

EXHIBIT F

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May 6, 2004

Agency Release Panel
C/O Mr. Alan W. Tate
Information and Privacy Coordinator
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505

Re: FOIA Case F-2004-00962

Dear Mr. Herman:

This is an administrative appeal under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). On 3 March 2004, I filed a FOIA request for copies of the President's Daily Brief (PDB) for the dates August 6, 1965, August 8, 1965, March 31, 1968, and April 2, 1968. My request was denied by a letter dated 15 April 2004, in which you cited FOIA Exemptions (b)(1), (b)(3), and (b)(5).

The CIA's reliance on Exemption (b)(5) of the FOIA is improper. First, over the years, the Agency has declassified and released portions of at least 10 PDBs from the Johnson administration (see Attachment 1) without making any claim that they were exempted under the (b) (5) exemption. If the CIA was able to review and release PDBs from August 7, 1965 and April 1, 1968, it should be able to review and release non-sensitive information from the PDBs of August 6, 1965, August 8, 1965, March 31, 1968, and April 2, 1968. The only information withheld from the previously released PDBs was withheld on substantive grounds, e.g., national security or to protect sources and methods. Indeed, the CIA recognized that the release of PDBs did not impair the U.S. government's deliberative process when it released the text of PDBs in 1985, 1989, and again in 1993.

Second, there is no legal basis for application of Exemption (b)(5) to the PDBs. Exemption (b)(5) excludes from disclosure any documents that are "inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with the agency." 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5). This provision protects from disclosure those documents covered by the deliberative process privilege. The purpose of the deliberative process privilege is to protect the government's decision-making processes. In order to qualify for protection under the deliberative process privilege of Exemption 5, a document must satisfy two conditions: (1) it must be either inter-agency or intra-agency in nature, and (2) it must be both predecisional and part of the agency's deliberative or decision-making process. Here the PDBs are not created for the purpose of aiding the agency's deliberative process. The PDBs are not inter-agency memoranda; they are developed for the President, who is not an agency under FOIA. See Judicial Watch v. United States Department of Energy, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5252, *87-*100 (D.D.C. March 31, 2004) (finding DOE materials prepared for the Vice President do not qualify for (b)(5) exemption). The CIA's own deliberations regarding the subjects to include in the PDBs have been completed once the decision is made as to what matters to report in the PDB. Id.

Third, review of the PDBs that have been released in the past demonstrates that they do not provide advice or

EXHIBIT F-1

recommendations such as would be required to make them subject to withholding under FOIA Exemption (b)(5). The (b)(5) exemption covers only predecisional and deliberative material. As is evident from the PDBs that have been declassified, their content is essentially factual without any recommendations or advice. Thus, PDBs are not the kind of policy advice documents to which the originators of the FOIA intended the (b)(5) exemption to apply. Release of the PDBs would not interfere with advisors providing full and frank advice to the president because they are not recommendatory in nature. At a minimum the Agency must release all factual content of the PDBs and limit withholding to any opinions expressed in the records.

Fourth, the matters that are reported in the PDB are also widely reported in other declassified reports disseminated by the CIA. For example, the 16 May 1967 PDB (see Attachment 2) contains a number of items that are also included in the declassified 16 May 1967 Central Intelligence Bulletin (see Attachment 2) often verbatim (see corresponding Laos reports). The same is true of the 1 April, 1968 PDB and the declassified 1 April, 1968 Central Intelligence Bulletin (see Attachment 3; see Panama, Egypt and Cyprus entries). There is no FOIA exemption for withholding the information in the PDB simply because it is in the PDB. If the same information can be declassified in the Central Intelligence Bulletin, then it can be declassified in the PDB. My research indicates that over 3000 Central Intelligence Bulletins have been declassified, so the information in the PDBs likely has been disseminated in the Central Intelligence Bulletins. In addition, dozens of Senior Executive Intelligence Bulletins (SEIBs), including recently issued SEIBs, have been released. As we know from Attorney General Ashcroft's recent testimony before the 9/11 Commission, the released SEIB from 7 August 2001 and the now released portions of the 6 August 2001 PDB contain the same entry regarding the terrorist threat posed by Osama Bin Laden. (see Testimony of John Ashcroft of 13 April 2004 at <http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/04105/300543.stm>).

Finally, using the (b)(5) exemption to withhold information has always been a matter of agency discretion. Federal agencies generally apply the (b)(5) exemption when they are considering release of relatively recent documents that relate directly to current policy issues. They do not use the exemption for documents that are decades old and have little or no bearing on current policymaking. For the CIA to treat the (b)(5) exemption as nondiscretionary and applicable to a document that is over thirty years old is completely inconsistent with the letter and spirit of the law.

Executive Order 12956 requires the Agency to declassify historical documentation such as the PDBs (and their forerunners). The selective declassification by the agency of portions of PDBs and other documents that are necessary to satisfy current political needs while historical material that poses no risk is not reviewed for declassification undermines the integrity of the entire classification system. The Agency's decision to invoke the (b) (5) exemption for material that would in all likelihood be declassified and released if it were reviewed amounts to an end-run around the Executive Order. I ask that the Agency comply with the Order and the FOIA by reviewing and releasing those PDBs that are responsive to my initial request.

Assuming that the Agency withdraws its objections under the (b)(5) exemption, it should be able to review the information in the PDBs on the merits as it did when it released PDBs held at the Johnson Library. I ask the Agency to follow the requirements of the Freedom of Information Act by declassifying reasonably segregable portions of the PDBs while protecting any truly sensitive information on sources and methods, etc. In that way, the CIA could segregate whatever information is legitimately classified under the (b)(3) exemption from any factual or analytical information whose disclosure would not disclose sources/methods information. Given that the previously declassified PDBs were also from the mid-to-late 1960s, it should be a matter of course for the Agency to declassify substantial portions of PDBs from the same time period.

With President Bush's recent decision to declassify part of the 6 August 2001 PDB, the case for declassifying historical President's Daily Briefs is even stronger. While the document has both factual and analytical content, it contains no policy advice or references to policy decisions. Plainly the document included brief references to intelligence sources, which the White House protected when it released the document in an excised form. Nevertheless, most of the document could be declassified without harm to national security. The same must be no less true of PDBs from the 1960s.

Finally, I appeal the statement in the denial letter that the CIA is "neither confirming nor denying the existence or nonexistence of" the requested PDBs. As the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has explained:

Agencies may respond to FOIA requests by refusing to deny or confirm the existence of records when the fact of the records' existence or nonexistence is itself classified. Documents and [refusals to deny or confirm records] that fall

EXHIBIT F-2

within a valid FOIA exemption are nevertheless subject to additional exemption if the agency waives the exemption by officially acknowledging the document.

National Security Archive v. United States Central Intelligence Agency, Civ. No. 99-1160, Opinion at p. 5 (July 31, 2000 CKK). Here the CIA has waived any right to refuse to deny or confirm the existence of the PDBs because PDBs and documents concerning the production of PDBs have already been made public by official and documented disclosure and the information in the requested PDBs matches information that already has been declassified.

Sincerely,



Larry Berman
44565 South El Macero Drive
El Macero, CA 95618

EXHIBIT F-3



SANITIZED
E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4
NIJ 92-292
By , NARA, Date 7-15-93

*Lent to
David
by name
Bing*

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

Attachment 1

THE PRESIDENT'S
DAILY BRIEF

7 AUGUST 1965

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EXHIBIT F-4

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COMMUNIST CHINA




EXHIBIT F-5

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[REDACTED]

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4. Indonesia

[REDACTED]

Sukarno collapsed three days ago and was still in bed yesterday.

1.3(a)(4)
S

Despite Sukarno's long-standing kidney ailment, for which he delays proper treatment, he has seemed quite chipper lately.

[REDACTED] a team of Chinese Communist doctors has been scheduled to visit Djakarta and there is some suspicion that another acupuncture treatment may be involved.

1.3(a)(4)
S

[REDACTED] although Sukarno may only have the flu, background political maneuvering may already have begun against the possibility it is more serious.

1.3(a)(4)
S

5. Greece

The King continues to talk with political leaders. The last word [REDACTED] was that he would delay until Monday announcing his next choice for the premiership, even though he may make his decision today.

1.3(a)(4)
S

The Communist press is playing up a fabricated document purporting to link the US with a tragic explosion last November at a Communist-sponsored celebration. This is an obvious effort to discredit pro-US elements during this period of crisis.

6. Dominican Republic

The Organization of American States team continues its talks with leaders from both sides. It may publicize its proposals Monday in hopes of building up popular support for them.

There is a report that extremists among the rebels are attempting to recruit youths from the countryside for indoctrination and the military training they have been conducting in their Santo Domingo stronghold.

EXHIBIT F-6

[REDACTED]

(ps)

SANITIZED



The President's Daily Brief

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 89-15

By 48, NARA, Date 12-21-89

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1 April 1968

1

EXHIBIT F-7

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5. Cyprus

Prospects for talks between representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities are better now than at any time since the outbreak of violence in late 1963. Preliminary contacts between the two groups have been aided by the steady decrease in tension since last November. Much distrust remains, however, and no easy solution to the basic problems is in sight.

6. Egypt

Nasir, in a speech to the nation on Saturday, outlined a "program of action" to bring about political reform. We doubt that it will amount to much.

EXHIBIT F-8

3. Vietnam

The North Vietnamese seem to want a war of attrition in the two provinces just south of the Demilitarized Zone.

In a CIA assessment completed this week, we have wrung out the available evidence and we conclude that the enemy is not trying to "liberate" these provinces now. Instead, we feel, the Communists hope to create the illusion of "a war no one can win."

Attacks will be aimed at spreading US forces thin and keeping them under constant pressure without offering the opportunity for a clear-cut allied victory. We believe up to five enemy divisions may now be involved along the zone and in the mountain redoubts to the south.

4. Soviet Union

The Soviets are increasing their military presence in Mongolia and they may be about to station a few combat units there. The British ambassador to Ulan Bator says that Russian air force troops are arriving by rail and that many Russian field grade officers have been seen in the capital since March. One Soviet motor pool there has doubled in size since late April.

5. Israel

The Israelis continue to threaten the Syrians with retaliation for recent Syrian-supported terrorist incidents. Prime Minister Eshkol has warned publicly that "if there is no other way out," Israel will be forced to take "appropriate means of action" to punish Syria.

New trouble with Jordan is another real possibility. On Monday, the Israelis plan to stage a military parade--perhaps with heavy weapons--in Jerusalem. This would be a clear violation of the armistice of 1949; a nasty incident in the divided city may result.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12856, Sec. 3.4
NJ 92-328

By WJ, NARA, Date 5-14-93

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13 May 1.3(e)(4) []

EXHIBIT F-9

3.. Laos

Supplies brought to the North Viet-^{1.36x3}nam - Laos border during late March and April are continuing to filter into Laos toward the Plaine des Jarres.

[] inside Laos report that about 36 trucks a day--the highest rate in recent months--moved west along the route between 6 and 10 May. We still believe that this is a stockpiling operation in anticipation of the rainy season.

4. South Arabia

Last week the cabinet in London formally endorsed the decision to unload Britain's South Arabian protectorates next January. The British hope they can give independence to a government with some base of support among the diverse peoples there. This will be difficult and the British will probably accept almost any kind of regime they can get. British troops are to leave as quickly as possible after independence.

A naval force is to be stationed nearby for six months [] but there will be no British guarantee against internal sub-^{1.36x3}version--or against a deterioration into political chaos. The whole nasty problem may well end up in the lap of the United Nations.

5. Egypt

Nasir is going all out to show that his mutual security pact with Syria is something which the Israelis should take very seriously. Large troop contingents were seen moving through Cairo yesterday and there are other signs of a wide-scale mobilization.

Nasir must be hoping desperately that there will be no need for him to fight the Israelis. He probably feels, however, that his prestige in the Arab world would nose-dive if he stood idly by while Israel mauled Syria again.

SANITIZED

E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 92-328

By 1-8, NARA, Date 5-14-93

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EXHIBIT F-10

16 May

1.36x3(4)

6. Egypt

1.3(a)(4)



1.3(a)(4)

7. Dominican Republic

Juan Bosch is still in Spain, leading the life of a rather embittered philosopher while his party back home carries on the wars. The latest party move has been to call again for a broad "anti-Trujillo front" to resist the Balaguer government.


So far, the only groups to respond positively to this idea have been extremists of the left. This response has put pressure on party leaders to go ahead with some kind of opposition "front"---even though this would surely produce a further exodus of the more moderate members.

President Balaguer continues on a hard-nosed course as he tries to restore public confidence in the wake of the upsurge of political terrorism. In the process, he is becoming more and more dependent on his conservative and right-wing supporters.

8. Ecuador

President Arosemena is faced with a new upsurge of violence. Several people were killed and many wounded late last week before police and troops were able to suppress crowds of workers and students demonstrating their support for striking railwaymen. Further violence is feared and there is talk of more strikes to come.

1.3(a)(4)



SANITIZED

1.3(a)(4) 21

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 92-328

NY 48, NARA, Date 5-14-93

DAILY BRIEF
5 JUNE 1967

1. Arab States -
Israel

Hostilities began early this morning. Both sides report heavy fighting in the air and between armored forces along the Israeli border with Egypt. Israeli planes raided airfields in Cairo and other areas beginning at about 8:00 AM local time (2:00 AM Washington time).

Cairo has just been informed that at least five of its airfields in Sinai and the Canal area have suddenly become "unserviceable." Israel's war plans had put high priority on quick action against the Egyptian Air Force because of the threat to its own more vulnerable airfields and vital centers.

Reports are still fragmentary, but the signs point to this as an Israeli initiative. Over the weekend it became apparent that Israeli leaders were becoming increasingly convinced that time was running against them. The new Israeli cabinet was meeting late yesterday with Ambassador Harmel present, and reconvened early today.

Cairo radio is calling on Egypt's Arab allies to attack Israel. []

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EXHIBIT F-12

2. Libya

The big US Wheelus base is becoming more and more exposed to nationalist pressures as the Arab war fever sweeps over this desert kingdom. Cairo is going all out to intensify the pressures, and responsible Libyans are worried; they see no way they can convincingly refute the propaganda that the base is being used to support the Israelis.

The Libyan foreign minister has been in Cairo this weekend, and Wheelus surely must have been discussed during his talks with Nasir.

3. Soviet Union



1.3(a)(4)



1.3(a)(4)



4. Nigeria

Both sides are preparing for war. Leaders of the breakaway republic in the East have evidence leading them to expect federal troops to attack today. The orderly evacuation of US dependents from the East began yesterday and is to continue today.

The federal government was strengthened over the weekend with the formation of an executive council with civilian representation. The leading political chieftain of the West was included. This has, at least for a time, reduced the danger of Western secession, which would surely have produced serious violence.

1.3(a)(4)



5 June

EXHIBIT F.13

LATE ITEMS

Libya

The US Embassy in Benghazi flashed word at 4:30 AM EDT that it was being attacked by a large mob. It is burning its papers.

Syria

Damascus radio announces that Syrian planes are bombing Israeli cities and that "we have joined the battle."

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[]

5 June

EXHIBIT F-14

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DAILY BRIEF
6 JUNE 1967

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NJ 92-328

By ljg, NARA, Date 5-14-93

1.3(e)(4)

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1. Arab States -
Israel

Cairo may be preparing to launch a campaign urging strikes against US interests in the Arab world. Both Egyptian and Syrian domestic broadcasts this morning called on the "Arab masses" to destroy all US and "imperialist" interests in the "Arab homeland." Last night Cairo radio claimed it had proof of US and British participation in the "aggression."

Demonstrations have now taken place against US embassies and installations all over the Arab world.

Arab oil-producing countries, meeting in Baghdad, say they will stop selling oil to any country which takes part in or supports Israel in the fighting. Baghdad radi said this morning that the pumping of Iraqi oil has been stopped "because of US and UK attitudes."

In the fighting, Israel has gained an early and perhaps overwhelming victory in the air, but the progress of the war on the ground is unclear. If Israeli claims regarding damage to Arab combat aircraft are valid, they have destroyed the entire Jordanian inventory of 21, two thirds of the Syrian inventory of 69, and 250 of some 430 Egyptian planes.

Arab counterclaims of 158 Israeli planes destroyed seem grossly exaggerated, but actual losses to the Israeli force of about 270 aircraft are not known.

Firm information on ground action remains sparse. The Israelis claim they have captured the "outer positions" of Kuntilla in southeastern Sinai and reached the outskirts of al-Arish in northern Sinai.

In Jordan, King Husayn said this morning that Israel is pushing ahead in a "punitive fashion." He ended with a plea that the US intercede.

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EXHIBIT F-15

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DAILY BRIEF
7 JUNE 1967

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NY 92-328

By ig, NARA, Date 5-18-93

1.3(a)(9)

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1. Arab States -
Israel
(As of 5:30 AM EDT)

At this point, the shooting continues despite the UN ceasefire resolution. Early this morning Israeli planes were hammering Jordanian positions outside Jerusalem. There also was some firing in the city last night.

The Israelis appear to hold substantial portions of the Sinai Peninsula, and Cairo is ordering the Egyptian force at Sharm ash-Shaykh on the Straits of Tiran to withdraw. In fact, there are strong indications that the Egyptians may be withdrawing most, if not all, of their forces from the Sinai.

Although the Soviets are airlifting in some spare parts for Egyptian tanks and aircraft, there are no indications of any major Soviet military moves.

1.3(a)(4)

In last night's Security Council meeting, Federenko demanded withdrawal of forces after a ceasefire, but this performance seems intended to put the best face possible on the retreat.

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The US Embassy in Cairo was not set on fire as reported in this morning's Washington Post.

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NLJ 92-328

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DAILY BRIEF
8 JUNE 1967

By kg, NARA, Date 5-14-93

1. Arab States -
Israel
(As of 5:00 AM EDT)

The UN's ceasefire order is being disregarded. Egypt has officially announced it will not comply, and Nasir has personally so informed most other Arab governments. The Israelis may have broken their ceasefire agreement with Jordan.

Early this morning the Jordanian prime minister told our embassy that Israeli tanks were moving into northwestern Jordan. The ultimate aim of such a movement might be to attack Syria. The embassy also says fighting on the Israeli-Jordanian front picked up during the night.

1.3(a)(4)(5)

On the Sinai Peninsula, the Israelis have apparently accomplished most of their military objectives. Yesterday the Israelis approached the Suez Canal so rapidly that they probably cut off the major portion of the retreating Egyptians.

Embassy Cairo believes that public realization of the Arab defeat has generated strong feeling against Nasir, and foreign diplomats in Cairo consider the Egyptians are in a state of panic over the military debacle.

1.3(a)(4)

Senior Iraqi officials in New York are said to believe Nasir is desperate and might do almost anything to maintain his position.

Mobs in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, have damaged US installations, and our consulate in Aleppo has been attacked and burned. As the extent of the defeat sinks into the Arab countries, danger to US citizens still there may increase. Refugees from the fighting in Jordan's West Bank are already streaming into Amman, where they could cause disorder directed at Americans.

1.3(a)(4)

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EXHIBIT F-17

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 85-293
Document # 28

LATE ITEM

Arab States -
Israel
(As of 5:30 AM EDT)

8 June

The Israelis have just announced (according to the press) that Egyptian armored forces have counterattacked "in force" in an effort to fight their way out of the Sinai Peninsula. This could refer to Egyptian troops trapped in the rapid Israeli advance.

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Authority NLJ 85-293

By lif, NARS, Date 11-6-85

Approved for Release
Date 1 OCT 1985

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DAILY BRIEF
9 JUNE 1967

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E.O. 12356, Sec. 3.4

NIJ 92-328

By ~~sig~~, NARA, Date 5-14-93

1.3(a)(4) 30

1. Arab States -
Israel

The ceasefire was observed on all fronts during the night. Further Israeli action is still possible against Iraqi forces in Jordan, however, since Baghdad has yet to accept the ceasefire.

The Israeli commander in Sinai reported that his forces were camping on the banks of the Suez Canal and the Red Sea.

Tel Aviv is beginning to discuss the terms it hopes to achieve in a permanent settlement with the Arab states. These include the establishment of an autonomous province of Jordan on the West Bank in which all Arab refugees could hopefully be settled.

The Israelis also intend to insist on the demilitarization of the Gaza strip and the Sinai border, guaranteed access to the Gulf of Aqaba; and an as yet undefined "new status" for a unified Jerusalem. The latter would guarantee people of all religions access to the holy places.

As for the Arab side, attention is now turning to what can be salvaged in post-ceasefire negotiations. Nasir, after earlier proposing an Arab summit as a means of preserving Arab unity, is now proposing the publication of a ten-point joint resolution to be signed by all Arab chiefs of state. The proposed statement trots out all of Nasir's propaganda attacks on the US and other "colonialist forces supporting Israel." On balance, it looks like a rather feeble effort to save face.

Signs are growing that Egypt's defeat has badly damaged Nasir's prestige in the Arab world. He will have trouble getting many other chiefs of state to adhere to his "joint resolution."

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1.3(a)(4)

2. Arab States

Arab resentment against the West continues to threaten US facilities. Libya appears to be a particularly dangerous spot at the moment.

3. Soviet Union

The Soviets are finding it hard to conceal their shock over the rapid Egyptian military collapse. A Soviet

1.3(a)(4)

[] could not understand "how our intelligence could have been so wrong." He asked despairingly, "How could we have gotten into such a mess?" Comments from other Soviets, while more restrained, reflect a similar state of mind.

4. Brazil

President Costa e Silva is still sidestepping the difficult economic decisions necessary to support the country's vital stabilization program. Anxious to avoid offending any pressure group, he is drifting into policies that could undermine much of the good work begun under Castello Branco.

5. Panama

President Robles is trying to keep student agitators off balance until the Canal treaties come up for ratification. This is the reason for unusually harsh sentences handed out to a number of extremist-led students who engaged in a minor ruckus on Tuesday. The bigger, Moscow-oriented student organization at the university is lying low for now, however, and saving its ammunition for the treaty issue.

1.3(a)(4)

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SANITIZED 29

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Mandatory Review
Case # NLJ 85-293
Document # 29

LATE ITEM

Arab States -
Israel

9 June

Israeli spokesmen told the press
this morning that Egyptian troops had
launched an attack on Israeli troops
near the Canal, thus violating the
ceasefire.

SANITIZED

Authority NLJ 85-293

By lig, WAG, Date 11-6-85



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TCS-NLJ-022103 B.
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DIRECTORATE
INTELLIGENCE

Attachment 2

*RES
Record
Center*

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 023070
By RS NARA Date 4/27/04

Central Intelligence Bulletin

DEPT OF STATE review(s) completed.



COPY

Approved for the National Archives

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16 May 1967

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
XIII F-23

[Redacted]

16 May 1967

Central Intelligence Bulletin

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Venezuela-Cuba: Venezuelan public backs diplomatic action against Havana following capture of Cuban soldiers. (Page 5)

Laos: Communist supply operations (Page 6)

Egypt: Alert continues (Page 6)

Sudan: Resignation of prime minister (Page 6)

Bolivia: Antiguerrilla campaign (Page 7)

Ecuador: Demonstrations and violence (Page 7)

EXHIBIT F-24

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Exempt

EXHIBIT F-25

Venezuela-Cuba: Disclosure of Cuban participation in the guerrilla landing last week has stimulated public support for prompt government action against Havana.

Since the murder of the foreign minister's brother in March, Venezuela has sought to bring the question of Cuban meddling to the United Nations or the Organization of American States. Venezuela's case, however, suffered from a lack of concrete evidence of Cuban intervention.


The capture of Cuban equipment and military personnel, at least one of whom is apparently willing to cooperate, provides the proof needed to support a strong denunciation.

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16 May 67

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EXHIBIT F-26



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EXHIBIT F-27

NOTES

Laos: Supplies brought to the North Vietnam - Laos border during late March and April are continuing to filter into Laos toward the Plaine des Jarres. Trained observers inside Laos report that about 36 trucks a day, the highest rate in recent months, moved west between 6 and 10 May. This activity along the principal route from North Vietnam still appears to be a stockpiling operation before the rainy season begins in northern Laos. [REDACTED]

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Egypt: The military alert in response to rising tensions between Israel and Syria continues. Large contingents of troops and equipment were seen moving through Cairo on 15 May. Roads from the capital to Alexandria, Suez, and Ismailia were reported closed to nonmilitary traffic, and major intersections in Cairo were being guarded by military police. Antiaircraft sites near Cairo and Suez were manned. Press reports claim that the emergency was declared "to put teeth into the mutual defense pact with Syria." [REDACTED]

25X1

Sudan: Moderate Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi's resignation yesterday following his loss of a vote of confidence in the Constituent Assembly has made increasingly uncertain the status of the transitional government. It is unlikely to alter the country's mildly pro-Western policies, however. Sadiq probably will now concentrate on canvassing for elections, which would follow the adoption of a permanent constitution and possibly come early next year. [REDACTED]

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EXHIBIT F-28

Bolivia: Government forces have failed in their attempt to entrap a guerrilla force which clashed with an army patrol on the night of 8-9 May. The guerrillas are believed headed for a nearby mountain sanctuary. [redacted]

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[redacted]

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Ecuador: More labor violence may occur in Ecuador in the wake of clashes on 11 and 12 May between supporters of striking railroad workers and the police and army. [redacted]

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[redacted] So far, no new clashes have developed, but other labor groups are threatening strikes in support of the railroad workers. [redacted]

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[redacted]

EXHIBIT F-29

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EXHIBIT F-30

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Attachment 3

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

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Central Intelligence Bulletin

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EXHIBIT F-34

Panama: The situation is likely to deteriorate no matter what the Supreme Court rules on the impeachment of President Robles.

The court is scheduled to reconvene today to decide on the constitutionality of the National Assembly's impeachment and guilty verdict against the President. Because of the justices' family and business relationships with both sides in the dispute, it is impossible to predict how the court will rule. It may hold off a decision as long as possible in the belief that a ruling in favor of either side would solve nothing and would probably push the country closer to civil strife. Most observers still believe the ruling will be in President Robles' favor.

Leaders of Arnulfo Arias' National Union (NU) are pushing a two-pronged program. They are preparing more legal moves against the government and at the same time keeping pressure on Robles and the National Guard through demonstrations and disorders. If the court invalidates the assembly's impeachment action, the NU is prepared to impeach the Supreme Court. Plans are also under way to bring criminal charges against Robles, his minister of government, and guard commandant General Vallarino for obstructing the assembly.

Pro-Arias demonstrators clashed with guardsmen in a number of interior cities during the weekend and the NU plans to step up demonstrations to create an "atmosphere of tension" while the Supreme Court is deliberating.

Influential families supporting both sides are increasingly concerned with the situation and believe a take-over by the guard might be the only solution. Those families allied with Arias are worried about the growing influence of leftists and radicals in his camp. They reportedly will stick with Arias as long as he follows legal procedures, but want no part of violence and disorder.

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EXHIBIT F-35

Meanwhile, "President" Delvalle continues to press for recognition. His "foreign minister" sent formal notices to all foreign missions in Panama City announcing that as of 24 March Delvalle assumed the duties of constitutional president. Pro-NU media also report that Delvalle has invited the Organization of American States to send observers to the elections, which are still scheduled for 12 May. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

EXHIBIT F-36

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EXHIBIT F-37

USSR-Brazil: The high-level Soviet trade delegation that recently arrived in Brazil is expected to make a number of attractive offers.

The chief of the Soviet aircraft export trust reportedly will offer IL-18D turboprop transport aircraft to the Brazilian Air Force at a substantial discount, and possibly may even offer some MIG-21s. The Soviets also will pursue negotiations with two small Brazilian airlines interested in smaller Soviet transports. It is unlikely that Brazil, which is currently seeking aircraft in the West, will accept these Soviet offers.

It is more likely that Brazil would accept long-standing Russian offers involving electric power and shale-oil development--two programs that have been surveyed by the USSR in recent years. The Soviets may renew and increase their offer of up to \$90 million for financial assistance to a shale-oil project that has been under consideration for some ten years. Brazil would also be interested in exploring an expected Soviet offer to construct a nuclear power plant.

The Soviets want Brazil to utilize some portion of the \$100-million trade credit extended in 1966, an idea recently seconded by Brazil's foreign minister. Soviet-Brazilian trade, which has been essentially the exchange of petroleum for coffee, cocoa, and cotton, has been at the rate of about \$60-65 million annually in recent years. [REDACTED]

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EXHIBIT F-38

Egypt: Nasir's plan for political reform will probably meet with considerable skepticism, and may not completely satisfy popular calls for greater political freedoms.

In a major address to the nation on 30 March, Nasir rejected any thought of disbanding Egypt's sole mass political organization, the Arab Socialist Union (ASU). Instead he stressed its importance as the most suitable organ for "mobilizing the people's forces through and on the basis of democracy," and called for popular elections of ASU representatives.

Nasir also outlined his views on the need to promulgate a new constitution, which is to be drafted by the ASU National Congress and will contain a number of guaranteed political and social rights. He called for a general referendum to be held on 2 May to approve his "30 March 1968 program," after which the promised elections are to be held.

Despite his current promises and the reforms Nasir has already made, politically aware elements in Egypt are unlikely to see any prospect of a real shift to a democratic society. Nasir's previous attempts to create representative and meaningful mass political organizations have not met with great success, and this effort may not fare any better.

[Redacted]

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NOTES

Jordan: King Husayn's government is reportedly under continuing pressure to lessen its close identification with the West, and particularly the US.

[Redacted]

To

undercut these and other pressures, Jordan on 26 March extended an invitation to Soviet Defense Minister Grechko to visit Jordan during his current tour of the Middle East. Grechko's response is not known.

[Redacted]

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Dahomey: Growing dissension among the young military men who have governed Dahomey since they overthrew the Soglo regime in December may lead to a new and more dangerous round of political turmoil this week when the results of yesterday's constitutional referendum become known. Southern officers see the referendum as a step by President Alley toward turning the government over to a northern-dominated civilian dictatorship. The removal of Alley, who seems increasingly estranged from even his fellow northern officers, might lead to a papering over of the army split.

[Redacted]

Cyprus: Prospects for talks between representatives of the Greek and Turkish communities are better than they have been at any time since December 1963 when violence disrupted the existing uneasy political situation on the island. Preliminary contacts between the groups have been aided by the steady decrease in tension since last November. Much distrust and suspicion remains between the two communities, however, and no easy solution of their basic differences is in sight.

[Redacted]

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EXHIBIT F-40

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