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*Communist China: Forces pressing for restoration of order and stability appear to be further strengthening and consolidating their position.

This is suggested by the apparent purge of Acting Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu, a Lin Piao protege, and Yang's replacement by Huang Yung-sheng, long a target of militant Red Guard criticism.

A Peking radio report of a reception attended by Mao Tse-tung, Lin Piao, and ten other leaders on 25 March listed Huang, commander of the Canton Military Region, in the place normally reserved for Yang, who has just come under heavy verbal attack by demonstrators in the capital. Such name lists of elite personages follow a strict order of precedence. At earlier turnouts in Peking to display the active leadership, Huang was invariably listed among regional military leaders, much farther down the list.

Throughout the spring and summer of 1967, Huang was under very severe attack by militant Red Guards in Canton, backed by now-discredited radical leaders in Peking. From August through November he appeared frequently in Peking and may have been representing other regional military leaders who had come under attack by militants in July and August. Huang was named head of the Kwangtung Revolutionary Committee in late February, which suggests that he was not at that time under consideration for a post of national significance.

Huang's apparent appointment to such a post seems to be part of a broader offensive by moderate elements who were themselves under attack at the height of the Cultural Revolution. The radical Cultural Revolution Group, partly dismembered in September, has recently been further whittled away. Propaganda attacks on militant "factionalists" have grown more severe. Recent appointments in the provinces have tended to confirm in place or restore to good grace personalities who had been attacked or sidelined by Red Guard attacks last spring and summer.

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The purge of Yang and of the Peking garrison commander and the air force political commissar represents the most significant setback for forces associated with the Maoist onslaught against the political and military establishment to date. Huang's appointment strongly suggests that elements in the provinces and in Peking pressing for a return to law and order have improved their position significantly.

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**The Director of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, and the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Defense, consider that there is not yet sufficient evidence of the reasons for the possible removal of Acting Chief of Staff Yang Cheng-wu or his possible replacement by Huang Yung-sheng and has the following series of specific objections to the analysis in this article:*

a) Evidence so far available does not support the conclusion that Yang's removal and Huang's promotion would strengthen "forces pressing for the restoration of order and stability." It is not established that Yang is a militant or that Huang is a moderate. b) In practice, Mao Tse-tung, Chiang Ch'ing and the armed forces have apparently pressed for moderation during the past six months. There is no evidence that Yang opposed these efforts. c) It is not necessarily true that Yang's apparent ouster is part of "a broader offensive by moderate elements." It might be attributable to differences with the army not necessarily related to the over-all direction of the Cultural Revolution. d) The only military leaders listed as present at the Peking reception were Lin Piao, Huang and air force commander Wu Fa-hsien. Wu is considered a militant by many observers, and none of the alleged moderate army leaders were listed. e) Available evidence does not show that Huang has acted as a spokesman for other regional commanders. f) It is true that Huang was under attack by Red Guard groups in contact with leaders in Peking, some of whom have been purged, but some of these leaders remain in power, and at least one is allegedly a moderate. In recent months, Huang has seemed to get along better with the Peking-associated Red Guard groups in Canton than with their opponents. g) Only a relatively few provincial officials previously under heavy Red Guard attack have apparently been rehabilitated. In general the new provincial revolutionary committees appear to be dominated by the armed forces.

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Czechoslovakia: Party leader Alexander Dubcek's remarks before the central committee yesterday were the strongest affirmation yet of Czechoslovak sovereignty.

In effect he said that the Czechoslovak Communist Party alone will make decisions affecting the country's course and will resist attempts by other countries to interfere.

Dubcek asserted that Prague "does not overlook related affairs" in the international Communist movement but that "responsibility for our internal developments... rests primarily with... this Communist Party." Dubcek's comments undoubtedly were meant in part to reject flagrant attempts by the East Germans to intervene in Czechoslovak politics as well as criticism by various other Soviet bloc parties.

Prague has begun to seek economic assistance from the West. On 19 March, a representative of a group claiming to be anxious to encourage foreign investment in Czechoslovakia visited a privately owned US firm in Geneva to solicit an invitation for talks. A Czech correspondent in Moscow has stated that the Czechoslovak purpose in attending the Dresden meeting was to seek economic assistance, presumably expecting a refusal, as a preliminary to making an overture to the West.

The liberal's grip on the Czechoslovak party, meanwhile, was further strengthened on 28 March with the election to high party posts of Josef Smrkovsky and Cestmir Cisar and the resignation from the presidium and secretariat of Antonin Novotny.

The central committee also nominated General Ludvik Svoboda to be president. Svoboda's election by the National Assembly on 30 March appears assured because Smrkovsky and Cisar, also nominees, declared in his favor. Svoboda's selection is a gesture to the

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Soviet Union because he is a well-known advocate of a strong alliance with Moscow. He will probably, however, be little more than a figurehead.

Adoption of the party's "action program" apparently has been postponed until the central committee reconvenes on 1 April.

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Poland: *According to press reports, students at Warsaw University met yesterday to demand a redress of grievances, including the reinstatement of faculty members recently dismissed by the regime.

*The threat of forceful counteraction by the government apparently forestalled any open demonstration, but the students remain defiant.

The situation could deteriorate rapidly. The regime press on 28 March threatened a mass expulsion of students and warned that forbearance will no longer be given to firebrands who try to sustain "a permanent psychosis of tension." The rector of Warsaw University warned that the school would be closed if students failed to resume studies. Student militants, however, continue to press for consideration of their demands, and there are rumors a student rally is being planned for next week.

Provincial universities appear quiet and their students reportedly believe that further protests now are useless.

The regime has clearly drawn the line against further disturbances, which are being equated with antistate activity affecting national security. At the same time, it may be exploring new moves to mollify the students. According to one unconfirmed report, liberal Premier Cyrankiewicz is working behind the scenes to resolve the student problem.

An increase of party factional infighting is probably behind the imminent closing of the party's prestigious weekly, Polityka. All but two members of its editorial board are said to have resigned in protest against tendentious antistudent propaganda. Veiled press attacks against chief editor Rakowski suggest that party hard-liners are attempting to silence one of the few liberals close to Gomulka.

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The expected purge of liberal elements, both Jewish and non-Jewish, from the party and state apparatus will probably reach into the upper levels of the Foreign Ministry, where Jews are still firmly entrenched. Top ministry officials, including both deputy ministers Naszkowski and Winiewicz, reportedly came under attack at a recent meeting of the ministry's party organization.

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
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A New Federation in the Persian Gulf



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Persian Gulf: The emergence of the Federation of Arab Amirates will further complicate the situation in the gulf.

The federation of Bahrain, Qatar, and the seven Trucial sheikdoms is slated to come into being on 30 March, the first day of the Muslim new year. No one, however, including the participants, seems to know just what the federation will entail. The British have already indicated that the date is "without significance" with respect to their relations with the gulf states, which they will continue to treat as nine, separate, British-protected entities. At least some Arab states and the Arab League apparently intend to extend recognition to the federation, however.

According to the agreement, the federation is to be responsible for both the defense and foreign policy of its members--matters reserved for the British in existing treaties. Decisions are to be taken by the unanimous consent of the nine rulers involved, which will almost certainly mean that very few decisions will be taken.

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Meanwhile, the Shah of Iran is irritated because the federation is to include Bahrain and various islands in the gulf which Iran claims. He apparently intends to denounce the federation, but is unlikely to take military action at least as long as Britain remains in the gulf.

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Guatemala: President Mendez' removal of Defense Minister Colonel Arriaga yesterday may provoke army reprisals.

Mendez reportedly has also decided to replace the commander of the Honor Guard Brigade in Guatemala City and the commander of the powerful army brigade in Zacapa, who is alleged to have been implicated in the kidnaping of Archbishop Casariego on 16 March. Other high-ranking military officers are rumored to have been involved, and Vice President Marroquin has been censured by the Congress for his newspaper's irresponsible coverage of the incident.

Unless key troop commanders have collaborated with Mendez in his action, there is a strong possibility that a military move against the government will follow. In any case, without continued support from the military, President Mendez would have little chance of completing his term which ends in 1970.

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[REDACTED]

*Panama: Renewed violence last night following a National Union (NU) women's march gave rise to the most serious incident yet in the four-week-old impeachment crisis.

Yesterday's protest march, which included the wives of "President" Delvalle and prominent NU leaders, drew an estimated 15,000 people--the largest turnout since the conflict over two presidents came to a head last weekend. When the crowd began to disperse, hoodlums looted and smashed store windows in the central business district; others attacked National Guard units and set five cars and two buses afire. Two persons reportedly were killed and many were injured before the vandals were brought under control by the Guard using tear gas.

Guard Commandant Vallarino yesterday cautioned his commanders against indiscriminate use of tear gas in coping with NU demonstrators because of recent criticism of the Guard's alleged heavy-handed use of force in quelling disorders.

In the three days remaining before the Supreme Court reconvenes to consider issues relating to the impeachment crisis, antigovernment disorders may resume. Unless rioting becomes widespread and prolonged, however, the Guard probably will be able to contain any further outbursts--though at the cost of increasing resentment over its support of the Robles government.

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
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
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Hungary-Rumania: Hungary's expert on inter-party affairs, Zoltan Komocsin, says the Hungarians will try in high-level talks with the Rumanians to smooth over, among other things, the differences arising from Rumania's walkout at the Budapest conference of Communist parties last month. Komocsin told a television interviewer that party and state "bilateral relations cannot be damaged by regrettable events that occurred at the meeting." The Hungarians will probably try to hold bilateral talks before the next session of the Budapest preparatory commission set for 24 April.



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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE ESTIMATE

The United States Intelligence Board on 28 March
1968 approved the following national intelligence estimate:

NIE 80/90-68 "The Potential for Revolution in
Latin America" [redacted]

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
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Japan: Extremist students test more sophisticated tactics in drive against US hospital. (Page 5)

Laos: Communist forces could resume dry-season offensive with little warning. (Page 6)

USSR: Soviet authorities rule out any liberalization on Czechoslovak model. (Page 7)

Belgium: Parliamentary election campaign dominated by divisive linguistic issue. (Page 9)

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Guatemala: President shifts more high-ranking army officers. (Page 11)

Panama: Possible disorders (Page 12)

Lebanon: Election crisis (Page 12)

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Japan: Violent demonstrations by extremist students may force the relocation of a new US field hospital outside Tokyo.

The attackers, exploiting the Vietnam issue, have already caused damage to the US hospital and further incidents are likely. The students apparently view these demonstrations as a means of improving tactics, organization, and "political consciousness" in preparation for a major campaign against the US-Japanese security treaty in 1970. Recent excesses, however, have apparently lost the students some of the sympathy they had earlier enjoyed.

The demonstrations are forcing the Japanese Government publicly to retreat from its earlier private assurances on the US hospital. Although government representatives have told the US ambassador that it does not officially oppose the present location, top leaders have been widely quoted in the press as saying that the hospital would have to be moved from Tokyo.


The government faces elections for the upper house in early July and is trying to avoid controversial issues. It is being particularly cautious in handling problems related to Vietnam in view of current public anxiety and leftist-sponsored opposition to the war there.

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Military Position in Laos Remains Unchanged



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Laos: The lull in the fighting continues, but Communist forces are still in position to resume their dry-season offensive with little warning.

In northern Laos, the Communists have not yet moved against the key government guerrilla bases at Na Khang and Muong Hiem, although they may well do so before the rainy season begins in late May. The capture of these bases would greatly impair the government's capability in the northeast, especially in view of other recent setbacks in this area.

The Communist push south of the Plaine des Jarres area has stalled, at least temporarily. Heavy truck traffic on Route 7 from North Vietnam in recent weeks, however, raises the possibility that Laotian forecasts of an impending offensive west of the Plaine may be somewhat more firmly based than they have been in past years.

In southern Laos, North Vietnamese troops are still dug in near the Bolovens Plateau, although there is no immediate threat to the provincial capitals of Saravane and Attopeu. Thus far, the North Vietnamese have refrained from attacking the two towns, although they could take them with relative ease, and have not pressed their offensive in the south. This lends weight to the view that the principal Communist objective in this area is to secure the infiltration corridor while a substantial movement of men and materiel takes place.

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USSR: Soviet authorities have no intention of letting developments at home follow the path set in Czechoslovakia.

Soviet party boss Brezhnev made this clear yesterday in a speech which contained the harshest attack on political dissent heard from a politburo member in the post-Khrushchev era.

Speaking at a Moscow party meeting, he portrayed the dissent as the activity of groups of intellectuals and not merely isolated individuals, and warned that "renegades cannot expect impunity." His remarks place an official seal of approval on the current crack-down which has included the recent trials of dissidents, the police warnings to petition-signers, and the ouster of several intellectuals, including Ginzburg's defense attorney, from the Communist Party.

Brezhnev's remarks implied that there may be some unrest within the party over the course of Soviet policies. He accused critics of acting out of political expediency rather than from conviction. Although admitting the need for "principled" criticism, he said that "the Leninist directive on the need of iron party discipline" had not lost its relevance.

Brezhnev took a similarly stern view of the world in general. He emphasized the need for solidarity in the socialist world and hostility toward the capitalist world. His anxiety over trends in Eastern Europe was revealed in his charge that the West was relying on "nationalistic and revisionist elements" in an effort to weaken the Soviet bloc.

He said that a "deep economic crisis in the capitalist system is not ruled out" and criticized those in the USSR who underestimate Soviet achievements and overestimate those of the capitalist world. The second point, while ostensibly criticism of elements in the

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Soviet scientific community, contrasts with the position taken by Premier Kosygin in a speech last month when he said that the USSR must be willing to learn from the scientific and technological progress of the West.

The more chauvinist attitude struck by Brezhnev seems to denote a shift of climate in Moscow, if not a divergence between the two leaders. [REDACTED]

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Belgium: The divisive linguistic issue has dominated the campaign which ends with parliamentary elections on Sunday.

Belgium's two largest parties, former Prime Minister Vanden Boeynants' Social Christian Party and the Socialist Party, both have strong French- and Dutch-speaking factions. They will probably lose votes to the Liberals, the third largest party, and to the small parties. The Liberals, alone among the leading parties, have consistently appealed for national unity.

The Liberals and Socialists, either of which may be in the postelection government, advocate phasing out conscription. The Socialists also propose cuts in military spending and "re-examination" of NATO.

The life of the postelection government, which will almost certainly be a coalition, may be short given the discord over the linguistic problem. With its full attention focused on this problem, the new government probably will have little inclination to grapple with contentious foreign and defense policy issues.

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Guatemala: President Mendez has shifted several more experienced high-ranking army officers and dismissed the national police chief.

It is still not clear what prompted Mendez to make these bold moves. The new minister of defense, Colonel Chinchilla, is a popular [redacted] leader. Additional changes are likely, and Chinchilla may have difficulty in keeping top-level officers in line.

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Panama: Panama City and other cities may face more disorder this weekend despite the government's ban on demonstrations. Several antigovernment marches are planned by Arias' National Union, and hoodlum elements might try to exploit them as they did in Panama City Thursday night. No major political developments are expected until the Supreme Court reconvenes on Monday.

[Redacted]

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Lebanon: A crisis has developed between President Hilu and army commander Bustani over army interference in current parliamentary elections.

[Redacted]

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The army has arrested a number of its opponents among second-level political leaders. Hilu has ordered the army back to its barracks, but Bustani has been either unable or unwilling to comply. If there is a test of strength, Hilu might threaten to resign, or, alternatively, the army might try to force him out. In either case, a prolonged crisis could ensue.

[Redacted]

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Finland: The five-party coalition government formed by Social Democrat Prime Minister Koivisto is strong, and includes some of the country's most widely respected political figures. It may well prove to be stable. Koivisto's coalition, like its predecessor, includes two Communists and the leader of the Communists' political front. The new government has declared its desire for continued friendly relations with the USSR, and this theme will probably be reaffirmed during the upcoming formal visit of Finnish Socialists to Moscow.

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Brazil: Student demonstrations subside but tension remains high. (Page 4)

Panama: National Guard determined not to accept Supreme Court decision against President Robles. (Page 5)

Communist China: SS-N-2 cruise missiles may be used both on land and in patrol boats. (Page 6)

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*Brazil: Student demonstrations have tapered off, at least temporarily, but political tension remains high.

On 2 April in the interior city of Goiania, two students are reported to have been wounded inside the cathedral. Police used tear gas to break up a demonstration in Belo Horizonte; in Recife police prevented incidents during a demonstration. Calm has prevailed in other major cities under the watchful eye of Brazilian security forces.

Extremist student agitators are calling for new demonstrations on 4 April when the seventh day mass will be held for the youth killed by police in Rio de Janeiro. Bickering among student leaders has somewhat limited their effectiveness, and many are reported to believe that continued violence could cause them to lose popular support.

Military members of the cabinet are reported to have been extremely worried during the current wave of student disorders.

[redacted]

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The President probably will delay any decision for several days, and will not act unless his hand is forced by renewed violence.

In a related development, security authorities are concerned about the President's safety during his visit to the southern state of Rio Grande do Sul.

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[redacted] extremists may be planning terrorist acts when Costa e Silva and Uruguayan President Pacheco open an international bridge today, and appropriate precautions are being taken.

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*Panama: National Guard Commandant Vallarino appears determined not to accept any anti-Robles decision by the Supreme Court.

Vallarino, who expects the court to rule in favor of Robles, reportedly has leaked the word to rival "president" Delvalle that the Guard would not abide by a court decision that goes against Robles. This stand would be contrary to Vallarino's public statements that he would accept the court's verdict.

Although the Robles government expects a ruling today, Delvalle's supporters may seek a delay, possibly until after the legal holidays during Easter week. National Union (NU) leaders would probably try to generate enough popular support during this period to intimidate the court.

A recent unsuccessful attempt to bribe one of the nine justices to support the NU may be followed by efforts to persuade one or more of the justices to withhold an opinion since the entire court is required to sign the final decision.

Some members of Arias' National Union reportedly are growing increasingly pessimistic about their plight. They are considering such options as dumping Arias in favor of another candidate, arranging for a civilian junta of ex-presidents, or, as a last resort, settling for an outright military dictatorship headed by Vallarino. An adverse decision by the court might be the catalyst for such a break.

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

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SS-N-2 CRUISE MISSILE
(Photograph is of Soviet equipment)

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Communist China: The Chinese may intend to deploy SS-N-2 cruise missiles to coastal defense installations as well as on their Osa and Komar patrol boats.

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The SS-N-2 normally is carried by Osa and Komar guided missile patrol boats, but could easily be adapted for use on land.

The SS-N-2 has a range of 20-25 miles, carries a high explosive warhead, and is an effective antiship weapon. The Chinese have built at least eight Osa and Komar patrol boats and are probably producing their own SS-N-2s.

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[Redacted] the Chinese have had guided missile patrol boats for several years. These boats are deployed in all three fleet areas. [Redacted]

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
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


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- 4. Singapore-Malaysia: State of Singapore proclaims itself a sovereign nation. (Page 6)
- 5. Notes: Greece; Sudan-Congo. (Page 7)

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Dominican Republic: [Moderates, as well as extremists, in the rebel camp appear to be planning to turn in only a portion of their weapons when a provisional government takes office.]

[Juan Bosch has reportedly stated that while his followers will hand in some weapons, they will always keep a few hundred hidden. A leader of Bosch's Dominican Revolutionary Party, [redacted] recently stated that arms, apparently buried by non-Communist rebels, were being cached for the future.]

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[redacted] rebel President Caamano has [redacted] told APCJ leaders that when he publicly calls for the turnover of weapons he does not expect the APCJ to give up a majority of its arms. Caamano has told the OAS committee, however, that he generally agrees with its plans for arms recovery. He objected to a clause stating that the rebel government must collect all arms within 48 hours and asked that he be given a "reasonable period" to accomplish the action. While Caamano probably intends to conduct a token turnover of arms, such statements would encourage extremist groups such as the APCJ to continue planning to retain their weapons.]

[Meanwhile, Bosch and rebel Minister for the Presidency Hector Aristy seem to recognize that the rebel government, whatever its attitude, would not be able to compel all its adherents to turn in their weapons. They feel that more rebels will voluntarily turn in their arms if they approve of the provisional government's policies and, in particular, if it is able to control the military and the police.]

25X1

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25X1

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25X1

*Singapore-Malaysia: The State of Singapore has withdrawn from Malaysia and proclaimed itself a sovereign nation by mutual agreement of both governments.

25X6 This was announced in a joint statement today by Singapore Premier Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysian Prime Minister Tunku Abdul Rahman. Although such a break had been mentioned increasingly in recent months as a solution to the [] differences between Singapore and Malaysia, it nevertheless came as a sudden development. [The British, who presided over the 1963 fusion of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo states of Sabah and Sarawak, had made a twelfth-hour attempt to avoid a breakup.]

25X6 [] dissension between predominantly Chinese Singapore and Malay-dominated Malaysia had blocked effective political and economic union. The aggressive political line taken by Lee Kuan Yew had served to deepen the suspicions of the ruling Malays and made them even less tractable to Singapore's demands.

An eight-point agreement also announced today spells out special arrangements for defense and other matters of common concern between Singapore and Malaysia. The two governments will enter into a treaty of mutual assistance, establish a joint defense council, and avoid any treaty with a foreign country which would be detrimental to the security of the other. Singapore will continue to afford the UK military base rights under existing agreements.

25X1 Varying interpretations of the somewhat loose agreements, however, seem likely to cause additional problems and frictions in the future. []

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25X1

NOTES

*Greece: Center Union (CU) party deputies plan to caucus today to determine whether to support Stephanopoulos who yesterday was asked by the King to "explore the possibility" of forming a new government. Stephanopoulos' chances for doing so are slim as Papandreu adamantly refuses to accept any compromise candidate and some 130 CU deputies have reportedly signed a manifesto supporting him. Meanwhile, the Communist press and the newspaper controlled by Papandreu's son Andreas are giving heavy play to a fabricated document, possibly a product of Andreas' entourage, blaming the US for an explosion last November at a Communist-supported rally in which several lives were lost.]

25X1

Sudan-Congo: [The Sudanese Government professes to have information which would make the US and Tshombé prime scapegoats for the worsening situation in Sudan's rebellious southern provinces. Prime Minister Mahjub privately claims to have letters "proving" that the US Embassy in Leopoldville is supporting the Sudanese rebels through Tshombé. Although such letters would be forgeries, their publication would strengthen Sudan's case for requesting outside aid--probably from Egypt--to combat the rebels.]

25X1

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THE PRESIDENT

The Vice President

Executive Offices of the White House

Special Counsel to the President

The Special Assistant for National Security Affairs

The Scientific Adviser to the President

The Director of the Budget

The Department of State

The Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State

The Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

The Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council

The Director of Intelligence and Research

The Treasury Department

The Secretary of the Treasury

The Under Secretary of the Treasury

The Department of Defense

The Secretary of Defense

The Deputy Secretary of Defense

The Secretary of the Army

The Secretary of the Navy

The Secretary of the Air Force

The Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

The Assistant Secretary of Defense

The Chairman, The Joint Chiefs of Staff

Chief of Naval Operations, United States Navy

Chief of Staff, United States Air Force

Chief of Staff, United States Army

Commandant, United States Marine Corps

U.S. Rep., Military Committee and Standing Group, NATO

Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Commander in Chief, Pacific

Commander in Chief, Atlantic

The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency

The Director, The Joint Staff

The Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Department of Army

The Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of Navy

The Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force

The Department of Justice

The Attorney General

The Federal Bureau of Investigation

The Director

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

The Administrator

The Atomic Energy Commission

The Chairman

The National Security Agency

The Director

The United States Information Agency

The Director

The National Indications Center

The Director

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