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(Drafting Office and Officer)

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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: September 8, 1961
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396.1-3 F.

SUBJECT: The International Situation

PARTICIPANTS: Igor Usatchev, USSR Delegation
Robert E. Matteson, U.S. Delegation

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The following were the points of interest at a dinner conversation in New York on the evening of September 7, 1961.

1. Usatchev began by describing the McCloy trip to Sochi and Pitsunda to see Khrushchev. He said Khrushchev himself had ordered a fast modern plane for Mr. McCloy when he heard they were scheduled to come on a slower plane. He said McCloy was upstairs preparing notes for his talk with Khrushchev, he (Usatchev) was below, when Khrushchev suddenly arrived at the villa. Khrushchev greeted McCloy as the goat in the cabbage patch, McCloy flushed, and after that introduction very good talks began.

2. Usatchev said twice that Mr. McCloy had made a very favorable impression on Khrushchev. He said McCloy had been a strong defender of his position but had carried on the talks in a friendly manner. He said McCloy had written a nice letter after the visit and that Khrushchev had responded in a friendly way.

3. Usatchev then repeated some of the positions Khrushchev had taken in the talks with McCloy. He emphasized that there need be no war over Berlin if there were reasonable negotiations. He said that after the October Party Congress a peace treaty with East Germany would be signed which would do away with the occupation rights in West Berlin. He said the USSR does not ask that the U.S. recognize East Germany. It does ask that a new agreement be worked out concerning the status of West Berlin, access rights, and the size of the forces in West Berlin.

Twice

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Twice he said that the forces should be "token" forces. He said it did no good from our standpoint to have large forces there--because they were trapped and would be of no use to us. In time, he said, most countries would recognize East Germany and the U.S. would be isolated on this question. He repeated that de Gaulle, Macmillan, and even Adenauer opposed a reunified Germany. Adenauer was opposed because a united Germany would be largely Protestant and socialist.

4. Usatchev said there had been great pressures on Khrushchev to resume tests from the military and the scientists and that the U.S. had assisted these pressures by intensifying world tensions. He said that Khrushchev had told Mr. McCloy this but had not said that he had no intention of testing. He said a number of tests were needed to perfect the 100 megaton bomb. A 100 megaton bomb itself would have to be exploded--probably at a high altitude to minimize fallout. A 100 megaton bomb was more "economical" than a number of smaller bombs. From a military point of view it was better to allocate three 100 megaton bombs to a missile target than many more smaller bombs. One 100 megaton bomb would be sure to blow up the entire missile complex. Only one would be needed to do the job. Also, a 100 megaton bomb was less costly in money and materials than the equivalent megatonnage in a number of bombs. He mumbled some unintelligible remark with reference to lithium and explosive devices in this connection but I let it go.

5. I mentioned I had read in the paper that the Soviet were closing off the Barents Sea area for maneuvers. He said yes. I said we had agreed to an Antarctic military free zone; why wouldn't it be a good idea--as a personal thought--to consider the same thing in the Arctic area. He said this was an interesting idea.

6. Usatchev said he couldn't understand why President Kennedy had started out his Administration by increasing the arms budget--he said this had set in train a number of unhappy events including the resumption of tests. He answered his own speculation by saying he believed that Kennedy had made campaign promises to help unemployment and that the best way of doing this was to increase military expenditures. I said, on the contrary, it was related directly to Soviet attitudes and posture. Usatchev said the Soviet had been trying to relax tension. He then pointed to a story in the evening paper which said the U.S. was to train the French in the use of nuclear arms. He pointed to another story that said Khrushchev had told Nehru that he was willing to meet Kennedy to discuss international problems. Usatchev said but you people are not interested in summit meetings. He went on to say that Kennedy gave the same impression Eisenhower gave--of weakness. Usatchev thought Kennedy had too many conflicting advisers and the result was no positive action.

7. Usatchev said he had been assigned to the UN for a number of weeks--particularly for the disarmament discussions. He said he had an agreement with his Foreign Minister that he could return to Moscow after this part of the UN discussion was over. He spoke of his two daughters--one intelligent but lazy who wanted to be an actress, the other not as intelligent but who worked harder

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just been admitted to Moscow University to study mathematics. He said this had been a great relief to him and his wife as the competition was great--25 to 50 per cent had been rejected.

8. He said he believed the Belgrade Conference indicated that the non-aligned countries would strongly support the twelve-nation (Indian) resolution at the 16th General Assembly. Out of this would come a directive to start general disarmament talks the first of the year. He asked if the U.S. had a plan. He also asked if Mr. Foster was to head the new Agency. I said the U.S. would have a plan and that Mr. Foster was expected to head the new agency. He didn't ask any other questions--but remarked that he had read many stories that President Kennedy was to present a U.S. plan at the UNGA. I said I had read the same story but didn't know what it meant--that I had just returned from vacation in northern Wisconsin.

9. Usatchev said the U.S. was losing influence all over the world. He cited as examples Tunisia, black Africa, Brazil, and the Belgrade Conference and said it was the result of the U.S.'s own statements and actions. He cited in particular a statement he had read that the U.S. was not willing to give aid to countries who didn't line up on its side. I referred to countries like the UAR that had experienced close relations with the USSR and had reacted strongly against some of the experiences that had resulted. Usatchev said this was a case of the local Communist party making mistakes. He said leaders like Nasser, Nehru, Sukarno were neither pro-Soviet nor pro-U.S. They were unaligned. He said the USSR action in resuming tests had shocked these non-aligned countries but the reaction was not as sharp as the USSR had expected. I asked if these tests would be over by the time the GA started. He said maybe--but if it was necessary to continue them they would be continued. He said the Soviet had conducted 70 tests, whereas the U.S. had conducted over a hundred, so that the USSR had a way to go before it catches up. He said the Soviet will reject the U.S.-U.K. test offer--that it should be in the newspapers already. He repeated that the Soviet resumption of tests was a reaction to U.S. actions. He said it took only about $1\frac{1}{2}$ months to set up a new test. He said underground tests were too expensive and would not produce realistic results.

10. Regarding disarmament, Usatchev said the bilaterals now going on would have to be finished by next Friday (September 15) because Zorin had a lot of work to do in preparation for the GA. He said the best thing would be if the U.S. and USSR could agree on a joint statement of principles. He saw two major differences--our emphasis on immediate measures and our concept of a UN peace force. I said there was also the basic difference on inspection and that because of their interpreter, it hadn't been exactly clear what Zorin meant by the Soviet conception of the transition process between stages. I asked how would it be decided by the control organ that a violation had occurred or not; would there be unanimity of the major powers on this--or merely a majority vote. Usatchev said this should be left for future discussion. He said that our two sets of

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principles (U.S. and USSR) had much in common by way of language--but that the purpose of Zorin's questions has been to ascertain what we meant by the language we used.

11. Finally, on the Berlin question, I cited to him the reactions of people in Minnesota and Wisconsin I had seen on my vacation, the recent Minnesota poll, my talks with Congressmen Judd and Nelson coming back on the plane from Minneapolis, the Eisenhower interview with Luce, my talks with Fred Eaton and with Gabe Hauge in New York as evidence of how united the U.S. was on standing firm on the Berlin question. Usatchev said what you want in Berlin is negotiable--that what he was afraid of was some incident in the Berlin area setting off a chain reaction.

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