

The Israeli Army: The Human Factor

(Part I)

by Amitai Etzioni

THE ISRAELI ARMY is considered by experts as well as by the man in the street as a most effective and victorious army. Politicians consider it the strongest and most stable army in the Middle East. Generals come to study its techniques. Books are written on each major campaign. The Sinai battle is already a standard case-study in many military academies. The public, together with a goodly number of secret agents from a large number of countries, tries to answer one question: what makes this army so successful? Obviously such a phenomenon cannot be explained by one magic factor. The weakness of the Arabs, the loyal help of American Jewry, the very significant friendship with France and other explanations play an important role. But on the day of battle one factor looms larger than all the others, and it makes the difference between victory and disaster: this is the human element.

What makes the human element of Israel's Defense Forces (the official name of Israel's armed forces) so superior? Experts have given training techniques a good part of the credit. But would these techniques be as effective if transferred to other armies? Could the Arabs, for instance, improve their armies immensely by copying the Israeli training manual? The training techniques, like all other processes of education, are tied in with certain social structures and values. Perhaps the techniques are only the manifest top of the iceberg supported by a massive but hidden base which is somewhat difficult to see and almost impossible to transfer.

THE ISRAELI army can be understood only against the background of the Israeli society of which it is an integral part. Unlike the French Foreign Legion, the German Prussians and the English armed aristocracy, the Israeli army—men and officers—is not a caste, separate from the main body of society by boundaries of class, prestige symbols and location. It is a popular army in the fullest sense of the term. Soldiers

are recruited from every stratum in approximate proportion to the distribution of citizens and an elaborate system of reserve service makes every civilian "a soldier on eleven months leave" as the Israeli saying goes. It is a nation in arms.

There is a comprehensive continuity between the nature and values of the Israeli society and its military branch. The nation has a strong interest in and emotional commitment to the army and the army has strong structural ties to the nation. The national interest in a strong army is too obvious to necessitate discussion here. But the emotional commitment cannot be simply explained by the constant threat to Israel's security. The pride with which every Israeli, with the exception of a few isolated intellectuals, watches each muscle flexion of the army derives from a basic idea which dominates the Zionist tradition and Israel's ideology, namely, the idea of "normalization."

The Jewish community in the Diaspora is seen by the Zionists as an incomplete society, a community which depends on external sources for the fulfillment of some of its most elementary functions. Normalization means striving to build a balanced society, in which all basic functions are carried out and regulated by the Jewish community. Hence arises the strong emphasis on the value of work, especially agricultural work, and hence the admiration for Jewish military might.

Another aspect of normalization is the change from the powerless and defenseless ghetto Jew to the "normal" Israeli who can strike back. The young Israelis hate in a very personal and aggressive way Jewish history. They are ashamed of it. With few exceptions (Moses killing the Egyptians, the heroic fight of the Warsaw Ghetto) it is seen as a series of humiliating events where the Jews were murdered like "sheep for slaughter" as Bialik put it. The Israelis are joyful at being able to change this into a "normal" state. This explains a quite positive approach to power, and something close to admiration for arms and military exercises.

There is no tradition and no cultural support for desertion or avoidance of military service. Deserters are not made into heroes of novels or movies. It is natural to serve one's country against one's enemy. The Israeli feels that by fighting for his country against his enemy, he

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thereby mitigates to some degree his shame at Jewish history.

But there is more to the emotional commitment to the army. The Israeli society is one of the most heterogeneous societies known to sociologists. A country with half of its citizens immigrants from seventy countries, with many political, ideological and religious cleavages, has only a few values and only a few foci of identification shared by all. The Israeli Defense Forces are a very important source of integration for the young society not only because members of all groups meet each other and become intimately acquainted in it, but also because members of all strata are strongly and emotionally committed to the same army.

MOREOVER, sociologists have often pointed out that people who have lost contact with their society and its main values in periods of change and stress, people who have lost their social anchorage because their communal groups have been disintegrated in the process of immigration, for example, tend to identify with power symbols. This is one of the reasons why totalitarian movements are relatively successful in such marginal groups. In Israel, because of the processes of mass immigration and the slowness of social integration of immigrants into society, this marginal sector is rather large. But it is exactly this sector which is most strongly committed to the army, turning out for every military demonstration and supporting the political parties which favor strong-hand foreign politics. Through the armed forces they find a way to share in the values of the society and the army finds another source of highly loyal and enthusiastic support.

Thus, the army is loved and adored, admired and supported, out of necessity as well as a deep emotional identification shared by old Zionists and new immigrants. A soldier on vacation is not viewed as a loafer who found himself a soft job and is wasting the taxpayer's money. He is followed with proud eyes. He may use public facilities before any civilian. For instance, if he takes his date home after a movie in Tel Aviv, he may enter the bus before any other citizen. Ben-Gurion, having a good understanding of the public, will come to the Knesset (Parliament) in military uniform if necessary, rather than visit the troops in a civilian dress. The only medal or tag he is ever known to have worn is the olive leaf supplied by the army's officer-school to its graduates. The same symbol cast in gold is awarded by the Government to Israel's dearest friends and most distinguished guests. Perhaps the strongest expression of the nation's feeling toward the armed

forces comes out clearly on the one real national holiday, Independence Day, which each year becomes more and more focused around military demonstrations.

The army, which is so loved and cherished, is much closer to its popular base than any other modern army. First of all, there is truly universal recruitment. While many countries theoretically have universal recruitment, Israel comes closer to realizing this than most of them. Israel recruits girls as well as boys. (The social significance of this will be discussed subsequently.) In many countries service can be delayed, parceled out, or even avoided. Some such possibilities exist also in Israel; service may be delayed until the completion of studies while some military training is given at the university, and some allowance for alternative service is made for religious people, mainly girls. But in general a boy or girl graduating from high school usually goes into service as naturally as he went to high school after grammar school. Older generations, who have completed their military service or have immigrated to Israel after the conscription age, are usually called to reserve service.

A SMALL cadre of officers and technicians constitute the permanent army. The sociological significance of the cadre system which relies for the rank and file soldiers on boys and girls doing their service and on reservists, is that there is little ground for a military caste to develop. Even the relatively small group of permanent cadre has a flexible membership. While statistics are not available for publication, it is well known that there is a high rate of turnover in the higher ranks of the army. Officers shuttle frequently between government service and the army; leave for studies abroad or at the Hebrew University, or return temporarily or permanently to their *kibbutzim*. The average length of service of the five chiefs-of-staff has been about two years, after which all turned to important civil tasks.

The army is young and so are its officers. Israeli officers and generals are known to be among the youngest in the world, which sometimes causes some slight embarrassment on the international scene as when a fifty-five year old French general, for instance, must treat a thirty-two year old Israeli chief-of-staff as his superior in rank. But youth has many advantages. The absence of military tradition and a high degree of personal flexibility make for free communication and smooth contact with the civilians. The army and the nation support each other by mutual loyalty.

Israel is a small country about the size of New

Jersey. This is an important factor in keeping the front and the home close together. A soldier on even a week-end leave can usually reach his home and his girl friend or wife. Few Israeli soldiers fail to return home for as long as three months, even during the most critical periods of war. When I was in the *Palmach* (commando) in Jerusalem in 1948, I used to spend two week-ends a month in Upper Galilee.

Since the army is always in the homeland and never overseas, there is little opportunity for a separate culture to develop. The typical obsession of soldiers in all armies is that their wives are betraying them and that their home has been ruined by enemy bombing while they are thousands of miles away and do not know about it. While some such fears exist in the Israeli army, they are much less significant because of contact and communication with home and the home-town.

Soldiers are often depicted in war novels as sexually starved and aggressive. This creates a cultural pattern of certain expectations from a soldier on leave in the big city, which are reinforced by the soldier's buddies, girl friends and civilians. The pin-up girl in the driver's cabin or sergeant's tent is one of the typical expressions of this mood. In the Israeli army few such pictures are found. There are usually a large enough number of girls in the unit to take away the feeling of sexual isolation. As the girls belong to the unit and move with it, the boy-girl relationship can take a stable form and conditions are less conducive to short-term, "explosive" relations. The atmosphere is more of a co-educational school. Thus army life is much closer to civilian life than in many a country.

THE MOST important source of continuity between society and army is the youth movement culture. The army tradition is to a very large degree a youth movement tradition. This continuity expresses itself both in the typical ideology of the Israeli soldier and in the social life and structures of the army.

Before this close relationship with the youth movements is spelled out, a word of warning is due. The Israeli army, like all large social organizations, is heterogeneous. For most Yemenites the army is the first experience of a modern life and the first intimate contact with modern Israel. There are students hating every minute of it because it interferes with their studies. Some young, ambitious officers see it as a career and no more. The list could easily be continued. But there is a dominant pattern which governs this great variety of people. The pattern is reinforced by the higher echelons and supported

by such elite units as the paratroopers, the *Nabal* and others. Most soldiers tend to accept some of it or at least respect it even if they do not share it. Our discussion will focus on this pattern and only later will some variations, especially with regard to the new immigrants, be brought up.

The norm is collective service, i.e., service to the collective, usually to the nation. While this is generally the ideology of armies, there are important differences in the acceptance of such an ideology. It seems that soldiers who are members of Western societies, where individualist values dominate, find it difficult to switch to a collective commitment when recruited. A. Shils and M. Janowitz have shown that German soldiers under Hitler had little knowledge of, interest in, or commitment to the war goals, or to the Nazi ideology. S. Stouffer and his colleagues showed that American soldiers had little normative commitment in the war. While these findings can be explained to some degree by the general reluctance of combat soldiers to express stereotyped ideals, it seems that there is some truth in a general lack of normative investment of Western soldiers in war resulting from civilian values of personal success.

The Israeli society was to a large degree created by pioneers and a pioneering spirit with an ideology of service. From the first days this took the form of pioneering work in agriculture and armed pioneers. In the last decade there has been a considerable weakening of the pioneering spirit and an increase of personal success values. But the pioneering values still dominate large sectors of Israeli society, especially the schools, most of the youth movements and the *kibbutzim*.

ISRAELI youth movements are so different from their American counterparts that a short discussion of their special nature is needed. First of all, they are much stronger and more important socially and psychologically speaking than American youth movements. An active member of an Israeli youth movement will spend Friday night, a good part of Saturday and at least two other evenings a week in the youth movement center. The youth movements carry out many of the extra-curricular activities sponsored by schools in the United States. They are highly independent in organization and spirit and cannot be viewed as an afternoon extension of the school. Their centers are usually not in the schoolyard. The relations of youth leaders (often *kibbutz* members) to the teachers and school principals varies from limited and antagonistic co-operation to open hostility. Members of the movements usually

have a much stronger commitment to the youth leader than to their teacher.

The youth movement is from the socio-psychological point of view an ideal structure for indoctrination. The high peer group solidarity builds the identification with, and commitment to, collective values. This is transferred from the group to the nation through the ideological education supplied by the youth leadership. The youth leader, usually only two to five years older than his followers, is a highly elective indoctrinator. The fact that he himself is in the service of the nation (as a *kibbutz* member and/or by the very fact that he is a low paid hard-working youth leader) gives him often a real *charismatic* power over the members.

Most youth movements educate their members to become pioneers by joining a *kibbutz*. Some make "realization (of the ideal) in the *kibbutz*" a mandatory requirement for their members. All youth movements advocate national service in some form, denouncing an individualistic life and values. Becoming a merchant, lawyer or industrialist is considered a threefold sin. It means neglecting the nation's welfare, becoming a bourgeois (many youth movements have some socialist commitments), and bringing the *Galut* (Diaspora) to Israel. Some of the graduates of this intensive education try *kibbutz* life as the highest form of service. But most members either do not stay in the *kibbutz* long or stay away to begin with. But this should not be understood to mean that the youth movement indoctrination has failed completely. Even today, many young Israelis feel guilty when they are not in the service of the nation. This is the motivation which makes many Israelis seek "collectivist" callings such as teachers, nurses and officers. The graduates of the youth movement have a strong need to serve. Many of the officers of the permanent staff of the Israeli army are ex-members of pioneering youth movements and ex-*kibbutz* members. Many of the non-commissioned officers and a good number of the soldiers—especially in the elite corps—have such an educational background, which reinforces the service tradition and ideology. Thus the usual alienation between enlisted men and the ideal of national service is much more limited in Israel. Service makes sense not only because the nation is in constant danger but also because the idea of service has been internalized by the young Israeli. If he does not choose to join a *kibbutz*, the least he can do is to serve his country by his years of army service. Like any other person in military service the young Israeli may find his army years rather tedious at times. One

should not expect him to enjoy close-order drill or a fifty-mile forced march. But in general his activities as a soldier are meaningful for him; he wants to serve his nation and believes that what he is doing relates to this goal.

It is important to put the relationship between youth movement and army in the proper historical perspective. The strongest tie existed in the underground days when military activities were far from routine and their relationship to youth ideals was clear and direct. The pioneering spirit was at the highest level. Training, like the youth movement activities previously experienced, was always voluntary and for many people a week-end or evening activity. The only permanent army of the underground days was the *Palmach* (literal translation: shock troops, i.e., commando). At least 80% of the members and almost all the officers were ex-members of pioneering youth movements. Units were usually stationed in *kibbutzim* and were trained in *kibbutz* life concurrently with military duties. The *Palmach* supplied many of the youth leaders. In those days, the youth movements and the "army" were closest, both from point of view of their organizational structure and ideology.

When the Israeli Defense Forces developed and the various underground units were dissolved, a struggle developed over the nature of the young army. While there were representatives of a large variety of military traditions, including Jews who had served in the Polish army, ex-officers of the Soviet army, some American officers and pilots and others, the two major groups of officers and non-commissioned officers were either trained in the British tradition (especially in the Jewish Brigade) or were ex-members of the *Palmach*, *Hagana* and other underground units who had never served in a regular army. The two groups represented two quite different military traditions. The graduates of *Palmach* and other underground units represented the youth movement-military tradition of small, voluntary units, commanded by leaders close to their men. The British-trained Israeli represented the no-nonsense tradition of a well-established bureaucratic army, which believed in the King's regulations, drill, and highly standardized battle-training. The conflict between the two traditions reached a crisis in 1948 when in a series of battles not far from Tel Aviv two army units, one organized according to one of the two traditions and the other according to the other tradition, failed to take a major stronghold of the enemy. Both sides used this as a "proof" of the inferiority

of the other side's training and organization methods.

The conflict was recorded in army folklore in the form of an exchange between Ben-Gurion and Yigal Allon (commander of the *Palmach* at the time). The exchange presumably took place after a *Palmach* unit failed to take the stronghold and an army unit organized according to the British tradition marched to the battlefield. Said Ben-Gurion, "You see, Yigal, this is an organized army!" Said Yigal, a few hours later, when the remains of the smashed unit returned, "It's organized all right. . . ."

By the end of 1949 and during 1950 it seemed that the British tradition had won. The *Palmach* and other underground units were disintegrated. Many partisans of the *Palmach* tradition were discharged or resigned in disgust. Many underground practices were discontinued. The army became highly bureaucratized. British-training techniques were introduced, accompanied by a considerable amount of drill and polish. The training-branch of headquarters, an important branch in periods when little battle activity occurs, became the stronghold of the British tradition. An ex-British sergeant became the commanding officer of this branch of service. In a relatively short period the Israeli army accumulated almost as much red tape as some of the oldest and most established armies.

IN THOSE days the army found it difficult to recruit for permanent service the kind of person desired. Attempts were made to make an army career attractive by offering a considerable amount of privilege to officers in terms of food, clothes, and housing (at a time when the Israeli rationing system was at its height). While the number of people who expressed willingness to stay in service increased, some of them were not of the type the army needed as officers. There were doubts if they could lead the Israeli youth into battle and win.

The period of bureaucratization, in retrospect, had its functions. Some of the underground practices, which were functional for a small, decentralized, voluntary army were not appropriate for a large-scale army. Quartermaster systems built on intimate knowledge of the unit members and informal communication between the quartermaster officer and the commanding officer had to be changed. More paper work was mandatory. The need to train rapidly a large mass of new immigrants necessitated some revision of training methods.

These highly justified changes had two kinds of by-products which perhaps were unavoidable but which created widespread alienation.

First of all, bureaucratization was overdone. Their enthusiastic efforts to make the army organized, the partisans of the British system introduced some elements which were alien to the Israeli tradition and incompatible with Israel's special needs. Secondly, many of the underground military leaders could not see the necessity of bureaucratization and felt that the intimate comradeship of the underground—source of the all-important *esprit de corps*—was lost without justification. The conflict was aggravated because some political conflicts and personal animosities impinged on the clash between the two military traditions.

The appointment of Dayan as chief-of-staff marked the change to a more balanced period in which the Israeli army institutionalized a pattern of its own, whereby structural conditions preserving a high *esprit de corps* were merged with more or less the right amount of bureaucratic practices needed to maintain and mobilize a large-scale military force. The alienation between the youth movements and the army diminished considerably. Dayan, the lad from Nahalal, a co-operative village, with a warm outgoing personality and a deep contempt for bureaucratic procedures became—more than any other Israeli chief-of-staff—a hero of the Israeli youth. Dayan is known to have circumvented the chain of command and to have taken over personally in the battlefield when things went wrong. Privates like to recite the story about the private who was wronged, or believed he was a victim of injustice, and went to see Dayan. Dayan, who appreciated the "nerve" of the "guy" and his ability to break through the various obstacles to reach him, received him—the soldiers tell—for an interview.

EVERY ARMY has to determine what position it is going to take on the so-called "distance issue." What balance of impersonality should an officer strike in his relationship to the men? (We shall discuss the special position taken by the Israeli Defense Forces subsequently.) The relevant point here is that while the *Palmach* underground tradition minimized distance, and the British tradition emphasized distance, the new Israeli tradition crystallized under Dayan favored a moderate amount of personal leadership of the officers. The new merger of the older traditions into the new pattern seems to have been so successful that when Lascov recently became chief-of-staff most officers did not expect any major changes along this line, although Lascov was associated with the British tradition. In an interview with the press Lascov explained the need for flexibility in a young army; he considered elaborate drill and polish

The Israel Army: The Human Factor

(Part Two)

Jan. 1960

by Amitai Etzioni

IN MODERN warfare machines play an important role; even before the mass production of atomic weapons, superiority of one side in terms of jets, tanks, and artillery could make war a very risky business to the other side. Machines dominate modern warfare not only as weapons but also as means of communication, transportation, and even as means of calculation. But time and again armies inferior in armament but superior in spirit (there seems to be a negative correlation between the two) win wars. There is scarcely a better case to prove this point than the various campaigns of the Israeli Defense Forces. What makes for such superior morale? What are the social conditions under which it is created and maintained? We saw some of the factors originate in the social background of the army. These include the closeness of the home and the front, the pioneering and service ideology of the society from which officers and enlisted men are recruited, and the special structure of the youth movements which give moral support to the army. What has to be added to this analysis is the social structure of the army itself which creates conditions favorable to a high *esprit de corps* so decisive especially in infantry combat.

Army life does not come naturally to citizens of a modern society. It may have been an integral part of the life and culture of certain feudal periods. But in those days life and death in battle had a different meaning. Armies were not segregated social units. Fighting was part of life itself, conducted in natural social units.

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The first installment of this study appeared in the November, 1959, issue of the *Jewish Frontier* and the next, and final, installment will appear in a forthcoming issue. The study has been approved for publication by the Israel military attaché in Washington.

By stretching our imagination a little, we can compare this to the life in a frontier kibbutz. Here also fighting is conducted as part of the activities of the community. In Magal, a young kibbutz about three hundred yards from the Jordan border, which I visited, the kibbutz constitutes the military unit: married couples serve together at machine guns requiring two soldiers and share night watches on beats where two have to make the round at a time.

In other societies, where fighting comes less naturally and is institutionalized in segregated social units, the all-important question of motivating the soldier to fight and to maintain the system which is considered essential for fighting becomes a critical problem. The two are by no means identical. People who accept the goals of warfare and have a certain amount of personal courage can be relatively easily motivated to fight and fight well. The direct relation of the campaigns to the goals of the war, at least as long as the strife is in the home land, is clear. Therefore we do not find in such armies the alienation so typical of soldiers in peacetime or farther away from the front. Moreover, a battle is a highly dramatized situation, which makes intensive involvement, in one way or another, very likely. Last but not least, the battle situation is highly laden with rewards and deprivations of the highest order. Soldiers may die or become invalids, may become heroes, earn a vacation, or get home with a light wound. Officers may gain a reputation and win a long hoped for promotion. They may be court-martialed or humiliated to such a degree that they are driven to suicide. In short, behavior is highly motivated. If the relation of the sanctions to the goals of warfare is maintained, behavior in the battlefield can be brought without too much difficulty to conformity with the norms and expectations of the army.

AN ARMY in peacetime—when its main immediate task is only to maintain itself—routine jobs like guarding borders, even the supply service and other staff units during wartime, constitute a much more difficult problem of motivation. People are drafted involuntarily to this life. Their initiation period, called "basic training," vividly described in *Commentary* (September, 1958), does little to increase their positive involvement in the army life, tasks and regulations. Routine life as clerks, radar teams, or coast guards includes few rewards and great amounts of petty deprivation which lack the dramatic and heroic nature of larger ones and are therefore in a certain sense more difficult to take. The relation of much of the work conducted during peacetime to warfare is indirect. Pay is low, prestige is lower, promotion comes slowly and, more often than in wartime, it rewards not ability but obedience and political manipulation. The soldier lives for his vacation and discharge. Officers withdraw into a closed caste, away from disrespectful civilians, build up minute privileges as compensation for their dull life, and often turn their slow-burning bitterness into aggression against their subordinates, especially the enlisted men, the civilians in uniform.

In short, when we ask what makes an army "tick," we have to ask the question twice, once for the battlefield and once for the rear lines and peacetime. One of the basic characteristics of the Israeli army is that it objects to this differentiation on principle and does its best to limit the "peacetime" phenomena. This is done first of all by the constant emphasis on the fact that Israel is not at peace with her neighbors. This is represented not only as a legal problem in that armistice agreements have been signed but no peace treaties, but also as a constant danger and immediate threat. Thus, a high level of tension and combat readiness is maintained all the time by a complicated set of devices including a continuous shuffling of officers and units between routine jobs and "hot" frontiers. Training rarely takes place in training-bases but usually under combat conditions, often in areas where actual battles have taken place.

In a training exercise in the Negev, in which the writer participated, the units carried live bullets in their left pocket and dummies in the right pocket (although this is against the training regulations which require a stricter separation of the two types of bullets) because there was a constant possibility that the exercise would turn into a real defense. Nothing is more effective than such training devices to keep the meaning of the rather demanding exercises constantly in mind. The yearly large-scale maneu-

vers have similar functions. Reputations of officers and units, for instance, are influenced by these maneuvers almost as much as by full-fledged battles.

Before venturing into a detailed discussion of the combat soldiers, the leaders, and the allocation of initiative, the general point can be made by saying that commitment to combat values maintained in a fashion similar to the way the youth movement indoctrinates its members also reinforces their ideological commitments. Thus not only the pioneering ideology of the youth movement is transferred but also some of its social and even organizational features are utilized by the army.

SOCIOLOGISTS have long known that the smallest face-to-face social group is a powerful social agent. If a group is highly unified or cohesive it will do better whatever it is doing than where this is not the case. A group of factory workers will not only strike more effectively but also increase production further if the members are emotionally tied together positively. Sport teams score higher, students study better, armies fight harder, when the unit is highly consolidated. The reason groups are such powerful agents is that a man has to be rewarded for his efforts and, since he is a social animal, the attitude of others towards him and their evaluation and approval of his efforts are an all-important source of satisfaction to him.

The youth movement in Israel supplies the army with patterns of social organization. The army group is a group of peers. Privates are of similar age, of the same position in the life cycle, often bachelors, and they have often a similar degree of education (just completed high school). They are a group of equals because all have the same rank in a highly stratified environment. Now patterns for behavior in such a situation have to be learned. The family can hardly supply a training-ground for such a situation. School classes come closer but in Israel there is relatively little social life along these lines. The peer group in which the boy and girl are trained for membership in the combat unit is the youth movement peer group.

The parallel between the youth movement group and the combat relation includes much more than the somewhat complicated processes of psychological transference of pattern of behavior. First of all, as youth movement groups are age groups they are recruited at the same time and often the nucleus around which combat units "jell" are three or more "buddies" from their youth movement days sent to the same unit. In the case of the *Palmach* and *Nahal*,

the youth movement *Garinim* (literally, "pits," meaning nuclei from which later kibbutzim will grow) are recruited together. There is a tacit understanding that the army will try to maintain them as one unit.

The major point is that shared patterns of behavior are the social glue. And army unit out in the desert or on the top of an isolated hill will tend to spend the evening the same way they did while they were in the youth center at Tel Aviv or Jerusalem: gather some wood, light a small camp fire, sit around in one big circle and sing folk songs. Somebody may accompany the singing by an accordion, or play in between songs a solo on a *halil* (flute). No alcohol is consumed. Potatoes roasted in the fire and candies provide an occasional treat. Usually girl soldiers who are present reinforce the youth movement image of the evening. Other evenings, spent in a primitive field-movie theatre or in the nearby town, do not "count." There is some guilt feeling if a week passes without a "platoon evening" of the type described above. Soldiers who can help create such an evening and make it a success are highly valued, both by the officers and the men.

The end of training periods, battles, and technical courses, is celebrated in a similar way: there are no wild parties in the nearby towns or an evening in bars and brothels. There is a *mesiba* (literally, "sitting together"), a term and form of celebration taken over from the youth movements. The commander starts the evening with a small speech explaining the importance of the activity completed. Then some serious passages are read from some Israeli poet. If the occasion is appropriate, a chapter of the Bible will be read. Some lines by a member of the unit may be contributed, discussing the activity performed. Then candy, soft drinks, and wine are served, and the "light" part of the evening starts in which humorists show their ability. Lately, some type of a quiz has been added. The evening will end with folk songs and dancing. If there were no uniforms and the participants were a couple of years younger, one could not distinguish the army unit's *mesiba* from those performed in the nearby town by the youth movements.

What has been discussed here in some detail with respect to evening and holiday and festive occasions generally holds as well for the relationship among members in everyday life. There is a high degree of mutual help, which is one of the values stressed in the youth movements' training for kibbutz life. Soldiers who have had no such training are often described as "egoists" and brought into line. Perhaps the deepest

influence of the earlier training is revealed in the type of friendships which develop. The youth movements, which educate toward life in a collective, emphasize a basic positive orientation to every member of the group. There are no "bad" people; there are only people whose education has not been completed due to the "bad" environment in which they lived. It is up to the collective to create an atmosphere which will educate these deviate members. If members continue to do wrong, it is—at least politically—the unit's fault. (This is the reason why in Israeli schools and in the Israeli army so many punishments are collectively given to the whole class or platoon.) But while everyone is to be treated as a friend, the collective frowns upon intimate comradeships. Very strong friendships create loyalties which actually or potentially compete with loyalty to the collective and its values. This attitude is transferred to the army. You are supposed to help any other member of your outfit. This is thoroughly drilled in long marches where the unit has to carry home all those who cannot complete them. Wounded soldiers are carried away even under heavy fire. But you will be censured and even punished for showing signs of special attachment to this or that member of the unit. We are all friends; there is no room for narrow comradeship.

OFFICERS are expected, trained, encouraged and motivated to lead their men, not "to pull their rank," and not to rely on the prestige of their position but on their personal merits. If their performance in the field does not create respect for them personally they are considered poor officers, usually will not be promoted, and often will be taken out of combat units for staff tasks. Distance between officers and men created by artificial means of salute and formal barriers on contact is considered detrimental to the morale of the unit. Many armies have similar expectations from their officers on the battlefield, but they are not an integral part of the general army institutions, policy and culture. The Israeli army has institutionalized these values as part of its everyday life. Why is this done?

First of all, there is very little age difference between soldiers and commanders. Usually not only the immediate commanding officer but even the division commander, the front commander, and even the chief-of-staff belong to the same age group and generation as the privates. This facilitates communication and understanding among the enlisted men and the officers. More than that: one of the major cleavages which divide Israel today is the cleavage between those born or educated in Israel and the older immi-

grant generation from East and West Europe who built the new society and are to a large degree its ruling elite and "upper" class. The army—not only the enlisted men but the whole army—is almost completely the realm of the younger generation. Thus, all ranks are tied together by a similar view of Israel, of the Jews in the Diaspora, the place of Israel in Asia, etc. While a good part of the soldiers are immigrants themselves, (a) they are not immigrants from Europe and therefore share some of the mild resentment with which the younger generation is watching the older one; (b) they are the most "Israelized" section of the new immigrants because they have come to Israel young and often have had some Israeli schooling; (c) the most important factor may be that for reasons discussed later immigrants tend to be lower in rank than Israelis born and educated in Israel, and thus the young Israelis supply the leadership which ties the army together into one big group.

To be a leader to his men is for the Israeli commander more than official ideology because of the youth movement and *Palmach* tradition. The youth movements are voluntary organizations which cannot maintain their membership and motivate their members by sanctions. A youth guide who does not have or does not develop "what it takes" to be a leader among young people, to obtain their loyalty to him and to the values and organizations he represents quits rather rapidly and has to be replaced. The Israeli youth movements are a rather cruel but effective testing-ground and development project for leadership. This is one reason why so many army officers have been youth guides before they became officers.

The *Palmach* tradition, as we have seen, was an attempt to translate the youth movement values into army life. The *Palmach* itself was a voluntary organization both because members joined voluntarily and because—an underground unit—it had to rely to a large degree on willingness to act instead of coercing people into doing things. As we have seen, this tradition had an important impact on the orientation which the Israeli army holds toward issues of discipline and motivation.

WHAT DOES this tradition actually mean in army life? It means a limited formal distance between officers and men. Separate dining-rooms and separate lavatories for officers and enlisted men were introduced after long and bitter argument. The quality of the services supplied to officers and men is presumably the same but this is not always strictly observed. Clothing is about the same. Officers are not

saluted outside the army bases. Saluting is often neglected not only at the front but also at headquarters and regular army bases. To observe strictly is considered desirable only at the training-bases. The Hebrew equivalent of "sir" is not used. The official and formal way to address an officer is to call him "commander." But more often than not he is called simply by his first name or nickname by one and all. Officers are not allowed, and do not use, the service of soldiers for cleaning their residential units, washing, or making the beds. The right of the soldier to gain access to his commanding officer is much more than a formal right. It is often exercised because there is little distance to be bridged in such a meeting. Usually there is no need to apply for an interview. Soldiers simply approach their commander freely and talk to him. There is no formal bar on friendship between enlisted men and officers as there is in other armies. Although units and persons vary, in general once a unit has been out in the field (out of the training-base or home base) a highly informal relationship is established. This is usually continued when the unit returns to the base.

The army officer, like the youth leader and the *Palmach* commander, is expected to win the loyalty of his subordinates and obtain their service without much use of sanctions. He is expected to build up a personal relation with them which will make them follow his orders willingly. A soldier who is a trouble-maker will find himself in an informal discussion with his officer and reprimanded privately. Usually, only when this has failed, will a formal punishment be applied. The assumption is that the men have to be educated and that punishment not only fails to educate, but blocks the way to future educative efforts. There is a striking similarity in the educational ideology applied in progressive kindergartens and the Israeli army with its emphasis on the educability of man, the basic harmfulness of applying punishment, and the underlying assumption that a good commander like a good kindergarten nurse can get his soldiers to follow him without as much as raising his voice. While many armies have some such notions about relations in combat units, this is the general ideology of the Israeli army, both because combat seems always around the corner and because this ideology is much more institutionalized than in other armies. Almost every Israeli officer has heard the story about the two ways to make a donkey cross a bridge—by using a carrot or by using a whip. While it is said that in both cases the donkey will cross the bridge, in the second case it will be obnoxious and stubborn, while in the first case it will be cooperative.

JANUARY, 1960

The moral of this fragment of army culture only too clear.

LAST BUT not least, the best way to lead instead of to command is to be an example. This is shown in forced marches, even in training outfits. Officers do not ride on horses as they do in the Russian army or ride past the marching unit in a jeep. They march along. When there is a shortage of water or food or any other lack, the officer gets an equal share and not an extra portion "because he is more vital"—as the general in *The Naked and the Dead* suggests. Officers are trained to march in front of their units on battlegrounds and in attacks. This is supported by a strong tradition going back to the *Palmach* days. An Israeli officer never commands "Forward!" (*kadimah*) but always "Follow me!" (*aharai*). Many anecdotes which circulate among the staff show that the chief-of-staff himself approves of these norms; moreover, he follows them himself. There are many stories about Dayan going in front of his unit while he was a battalion commander. Lately, the following story is told: at a certain stage in the Sinai campaign a division commander gave orders from the safety depths of his headquarters-bunker for a divisional attack. Reports came in of strong enemy opposition, but he ordered the attack to be continued—to no avail. Dayan (at that time chief-of-staff) happened to be there and he immediately relieved the commander from his post, took over the command personally, and led the attack which ended by the conquest of an important enemy stronghold.

The second story, also about the Dayan days, tells about a high officer who was driving along the frontier when his jeep was attacked with machine-gun fire. He and his driver (a private) left the jeep in search of cover. At nightfall the commander sent the private to take the jeep and join him later in a safe place. When the chief-of-staff heard about the case, he demoted the officer and ordered the incident reported to all soldiers in all camps. Thus, leadership through exemplary behavior is strongly reinforced all the way from the chief-of-staff through officer training schools, down to privates who are used to following such leadership—and such command only—from their youth-movement days. General Marshall pointed out the heavy price the Israeli army pays for this type of leadership. The ratio of casualties among officers and NCOs as compared to enlisted men is much higher in the Israeli army than in others. But he also mentioned that the price is considered worth paying in view of the wonderful achievements of this army.

The Israel Army: The Human Factor

(Part Three)

by Amitai Etzioni

Feb. 1960

THERE IS a strong tradition in the Israeli army against drill and polish. First of all, it is in line with the tradition of the "puritan" pioneering Israel. In a society which still has little class distinction, only few status symbols, in which the prime minister and top officers prefer the sport shirt to a tie, there is little room for a pompous army. Tourists will not find a Buckingham Palace guard or even a marine-like uniform in Israel. Army camps are guarded by sentries with regular uniforms. Even honor guards are dressed in the same standard uniform. Officers visiting the president or going to an opera premiere will be dressed in their regular uniform. There is no other. Similarly brass and chrome, and with it polish, are kept to a minimum.

The same holds true for the drill, which is considered basically a waste of time, taking the place of training in the field. In addition to the general pioneering tastes and informality of Israeli society and the youth movement *Palmach* tradition mentioned before, there are two other compelling factors. The ideology behind polish and drill in other armies is that they are considered means to build up discipline and no army can function without discipline. Orders often cannot be explained for reasons of secrecy or complexity or lack of time. The soldier must acquire the habit of obeying automatically like "a machine". The drill and the polish provide occasions for training the soldiers to obey meaningless orders.

But drill and polish have other characteristics: first of all they allow the officer to demonstrate his superiority, his power and the helpless dependence of the soldiers on him. It gives him an illegitimate but extensive opportunity to revenge any real or imaginary insubordination. Digging holes and filling them up has similar functions in military prisons. Now the Israeli tradition tends to limit the conditions under which such tyranny can develop by mini-

mizing the meaningless work to begin with and by pointing out that meaningless work and meaningless discipline create alienation instead of automatic obedience. If discipline has to be exercised in order to be reinforced the best way of doing that is by training in circumstances as close as possible to actual battle conditions. If extra training as punishment for lack of discipline is required, forced marches are recommended, with the commanding officer sharing the exercise. Disciplining, like punishment should be closely tied to the actual work of the army. The Israeli Armed Forces follow the progressive educational theory which requires punishment to be related to the misdemeanor and self-control by the authority in order to avoid punishing from sadistic motives.

Finally, drill and battle drill are considered harmful to low level initiative. Every army has to find its optimal balance point of discipline versus initiative. These two are partially incompatible. The soldier or junior officer who is discipline-minded will tend not to take the risk of unordered action even when the situation requires it. He will be inclined to pass problems upward and not to move unless he gets an explicit order. The initiative-oriented person will tend to act on his own, taking responsibility for failures and credit for success. In some cases, this may lead to unplanned and/or poorly coordinated action, even to a breakdown of order and discipline with each low-level commander using every lack of communication as an opportunity to materialize his own plans.

The optimal balance point changes according to a great number of objective conditions. For the Israeli army most of these factors point in favor of maximum delegation of authority even if this means that order and discipline are sacrificed to a certain extent. One reason why this emphasis on low-level initiative "payed off" so well is the peculiar educational structure of the army. Until recent years, the army had a very high ratio of highly-educated command, including the lowest levels of NCOs. Since the ability to take initiative and the psychological need to be given the opportunity to take initiative increase with education, the large number of well-educated and intelligent people in the army made the decentralized structure of initiative both possible and desirable.

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The first two installments of this study appeared in the November, 1959, and January, 1960, issues of the *Jewish Frontier*. This is the last and final installment. The study has been approved for publication by the Israel military attaché in Washington.

THE ISRAELI ARMY was often confronted with an enemy which was superior in numbers and in armament. This prescribed war at night, when the element of surprise could be maximized and superiority in arms and numbers could be neutralized. Most of the successful Israeli campaigns have been fought or at least initiated at night. But fighting at night means limited communication (visual disability and the need for oral as well as radio silence in order to achieve surprise) and fighting in small units. It is dependent on high initiative of the low-level commanders, who must be able to evaluate the new problems and possibilities with which they are confronted and to make the best of it, often without communication with superiors.

The training methods are adjusted to these needs. Thus discipline or exercise are kept at minimum level and night training and field exercises are maximized. Initiative is stressed in training for all ranks and it is often the basis for promotion. Docile obedience may sometimes flatter a commander but is usually considered a sign of lack of independence which might be disastrous in a critical moment. The objective conditions force the Israeli Defense Forces into certain types of warfare. These create support for certain training techniques. These techniques, in turn, are highly favorable for high morale and *esprit de corps* since they are in favor of delegating authority, somewhat lax discipline, and high appreciation of the lower ranks. The high morale gives the army a semi-voluntary nature, minimizes the necessity to exercise discipline for discipline's sake, enables it to rely on low-level command and follow the patterns of warfare which are most advantageous to the Israeli army.

It has been suggested that the premium put on limited distance between officers and men, the emphasis on personal authority of leaders, the preference for small units and night fighting, and the morale-building training methods are not peculiar to the Israeli army but are typical of all armies in combat, and of underground and revolutionary armies in general. While there are similarities between the Israeli army and these armies there is also an important difference. Revolutionary armies and underground organizations are short-term organizations. Battle conditions are usually temporary. The assumption is that while one can run an effective army in the short run on such grounds as informal and close relations between commanders and men, lax discipline and the rest cannot be maintained in a regular peace-time army. This ideology was used when the *Palmach* was dis-

integrated and the regular Israeli army established more or less after British patterns. But, as we discussed before, a new pattern has developed which introduced many of the underground traditions in the regular army. It is correct to say that these elements become more emphasized in battle conditions and commando units even in Israel than in P-X staff and quartermaster units, and in peace-time headquarters. But the important point which should not be overlooked is that the Israeli army maintains some of this underground front-line spirit in the regular army, in all units, and in relative peace time as well as in days of battle.

The constant threat of Arab armies is a factor which reinforces a kind of semi-frontline tension all the time, and the frequent border clashes support it. But this in itself cannot explain the special nature of the army. It has maintained its special atmosphere in periods of relative peace, as in the last two years, for instance, and was most bureaucratic in a transitory period during and after the War of Independence. We suggest that once the special character of the Israeli army became institutionalized, it has maintained itself. One of the most important reinforcing factors is its high compatibility with the nature of Israeli society which—like the army—is based on a delicate balance between bureaucratization and “traditional” practices of the earlier Mandate days.

THE NEXT question we should like to attempt to answer is the implication one major change in Israeli society may have on the army and its effectiveness. Naturally, this is a realm of mere speculation; while factors can be pointed out and processes can be gauged, only the future can really answer these questions.

The mass immigration to Israel has changed and continues to change its society. Actually the whole of Israeli society, not unlike the American one, is a social ladder of immigrant waves, at different stages of acculturation, economic status, prestige, etc. But while there are many immigrant groups there is one major cleavage—between non-Oriental Israelis and Oriental ones. This cleavage divides the society in about two equal halves. The Oriental half came to Israel mainly in the last ten years and is usually referred to as “the new immigrants”. As every immigrant becomes automatically an Israeli citizen on arrival, he also becomes, if he is of the right age, a soldier, sooner or later. Thus, we may assume that about half of the draftees into the Israeli army are “new immigrants”. How does this influence the army?

The truth of the matter is that nobody knows. There are a few reports from journalists and some speculations of arm-chair sociologists, but both have little evidence for their impressions. The army, for various reasons, does not study the issue systematically and is not much interested in having others study it. Some facts are known. Ben-Gurion, for instance, at every graduation exercise of pilots of the Israeli Air Force looks for a Yemenite pilot. It is said he is searching for an Oriental immigrant suitable to become a general. But after ten years he is still searching. There are some Oriental Jews in the position of lowest-ranking officers, but their numbers compared to their proportion among the enlisted men is exceedingly small. There are very few high-ranking officers among Yemenite, Iraqi, North African or other Oriental Jews. The same, by the way, can be said about other hierarchies, such as the government bureaucracies, trade unions, headquarters of parties, and the Jewish Agency in Jerusalem.

But what is the meaning of these facts? Few claim that they are a consequence of discrimination. Most commentators agree that it is a consequence of difference in educational and cultural background between "the new immigrants" and the young native-born Israelis. These cultural and psychological differences work in favor of the *sabras* (native Israeli). *Sabras* are, naturally, in most cases of higher military value to the army and therefore are promoted more quickly.

Does this mean that the Israeli army is more and more burdened with low-quality soldiers? Again there is no clear-cut answer, for obvious reasons. In trying to form an opinion on the subject the observer has to take into account the enormous process of acculturation which takes place continuously and constantly reduces the gap for more and more "new immigrants". This process takes place inside the army as well as outside the army. Secondly, as long as Israel has enough top-quality soldiers to fill all the command and staff positions, the army may suffer relatively little from the decline in the quality of half of the recruits and be able to maintain its general quality till the process of education is completed. Whether this is a prediction which will come true or just wishful thinking, the future will have to show. To judge by the Sinai Campaign, seven years of mass immigration have enlarged the power of the Israel Defense Forces rather than curtailed it.

IN THE MIDDLE EAST generals and military dictators are taking over one state after another,

as a kind of unanticipated consequence of the arms race. After Egypt and Syria, Iraq and Lebanon followed suit. Lately Pakistan joined the line. Burma, which is often compared to Israel, has fallen before the same wave. It seems that a high concentration of power in the armed forces, in societies with a weak and traditionless democracy, leads eventually to a military coup. It is of interest to examine Israel from this point of view. If the army is so effective, successful and cherished, will it march one day on the Government and take over?

A few years ago there was a group of intellectuals of respectable stature who published a pamphlet on "The Status of the Army in Israel: State and Society" (Beth-Hillel, Tel Aviv, 1954) which was actually an attempt to warn Israel that the Armed Forces were gaining power far beyond that needed for them to fulfill their functions successfully. The readers were warned by a "top" economist, a leading sociologist, a prominent lawyer, a member of the Knesset and others that the development in favor of the army endangered Israeli democracy. The argument, briefly recapitulated, follows.

First of all, there is little civil control over the Armed Forces. The Defense Ministry was depicted as a weak body of civilians which instead of watching the military are a service organization for it. The Parliament Security Committee was claimed to be powerless, lacking the authority and the mechanism, budget and staff to control even limited aspects of army life. Unlike American legislative committees, Israeli committees cannot conduct investigations, hire agents, or summon officers of the Administration (including the Armed Forces) to appear before them. The military budget in Israel is never made public, neither the total sum nor items which have little to do with military secrets, such as educational activities. Thus the public and the press cannot criticize the budget because information is not available. There is a widespread—according to this group—a too widespread censorship. The State Controller's authority with regard to the Armed Forces is extremely limited.

While there is little control over the military, it is gaining more and more control over more and more functions, many of which—according to this group—legitimately should not be carried out by the Armed Forces at all. The Army is teaching Hebrew, geography, Bible, history, etc., and a large number of technical courses. It is suggested that it would be more efficient and more appropriate if the Army would release the

teachers and the funds and leave education to civilians and schools. In 1951-52, when several immigrant villages were flooded because of heavy rains, the Army was sent to take over the rescue work. Again it became the savior of the immigrants which only increased their identification with power organizations of the State instead of enhancing commitments to Israeli society as such. During a severe scarcity of vegetables in Israel the Army started to grow vegetables. Again, it was suggested that release of means and manpower would enable civilians to do a better job and make the Army less omnipotent.

Finally, this group of intellectuals opposed the development of a military ideology and prestige symbols which put the military as the leading function and top group in the young Israeli society. It was claimed that in a period when traditional symbols of pioneering work were declining the Armed Forces tried to create the impression that the only pioneering function left was service in one of the branches of the military, and that other functions were defined not only as secondary but also as politically corrupt, while the Armed Forces were the only sector of the nation not subordinated to political intrigues. Those who declared their readiness to make the military their way of life by joining officer courses through the Israeli R.O.T.C. or military high school, as well as the permanent officers of the Israeli Defense Forces, were showered with so many privileges that they were not only better off from an economic point of view but also were considered as the favorite servants of the State, the privileges being regarded as symbols of the social significance of the group.

While many of the facts depicted by the group as reported above were true, and most of them still hold today, the crucial fact is that the Armed Forces have never tried to intervene in any way in the political life of Israel. The military is still considered "public service number one" by the young Israelis. Some privileges have been cut after the military secured the needed technical and commanding personnel. The Army no longer grows any vegetables nor does it take care of flooded immigrants' villages. But it still educates a great part of its "new immigrant" privates and trains a good part of its technicians in army technical schools. Weapon production in Israel is usually not a private industry. But, as Mr. Jak replied to one of the intellectuals' complaints, Israel is under constant threat to its very existence. The only power which maintains it directly is the Israeli Defense Forces. All the other points are conse-

quences of this major determinant. As long as it cannot be changed there is relatively little which can be done about the consequences.

BUT WHY did the military refrain from entering politics and maintain such strong loyalty to the legitimate government? What made the Armed Forces withdraw from Sinai without any public criticism or delay? The answer can be found in the power structure of the Israeli military in relation to the power structure of Israeli society. Although a full analysis of the power structure of Israel is far beyond the scope of this discussion, the major point can be made rather easily. A military organization endangers the stability of a regime when it is not in accord with the political elite of the country. Thus, the German army supported Hitler because it was a rightist, aristocratic-dominated army in the Weimar Republic, and this was governed by an elite which included strong socialist elements. The paratroopers' revolution, which ended the life of the Fourth French Republic can be explained in similar ways. The like holds for some military coups in the Middle East and the one in Burma. In other countries, the military may be more "progressive" and to the left of the political elites ousted, but the pattern is the same: a regime is endangered when the military elite has a political orientation which is not in the range of political alternatives considered legitimate by the ruling elite.

In the latter days of the Mandate and the first days of the State of Israel there were armed units which were not in accord with the representative bodies of the Jewish community in Palestine and later with the young Israeli government. Even the *Hagana* (the semi-official underground organization of the *Yishuv*) had a long and strong political tradition. For years the *Hagana* was split into two political units, *Hagana A* and *Hagana B*. One was a left-of-center organization, the other was supported and staffed by the Right. When the units merged in 1938, the *Hagana* headquarters still included three representatives of the Left (*Histadrut*) and three of the Right. In the last years before the State was established strong new underground units developed, each with its own political orientation. The *Palmach* had a strong commitment to the leftish *Abdut Ha-Avodah* and I.Z.L. was supported by, and supported, right-wing circles. This meant that there was a political balance between the civil authorities of the *Yishuv*, which was under the dominance of Mapai, and the two strongest underground units. In the case of the *Palmach* this

caused severe tensions and in the case of I.Z.L. open disobedience.

When the State of Israel was established, one of the first tasks undertaken by Ben-Gurion was to depoliticalize the Armed Forces by abolishing the units which had clear political affiliations or orientations. He prohibited soldiers and officers from being politically active (although they were allowed to vote and run for office), and secured the loyalty of the Armed Forces by staff key-positions held by people whose loyalty to the Government was beyond doubt. Today the regime is much safer than it ever was in the *Yishuu* days. There is a balance between the orientation of the Government, and the orientation of the higher command as well as commanders of elite corps. Thus, the might of the Israeli Defense Forces is behind the legitimate government and it does not constitute a threat to Israeli democracy in its present state.

By Way of Summary

THE ISRAELI Armed Forces has many sources of strength: one of the most important ones is its fighting spirit. An examination of the sociological conditions under which this spirit emerges and is supported shows that the collectivist-pioneering tradition is the major source of the willingness to serve the nation. This spirit is first implanted in the young Israeli in the pioneering youth movements. The close relations to his youth-movement group and

youth leader create the pattern of relations which are later carried over to his platoon and officer. Officers themselves have often been youth guides, and thus reciprocate the pattern of personal authority and leadership rather than "rank-pulling" and maintaining discipline by formal distance. While many armies create similar relationships for limited periods it seems to be a constant part of the social structure of the Israeli army.

The pioneering spirit and the social conditions in the army which are favorable to its reinforcement reached a maximum in the underground-*Palmach* days. The establishment of the formal army brought with it a wave of necessary and unnecessary bureaucratization, which threatened the pioneering service spirit. But after a short period of overbureaucratization, something like a happy medium was found, in which the old spirit was institutionalized.

The mass immigration constituted a new threat to this spirit because of lack of education, of pioneering commitments, and because of a tendency to accept rather readily authoritative patterns of leadership. Mass education and *sabra* leadership may overcome this threat before it materializes.

A strong and successful army is always considered a threat to a democratic society. Israeli society seems not to face such a danger because the limited political orientation of the Armed Forces is highly compatible with the dominant powers in the Government.