The use of the notion of information for the analysis of biological systems is fallacious.



The use of the notion of information for the analysis of biological systems, is, however, fallacious for the following reasons:

i) The notion of information is in fact a cognitive notion that refers to the observer's uncertainty with respect to the system, situation or phenomenon under consideration, not a notion that refers to a physical magnitude, even though the mathematical expression of its measure is formally similar to the expression of entropy.

ii) Since in order to charcterize a system in informational terms one must know the system completely, doing so with an already known system is to make a trivially redundant description, and doing so with an incompletely known system as if it were known is a mistake. If, on the contrary, one attempts to design a system, the use of informatino concepts to assess the domain of its possible states is a non-trivial affair.

iii) Due to his cognitive operation, an observer frequently attaches semantic value to the biological phenomena considered by him as if this semantic value participated as a component in the mechanism of their realization, which cannot be the case because meaning is a contextual relation. The notion of information does not apply as a characterization of the operation of the nervous system. (CS 458)



This page was last updated on July 9, 1996, by Rob Sable.