

B6



"The gravest risk—that the balance of terror will become unbalanced."

A 'Peacemonger' Answers Some Questions

THE NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE

APRIL 21, 1963

By AMITAI ETZIONI

IN recent months I have been speaking to a large variety of groups across the nation about the dangers of war and the need for disarmament. Practically every group—from the campus of U.C.L.A. to Harvard Yard, from New York to Texas—has asked me the same questions. They want to know: How can one talk about peace and disarmament when the goal of Communism is world domination? Is not a strong America the best way to protect peace? Could the American economy survive disarmament? Would the Russians allow effective inspection? Who would enforce disarmament?

Here are the questions asked a peacemonger, and his answers.

How can one talk about peace and disarmament when the goal of Communism is world domination?

WHEN one asks how we can have peace while the Communists seek world domination, the word "peace" is usually being associated with harmony, absence of conflict. But such a world is impossible. People are going to have differences of interest and belief, and hence conflict, the way they have had

them in every country—and family—since time began. Peace requires not the elimination of differences of interest and belief, but the prevention of their turning to violence; not the elimination of conflict, but the prevention of armed conflicts. The new world this peacemonger is working for is not a kingdom of heaven on earth, but one in which we can survive together. This does not require the Communists—or us—to give up the values we believe in; it requires only that they—and we—give up one, and only one, set of means by which international goals are pursued—i.e., the wielding of violence.

Thus, there is nothing incompatible between Communist ambitions and disarmament. The Russians still would have open to them the means of propaganda and agitation, and of economic and technical aid, to forward their cause.

The Communists have been declaring for the past 30 years that they desire general and complete disarmament. They firmly believe that they will do as well, if not better, in a competition in which they can draw on the appeal of their doctrine of equality for people in Asia, Africa and Latin America; and

on their rapid method of industrializing, which these people desire. Now, we may know that their "equality" is a false one, and that their industrialization is inefficient and requires a high human cost, but this does not stop them from believing in it and in its appeal to people all over the world. That belief might well suffice to make them genuinely willing to disarm.

We should be willing to accept that challenge of a disarmed competition, to match the exposition of their ideas with ours, and to see where the chips fall. Certainly we have to insist that the arms will really be "checked in," but our fear should be of a failure in disarmament, not of disarmament itself.

Is not a strong America the best way to protect peace?

THE question has many variations: Why take risks? What if the Russians hid a dozen nuclear bombs at the bottom of a lake and then, by threatening to drop them—perhaps from a civil airliner, if all missiles and military planes had been destroyed—impose their will on the rest of us? Has not the present "balance of terror"

kept the peace for the past 15 years? Why could it not do so in the future?

My answer is that there can be no disarmament without risks. But these risks need to be compared with the most grave risk—that the balance of terror will become unbalanced.

Do not take the word of the peace movement; take that of the military experts. Herman Kahn, the author of "On Thermonuclear War" and "Thinking About the Unthinkable," an authoritative consultant to the Defense Department, has prepared a list of the dangers.

THERE might be a nuclear war as the result of a mechanical accident. Three years ago, for example, a flock of geese was recorded on the radar screens in a way that looked like a major missile attack closing in. Only at the last moment was the order to strike avoided when the true nature of the radar blips was discovered.

Secondly, unauthorized action cannot be prevented with absolute certainty. Various safety devices, such as locks on missiles that require the insertion of two keys before firing is possible, prevent a single enlisted man from starting a nuclear war, but a commander can order two, four or as many men as necessary to fire. How can his subordinates tell whether his command is truly "authorized"? To the best of my professional judgment, there is no psychological test that will positively screen out people who—especially as international tensions mount—might assume the responsibility of "protecting" the U.S. (or the U.S.S.R.) from a "soft" president or premier by taking the nuclear initiative into their own hands.

Escalation is one more widely recognized path to war. Since World War II, West and East have frequently become involved in local conflicts, such as those in Vietnam, Lebanon, the Congo, Cuba, Guatemala, Greece, and others. Once the prestige of a major power becomes firmly involved in local fighting, especially if there has been a large number of casualties, the temptation to become more involved is great. The escalator might be stopped, nine times or 99 times, before reaching the nuclear level, but if it drags us up all the way just once, millions will die, and the survivors may well envy the dead.

NO less dangerous is a miscalculation. Khrushchev has said that he thinks that the United States would not fight over West Berlin. He is deadly mistaken; the United States is fully committed to defend the city. If Khrushchev acts on the basis of such a misjudgment, there will be a war.

In the West, the success of the American action for the removal of offensive Soviet missiles from Cuba has created a similar danger of miscalculation. The Soviets might retreat every time they are challenged, but if we should make one major mistake, as President Kennedy has said "there will be 150 (Continued on Page 114)"

AMITAI ETZIONI is an associate professor of sociology at Columbia and a research associate at the university's Institute of War and Peace Studies. His book, "The Hard Way to Peace: A New Strategy," appeared in 1962.

A 'Peacemonger' Answers Some Questions

million deaths within the first 18 hours." Can we expect governments never to miscalculate?

Finally, less likely but most dangerous, is the possibility of a major technological breakthrough. The balance of terror rests on the assumption that if you hit me, I can still hit you back, good and hard, and vice versa. But the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. are working day and night on new weapons. If



one of them comes up with an anti-missile defense, for instance, that nation could hit the other with impunity. Most military experts believe that an invention of the magnitude to give any power such a critical advantage is quite unlikely, but the possibility cannot be excluded. It is most dangerous, for the way to exploit this sort of critical breakthrough would be by an all-out strike.

ALL these are possibilities. Experts do not disagree that they might occur; they disagree as to how likely they are. Sir Charles Snow, the British author and scientist, believes that a nuclear blow-up in the next 10 years is a certainty. Herman Kahn states that if we are to reach the year 2000—probably even 1975—we must somehow reach an

agreement with Russia on limiting the arms race.

* * *
Could the American economy survive disarmament?

TO answer this question is a task for a major volume on the American political structure. Briefly, one must point out, first, that disarmament does not come free. At least 10,000 Westerners would have to serve as inspectors to verify that commitments to reduce arms were carried out as agreed. These inspectors would have to be militarily trained; hence many ex-officers would find employment in the inspection agency. Inspection instruments, from U-2 planes to satellites carrying TV cameras, would have to be produced, keeping busy some of the assembly lines now working for armament.

Second, about 10 per cent of the labor force and of the American economy are involved in military production. Since disarmament would be carried out in five years at the very best, it would mean a fairly small annual adjustment of 2 per cent per year. A much larger cut in the military budget and production was carried out in 1946 without crisis.

Third, there are many ways we could use those resources now going into armaments—from building schools to improving medical facilities, from increased foreign aid (which would become a more important instrument in our competition with Communism) to increased contributions to international institutions whose activities would have to be extended to guard disarmament. Even some tax reductions should not be out of the question.

Surely Americans, as well as the citizens of other Western countries, would resist—as would citizens of the Socialist republics—any solution that protected their lives but not their values. But multilateral disarmament seeks a peace in which no country is asked to sacrifice its beliefs;

it seeks a new international life in which the various camps will continue to promote their values and ideals, but will have to refrain from using arms to advance their beliefs. There is nothing in such a world Americans cannot afford.


* * *
Will the Russians allow effective inspection?

I WOULD not think of giving up my arms if the other side does not also, and I would trust no country to carry out its commitments unless effectively verified. But it is necessary to distinguish between verification and inspection. The need for verification is absolute; it cannot be compromised or circumvented. At the same time, we must recognize that some disarmament steps can be verified without inspection, and many others without on-site inspection.

If, for instance, the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. would agree to turn over to the United Nations, each year, a certain quantity of nuclear weapons to be converted to peaceful uses, no inspection would be needed to verify that these commitments were fulfilled.

When inspection was needed, often methods other than sending inspectors into the Soviet Union would be feasible. For instance, the closing of bases and dismantling of installations can be effectively inspected with photographic and electronic surveillance; the embargo on the shipment of weapons to other countries can be verified by border inspection. A recent study of the Institute for Defense Analyses provides a long list of disarmament measures which can be verified through "intelligence, open sources, voluntary self-disclosure, and 'common knowledge.'"

It is significant that whenever weapons have been clandestinely produced or shipped on any significant scale—as in Germany in the early thirties, in Palestine under the British, in Greece in 1947, in



Cuba last fall—no one ever has succeeded in concealing the fact. That verification can work—without entry into a country—has been shown in the recent Soviet arms reduction in Cuba.

Of all the verification methods, that of sending foreigners into a totalitarian country for on-site inspections is the one such societies resist most strongly. To allow foreigners to poke their noses wherever and whenever they wished would require a major reorganization of the societal fabric, possibly compromising essential principles of the regime. Hence we find the Russians' persistent objection to on-site inspection, which often is misinterpreted as objection to verification in general.

THE question we need to ask ourselves regarding each disarmament measure is: Are there other, equally effective, methods of verification than manned inspection? It might well be that we could progress a long way toward disarmament by relying on non-manned inspection. We would probably reach a stage at which manned inspection would be needed, as an international police force would be; but this might be a long way off. Carrying out some disarmament before that stage would largely change international relations: mutual suspicions would be reduced as the sides observed each other carrying out arms-reduction agreements; processes of liberalization within closed societies would be accelerated by shifting resources from arms to consumer needs. These developments might well open the way for manned inspection.

I SAY "might." I do not know what the Kremlin "really" thinks, or what would happen once the cold war subsided and arms were reduced. I cannot guarantee that if we offer a disarmament plan based on effective, non-manned verification, with manned inspection as a later phase, the Russians will accept it. But I would surely prefer to offer them such a treaty than to sit back in my armchair asserting that they will not accept it.

I should not close this long answer to a brief question without pointing out that there is—and will be—no foolproof verification system, manned or unmanned, or both. We should nevertheless, I suggest, accept

the marginal risks that remain, should the Russians accept a system which our experts consider effective. These risks seem to me far smaller than those involved in continuation of the arms race.

* * *
Who would enforce disarmament?

THIS question raises the issue of world government. Would not an international police force strong enough to maintain disarmament—to protect the disarmed nations from a violator—require an executive authority to give it orders? And who would that be? Would there not have to be global law for this body to enforce, and would not this law have to be enacted by a world legislature? And would the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. ever agree to submit themselves to such a world government?

Here one has to distinguish carefully between the short and the long run. In the short run, such international institutions are not a necessary requirement for the initiation of disarmament. The two blocs could check on each other to satisfy themselves that commitments are fulfilled. Britons and Canadians, for instance, could verify Russian arms reduction for the West, and Poles verify American arms reduction for the East. Differences of opinion could be brought for arbitration before a panel of "wise men," selected by both sides from among men known throughout the world for their integrity—as U Thant is, for example. Even an "international" police force could be initiated on a two-bloc or three-bloc basis.

IN the long run, stronger international institutions might develop. Once the arms race was reversed, once the cold-war barriers of suspicion were shattered, many possibilities now viewed as unlikely would open up. Few expected that Japan and Germany would become intimate allies of the U.S.; that Germany and France, after three generations of hostility, would enter into an intimate union; that Soviet Russia and Communist China would come into bitter and open conflict. An international police force seems now as unlikely, and might be just as possible.

The road toward disarmament is not without risk, and the development of effective international organizations is far from guaranteed. Those who support disarmament can only state that they prefer to take those risks over those involved in the continuation of the arms race. I belong to a large group of people in the West who want peace but not appeasement, disarmament but not Communism. It is true that some members of the peace movement are appeasers or worse; but will we close our hearts to a world with its waiting megaton graves, just because a few abuse our concern for the survival of our lives and our values, and are willing to trade the one for the other?

