The outstanding feature of behavior is that it is often quite easy to recognize but extremely difficult or impossible to describe with precision. (A, p. 92)

On the question of whether a behavioral science can in principle be constructed, we shall take no sides. That some kinds of human behavior can be described and even predicted in terms of objectively verifiable and quantifiable data seems to us to have been established. (5, p. v)

It seems to me that the methodologies of the physical, the biological, and the social sciences should be in the increasing order of "richness." . . . It should most certainly not be completely stripped of speculative imagination, contrary to what some physicists thought in the 1890's, when they proclaimed that the only remaining problems of physics were those of measuring constants to the next decimal place of precision. There are, nevertheless, rather long periods of quiescence in the physical sciences, the periods between the "scientific revolutions," as Thomas Kuhn called the conceptual upheavals that introduced new frameworks of thought. . . . The development in these periods can well be confined to refinements in experiemental and deductive techniques. (D, p. 186)

There are two other by-products of physical science, not often appreciated by the layman but of extreme importance to man and of special relevance to our discussion. They are philosophical, specifically the epistemological by-products, related to conceptions of knowledge. In the light of the physical sciences, the world of matter is seen to be governed not by whims of gods or demons but by laws. The other epistemological by-product of physical theory pertains to the nature of knowledge itself. . . . To gain knowledge, we must learn to ask the right questions; and to get answers, we must act, not wait for answers to occur to us. (E, p. 16)

We have attempted to gain understanding by postulating a system going through a sequence of states and by attempting to formulate some mathematical models from which the dynamics of the system could be deduced. Once such a model is found, its parameters, properly interpreted, become the key terms in the emerging psychological theory. This strategy can be deemed successful, if the parameters so discovered are indeoendent of the process itself, if they suggest further investigation, and if the further investigations, in turn, lead to a more inclusive theory. (5, p. 185)

The usefulness of models in constructing a testable theory of the process is severely limited by the quickly increasing number of parameters which must be estimated in order to compare the predictions of the models with the empirical results. Even though the specific assumptions of the parameter-adjusting model (namely that the "system" passes through contiguous equilibria as in a reversible thermodynamic process) are not plausible, it is not unlikely that the effect is also a consequence of more general assumptions. (5, p. 150)

A scientific model is thus a result both of synthesis and of analysis. Its synthetic nature is in the opportunity it gives for contemplating a class of events as a whole (which is what all metaphors do). Its analytic nature is in the specific description of the structure (the totality of relations) of the situation studied. The model therefore serves as a bridge between the analytical and the holistic approaches to phenomena. . . . The entire argument of holistic philosophy may be summarized thus. There are different levels of organization in the occurrence of events. You cannot explain the events of one level in terms of the events of another. For example, you cannot explain life in terms of mechanical concepts, nor society in terms of individual psychology. Analysis can only take you down the scale of organization. It cannot reveal the workings of things on a higher level. To some extent the holistic philosophers are right. (2, pp. 211-212)

It is hard to imagine anything less resembling thought than a process of countering each situation with a rigidly fixed response determined in advance.

Now a chess playing machine could not be constructed in this way, because here the number of possible positions is too immense. Nevertheless chess playing machines exist. They operate not by builtin prescribed moves but by built-in general rules, "heuristics", as they are called. A heuristic is a rule which prescribes how to evaluate each chess position according to certain criteria. The positions examined are the positions which can result from a given position after a certain small number of moves, say two, by each player. Although the number of such positions can be very large, it is not unmanageable for a high speed computer. The move selection can then be the move which will lead to the most valuable position after two moves, assuming that the opponent will make the best moves available to him.

Now let us see how the evaluation rules can be assigned. Obviously if a contemplated move provides the opponent an opportunity to checkmate, the contemplated move must be eliminated. Thus, immediate checkmate threats are parried. Next, if the machine can "see" a checkmate to the opponent on the immediate or on the next move, regardless of what the opponent does, this move (or moves) will be assigned the greatest value. Thus, the opportunity to impose checkmate will always be utilized. If none of these situations are imminent, the quality of future possible positions will be evaluated by various general considerations such as value of each piece, control of center, mobility, etc.

Each of the positions can be given an exact numerical value to the extent that the above desiderata are more fully realized for the machine and less fully realized for the opponents This value is compounded of a weighted sum of the values of the positions by the listed criteria. The set of weighting factors for the several criteria used obtaining this sum constitutes a particular heuristic. Once a numerical value is assigned to each of the foreseen positions, the machine will choose the move which will certainly lead to the most valuable position for itself, assuming that the opponent makes his best moves.

Now the automaton built on these principles has not been "told" what move to play in every conceivable situation. It has only been told what rules to apply in choosing moves, that is it has been told only how to play. . . . It must be admitted, this step is in the direction of "thought", at least according to a certain understanding of thought.

But now consider a further modification. Suppose after each game the machine adjusts the weighting factors which determine the relative importance of the criteria for evaluating positions, Suppose, moreover, that it makes such adjustments at first in a random fashion, as if conducting a search. If it looses too many games, it will make adjustments roughly opposite to the ones preceding the loosing streak; if it has a winning streak, it will make further adjustments in the same direction. This machine will behave like a learning organism, making variations in its behavior pattern which are at first random, then more and more systematic leading finally to the elimination of "punished" patterns and the fixation of "rewarded" ones. . . . This machine was not "trained"; it was "educated," that is taught how to find out things for itself. (A, pp. 97-98)

If a society is a quasi-biological organism, what are its needs? We do not know. We cannot talk to this organism as we do to individuals when we try to ascertain their needs. But to a certain extent we can guess the needs of a society. If it is like ask organism at all, 'it' strives to survive and to maintain its integrity. We may even suppose that it tries to grow, to learn by experience, to develop, and to become more complex, since we can observe these things happening to social organisms fairly consistently. The entity on which the life of the greater organism can be said to depend is its organization, the totality of the functional relations among its parts.

The monopoly of communication channels (which is effected by keeping the channels "empty" or "clogged") enables social organizations based on undelegated power to maintain themselves. A power in an organization which does not stem from the explicit consent of its members and therefore performs no function in serving the needs of the members may be termed an undelegated power. Such a power may, however, serve the needs of the organization, at least temporarily, by enabling the organization to maintain itself. . . . The characteristic thing about delegated power is that its range is limited to specific areas of activity and usually to specific times. . . . A society in which the principle social values consist in keeping the free flow of information through its channels has been called an "open society." Society can be called an open society only if its structure is such that it continues to remain open, that is, undelegated power cannot be consolidated within it."

The only general principle of an operational social philosophy is that it is operational. Like operational knowledge, it is guided by the analysis of experience. Based on operational ethics, it is guided by freedom of choice, knowledge of consequences, and self-insight. (2, pp. 139-150)

At one time there were serious discussions of the question of whether living organisms did not violate the Second Law of Thermodynamics, inasmuch as they are able to increase their internal organization instead of succumbing to "disorder" as the Second Law prescribes. Since an explicitly stated condition for the operation of the Second Law is that the process in question proceed in a closed system, it is obvious that the law does not apply to a living organism through which matter and energy constantly flow. It is hard to see why it was ever necessary to make this obvious argument. (A, p. 88)

It must be kept in mind that a living organism is never a closed system. It always exchanges energy and matter with its environment. In fact, a sure way to kill an organism (and thus to increase its entropy) is to shut it off completely from the environment. (2, p. 242)

The usual argument against this allegation that the second law can be violated goes as follows. You must include the demon in the physical system you are considering. Even though the entropy of the gas does decrease throught his activities, the demon's own entropy may be increasing in the process, so that total result will still be a net increase in entropy. (2, p. 186)

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