

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 934546

by SB NARA Date 8/3/70

AM

Department of State

ACTION COPY

PERMANENT RECORD COPY

Action

~~SECRET~~

Control: 7413
Rec'd: MARCH 11, 1963
1:58 PM

12
031
13
Moscow 2236

EUR

Info FROM: MOSCOW

SS TO: Secretary of State

G NO: 2236, MARCH 11, 5 PM

SAL

RMR

ACTION DEPARTMENT 2236, INFORMATION LONDON 224, PARIS 255,
BONN 157, BERLIN 99.

LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

EMBTel 2234

KHRUSHCHEV-TREVELYAN TALKS MARCH 6.

NUCLEAR TESTING. KHRUSHCHEV SAID THAT AT PUGWASH BRIT SCIENTISTS HAD URGED SOV SCIENTISTS TO AGREE TO USE OF "BLACK BOXES". HOWEVER US INSISTED ON INSPECTION EVEN THOUGH THIS WAS NOT NECESSARY. US WAS SAYING THERE MUST BE EIGHT OR TEN INSPECTIONS. USSR HAD MADE GESTURE IN THIS DIRECTION BUT "WOULD NOT ADD A SINGLE ONE". HE HAD TOLD KUTNEZOV TO STOP WASTING TIME AND MONEY AND COME BACK FROM GENEVA.

AFTER SIR HUMPHREY ARGUED WESTERN CASE, KHRUSHCHEV AGAIN REPEATED THAT SOV UNION WOULD NOT ADD ONE INSPECTION, WHETHER IT WAS QUESTION OF FIVE OR SIX OR ANY OTHER NUMBER. EVEN IF SOVS AGREED TO EIGHT THEN ROCKEFELLER WOULD SAY TWENTY WERE ESSENTIAL.

WHEN SIR HUMPHREY ARGUED THAT SCIENTISTS CONSIDERED INSPECTIONS ESSENTIAL, KHRUSHCHEV ARGUED THAT THESE WERE ONLY SCIENTISTS EMPLOYED BY US AND BRITISH GOVTS WHICH WERE SEEKING TO INTRODUCE SPIES INTO USSR. HE, KHRUSHCHEV, HAD WRITTEN TO PRESIDENT KENNEDY "NAIVELY THINKING PRESIDENT WOULD BE SATISFIED". IF WEST DECLINED SOV OFFER MATTER WOULD THEN BE ON THEIR CONSCIENCE. HE COMMENTED THAT ATOMIC SCIENTISTS HAD

1963 MAR 11 PM 4 54
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OFFICE OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS
MESSAGE CENTER

POL 17-144-USSR

FILED
MAR 16 1963

RE DEF 12-1
DEF 18
DEF 12-1 USSR

Copy #2 destroyed, RM/R

* This copy must be returned to RM/R central files with notation of action taken. REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS UNCLASSIFIED

ASSIGNED TO	ACTION TAKEN	DATE OF ACTION	DIRECTIONS TO RM/R
EUR/sov	Noted	3/11/63	file
NAME OF OFFICER	OFFICE SYMBOL		
P Valdes			

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 934546By SPB NARA Date 8/3/98

SECRET

-2- 2236, MARCH 11, 5 PM, FROM MOSCOW

REACHED OUTER LIMIT FOR DEVELOPMENT OF ROCKETS AND BOMBS. SOV OFFER HAD BEEN POLITICALLY MOTIVATED AND HE DID NOT SEE WHY HE SHOULD MAKE ANY FURTHER CONCESSIONS TO ROCKEFELLER AND KEATING. TIME HAD NOW ARRIVED AS LENIN HAD PREDICTED WHEN US MONOPOLIES REPRESENTED STATE POWER IN US. IN ANY EVENT, KHRUSHCHEV CONCLUDED, NUCLEAR TESTING WAS NOT A BIG QUESTION. AGREEMENT WOULD NOT CHANGE BALANCE OF POWER IN WORLD; IT WAS NOW ONLY A HUMANITARIAN QUESTION.

DISARMAMENT. KHRUSHCHEV SAID US WANTS SEVEN HUNDRED THOUSAND WEST GERMAN TROOPS. US PRESSING FOR MORE WESTERN LAND FORCES. THIS DID NOT BOTHER USSR. INFANTRY WAS NO LONGER QUEEN OF BATTLE. SOV UNION WOULD NOT INCREASE ITS INFANTRY; IT WOULD INCREASE ITS ROCKETS. MCNAMARA'S THEORY THAT CONVENTIONAL WARFARE MIGHT TAKE PLACE FOR A PERIOD BEFORE NUCLEAR CONFLICT WAS A FAIRYTALE. NUCLEAR WEAPONS WOULD BE USED FROM OUTSET. WHAT CONSOLATION WOULD IT BE TO BRITISH TO BE ABLE TO STRIKE FROM POLARIS SUBMARINES IF UK HAD ALREADY BEEN DESTROYED? HE, KHRUSHCHEV WAS IN FAVOR OF ELIMINATING MILITARY BLOCS, MILITARY BASES AND ARMS. HOWEVER, IN PRESENT SITUATION, SOV UNION HAD SET UP ONE NUCLEAR ROCKET WEAPON SYSTEM BUT SCIENTISTS HAD SUGGESTED THEY SHOULD SET UP NEW SYSTEM. USSR WAS NOW HAVING TO DO THIS THOUGH IT TOOK MUCH MONEY FROM TILL.

SCP-3.

KOHLER

BAP

SECRET