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*Nonconventional
Uses of Sociology
as Illustrated
by Peace Research*

AMITAI ETZIONI

chapter 30

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spending. Still, the United States seems to spend more on disarmament research than any other country. The United States is also one of the few nations that have a special government agency (the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), privately endowed foundations (for example, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, the Institute for International Order), and academic research institutes (such as the Center for Conflict Resolution at the University of Michigan, the Center for Conflict and Integration at Stanford University, and the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University) devoted to these problems.

Sociological contributions to this field, though growing, are still minor. There are probably not more than twenty sociologists who regularly devote part of their research time to the study of disarmament and arms control (hereafter referred to simply as "disarmament"). Only a very few sociology departments conduct classes or seminars in this field or otherwise provide training for future sociologists who wish to specialize in this area. It was only in the early sixties that a section devoted to disarmament began to appear with some regularity at the annual meetings of the American Sociological Association and at some regional meetings. Considerably more sociological work is conducted in areas closely related to disarmament, especially international relations; but this, too, is a new and developing field. To survey the use of sociology in this field is therefore to study pioneering efforts, new beginnings, infantile diseases, and the potential value of contributions as yet unmade.

Sociological contributions take four basic forms: *facts*, *theorems*, *methods*, and *perspectives*. Differences among the four reflect the substance of the sociology applied, rather than the sociological context in which it operates. Although no data are available, we have the impression that the four approaches are not employed equally in the study of disarmament. Few facts are available; theorems may be used somewhat more often, but still inadequately; methods are more popular; and perspectives probably receive more attention and have more impact than the other three categories combined. Each of the four kinds of sociological contributions creates some special problems. We shall present some illustrations for each of the categories and briefly review the questions raised by its use. No attempt will be made here to survey the field. Unless otherwise specified, statements refer to the United States.

Sociological Facts

Every discipline commands a store of facts with which its practitioners are familiar and which are potentially useful to members of other disciplines as well as to decision makers. There are difficult methodological problems involved in the definition of sociological facts, their independence from a

Introduction

Sociologists who study disarmament are at a double disadvantage: both the contributions of sociology as a discipline and the investment of the society as a whole in this field are so small that the study of disarmament is a prime "underdeveloped" area. In the early 1960's the United States government spent about \$7 billion a year on defense research and development, but only about \$6 million a year on disarmament and arms control research. Senators openly questioned the need for such research.¹ The exact amount of money spent by private foundations and universities on disarmament research is unknown, but the best estimates suggest that in proportion to their total expenditures it is even lower than government

theoretical framework that defines concepts, and the difference between sociological and historical or psychological facts. Without going into these questions here, we observe that there is a body of information with which sociologists are more likely to be familiar than members of other disciplines, and some of these facts have a bearing on questions of disarmament.

Like most international problems, disarmament is closely related to domestic dynamics. Changes in international relations are affected by changes in foreign policy, and these, in turn, are affected by intrasocietal processes. This is true for all countries, but particularly for mass democracies. In this context a sociologist might mention the fact that there is a secular trend in the United States, even in peacetime, for a growing proportion of voters to consider foreign policy more important than domestic concerns in deciding how to vote. Survey data show that when asked about the most important issues facing the American people, the percentage of those who answered that foreign policy, world affairs, and defense are most important has grown significantly larger over the years, despite temporary reversals. In the period between November, 1935, and January, 1939, this figure ranged between 11 and 26 per cent, with the highest percentage obtaining at the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. In the period between February, 1948, and October, 1959, those who felt that such issues were most important never fell below 30 per cent, and in all but one survey (October, 1949) were at least 40 per cent of those polled. Fluctuations can be seen in the figures presented in Table 30-1, but most of them can be linked to a specific world event, and each such event seems to contribute to a growth in foreign policy concern.²

When decision makers—for example, the President of the United States and his advisers—consider a change in foreign policy that would be conducive to peace, such as the one initiated by President Kennedy in his "Strategy for Peace" speech on June 10, 1963, the adaptability of public opinion is a major question. While the President can act without public support, or even against it, such acts have a political price. United States recognition of Communist China, for instance, was considered too costly by most politicians in the fifties. It was not a simple task for Roosevelt to prepare the American public for his declaration of war. Thus, a decision maker seeks to know, before he launches a major change in the course of foreign policy, how easy it will be to convince the public that the change is needed and how rigidly the public will adhere to earlier policies—in short, how great the political cost is likely to be. If the cost is expected to be high and the change is not vital, it is likely that it will not be carried out at all.

The sociological storeroom includes some relevant facts for such decisions. For instance, a sociologist might point out that the public generally accepted the Eisenhower space policy with little resistance. In 1957, the

TABLE 30-1.

YEAR	PERCENTAGE NAMING FOREIGN PROBLEMS MOST VITAL
November, 1935	11%
December, 1936	26%
December, 1937	23%
January, 1939	14%
February, 1948	33%
April, 1948	73%
June, 1948	50%
October, 1949	34%
May, 1950	46%
1951	Foreign policy was most salient issue
1953	Korean Policy was most salient issue
June, 1954	52%
September, 1956	46%
September, 1957	43%
March, 1958	64%
September, 1958	44%
February, 1959	40%
May, 1959	44%
October, 1959	51%

majority of the American people did not know what a satellite was,³ considered the Soviet Union backward in general and in scientific and technological matters in particular, and was hence unprepared for the launching of a Soviet Sputnik on October 5, 1957.⁴ Though much pressure from Congress followed, demanding that we match the Soviet deed, and the Democrats threatened to make a campaign issue out of the "neglect" of space, President Eisenhower preferred not to enter a space race with the USSR for a number of reasons, especially his devotion to balancing the budget. He belittled the Soviet achievements by referring to the satellite as "this small ball," which, he said, was no cause for alarm since it was "certainly not going to drop on their [the public's] heads." Sherman Adams, Special Assistant to the President, referred to the orbiting of satellites as an "international basketball game."⁵ Samuel Lubell, who studied public reaction to the space problem in the following weeks, found that by and large it accepted both the President's explanation and his policy; people often even used the very same phrases Eisenhower did to account for their position.⁶

Space, it might be argued, was a new, undefined, "unspecified" issue in 1957, so that whoever first "imprinted" it faced little resistance. The President was first, and thus won public approval. But one might question if

such ready followship could be gained on matters about which the public had already formed a definite opinion. How readily can one change an imprint once made, and at what cost?

Here a sociologist can cite several facts. In 1961, when President Kennedy decided to transform the space race into a major issue, in sharp contrast to Eisenhower, he encountered little difficulty in recruiting public support. In a major speech he defined putting an American on the moon as the "most important decision we can make as a nation."⁷ After this speech and several similar ones, the public mood shifted considerably. An even more dramatic shift was achieved on a policy question that had been imprinted much more than the space race, namely, the nuclear test-ban treaty.

Public opinion played a more significant role in shaping the test-ban treaty than is common in foreign policy issues. The treaty was negotiated after mid-1963, as the country approached an election year, a period during which political leaders traditionally approach controversial issues with more uneasiness than usual. Moreover, a ban of thermonuclear tests, Kennedy had promised, was to be in the form of a treaty, which required ratification by the Senate. But Senate support for the treaty was lacking. Kennedy and his staff were concerned about the international and domestic costs that would be incurred by signing a treaty the Senate refused to ratify. Favorable public opinion had to be generated to gain the support of wavering senators. If this could not be done, the *signing* of the treaty might have to be avoided.

Initially, public opinion was not very favorable. The negotiations between the United States and the USSR began barely seven months after the Cuban missile crisis and after the USSR had arbitrarily and abruptly resumed testing in 1961, thus ending a three-year moratorium on testing that had been observed by both sides. Suspicions of the Soviets' offer to ban tests in 1963 were high; *The New York Times*, for instance, wondered if this was not a "Soviet trap."⁸ But, when the Senate convened to ratify the treaty, public-opinion polls showed that 81 per cent of those polled gave "unqualified" support to the treaty, as compared to 52 per cent two months earlier.⁹ Kennedy succeeded in gaining public support.

Many other such facts about trends and shifts in public opinion are valuable to a decision maker who wants to support disarmament measures actively and thereby comes into conflict with the policy that prevailed in earlier periods. The exact lesson to be drawn from such facts is much more difficult to spell out. There are the usual problems of secondary analysis: the data on the reception of Kennedy's space policy are not exactly parallel to those collected in the Eisenhower era; Lubell's data are mainly qualitative. Moreover, interpretation of the facts is hazardous. While it seems obvious that an ultrarigid image of public opinion is not justified, the

speed with which one can move on various issues is a more difficult question. What range of policies is the President free to follow within the limit of a given political cost? How rapidly can he shift courses without losing, let us say, more than a quarter of the public? How much explaining must he do before or after the fact? How important is bipartisan support? And the support of mass media?

Two questions remain largely unanswered after a tour of the existing store of facts—questions which are almost unresearched: first, what are the dynamics involved in changing the *Gestalt* of a foreign policy, rather than a specific item of policy? Kennedy represented the test-ban treaty largely as a measure that would improve United States security and even its military might, while he played down its role as a step toward disarmament.¹⁰ That is, he put a *new* policy *measure* into an *old*, accepted *Gestalt*, the cold-war perspective. He introduced in a similar fashion the sale of American wheat to the USSR, to which conservatives objected. This raises the following question: Could he have introduced other tension-reducing and disarmament measures, increased commitments to the United Nations, and so on, within the old frame of reference? At what point, if any, would the contradiction between a strategy for peace and the cold-war framework become evident?¹¹ Would a backlash be triggered? And under what conditions, at what cost, could a new frame of reference be successfully introduced?

Second, is it true—and one has the unsubstantiated impression that it is—that the public can more easily be moved up on a hate-the-enemy scale than down, even—perhaps especially—when the public is already "high" on such a scale and one would normally expect a "ceiling" effect to set in? It was apparently much easier for Kennedy to elicit support in his 1961 "call to the flag" speech (following a Berlin crisis) than in his 1963 call for a "strategy for peace." The Soviet Union, an estranged ally during World War II, became an archenemy in the few short months between late 1946 and early 1947. How long did it take France to accept Germany as an ally after World War II and for Roosevelt to alter American feelings about Germany in the pre-World War II years? If the sociological store included more facts on these questions, they would be of use for a President and staff faced with the need for a broad change of foreign policy, especially changes of the magnitude of effective pursuit of disarmament.

Besides being relevant to national policy-making processes, sociological facts are also valuable for international research and its consumers, from the United World Federalists to Peace Corps consultants. One of the propositions most widely espoused in the literature of international relations by the designers of the International Cooperation Years and by supporters of joint American-Soviet scientific efforts, of student and leader exchanges, and so forth, is that more contacts between members of differ-

ent societies lead to greater understanding and affinity between them.¹² As on many other issues, the case in favor of this proposition can be argued on common-sense grounds as potently as the case against it.

Two studies provide some facts that have a direct bearing on this question. Daniel Lerner reports that French businessmen are more likely to favor increased contact with other Europeans, in the form of a close alliance, if they have had some exposure to foreigners than if they have been isolated. He measured this exposure first by using the amount of export business as an indicator; he then found that this was highly correlated with travel to foreign countries, the reading of foreign publications, and familiarity with European culture.

Lerner made this finding after having tried to differentiate between those who favored increased contact and those who favored less contact on the basis of more traditional sociological variables such as age, birthplace, domicile, and size of firm. When correlated with attitudes toward increased contact, none of these variables accounted for a significant variation in the sample's attitudes, which favored increased contact by a ratio of 2.8 to 1. However, when previous exposure was considered, those with the least such exposure favored contact by a ratio of only 2 to 1, while those with the most exposure favored contact by a ratio of 6 to 1.¹³

Sociologists played a comparatively important role in correcting one major misconception about the effects of nuclear war. The central question considered was whether or not a society could survive such a war. Assumptions about the postattack state are one important factor affecting not only the decision makers who contemplate triggering a nuclear war and evaluate tactics that might lead to war (such as the initiation of limited warfare) but also those who deal with other considerations, such as the relative investment in peace efforts, civil defense, and the like.

As with most estimates, some normative factors enter these deliberations (such as how much one values 100,000 lives or one's commitment to a small ally). Next, it is extremely difficult to obtain all the relevant and valid information. The addition of any relevant fact can alter the picture. Early studies of the recovery period tended to be highly statistical in their approach, in that they counted the number of dead as compared to survivors and the number of GNP units lost versus those remaining.¹⁴ These calculations almost completely ignored, among other considerations, the structure of society; that is, the loss of people in strategic roles and key facilities would have a much greater retarding effect on recovery than the loss of others. Sociologists showed, by using facts from their storeroom, that such crucial people and facilities were more likely to be lost than less vital elements of the society, given the attack conditions assumed by the initial studies.

These studies assumed attacks to be concentrated on cities. Dentler and Cutright considered the affects of a comparatively small (2,000 megaton)

nuclear attack on seventy urban areas. These areas are almost exactly the same locations chosen by the Office of Civil and Defense Mobilization in 1959 as the most likely targets in a nuclear war. They used census figures on the percentages of urban populations employed in key occupations and arrived at the following results: while 46 per cent of the total population would be lost in the projected nuclear attack, this would include 73 per cent of all accountants and architects, 62 per cent of all physicians, 79 per cent of all salaried managers in the transportation equipment industry, 71 per cent of all foremen in the metals industry, and 76 per cent of all tool-and-die makers.

Dentler and Cutright also projected a composite picture of the United States Congress after such a nuclear attack on urban areas. Based on the elections of 1956 and 1958, they predicted the loss of almost half the 435 existing congressional districts. Because of population densities in certain areas of the United States, notably the industrial Northeast, they projected a Congress (if elections could be held) that would be dominated by Republicans and southern Democrats.¹⁵

The problems raised by these facts are not peculiar to sociological contributions in this field, although they may be somewhat more accentuated. First, there are not enough facts; almost each fact we have now immediately raises additional factual questions we must have answered before we can use the original fact responsibly. Second, the facts we *do* have are not necessarily available when needed. There is no "storeroom" of the type we have alluded to metaphorically; facts exist in discrete, dispersed units. As a rule we rely on the memory of one man with a small, high-turnover staff to provide facts. Of course, there are various indices, catalogues, and abstracts, but generally those which serve the peace researcher are less well codified, developed, and systematized than those in most other fields.¹⁶

Finally, giving advice on the basis of "facts" without any theoretical analysis raises further problems. As long as the underlying dynamics are unknown, it is impossible to know the conditions under which a "fact"—for example, a statistical regularity—will hold true. Suppose that a sociologist had predicted in 1950, on the basis of past and present knowledge, that at least one-third of all patients entering mental hospitals would remain hospitalized until their death. (If discharged, they would have to be readmitted after a short period of time.) Then, rather suddenly, tranquilizers were introduced and, in addition, many senile patients were transferred to homes for the aged. The readmission figure would be drastically reduced. This sort of problem is particularly severe in the study of international relations, because our knowledge of the "emergent" properties involved is limited and their effects are particularly difficult either to discount or to include.¹⁷

A professional often warns his client that the facts on which he is basing his advice or prediction are expected to "hold" only "if all other conditions

are equal." These conditions he cannot specify, as a rule, when facts are used, partly because they are unknown. He is thus exposed to a backlash of disappointment when the advice fails to work. His early warning is almost always disregarded.¹⁸ While this is true in general, it particularly haunts the sociologist who studies disarmament, because the number of variables involved is especially large, information is, in part, classified, cross-cultural data are often of poor quality, and the stakes are the highest.

Theorems

Some of the problems involved in using "naked" facts are reduced, while other problems emerge, when theorems are employed. A *theorem* is a statement about the relationship between two or more variables which is supported by some data. (A *proposition* is an unsupported theorem.) The distinction between sociological and nonsociological theorems is much easier to draw than that between sociological and nonsociological facts. Only statements dealing with the relations between sociological concepts as independent and dependent variables (although intervening variables need not be sociological) concern us.

Theorems are transferable from one body of data to another and therefore can be "used" for the interpretation of data other than those with which they were initially tested and applied in a situation other than the one in which they were first "found" or supported. One routinely transfers theorems between bodies of data with similar configurations of relevant variables. "Transferring" a statement about the effect of informal communication on the acceptance of formal communication—for instance, from reports on readers of bus advertisements to an examination of those who watch television programs—is an example. (It is always possible that a new variable will be triggered by such a transfer; for example, the emotional involvement in television watching might be smaller, and hence willingness to accept formal communication without informal backing greater. But the more generally similar the two bodies of data are, the less likely this is to happen.)

Second, theorems can be transferred from one subfield to another, using quite different data. This requires considerable reinterpretation of indicators, but involves the same basic variables. Let us take, for instance, the transfer of a theorem from the field of industrial relations to the study of the military establishment. The process involves first abstraction and then respecification. To save space, let us be content with a trivial example. We find that to the extent that workers view their foreman as a father-figure, they are likely to view the profit making of the factory they work in as just. We abstract this and state that the stronger the identification of low-

ranking members of a complex organization with those higher in rank, the more likely they are to view the organization's goals as legitimate. We then respecify and apply this proposition to the army, for instance, and state that we expect that the more soldiers view their officers as father-figures, the more likely they are to view the war effort as just.

Finally, the most difficult task is that of moving theorems from one level of abstraction to another. In addition to abstraction and respecification, which involve a reformulation of the indicators, new variables must be added—the emergent properties of the system to which the theorem is extended. For example, statements about the effects of interaction on conflict, when transferred from intrasocietal studies to international ones, must be revised to take into account that the most important regulatory machinery for intrasocietal conflict—the state—is absent on the international level. On both levels there are processes of escalation due to incremental growth of hostilities (A responds with increased aggression to a random increase in B's aggression, to which B responds with an additional increase in aggression, and so on). But on the societal level, this tends to bring to the activation "third party" mechanisms (for example, the police and the courts), which limit the conflict and return it to a lower level of aggression. On the international level, by and large, regulation must be self-imposed. (An interesting exception occurs when a Big Power acts as a policeman, as in the Middle East during the Sinai campaign.)

On all levels, but particularly on this one, the transfer of a theorem weakens it; it must be retested in the new context. But it should not be ignored that such transfers are regularly made and that we tend to give more credence to statements thus transferred than to those that have no systematic support at all, even though neither statement has been confirmed. The art of theoretical extrapolation is in urgent need of study and improvement; it is futile to expect that professionals can convince their client not to use the theorems transferred until their validity is reconfirmed and thus until the extent of their applicability in a new context is determined.

Many theorems are loosely transferred, as when one personifies a nation and expects it to act on the basis of guilt, defensiveness, and so on, in essence forecasting reactions on the basis of an implicit anthropomorphism. Osgood used an interpersonal image to build his theory on ways and means to reduce international tensions. "John and Ivan—who stand facing each other, near the middle but on opposite sides, of a long, rigid, neatly balanced seesaw . . . John and Ivan gradually work their ways back to safety by a series of self-initiated, but reciprocated, steps—very much as they had originally moved out against each other."¹⁹ Such applications tend to ignore the shift from one context to another, the special characteristics of each context, and the procedures for systematically taking such differences into account. But several applications have been more

carefully carried out and successfully completed, as the following examples illustrate.

Sociologists studying consumer behavior and voting patterns have shown that mass media have much less direct effect on the voter or the consumer than has often been claimed. For example, among those who reported a change of brand when they last bought food, Katz and Lazarsfeld report that 37.6 per cent of those who changed brands mentioned personal influence, 30.3 per cent radio advertising, 30 per cent newspaper advertising, 24.8 per cent magazine advertising, and 20.9 per cent salespeople (these figures add up to more than 100 per cent because of multiple answers, but within each group the salience of the factors was found to decrease in the same order).²⁰ To transfer this finding abstractly, we might say that choices between political and economic alternatives are affected more by primary-group contacts (and psychological predispositions) than by impersonal, formal communication.

The theorem was respecified to apply to attitudes toward the United Nations. During the late forties, a civic group in Cincinnati decided to mount a campaign to increase support for the UN. The group sponsored traditional advertising in newspapers and on the radio, as well as discussions, debates, lectures, and so forth, conceiving of their job as informational, not motivational. Two sociologists who were interested in the problem of the effect of adult education on attitudes toward international issues studied this campaign. They carried out a "before and after" survey, which enabled them to discover that many people were "reached" by the program (12,868 through the P.T.A., all school children, and 14,000 Weekday Church School children; 59,588 pieces of literature were distributed, 2,800 clubs were supplied with speakers, and so on). After the second survey wave, the authors wrote:

It is the interested, rather than the informed, who are more accessible. And, at each level of information, the interested are more likely to hold the desired attitudes of internationalism and belief in the United Nations. In a sense, then, interest is prior for an informational campaign. . . . The conclusion is that the people reached by the campaign were those least in need of it, and that the people missed by it were the new audience the plan hoped to gain.²¹

The extent of application is small in these cases; attitudes toward the United Nations seem, on the relevant variables, to be not analytically much different from those previously studied. More "interesting," in terms of theoretical pay-off, is the application of sociological theorems concerning interpersonal relations at the interstate level. One such theorem—one that seems to be valid—is the theorem of homophily. As developed by Lazarsfeld and Merton, the theorem states that people whose sociological

characteristics are similar are more likely to become friends than those whose characteristics differ.²² Since many nonsociologists consider this statement obvious and therefore trivial, it should be pointed out that the contrary statement, "opposites attract," is just as "obvious." Although "opposites attract" is true for magnets in an electric field and perhaps for some psychological characteristics of people, similarities in economic status, level of education, religion, and the like seem to be more conducive than differences to friendship, mating, and formation of cohesive groups.

The same is possibly true on the international level. That is, if one sets out to join nations into communities, those that are similar to each other, on certain structural variables, will be more cohesive than those that are different, all other things being equal. In terms of economic status, the federations, common markets, and similar forms of interstate unions that have been initiated in the last decades have, so far, encompassed countries that were either developed or underdeveloped, but not both. There is a Central American common market, one evolving in South America, some in Africa, and one in western Europe, but none was initiated as a mixture of "developed" and "underdeveloped" countries. This, one might feel, could be due to geographical proximity, rather than sociological similarity. But Mexico joined the South American Free Trade Area, rather than one in North America; North African countries, despite their greater proximity to Europe than to many of their African affiliates, have entered African customs unions, not the European Economic Community (EEC).

Of greater interest is the development of the European Economic Community itself. There have been at least a half-dozen different efforts to form European regional organizations since World War II, including the Western European Union, the Organization of European Economic Cooperation, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Though all these organizations tried to provide a basis for European integration that extended into the social, political, and economic spheres, not one of them was able to do so. These organizations differ from the more successful EEC primarily in the degree of their heterogeneity. First, their membership is at least twice as large as that of the EEC. They have between fourteen and twenty-two members, while the EEC has only six. This is consonant with research which shows that groups are more cohesive if they include fewer, rather than more, people.²³

More important is the fact that EEC membership is much more homogeneous than that of the other organizations. Whereas the latter include countries with social-democratic governments, such as Norway, there is no such member of the EEC. Whereas they include authoritarian countries like Portugal, the European Economic Community does not. Whereas many of the unsuccessful European organizations included both neutralist and NATO members, the EEC was initiated by only NATO members.

Whereas other European organizations have both countries that are largely Protestant and countries that are largely Catholic, the EEC has no predominantly Protestant members.²⁴

It is important to emphasize that homogeneity in itself is not a *sufficient condition* for the successful initiation of an international community. The Arab countries, for instance, are highly similar to one another, but despite this all efforts have so far failed to form a common market, an international bloc, or any other form of international community. Note also that the six western European countries were highly "similar" to one another long before they initiated a community in 1958.

Nor is homogeneity a *necessary condition*. Many nation-states, the United States, for example, are communities despite a high degree of internal differentiation, both among the founding units and the present member-states. This, of course, does and did exact a price in terms of social solidarity—a price that in the case of the United States included a civil war—but it did not prevent the ultimate evolution of one community. Homogeneity is thus a predisposing or auxiliary condition, but it is neither necessary nor sufficient. But this does not invalidate the transfer of the proposition; on the contrary, homophily among persons has the same status. Not every two people who are similar in background form a friendship, even if they come to know each other. But they are more likely to become friends than people whose backgrounds are dissimilar in the ways discussed above for nations.

What can be learned from the theorem of homophily about the possibility of a world-wide community? Does it not suggest that it will be impossible to form one, since lack of homogeneity is most manifest on this level? In part, the answer is affected by one's estimate of the pace of processes that alter global homogeneity. While the degree of homogeneity is a given at any point in time, it changes over time. Several processes contributing to homogeneity are at work, including the development of the underdeveloped nations (though, so far, the gap between the "have" and the "have not" countries has increased rather than decreased),²⁵ the development of world-wide communication systems (though the effect of these has often been exaggerated), and finally the evolution of regional communities.

The evolution of regional communities is of special interest because it illustrates both the merits of transferring sociological propositions from intrasocietal to intersocietal analysis and the possibility of "stringing" together theorems derived from various sources to form a set of propositions pertaining to international systems. (The relevance of this to disarmament is that many authorities believe disarmament cannot be achieved and that, if achieved, it could not be maintained unless some form of world authority were established; such an authority requires, as a basis of policy formation, the evolution of an international community.)

To create a world community, some agreement must exist among the countries involved. The formation of a world government in one step is an unrealistic goal because of the lack of world consensus. By looking at the ways in which consensus is obtained within a society and then transferring the abstracted model to the international level, we may make some suggestions about more realistic roads to international community.

Since, as we have noted, smaller groups are more likely to be homogeneous than larger ones, one process that often occurs within nations is the formation of subgroups, which are able to reach consensus more easily than larger, more diverse groups. Within the United States, the process of political decision making proceeds from state primaries to national party conventions to interaction between parties within Congress. In a multi-party system, the process includes factional decisions within a party and party decisions within a coalition. Described abstractly, the process can be seen as operating on two levels: first, subgroups which are relatively homogeneous and can reach consensus relatively easily; then these groups send representatives to the next level, where consensus can now be reached because diversity has been reduced on a lower level.

At the international level we can see similar examples of this process. Within the Organization of American States two smaller economic groupings are emerging: South American and Central American. Within the United Nations, there are several voting blocs, each representing a certain regional group. Given our understanding of consensus formation within national societies, this process of regional group formation tends to be, though it is not necessarily, a useful step on the road to a world community.²⁶

Another transfer of levels of analysis is seen in the work of Galtung. Working with a theory of aggression that can be relevant at both the individual and national levels, he suggests that

Aggression is most likely to arise in social positions in rank-disequilibrium. In a system of individuals it may take the form of a crime, in a system of groups the form of revolutions, and in a system of nations the form of war. But these extreme forms of aggression are unlikely to occur unless 1) other means of equilibration towards a complete topdog configuration have been tried, and 2) the culture has some practice in violent aggression.²⁷

Sociological Methods

There are no methods that are intrinsically sociological, but sociologists have developed and used research techniques about which they are frequently consulted by practitioners of other disciplines as well as nonacademic consumers. One such technique is the survey, by which we system-

atically explore what other people think, know, feel, or believe. One early use of this method is of much interest here. It was developed in England when the urban, industrial middle class wanted to know what the working class thought.²⁸ Similar surveys have served as a communication device for corporations, churches, armies, societies—and now international organizations—to channel “upward” what lower units or subunits see and feel.

The lay person is inclined, when acting without reflection, to assume that since all men are similar, he can use his knowledge of himself and of his acquaintances to understand the motivation and behavior of others. But one's knowledge of one's mind and body is rather fragmented and is distorted by emotions and stereotypes. And, because of culture-bound socialization, most persons uninitiated in the social sciences are *unable* to empathize with members of other classes, nations, or cultures. The device of “interviewing” taxi drivers or cleaning women compares poorly with survey methods as a source of information about “what people think.” Diplomatic reports, often based on impressions gained at a cocktail party or a local pub, are much inferior to cross-cultural surveys, despite all the latter's shortcomings.

One such survey, carried out among a representative sample in the United States, probed the dimensions of the cold war, as the “man in the street” sees it. The report of this study suggests that:

The Cold War might be seen in the perspective of polarities—Communism versus capitalism, democracy versus totalitarianism, a Russian world versus an American world—but virtually no one sees the Cold War in these dimensions!

Russia is seen either as simply making a power play for extended and perhaps global control or she is seen as trying to spread Communism. In “opposition” to this, the United States is seen, most broadly, as trying to keep the peace.

Only one American in five sees the United States as trying to spread democracy as a national purpose in our relations with Russia. Virtually nobody mentions capitalism. The contest is usually posed as Russian expansion *versus* U.S. maintaining the peace, or the spread of Russian Communism *versus* the U.S. keeping the peace. The majority of the American public, therefore, sees the Cold War as a threat of force, with the threat of war as the ultimate possibility.

But Americans do not necessarily see global war or a nuclear exchange between the great powers as the inevitable outcome. The population is about evenly split (one-third to one-third) in estimating that a big war is likely or unlikely. This balance is apparently slowly tipping toward those who think it will not happen. . . .

Although few people volunteered a policy of disarmament, when the broad spectrum of possible policies including arms control, test bans, progressive reduction in arms, disarmament, etc., was raised, more than half the popu-

lation thought that such steps should certainly be tried and continued. Between one-fourth and one-third thought that such steps would be worthwhile, and one-fourth, although skeptical over their worth, still thought that the U.S. should continue a strong policy of interest in these measures. . . .

To probe further into the broad perspective under which the Cold War might be seen by the U.S. public, five ways of looking at U.S.—U.S.S.R. relations were posed. These five are by no means exhaustive of perspectives but they do range over the scale of viewpoints and they provide a check on the more spontaneously expressed opinions already reported and encountered early in the interview. The five in the order of their acceptance are as follows:

“The cold war with Russia is a fight between two very different ways of life with different values and ideas.” 89 per cent agree.

“Our problems with Russia are just like having trouble with a ‘bad guy’ or a delinquent who won't behave.” 63 per cent agree.

“We have a Cold War with Russia because the United States and Russia are each trying to do what they want and their interests interfere with each other.” 55 per cent agree.

“Our troubles with Russia are just a question of which country is going to survive as a powerful nation.” 49 per cent agree.

“We have a Cold War with Russia because the United States and Russia don't really try to work together and understand one another.” 29 per cent agree.²⁹

On the other hand, the findings of surveys have often been used to show how uninformed people are. A survey carried out by the Survey Research Center in 1964 indicated that 28 per cent of the sample interviewed did not know that there was a Communist government in China. Thirty-nine per cent had never heard of the Nationalist Chinese government, and an astonishing 25 per cent answered “No” when asked, “Have you happened to hear anything about the fighting in Viet Nam?”³⁰ These findings are used to demand greater investment in education, including adult education, and more sharing of information with the public, ranging from demands for more presidential press conferences to demands for more public information programs on TV.

The United States is constantly taking surveys of what people in other countries think about this country, the U.S.S.R., China, and so on in general terms as well as with regard to specific policies. For instance, when asked in 1958 about their willingness to allow NATO missile bases with American equipment in their countries, parliamentarians were found to favor the idea in Great Britain, Italy, and France (by margins of 73, 28, and 22 per cent, respectively) but to oppose the idea in Germany and Japan (by 12 per cent and 75 per cent—in the latter case NATO was, of course, not mentioned).³¹

Almond reported small changes in western European public-opinion support for the United States after the launching of Sputnik. Some people expressed sentiments of neutrality after Sputnik, although they had previ-

ously favored a strongly pro-United States position by their respective countries. For example, the percentage claiming that Great Britain should side with the West declined from 53 per cent in May, 1957, to 49 per cent in October, 1958, while those favoring neutralism increased from 29 to 38 per cent during the same period.³² These results call into question the widely held belief that the effect of Sputnik was dramatic. Shifts for all countries studied are below 10 per cent, many considerably smaller.

Although excessive concern with our "image" and crude efforts to manipulate it are correctly criticized, one might note that these surveys provide one of the few avenues for the United States to systematically learn what other nations think about it. Such surveys serve to counteract some of the influence of domestic public-opinion polls. In this sense, they make United States foreign policy somewhat less nationalistic. The units of international action in the nuclear age are often blocs of nations, not individual states. Each bloc has one or more elite states or superpowers. As there are neither bloc parliaments nor international elections, public-opinion polls conducted in other countries by the superpower help to increase the responsiveness of the elite state to other members of its world.

The impact is obviously small, since foreign policy is affected by many more salient factors than public opinion. Moreover, most of the influence attributed to public opinion is conceded to the domestic public opinion of the superpower itself. Yet "foreign" public opinion does play a role. When the United States employed nonlethal gas in Vietnam early in 1965, there was a strong public reaction. To explain the President's carefully worded statement on this issue, a staff writer for the *Washington Post* said that "officials favoring the promotion of the gases appear to view these same statements as a diplomatic retreat in the face of the sharp public reaction around the world."³³

During the Cuban crisis of October, 1962, the influence of foreign public opinion was recognized by Attorney-General Robert Kennedy, who argued against a bombing of the Soviet missile sites. He reminded the group of Pearl Harbor. "For the United States to attack a small country like Cuba without warning," he said, "would irreparably hurt our reputation in the world—and our own conscience."³⁴ A leading news service described the ending of the United States airlift operation in the Congo, during November, 1964, as a step taken in part as a response to adverse foreign opinion, especially among African, Asian, and Latin American countries.³⁵

It is relevant to point out here why public opinion in third countries surveyed by sociological techniques and interpreted by persons with sociological training tends to have a moderating effect on the foreign policy of the superpower. This is not always the case; West Germany has often demanded and achieved a "tougher" line against the USSR, and so have the Nationalistic Chinese against the mainland government. But by and large, the effect tends to be moderating. One reason is that the United

States has multifaceted involvements on many fronts. When it faces an escalation of tensions in one theater, its allies and friends in the others are likely to be less engaged and less concerned than the United States. Thus, for instance, the European allies tended to counsel moderation during the Cuban missile crisis of 1962 and favor negotiations in Vietnam in 1965. Allies in the Far East and South Asia were urging restraint during various Berlin crises. The net result, since confrontations tend to be limited to one front at a time, has been a generalized pressure toward moderation.

A study of the general effect of voting by nonaligned countries in the General Assembly of the United Nations indicates similar findings for bloc behavior there. The study covered eighty of the most important roll-call votes in the Fifteenth and Sixteenth General Assemblies. Included are key votes in both plenary and committee sessions. In those instances where the United States and the Soviet Union voted differently, 26.1 per cent of the votes cast by the fifty nonaligned countries coincided with those of the United States, and 29.2 per cent with those of the Soviet Union. The author then isolates seven countries which have consistently voted more frequently with the United States than with the Soviet Union (Austria, Finland, Ireland, Sweden, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, and Israel). This is balanced by eleven Arab countries, which have voted more frequently with the Soviet Union than with the United States at a ratio very similar to that of the seven countries which tended to vote with the United States.³⁶

Sociologists have used survey methods to show that people in many countries are more favorable to world government than is often claimed. A public-opinion survey in the United States, Great Britain, France, India, West Germany, and Japan asked respondents: "Would you favor or oppose setting up a world-wide organization which would make sure—by *regular inspection*—that *no* nation, including Russia and the United States, makes atom bombs, hydrogen bombs, and missiles?" The respondents in each country favored such an organization by at least 70 per cent, with West Germany and Japan having 92 and 91 per cent in favor, respectively. When each respondent was asked if he would personally report any knowledge of illegal weapons manufacture to such an organization, those in all but one nation (Great Britain) answered affirmatively by more than 63 per cent.³⁷ In Great Britain, 50 per cent agreed.

In a similar vein, the European Coordination Centre for Research and Documentation in Social Sciences carried out a survey in Norway, Poland, and France during January, 1965. The study, sociopsychological in nature, attempted to discover what conceptions of a disarmed world were held by persons living in societies with different social structures. The answers are not used to draw a picture of such a world, but to explore the factors relevant to the formation of such concepts.³⁸

The use of these methods raises several technical as well as ethical questions.³⁹ Technically, multinational surveys are likely to be less accurate

than national ones because the ambiguity present in any survey questionnaire is multiplied not only by several different contexts but by several languages as well. The reliability of the data will also vary from country to country, depending on the sophistication of the collectors in each. Until linguistics is developed as a science, the parallel phrasing of questions to elicit the same response, both cognitively and normatively, is a doubtful art.⁴⁰

Ethically, government by public-opinion polls is similar to government by referendum; it involves direct interaction between a national elite and the citizenry, with little blending of diverse interests and viewpoints through the representative-democratic process. Sentiments often have no chance to be dissipated, compromises no chance to be worked out. But as long as the importance of public-opinion polls is not exaggerated, so that they serve as one additional channel of public expression and do not replace others, they are desirable additions to the democratic process, making governments more responsive without making them excessively responsive.⁴¹ In the international community, where few other channels exist, public-opinion polls supply one of the few mechanisms that provide some responsiveness, often substandard, rarely excessive, of a superpower to the peoples of other countries.

Sociological Perspectives

Probably the most important contribution sociology has made so far to the study of war and peace, and the one most difficult for its clients to acknowledge, is the addition of a special perspective on questions of international relations. When attending various meetings of sociologists with policy makers, I have found again and again that the main virtue of specific sociological recommendations was the expression of a viewpoint, a way of looking at things, that would otherwise have been neglected. As Shils has said of sociology,

Its rigorously scientifically established general truths are still very few, and they are not at the center of sociological thought. The achievements of sociology in concrete descriptive research are, likewise, more important for the general orientation which they exemplify in increasingly nuanced form, than for the particular details that convey it, which are themselves often only of transient interest. The general orientation is not the goal of sociological theory; but it is its most important by-product and precondition.⁴²

Together with other social scientists, particularly psychologists, sociologists have pointed out the need for a margin of safety in international systems to act as a safeguard against the dangers of unintentional and irrational behavior.

Military command and communications systems that control the use of nuclear weapons are designed by engineers who are experts in operations analysis and systems development. They tend to worry about problems such as the transmission of powerful signals, the prevention of decoding by enemy agents, and the speed of communication. Being preoccupied with perfecting the technical aspects of communications systems, they tend to have a "trained incapacity" to deal with others. Social scientists, in the late fifties and early sixties, focused attention on the special dangers posed by the human components in these systems. They warned that a nuclear force might be triggered by unauthorized action, by misunderstood communications, by misinterpretation of the acts of the enemy, by psychological distortion under the pressures of a crisis.⁴³ These criticisms were followed by some corrections in the system, such as the introduction of electronic locks on missiles that can be opened only from a command position, the introduction of double-key systems on other missiles, and tougher psychological screening of personnel with access to command positions.

An example of this interaction might be found in the following letter the author sent to *The New York Times*:

The events of the last few days make the question of the reliability of the "fail-safe" system all too vital. The *Times* Oct. 21 report states that Pentagon officials feel that accidental nuclear war is most unlikely to occur because of a mechanical failure, as suggested in the novel by Burdick and Wheeler, since the Strategic Air Command bombers wait in their alert positions for a positive signal to go ahead. A mechanical failure could produce garbled communication or fail to provide any, but is quite unlikely inadvertently to produce the specific code signal required. . . .

There is no way to select the personnel who have access to nuclear triggers or communication commands, or who feed information to the decision-makers in a way that will prevent a mentally disturbed individual from initiating a nuclear war sooner or later. As the number of triggers grows, the probability that one such person will be found also grows. As the international tension grows, the potentially mentally disturbed are more likely to act out.

The military, which has invested millions in preventing mechanical accidents, has done less toward preventing a human failure.⁴⁴

A month later, following a letter from the White House to the author of *The New York Times's* letter, and surely many other developments, the following item appeared in the same newspaper:

The Defense Department is ordering precautions in all the military services against the possibility that emotionally unstable persons may somehow get near nuclear weapons and set them off. . . .

These regulations will require strict screening of military personnel who

may be assigned to positions of control and handling of nuclear weapons or nuclear devices.

The regulations also will provide for screening of persons who merely have access to the weapons.⁴⁵

Another danger to which sociologists and anthropologists have called attention is the possible lack of communication *between* the sides rather than between "broadcasters" and "recipients" on one side or the other owing to cultural differences. Thus, it has been pointed out that "the Russian word *mir* means peace; however, it does not carry over the full English connotation. Peace in English means both the absence of war and the existence of a condition of 'tranquility.' The condition of tranquility is not included in the concept *mir*. The word 'compromise' has no equivalent in Russian, to cite another example."⁴⁶

These considerations point to dangers from within, but sociologists have also raised severe questions about the rationality of the whole strategy called the "balance of terror." The concept most often used, either explicitly or implicitly, is Weber's "irrational rationality."⁴⁷ Weber suggested that the perfection of means can lead simultaneously to the undermining of goals, until a formidable combination of means stands like a pyramid without a king to glorify. He analyzed Puritan asceticism, whose denial of gratification lost its rationale, once secularism had abolished belief in God. Similarly, the asceticism of capitalism loses its meaning, once saving is no longer necessary to provide the basis for the development of the means of production. More broadly, he saw the same ritualization in the adherence to bureaucratic rules (the means) even when this endangers the service offered to the client (the goal). Still more generally, he showed that the rational approach to life, which is necessary to the age of capitalism, bureaucracy, and science, undermines nonrational commitments to moral goals and normative limitations on the selection of means. Sociologists have applied these general observations to the continual increase in the potency of modern armaments.

The construction of the vast, complex, intricate military apparatus which deterrence requires demands high-speed computers to calculate its moves, teams of experts and electronic brains to think through its tactics, and hundreds of millions of dollars per year to keep it going. The machinery of deterrence is rational; that is, the parts are all interdependent, and each one is "justified" by the others. If one has bombers, for example, they are useless unless runways are supplied; if there are runways, they must be protected from bombs; both the bombers and their defenses need someone to command them, hence the need to protect the headquarters and maintain "jam-free" communications networks at all times. Thus, each item "makes sense" because of its contribution to the others.

The proponents of deterrence point out that the whole deterrence ma-

chine breaks down unless every one of its parts is present and functioning. There is simply no getting away with partial measures. In fact, half-deterrence is more dangerous than full deterrence, because it gives illusory strength and security. One becomes aggressive or complacent while actually being highly vulnerable. Once the enemy discovers his opponent's weak spot, he can paralyze him.

The crucial question, then, is not whether one or another item on the deterrence list is necessary; for given the deterrence strategy, they are all necessary, and there is little point in asking, "Could we do without a nuclear bomber? Do we really need more Polaris subs?" The question is: Assuming that we spend the many hundreds of millions of dollars each year that this machinery requires; assuming we build all the weapons, weapons systems, flying commands, underwater bombs, antimissile missiles, radiation counters, and what not—what will it give us? If this enormous, ultracomplex system, this investment of resources, of human energy, and of ingenuity, would yield a relatively assured peace—or at least a substitute for nuclear warfare—many of us might seriously consider buying it. In the bargain we might have to give up a large part of our income and reduce our investment in schools, medical research, and economic development, not to mention private consumption. We might even have to turn our society into something resembling an immense fortress, live in concrete-walled bunkers, put our sons into trenches, subordinate many of our basic freedoms to security regulations. Again, if this state would keep us from nuclear war, it might be worth the price.

But like any supercomplex mechanism, in this apparatus of automats and explosives, human commanders and computers, electronic beams and buck privates, something—something basic—might go wrong. It is impossible to have any assurance that such a system will function reliably. Let us suppose that the Russians invent a device to neutralize the American radar system ("fooling" the radar with decoys has been suggested) or develop a drug that neutralizes fallout the way a base neutralizes an acid; for that matter, let us imagine any other Russian technological breakthrough of the magnitude of their invention of high-thrust missiles, or a major security leak that reveals to the Russians our main defense gap. What is there in the strategy of deterrence to stop them from exploiting their advantage to the hilt?

One can cite numerous cases—from France's Maginot Line against Germany to the greatly feared poison gas deployed in World War I, from the American defense installations at Pearl Harbor to Hitler's "ultimate" weapon, the V-2 rocket—when all human calculations and preparations failed. Too many times the "safe" defense provides no safety; the "ultimate" weapons are lost along with those who relied on them. In earlier wars, in which the means of destruction were primitive by comparison, such failures were rarely decisive. But now a gap may cost some sixty million

deaths beyond the sixty millions or so provided for in the neat calculations of military strategists.

Those who place their confidence in deterrence seem unaware that in a nuclear war one flaw may prove fatal. They are handicapped in realizing such facts by traditional American overconfidence, based on many past victories, no major defeats, long security, and 150 years of hegemony in the Western Hemisphere. There is the implication that the United States, if it desires, can build a force to maintain American security while continuing to realize domestic national objectives. But if this vast apparatus cannot yield such security, especially if, as we shall see immediately, its very construction enhances the likelihood of nuclear war, then this machine is not only not a rational system; it is systematic madness. There is no more safety in a stockpile of bombs, missiles, and guns than there is in one powder keg. And the larger and more complex the stockpile, the more likely this Pandora's box will be to spring open of its own accord—and the more awesome will be its contents.

There were sociologists among those social scientists who, through private meetings with the President, his aides, members of Congress, the press, statements on television, in paid advertisements, and in letters to the editor, kept pressing similar perspectives. David Riesman recounts:

In July, 1961, Dr. Erich Fromm and I went to Washington to discuss the Berlin crisis in the context of the internal politics of both the Soviet Union and the United States with some officials in the government and a few Senators. In the case of the latter, what impressed me was their openness toward and appreciation for people like ourselves, in whose disinterestedness they had confidence and who could discuss with them the significance of events already pre-interpreted for them by the mass media or by official briefings. For example, we could suggest the possibility that the Soviet Union's by no means monolithic and fanatical support of the Ulbricht regime was not part of an attempt to take over West Berlin, and that a settlement of the crisis was conceivable.

One perspective which I have often found helpful whether with public officials or college students or professional people is that of pluralistic ignorance. Many Senators themselves suffer from lack of reciprocal communication; thus one can find those who believe that their misgivings about a particular policy are perhaps shared only by another Senator and their two legislative assistants, and I think here especially of senators who are not on the Foreign Relations Committee or the Armed Services Committee, and who have not considered themselves experts. Any doubts they might express at a briefing could readily be overridden by men from the State Department or the Pentagon, who might not in every case either tell or know the full story behind a particular policy. To encourage a mindless opposition to the "whiz kids" of the Pentagon or the government intellectuals of the State Department would be the last thing I would ever want to do; to raise questions about styles of rationality in different social strata or national culture

might help inoculate the Senators against excessive humility and deference toward experts in the Executive Branch.⁴⁸

In sum, sociologists have suggested several perspectives:

1. They provided an institutionalized reminder of considerations ignored because of the pressures of crises and the blind spots of "trained incapacities" even though they are known abstractly in more reflective, less action-oriented situations.
2. They stressed the role of cultural, social, and psychological factors in systems in which attention had been focused on those of mechanical and electrical engineering.
3. They acted as representatives of the humanist perspective, to which social science tends to be more sensitizing than either natural science or political experience.

"Interaction" among the Four Categories

The four categories by which sociological knowledge has been structured have so far been treated as independent units. However, they also appear in various combinations and thus affect each other. But this "interaction" is more complicated than that suggested by the textbook model, where a theoretical statement is confronted with facts and revised according to the discrepancies uncovered.⁴⁹ Not only are facts often collected first and theoretical statements formulated later; the accumulation of findings to test a theorem is still a rare phenomenon, and theorems that are tested by facts and found inadequate are rarely discarded; but also much of the interaction that takes place is between perspectives and theorems and between perspectives and facts, not between theorems and facts.

Studies of the role of military institutions in democratic societies illustrate this point. Few, if any, of the studies conducted by sociologists in this area are normatively neutral. Some of the authors may not have deliberately planned to conduct a study which demonstrates that the military is (or is not) distorting democratic control; some may not even be aware that their study has a direct bearing on this question. Most readers, however, will be affected both cognitively and expressively. Cognitively, they will find new evidence for or against their fear of domination by the "military-industrial" complex. Expressively, the tone, the terms, the slant, and sometimes the findings of such a study affect their evaluation of the military and its threat to democracy.

Probably the most widely read sociological work on this subject is basically an expression of a perspective. It makes few theoretical statements in the technical sense used here and does not build its case on the presenta-

tion of a body of sociological data. C. Wright Mills, in *The Power Elite*,⁵⁰ sees a fairly monolithic power elite in the United States, at the core of which is a military-industrial complex. This complex combines varied interests and powerful elements of society with an ideology, a state of mind. The military establishment and the "military mind" are presented as a direct threat to the American democratic process. In terms of our classification, *The Power Elite* provides a perspective on American society, but scarcely considers other categories of sociological knowledge.

But our profession has contributed more than this one book to the study on an issue of this magnitude. Although there are no studies that *directly* submit the perspective put forward in *The Power Elite* to an empirical test—it may well be too generalized, abstract, and normative to be susceptible to such verification⁵¹—there are several studies that have a bearing on one or more aspects of this perspective. A study by Morris Janowitz, *The Professional Soldier*, is one of the best in this category.⁵² He examines the nature of the training system of the United States military in detail and shows that it works to *reduce* the "military" orientation of the officers, thus weakening Mills's thesis. He explores the effects of changing needs of the military—from "heroic leaders" to "military managers"—which in turn weaken some of the sociological bases for the concept of the "military mind" and reduce the distance between it and the civilian mentality. As Lyons comments in reviewing the Janowitz work, the military managers have become highly "civilianized."⁵³

Another study with such characteristics is one by Lyons and Masland, which shows that the increasing demand for officers forces the military to rely increasingly on civilian institutions for their training.⁵⁴ (A rapidly growing body of research on the role of the military in developing societies reveals similar characteristics.⁵⁵)

An example of the interaction between theory and perspective, without the direct benefit of any data, can be seen in the effect sociological theory has had on students of world government. There is a growing belief that the world will not be safe from nuclear destruction until some form of world government is established. Hans Morgenthau, known for his *Realpolitik* approach to international problems, has stated, "Total disarmament requires as its corollary the existence of a supranational authority capable of committing organized force to the defense of the legal order and the political status quo."⁵⁶

For a while, ideas of how such a government might be created were largely influenced by legal thought. Various writers argued that a world constitutional assembly should be convened, a world constitution drafted and submitted for ratification to all the national governments, and thus a world government established.⁵⁷ It was suggested that this effort be accompanied by an educational campaign that would organize grand debates, in each nation and in the United Nations, to illuminate the virtues

of such a plan.⁵⁸ Other authors focused attention on the legal details of a world constitution and government, rather than on their genesis.⁵⁹

Sociologists have introduced important correctives to this view by stressing the links sociological theory has articulated between legal institutions and their social bases. They have suggested that if a government is to be formed and remain viable, consensus is required on both its form and its policy. This consensus is found only when differences among the various social groups that make up the unit to be governed collectively are limited or declining and when basic values as well as procedural ones are shared.⁶⁰ However, the world community is at present lacking in these qualities, and they can be built up only gradually.⁶¹ The effect of such sociological statements has been to create a slow and far from complete revision of expectations concerning the time at which a world government will be feasible and the pace at which it will proceed.⁶²

Sociologists and Peace Action

While individual sociologists have played prominent roles in the peace movement, the large majority of sociologists have not been involved.⁶³ The American Sociological Association has studiously avoided taking a position on this question, as it has on other matters of social action. One member has referred to the Association's "long-standing policy" of apoliticism.⁶⁴ When attempts were made to circumvent this situation, numerous voices were raised to stress and re-emphasize the notion of the ASA as a "scientific society" and hence to object strenuously against any implication of social action. However, other social-science associations have tended to take a more flexible view. For example, the American Psychological Association adopted a statement on social and political action which says, "The Association should speak for the psychological profession on social and political issues only when psychologists have a professional expertise which is clearly relevant to the issues involved, and when there is a substantial convergence of judgment among psychologists on the nature and implications of relevant scientific data." While couched in cautious language, this statement opens the door for a responsible role for psychologists as a group in American society. A president of the American Psychological Association, Charles E. Osgood, published a popular book outlining a policy leading toward peace in the year of his election⁶⁵ and used his office to interact with decision makers in Washington, including Senator Hubert Humphrey and members of the United States Information Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Senate Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, among many others, to bring attention to a view that he and many other, though by no means all or even most, psychologists are known to share.

Several issues are involved. One is a fear complex regarding macroanalysis, which the application of sociology to international problems entails. A hardly novel historical approach to sociology serves to emphasize this point. We started with grand social theories, formulated in emotion-laden terms (such as progress), covering no more and no less than all of history and all of mankind; we began by flying so high on the verbal trapeze that most of our propositions could not be pinned down, and those that could be often did not withstand empirical tests. The grand designs collapsed.⁶⁶ Then we chose to advance step by step.⁶⁷ Research tools were developed by studying the radio listening of housewives, and concepts were sharpened by analyzing small groups of college sophomores. Such a concentration was essential for a transitional period; but work that is quite suitable for a transitional stage is inadequate, even inhibiting, if it remains the prevailing focus. Sociological theory is to be further extended and methods of collecting and analyzing data improved, but sociology is now ready for the study of macro-units.

Another reason sociology, as a profession, has shied away from macroanalysis is the fear of value judgments, which seem to be more rampant in macro- than in microanalysis. Weber's bequest is the separation of understanding from criticism, which is the basis of all rational, and hence scientific, analysis. But Weber carefully distinguished between a *wert-frei* and a *wert-los* approach (between one free of values and one without values, or literally valueless). A *wert-frei* sociologist holds his values in abeyance while he follows the guidelines his data reveal, allowing them to speak, rather than imposing on the data the findings he prefers. Thus, he is "free" from values while engaging in the procedural act of science. But this is not to imply that the work of the very same sociologist needs to be *wert-los*, either in his professional or his citizen role.

In his professional role, the sociologist, like any other scientist, must choose his research topic by nonscientific, normative criteria. "Must"—because there are no intrinsically scientific criteria for this selection. One might say one ought to fill in the lacunae of sociological theory. But as there are more unknown than known spots, how is one to tell, on what scientific consideration, which to fill first? Moreover, since so much of our theoretical work is tentative, rechecking the known is as important as exploring the unknown. Hence, the list of topics a sociologist can legitimately choose from for his study is inexhaustive. Selection is thus invariably determined by intellectual curiosity, aesthetic values, fads, career interests, availability of funds, leadership of senior colleagues, and so on. But there is nothing intrinsic in sociology as a discipline that makes the study of macroscopic units less respectable than the study of microscopic ones, now that it is equipped with the basic skills and tools necessary to study both kinds of units.

Finally, sociological scientism is revealed in the research attitude to-

ward social action of many members of the profession. This is a severe case of the inroads that the professional role of the sociologist has made into his role as a member of the community's educated elite. This is a question not just of being a poor citizen but of not living up to a special social obligation that we have as persons who know society expertly. To indicate more clearly what I have in mind, let me point to a term that is helpful for social as well as sociological analysis: *role pairs*. Role pairs are roles that frequently appear together in a society, in the sense that they are played by the same actor. The importance of such combinations is that they provide the most effective means of communication known between two roles: personal union. They also allow economy of resources, such as that found in the housewife-mother, watchman-elevator-boy, teacher-researcher, doctor-medical professor.

The role pair of sociologist-intellectual is a particularly effective one. Not that all sociologists have ever been intellectuals, or all intellectuals sociologists, but there seems to have been a much higher degree of overlap in earlier generations. The growing tendency to disassociate the two roles is particularly dysfunctional because the effectiveness of such a role combination is greater now than it was in the days when it was more common, for now sociology commands a body of theory and methodology as well as a store of validated knowledge about man in society which can provide a much-needed background for speculation about society.⁶⁸ The social analysis of Daniel Bell, Lewis Coser, Nathan Glazer, David Riesman, Denis Wrong, and other contemporary sociologists who fulfill this role pair is much more hardheaded, soundly based, and politically sophisticated than that provided by earlier generations of social analysts or that of their former college mates who majored in English literature and still interpret the American scene in the light of moods revealed in *Moby Dick* or "understand" the Soviet Union because they have suffered with Dostoevsky and Pasternak.

As a discipline, sociology does not encourage, or at least does not train for, the sociologist-intellectual pairing of roles. In earlier days the clergy and radical movements provided the sparks that fused sociological training with policy concern. Today, in the age of specialization, more and more sociologists feel that what is proper behavior in their role as scientists is proper behavior in their community role as well; the only way they face a policy problem is through the lenses of theory and methodology. Civil defense, for example, becomes a subject for a study of attitudes ("people who fear war more are also more in favor of fallout shelters") or an occasion to try out a new computer program in mass dynamics. The sociologist's scientific role is pre-empting time, energy, and resources that belong to his role as intellectual, as one who is committed to the study of policy. Thus not only is he against nuclear war; he applies his knowledge of society to understand why nations become inflexible in the face of such

a danger, "freezing" rather than acting, and he shares his analysis with those who seek to reduce the danger by political action, but lack the benefits of the sociologist's training and expertise.

Most of these considerations would apply to social action in other matters, let us say civil rights, just as much as to questions of peace and disarmament. However, there is one special consideration. Many of us who work in this area have a sense of urgency, of crisis. While such a sense is common among those committed to most action courses—civil-rights leaders, for instance, feel that now is the time for all men to speak up and work for realization of the American dream—the emergency created by the threat to the very survival of civilization seems more total, immediate, and definitive than any other; the danger of nuclear war seems at least as imminent as Nazi rule in Germany did in the late twenties. Is this not the kind of occasion when special dispensation has to be given from norms of professional purism that seem absolute in less extreme situations? Jews are sometimes entitled not to fast on the Day of Atonement, Catholics to eat meat on Friday in an emergency. Could not the ASA's official stand against social action be more loosely interpreted, given the circumstances? Would members who hold these norms as standards to judge their more action-oriented colleagues not do better to be more tolerant in this situation? Whatever the answer, it will have much bearing on the usefulness of sociology for the advancement of peace and disarmament.

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1. Hearing before U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, February 23, 1965.
2. The data were collected by the American Institute of Public Opinion. I am grateful to Mrs. Leiba Brown for providing them.
3. Donald N. Michael, in "The Beginning of the Space Age and American Public Opinion," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, XXIV, No. 4 (Winter, 1960), 573-582, stated that 54 per cent of the American public had never heard of a space satellite six months before the Sputnik was launched. Only 20 per cent of the population had any real idea of the nature and purpose of such a satellite. (He obtained the data from the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan.)
4. The Opinion Research Corporation, in "America's Reaction to the New Soviet Challenge" (Princeton: February, 1958), p. A8, reported that almost half the respondents were shocked by the launching of Sputnik.
5. Quoted in Donald W. Cox, *The Space Race* (Philadelphia: Chilton, 1962), pp. 17, 28.

6. Samuel Lubell, "Sputnik and American Public Opinion," *Columbia University Forum*, I, No. 1 (Winter, 1957), 18.
7. *The New York Times*, May 26, 1961, p. 12.
8. *Ibid.*, July 7, 1963, p. 1E.
9. *Washington Post*, September 16, 1963.
10. United States Senate, Committee of Foreign Relations, *Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: Hearings on Executive M*, 88th Congress, 1st Session, August 12-17 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 97-109. For additional documentation and discussion of the Kennedy experiment see the author's "A Gradualist Strategy at Work," in his *Studies in Social Change* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), pp. 57-78.
11. An indication of what such a challenge would be like can be seen in General Thomas S. Power's book *Design for Survival* (New York: Coward-McCann, 1965). He argues that one cannot arm and disarm at the same time.
12. Kenneth Holland, President of the Institute for International Education, has said that educational exchange programs have "become a major instrument of United States foreign policy in disseminating aid and knowledge and promoting mutual understanding throughout the world." "For Understanding and Knowledge," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, XXI, No. 4 (April, 1965), 45.
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14. See Herman Kahn, *On Thermonuclear War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), especially Chapter 2, pp. 76, 82, 83. "Will the Survivors Envy the Dead?"
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16. Among the more useful journals, see *International Political Science Abstract* (Oxford: Blackwell); *Journal of Conflict Resolution* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan); *Journal of Peace Research* (Oslo: Universitetsforlaget); *Peace Research Abstracts Journal* (Clarkson, Ontario: Canadian Peace Research Institute). Other bibliographical sources include U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *A Basic Bibliography: Disarmament, Arms Control and National Security* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Disarmament Administration, Department of State); Margaret Mead, ed., *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change* (UNESCO: Tensions and Technology Series, Holland, 1953.)
17. Emergent variables are those elements inherent in a system which are qualitatively different from those in less complex systems. See Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action* (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1949), p. 35, fn. In the field of international relations, the institutionalized use of force in interunit relations would be an example.
18. Max F. Millikan, "Inquiry and Policy: The Relation of Knowledge to Action," in Daniel Lerner, ed., *The Human Meaning of the Social Sciences* (New York: Meridian, 1959), pp. 158-180.
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24. For details of the evidence, see the author's *Political Unification: A Comparative Study of Leaders and Forces* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1965).
25. In 1953, the per capita Gross Domestic Product averaged for the United States, the United Kingdom, and Western Germany was 19.8 times higher than the averaged GDP for Kenya, Upper Volta, and India. In 1962, although the increase in each of the three underdeveloped countries was greater than 10 per cent, the difference between the two groups still favored the developed countries, by an even higher rate of 28.3 to 1. Figures derived from the UN Department of Economics and Social Affairs, *Yearbook of National Account Statistics* (New York: United Nations, 1964).
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