The concept of redundancy is usually derived, as I have derived it, by considering first the maximum of information which might be carried by the given item and then considering how this total might be reduced by knowledge of the surrounding patterns of which the given item is a component part. There is, however, a case for looking at the whole matter the other way round. We might regard patterning or predictability as the very essence and raison d'etre of communication, and see the single letter unaccompanied by collateral clues as a peculiar and special case.

The idea that communication is the creation of redundancy or patterning can be applied to the simplest engineering examples. Let us consider an observer who is watching A send a message to B. The purpose of the transaction (from the point of view of A and B) is to create in B's message pad a sequence of letter identical with the sequence which formerly occurred in A's pad. But from the point of view of the observer, this is the creation of redundancy. If he has seen what A had on his pad, he will not get any new information about the message itself from inspecting B's pad.

Evidently the nature of "meaning", pattern, redundancy, information and the like, depends upon where we sit. . . . But in a wider universe, i.e., that defined by the point of view of the observer, this no longer appears as a "transmission" of information but rather as a spreading of redundancy. (SEM 406-407).

In cybernetic language, the course of events is said to be subject to restraints, and it is assumed that, apart from such restraints, the pathways of change should be governed only by equality of probability. In fact, the restraints upon which cybernetic explanation depends can in all cases be regarded as factors which determine inequality of probability. If we find a monkey striking a typewriter apparently at random, but in fact writing meaningful prose, we shall look for restraints, whether inside the monkey or inside the typewriter.

IdeaIly - and commonly - the actual event in any sequence or aggregate is uniquely determined within the terms of the cybernetic explanation. Restraints of many different kinds may combine to generate this unique determination. For example, the selection of a piece for a given position in a jigsaw puzzle is "restrained" by many factors. Its shape must conform to that of its several neighbors and possibly that of the boundary of the puzzle; its color must conform to the color pattern of its region; the orientation of its edges must obey the topological regularities set by the cutting machine in which the puzzle was made; and so on. From the point of view of the man who is trying to solve the puzzle, these are all clues, i.e., sources of information which will guide him in his selection. From the point of view of the cybernetic observer, they are restraints. (SEM 400)

The attempts of some individuals to cope with the double bind(s) which they experience is a probable cause of schizophrenic communication, rather than some "specific traumatic experience in the infantile etiology". The neeessary ingredients for a double bind situation are:

1. two or more persons;
2. repeated experiences;
3. a primary negative injunction, e.g., "do not do this or I will punish you";
4. a secondary injunction conflicting with the first at a more abstract level and like the first, enforced by punishment or signals which threaten survival:

Previous work in the fields of anthropology, animal ethology and psychiatric theory provides a theoretical framework for the transactional analysis of behaviors. The premises of this theoretical position may be briefly summarized: (1) that a relationship between two or more organisms is, in fact, a sequence of S-R sequences (i.e., of contexts in which proto-learning occurs); (2) that deutero-learning (i.e., learning to learn) is, in fact, the acquiring of information about the contingency patterns of the contexts in which proto-learning occurs; and (3) that the "character" of the organism is the aggregate of its deutero-learning and therefore reflects the contextual patterns of past proto-learning. (SEM 364)

These premises are essentially a hierarchic structuring of learning theory along lines related to Russel's Theory of Logical Types.

The contexts of proto-learning may be variously constructed with a view to observing in what types of contexts certain types of learning most readily occur. We shall pay special attention to those contexts that involve either relationships between two or more animals and one persons or relationships between two or more people and one animal. Such contexts are miniature models of social organizations within which the animal may be expected to show characteristic behaviors and to make characteristic attempts to modify the context (i.e., to manipulate the humans). (SEM 376-377)

Up to Lamarck, mind was the explanation of the biological world. But, hey presto, the question now arose: Is the biological world the explanation of mind? That which was the explanation now became that which was to be explained. About three quarters of Lamarok's Philosophie Zoologique (1809) is an attempt, very crude, to blind a comparative psychology. He achieved and formulated a number of very modern ideas: that you cannot attribute to any creature physiological capacities for which it has no organs; that mental processes must always have physical representation; and that the complexity of the nervous system is related to the complexity of mind. (SEM 427)

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