americans stated that the American flag had been
used too much since the attacks. For instance, in October 2001, 73 percent thought the flag had been
used the "right amount," 17 percent thought the flag was used "too little," and eight percent
thought it was used "too much."(194) In February and March of 2002, 66 percent still thought there
had been the "right amount" of showing the American flag, while 16 percent each thought there was
either "too little" or "too much."(195)
IX. Conclusion
This is not the whole story. Americans remain more fearful than they were before the attack.
Rights are, and continue to be, curtailed, and we are giving up a great and growing amount of
resources to protect ourselves, a sort of tax imposed by the terrorists. However, among all
these clouds there are several silver linings. By many measures, Americans are better people
and are more communitarian than they were before September 11, 2001.
Endnotes:
1. I am indebted to Deirdre Mead for extensive research assistance.
2. Time/CNN/Harris Interactive Poll, 7-8 November 2001.
3. Time/CNN/Harris Interactive Poll, 22-23 May 2002.
4. Princeton Survey Research Associates/Newsweek Poll, 15-16 November 2001.
5. New York Times/CBS News Poll, 6-9 October 2001.
6. Princeton Survey Research Associates/Newsweek Poll, 11-12 October 2001.
7. CBS News/New York Times Poll, 25-28 October 2001.
8. Gallup/CNN/USA Today, 14-16 December 2001.
9. IPSOS-REID Poll, 26-29 October 2001.
10. American Demographics/Greenfield Online Poll, October 2001.
11. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Media Attitudes/Youth
Engagement/ Religion After 9/11 Poll, 13-19 November 2001.
12. CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, 28 June-1 July 2001; and CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll, 21-23 June 2002.
13. American Demographics/NFO WorldGroup, 9-11 October 2001.
14. Ibid.
15. Time/CNN/Harris Interactive Poll, 13-14 September 2001.
16. American Demographics/NFO WorldGroup, 9-11 October 2001.
17. Time/CNN/Harris Interactive Poll, 27-28 September 2001.
18. Princeton Survey Research Associates/Newsweek Poll, 15-16 November 2001.
19. Time/CNN/Harris Interactive Poll, 7-8 November 2001.
20. Gallup/Bayer Facts of Science Education VIII Poll, March-April 2002.
21. American Demographics/NFO WorldGroup, 9-11 October 2001.
22. American Demographics/NFO WorldGroup, 12-20 June 2002.
23. American Demographics/NFO WorldGroup, 9-11 October 2001.
24. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Media Attitudes/Youth Engagement/
Religion After 9/11 Poll, 13-19 November 2001.
25. American Demographics/NFO WorldGroup, 12-20 June 2002.
26. Princeton Survey Research Associates/Newsweek Poll, 1-2 November 2001.
27. American Demographics/Greenfield Online Poll, October 2001.
28. Time/CNN/Harris Interactive Poll, 7-8 November 2001.
29. Princeton Survey Research Associates/Newsweek Poll, 15-16 November 2001.
30. Center for Gender Equality Impact of the Terrorist Attacks on Women Survey, 27-29
November 2001. Responses also include the following: 57 percent said they were "more
aware of what's going on in the world/people around us/other countries," 14 percent
said they "appreciate things more/cherish time/life/put things into perspective,"
nine percent said they have "more anxiety/stress," and six percent "watch television more."
31. American Demographics/Greenfield Online Poll, October 2001.
32. Polling data reported in Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and
Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, American Views on Religion, Politics and
Public Policy (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, March 2002).
33. Ibid.
34. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and
Public Life 2002 Religion and Public Life Survey, 25 February-10 March 2002.
35. Gallup Poll, 16-18 March 2001.
36. Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, 10-12 August 2001.
37. Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, 19-21 October 2001.
38. Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, 14-16 December 2001.
39. Gallup Poll, 18-20 March 2002.
40. Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, 28-29 May 2002.
41. Gallup Poll, 19-21 February 2001.
42. Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, 21-22 September 2001.
43. Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, 14-16 December 2001.
44. Gallup Poll, 18-20 March 2002.
45. Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, 11-14 January 2002.
46. Religion and Ethics Newsweekly/U.S. News and World Report Poll, 26 March-4 April 2002.
47. Gallup Poll, 26-28 March 2001.
48. Ibid.
49. Religion and Ethics Newsweekly/U.S. News and World Report Poll, 26 March-4 April 2002.
50. New York Times/CBS News Poll, 4-9 June 2002.
51. Quinnipiac University Poll, 12-17 April 2000; and Quinnipiac University Poll, 6-12 June 2000.
See also, Dean E. Murphy and David M. Halbfinger, "9/11 Aftermath Bridged Racial Divide, New
Yorkers Say, Gingerly," New York Times, 16 June 2002, A21.
52. Quinnipiac University Poll, 12-17 April 2000.
53. Polling data reported in Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum
on Religion and Public Life, American Views on Religion, Politics and Public Policy
(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on
Religion and Public Life, March 2002).
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.
56. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and
Public Life 2002 Religion and Public Life Survey, 25 February-10 March 2002.
57. Polling data reported in Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and
Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, American Views on Religion, Politics and Public
Policy (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum
on Religion and Public Life, March 2002).
58. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and
Public Life 2002 Religion and Public Life Survey, 25 February-10 March 2002.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Polling data from ABC/Beliefnet as reported in Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, American Views on Religion,
Politics and Public Policy (Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and
the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, March 2002).
62. Ibid.
63. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and Public
Life 2002 Religion and Public Life Survey, 25 February-10 March 2002.
64. ABC News Poll, 8-9 October 2001.
65. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Media Attitudes/Youth Engagement/
Religion After 9/11 Poll, 13-19 November 2001.
66. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and
Public Life 2002 Religion and Public Life Survey, 25 February-10 March 2002.
67. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, 13 September 2001.
68. New York Times/CBS News Poll, 20-23 September 2001.
69. Pew Research Center Survey, 21-25 September 2001.
70. New York Times/CBS News Poll, 6-9 October 2001.
71. ABC News Poll, 8-9 October 2001.
72. National Public Radio/Kaiser Family Foundation/Kennedy School of Government Poll
on Civil Liberties, 31 October-12 November 2001.
73. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and
Public Life 2002 Religion and Public Life Survey, 25 February-10 March 2002.
74. Ibid.
75. New York Times/CBS News Poll, 20-23 September 2001.
76. New York Times/CBS News Poll, 6-9 October 2001.
77. National Public Radio/Kaiser Family Foundation/Kennedy School of Government Poll on Civil
Liberties, 31 October-12 November 2001.
78. Ibid.
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Richard A. Serrano, "Assaults Against Muslims, Arabs Escalating," Los Angeles
Times, 28 September 2001, A19.
82. Federal Bureau of Investigation Press Release, 13 February 2002. Available
at: http://www.fbi.gov/pressrel/pressrel02/director021302.htm. Accessed 22 August 2002.
83. Richard Serrano, "Deluge of Hate Crimes After 9/11 Pours Through System," Los Angeles
Times, 6 July 2002, A8.
84. Ihsan Bagby, Paul M. Perl, and Bryan T. Froehle, The Mosque in American: A National
Portrait (Washington, DC: Council on American-Islamic Relations, April 2001). Available
at: http://www.cair-net.org/mosquereport/Masjid_Study_Project_2000_Report.pdf. Accessed
22 August 2002.
85. The Census Bureau, in its 2001 Statistical Abstract of the United States, uses
statistics from the National Survey of Religious Identification, conducted by the
City University of New York in 1990, and published in Barry Kosmin and Seymour Lachman,
One Nation Under God: Religion in Contemporary American Society (New York, NY: Harmony
Books, 1993). The 1990 estimates place the American Muslim population at 527,000. The
population section of the 2001 Statistical Abstract of the United States is available
at: http://www.census.gov/prod/2002pubs/01statab/pop.pdf. Accessed 22 August 2002.
86. Encyclopędia Britannica estimates that in the year 2000, four million Muslims lived
in the United States. See "United States," Encyclopędia Britannica. Available
at: http://search.eb.com/eb/article?eu=121246. Accessed 22 August 2002. The Council
on American Islamic Relations estimates there are seven million Muslims living in
America. Available at: http://www.cair-net.org/asp/aboutislam.asp. Accessed 22 August 2002.
87. For instance, Kevin Strom with the Bureau of Justice Statistics reports that between 1997
and 1999 about six percent of reported hate crimes (or 177 incidents) were motivated by
anti-Jewish sentiments and about 36 percent (or 1,059 incidents) were motivated by anti-black
sentiments. In contrast, during this same period, anti-Muslim hate crimes consisted of only
one percent of hate crimes (or 30 incidents). One should note that the data do not comprise
the total number of hate crime incidents nationwide, but rather consist of the number of
incidents reported by some 3,000 agencies in less than half of the states. See Kevin J
Strom, Hate Crimes Reported in NIBRS, 1997-1999 (Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice,
Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Statistics, September 2001). NCJ 186765.
Available at: http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/hcrn99.pdf . Accessed 22 August 2002.
88. Janet Tu, "Hundreds Assist Muslims with Watchful Eyes," Seattle Times, 13 October 2001, E8.
89. "Community Lends Its Support After Vandals Strike Mosque," New York Times, 3 January 2002, A14.
90. Richard Bernstein, "An Ugly Rumor Or an Ugly Truth?" New York Times, 4 August 2002, D14.
91. Alan Wolfe, One Nation After All (New York: NY, Viking, 1998); and Alan Wolfe, Moral Freedom
(New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2001).
92. U.S. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Transportation Statistics, Transportation
Indicators (Washington, DC: Bureau of Transportation Statistics, July 2002). Available
at: http://www.bts.gov/transtu/indicators/. Accessed 12 August 2002.
93. Ibid.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. National Public Radio/Kaiser Family Foundation/Kennedy School of Government Poll, June 2000.
97. National Public Radio/Kaiser Family Foundation/Kennedy School Poll on Civil
Liberties, 31 October-12 November 12, 2001.
98. ABC News Poll, 18-19 December 2001.
99. National Public Radio/Kaiser Family Foundation/Kennedy School Poll on Civil
Liberties, 31 October-12 November 12, 2001.
100. ABC News Poll, 18-19 December 2001. Twenty-one percent thought the federal
government posed a serious threat to their constitutional rights and 18 percent
thought it posed a threat, though not a serious one.
101. Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, 27-27 November 2001.
102. Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, 21-23 June 2002.
103. Harris Poll, 19-24 September 2001; and Harris Poll, 13-19 March 2002
104. Polling data reported in Tom W. Smith, Kenneth A. Rasinski, and Marianna Toce,
"America Rebounds: A National Study of Public Response to the September 11th Terrorist
Attacks. Preliminary Findings," (Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center, October
2001). Available at: http://www.norc.org/proects/reaction/pubresp.pdf. Accessed 10 June 2002.
105. National Opinion Research Center/University of Chicago National Tragedy Study, 13-27 September 2001.
106. Polling data reported in Tom W. Smith, Kenneth A. Rasinski, and Marianna Toce,
"America Rebounds: A National Study of Public Response to the September 11th Terrorist
Attacks. Preliminary Findings," (Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center, October
2001). Available at: http://www.norc.org/proects/reaction/pubresp.pdf. Accessed 10 June
2002.
107. National Opinion Research Center/University of Chicago National Tragedy Study, 13-27
September 2001.
108. Polling data reported in G. Calvin Mackenzie and Judith Labiner, "Opportunity Lost:
The Rise and Fall of Trust and Confidence in Government After September 11," (Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution Center for Public Service, May 2002). Available
at: http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/gs/cps/opportunityfinal.pdf. Accessed 6 June 2002.
109. Ibid.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
112. Ibid.
113. Princeton Survey Research Associates/Brookings Institution Center for Public
Service Trust in Government Survey, 2-12 May 2002.
114. Polling data reported in G. Calvin Mackenzie and Judith Labiner, "Opportunity
Lost: The Rise and Fall of Trust and Confidence in Government After September 11,"
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Center for Public Service, May 2002). Available
at: http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/gs/cps/opportunityfinal.pdf. Accessed 6 June 2002.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid. Twenty-nine percent trust the government in Washington "just about always" or "most of the time."
118. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, 25-27 September 2001. Sixty-four percent trusted the
government in Washington "about always" or "most of the time"
119. Polling data reported in G. Calvin Mackenzie and Judith Labiner, "Opportunity
Lost: The Rise and Fall of Trust and Confidence in Government After September 11,"
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Center for Public Service, May 2002). Available
at: http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/gs/cps/opportunityfinal.pdf. Accessed 6 June 2002.
Fifty-seven percent trusted the government in Washington "just about always" or "most of
the time."
120. Princeton Survey Research Associates/Brookings Institution Center for Public Service
Trust in Government Survey, 2-12 May 2002. Forty percent trusted the government in Washington
"just about always" or "most of the time."
121. Lake Snell Perry & Associates and the Tarrance Group, Inc., Short-Term Impacts,
Long-Term Opportunities: The Political And Civic Engagement of Young Adults in America
(Washington, DC and Alexandria, VA: Lake Snell Perry and Associates and the Tarrance
Group, March 2002). Available
at: http://www.youngcitizensurvey.org. Accessed 10 July 2002.
122. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, 30 March-2 April 2000; and ABC News/Washington Post Poll, 25-27 September 2001.
123. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, 30 March-2 April 2000. Polling data about
political parties reported in Gary Langer, "Trust in Government . . . .to Do What?"
Public Perspective, July/August 2002, 10.
124. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, 25-27 September 2001. Polling data about political
parties reported in Gary Langer, "Trust in Government . . . .to Do What?" Public
Perspective, July/August 2002, 10.
125. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, 30 March-2 April 2000. Polling data about political
parties reported in Gary Langer, "Trust in Government . . . .to Do What?" Public Perspective,
July/August 2002, 10.
126. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, 25-27 September 2001. Polling data about political
parties reported in Gary Langer, "Trust in Government . . . .to Do What?" Public
Perspective, July/August 2002, 10.
127. ABC News/Washington Post Poll, 9-13 January 2002.
128. Ibid.
129. Polling data reported in G. Calvin Mackenzie and Judith Labiner, "Opportunity Lost:
The Rise and Fall of Trust and Confidence in Government After September 11,"
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Center for Public Service, May 2002). Available
at: http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/gs/cps/opportunityfinal.pdf. Accessed 6 June 2002.
130. Princeton Survey Research Associates/Brookings Institution Center for Public Service Trust in
Government Survey, 2-12 May 2002.
131. Ibid.
132. Polling data reported in G. Calvin Mackenzie and Judith Labiner, "Opportunity Lost:
The Rise and Fall of Trust and Confidence in Government After September 11," (Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution Center for Public Service, May 2002). Available
at: http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/gs/cps/opportunityfinal.pdf. Accessed 6 June 2002.
133. Polling data reported in Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Media
Attitudes/ Youth Engagement/Religion After 9/11 Poll, 13-19 November 2001.
134. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press Media Attitudes/Youth Engagement/
Religion After 9/11 Poll, 13-19 November 2001.
135. Polling data reported in G. Calvin Mackenzie and Judith Labiner, "Opportunity Lost:
The Rise and Fall of Trust and Confidence in Government After September 11," (Washington,
DC: Brookings Institution Center for Public Service, May 2002). Available
at: http://www.brook.edu/dybdocroot/gs/cps/opportunityfinal.pdf. Accessed 6 June 2002.
136. Princeton Survey Research Associates/Brookings Institution Center for Public Service Trust
in Government Survey, 2-12 May 2002.
137. Polling data reported in Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew
Forum on Religion and Public Life, American Views on Religion, Politics and Public Policy
(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on
Religion and Public Life, March 2002).
138. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and
Public Life 2002 Religion and Public Life Survey, 25 February-10 March 2002.
139. Polling data reported in Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew
Forum on Religion and Public Life, American Views on Religion, Politics and Public Policy
(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion
and Public Life, March 2002).
140. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and Public
Life 2002 Religion and Public Life Survey, 25 February-10 March 2002.
141. Polling data reported in Tom W. Smith, Kenneth A. Rasinski, and Marianna Toce,
"America Rebounds: A National Study of Public Response to the September 11th Terrorist
Attacks. Preliminary Findings," (Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center, October 2001). Available
at: http://www.norc.org/proects/reaction/pubresp.pdf. Accessed 10 June 2002.
142. National Opinion Research Center/University of Chicago National Tragedy Study, 13-27 September 2001.
143. American Demographics/TeleNation, Market Facts, Inc. Poll, 28-30 September 2001.
144. American Demographics/TeleNation, Market Facts, Inc. Poll, 28-30 June 2002.
145. American Demographics/TeleNation, Market Facts, Inc. Poll, 28-30 September 2001.
146. American Demographics/TeleNation, Market Facts, Inc. Poll, 28-30 September 2001.
147. American Demographics/TeleNation, Market Facts, Inc. Poll, 28-30 June 2002.
148. American Demographics/TeleNation, Market Facts, Inc. Poll, 28-30 September 2001.
149. Ibid.
150. American Demographics/TeleNation, Market Facts, Inc. Poll, 28-30 September 2001; and
American Demographics/TeleNation, Market Facts, Inc. Poll, 28-30 June 2002
151. Ibid.
152. Ibid.
153. Ibid.
154. Ibid.
155. Lake Snell Perry & Associates and the Tarrance Group, Inc., Short-Term Impacts,
Long-Term Opportunities: The Political And Civic Engagement of Young Adults in America
(Washington, DC and Alexandria, VA: Lake Snell Perry and Associates and the Tarrance Group, March 2002).
Available at: http://www.youngcitizensurvey.org. Accessed 10 July 2002.
156. Ibid.
157. Gallup/Bayer Facts of Science Education VIII Poll, March-April 2002.
158. Ibid.
159. Ibid.
160. National Opinion Research Center/University of Chicago National Tragedy Study, 13-27 September 2001.
161. Ibid.
162. Ibid.
163. Statistics drawn from polling data reported in Wirthlin Worldwide, A Survey of Charitable Giving
After September 11th, 2001 Prepared for Independent Sector," (McLean, VA: Wirthlin Worldwide, October 2001).
Available at: http://independentsector.org/PDFs/Sept11_giving.pdf. Accessed 7 August 2002. The questionnaire is
available at: http://www.independentsector.org/PDFs/questionnaire.pdf. Accessed 7 August 2002.
164. New York Times/CBS News Poll, 6-9 October 2001.
165. Lake Snell Perry & Associates and the Tarrance Group, Inc., Short-Term Impacts, Long-Term Opportunities:
The Political And Civic Engagement of Young Adults in America (Washington, DC and Alexandria, VA: Lake
Snell Perry and Associates and the Tarrance Group, March 2002). Available at: http://www.youngcitizensurvey.org.
Accessed 10 July 2002.
166. Ibid.
167. Ibid.
168. Ibid.
169. Ibid.
170. Gallup/CNN/USA Today Poll, 29 January 2002. Respondents to this question were originally
interviewed 25-28 January 2002 and indicated that they planned to watch the State of the Union
address and were willing to be re-interviewed after the speech.
171. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life
2002 Religion and Public Life Survey, 25 February-10 March 2002.
172. Polling data reported in Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum
on Religion and Public Life, American Views on Religion, Politics and Public Policy (Washington,
DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life,
March 2002).
173. Ibid.
174. Mary Beth Marklein, "College Grads Bask in the Glow of Service," USA Today, 30 May 2002, 8D.
175. Ibid.
176. President George W. Bush, "President Celebrates USA Freedom Corps Six Month Anniversary,"
(speech given in the East Room at the White House on 30 July 2002). Available
at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/07/20020730-5.html. Accessed 8 August 2002.
See also the progress report from the USA Freedom Corps. Available
at: http://www.usafreedomcorps.gov/about_usafc/whats_new/progess_reports.asp Accessed 8 August 2002.
177. Ibid.
178. Polling data reported in Tom W. Smith, Kenneth A. Rasinski, and Marianna Toce, "America Rebounds:
A National Study of Public Response to the September 11th Terrorist Attacks. Preliminary Findings,"
(Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center, October 2001). Available
at: http://www.norc.org/proects/reaction/pubresp.pdf. Accessed 10 June 2002.
179. National Opinion Research Center/University of Chicago National Tragedy Study, 13-27 September 2001.
180. Ibid.
181. USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll, 5-8 June 2002.
182. USA Today/CNN/Gallup Poll. See Bruce Horowitz, "Scandals Shake Public," USA Today, 16 July 2002, 1A.
183. Ibid.
184. New York Times/CBS News Poll, 1-6 March 1997.
185. New York Times/CBS News Poll, 6-9 October 2001.
186. New York Times/CBS News Poll, 4-9 June 2002.
187. Harris Poll, 14-17 June 2002.
188. Americans Demographics/Greenfield Online Poll, October 2001; and American
Demographics/TNS Interactive Poll, June 2002.
189. Americans Demographics/Greenfield Online Poll, October 2001.
190. American Demographics/TNS Interactive Poll, June 2002.
191. American Demographics/Greenfield Online Poll, October 2001.
192. American Demographics/TNS Interactive Poll, June 2002.
193. Center for Gender Equality Impact of the Terrorist Attacks on Women Survey, 27-29
November 2001; and CBS News Poll, 5-6 January 2002.
194. Polling data reported in Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew
Forum on Religion and Public Life, American Views on Religion, Politics and Public Policy
(Washington, DC: Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion
and Public Life, March 2002).
195. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press and Pew Forum on Religion and Public
Life 2002 Religion and Public Life Survey, 25 February-10 March 2002.
|