



Department of State

TELEGRAM

SECRET

AK: 0810174-0415

E14

SECRET

PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00972 01 OF 02 122039Z
ACTION SS-30

RELEASED

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 /031 W
-----305303 122102Z /64

O 121650Z APG 81 ZFF4

FM USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1668
INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 602

- AEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE
- AEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE
- AEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE
- AEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE
- AHCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE 72
- AEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE
- AEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE
- AEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE
- AEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE 0
- AEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE
- AEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE
- AEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 BAGHDAD 0972

EXDIS CAPTION REMOVED BY S/S (EK) ON 7/20/93

E.O. 12065: RDS 1,3,4 4/12/2001 (DRAPER, MORRIS) OR-H
TAGS: IK, US, XF, PLO, LE, SA, US, EGEN, IR
SUBJ: MEETINGS IN BAGHDAD WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAHHADI

1. (S -1 ENTIRE TEXT)

2. SUMMARY: NEA DAS DRAPER ON APRIL 12 MET WITH SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS INITIALLY AND THEN WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAHHADI FOR ONE HOUR TO DISCUSS INTER ALIA HIGHLIGHTS OF SECRETARY'S MIDDLE EAST VISIT, THE ADMINISTRATION'S BASIC POLICIES TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST, AND U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS. IRAQ PROVIDED A WARM AND CORDIAL RECEPTION.

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 00972 01 OF 02 122039Z

HAHHADI HAS VICTORIOUSLY CLEARED BY THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE TO CIA.

SECRET

IS/FPC/CDR Date: 8/17/93

TS authority to: () S or () Q OADR () S or () C OADR

CLASSIFY as () S or () C OADR

DOWNGRADE TS to () S or () C OADR

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

() RELEASE () EXCISE () DENY () DELETE Non-Responsive Info

() DECLASSIFY IN PART () DECLASSIFY

EO Citations

FOIA Exemptions

PA Exemptions



SECRET

IRAQ IS NOT YET PREPARED TO RESUME FULL DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS BUT WILL RESUME AND ENCOURAGE A MORE SYSTEMATIC AND MORE INTIMATE DIALOGUE AT SENIOR LEVELS. END SUMMARY.

3. JOINED BY INTERESTY SECTION CHIEF EAGLETON AND DCH BODINE, NEA DRAPER MET ON APRIL 12 WITH SENIOR IRAQI FOREIGN MINISTRY TEAM HEADED BY MUHAMMAD AL-SAHAF, CHIEF OF FIRST INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT, FOR OVER AN HOUR AND ONE-HALF, AND SUBSEQUENTLY WITH FOREIGN MINISTER HAKHADI FOR AN HOUR. DRAPER EARLIER HAD BEEN OFFICIALLY WELCOMED TO BAGHEREHER RESERVATIONS AT A LUXURY HOTEL, WITH A FOREIGN MINISTRY PROTOCOL OFFICER WHO ACCOMPANIED HIM ON ALL TRAVELS, A CAR AND DRIVER, PLUS A FOUR-MAN SECURITY DETAIL WHICH PROVIDED SIREN ESCORT ON THE WAY TO APPOINTMENTS; HIGHLIGHTS OF MEETINGS FOLLOW. MORE DETAILED RECORDS BY POUCH.

4. AT THE INITIAL MEETING WITH SENIOR FOREIGN MINISTRY OFFICIALS, DRAPER REVIEWED IN SOME DETAIL THE HIGHLIGHTS OF THE SECRETARY'S MIDDLE EAST TRIP -- INCLUDING THE SPECIAL ATTENTION GIVEN TO THE SERIOUS LEBANESE SITUATION -- AND THE BASIC POLICY APPROACHES OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION TOWARD THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTHWEST ASIAN REGION. DRAPER PARTICULARLY STRESSED TO BOTH THE MINISTR TEAM AND TO HAKHADI THAT THE TWIN U.S. OBJECTIVES OF IMPROVING THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT IN THE REGION AGAINST OUTSIDE THREATS AND CHALLENGES AND MOVING FORWARD ON THE PEACE PROCESS WERE INTER-LINKED, CO-EQUAL IN PRIORITY, AND MUTUALLY REINFORCING; PROGRESS TOWARD ONE OBJECTIVE, WOULD HELP PROGRESS IN THE OTHER AND VICE VERSA.

5. THE SECRETARY HAD INSTRUCTED HIM TO GO TO
SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 03 BAGHDA 00972 01 OF 02 122039Z

IRAQ, DRAPER SAID, OUT OF RECOGNITION THAT IRAQ WAS AN IMPORTANT COUNTRY AND HAD THE CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN THE REGION AND BEYOND. HE DESCRIBED THE SECRETARY'S STRONG CONVICTION THAT THE U.S. MUST PURSUE A POLICY OF RELIABILITY AND CONSISTENCY WITH ITS HISTORIC FRIENDS PARTICULAR, K AND SAID THAT THE U.S. WAS BUILDING UP ITS BASIC MILITARY ESTABLISHMENT WHILE IMPROVING ITS DOMESTIC ECONOMY.

6. THE MINISTRY TEAM WAS SOMEWHAT RELIEVED AT THE CO-

SECRET

SECRET

EQUAL PRIORITY BEING GIVEN TO THE PEACE PROCESS, HAVING SENSED THAT THE U.S. WAS LOOKING AT THE MIDDLE EAST IN EAST-WEST TERMS EXCLUSIVELY. SAHHAF, HOWEVER, MADE IT CLEAR THAT A FORMAL RESUMPTION IN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE UNTIL THE U.S. ALTERED ITS BASIC MIDDLE EAST POLICIES, BUT HE NEVERTHELESS WELCOMED A MORE SENSIBLE LEVEL AND EXPANDED SUBSTANTIVE DIALOGUE. HE ALSO MADE CLEAR IRAQ WELCOME IMPROVED ECONOMIC AND COMMERCIAL RELATIONS.

7. HANMADI SAID HE WELCOMED DRAPER'S VISIT. HE READ WITH VISIBLE SATISFACTION THE SECRETARY'S MESSAGE AND SAID THAT HE WOULD LOOK FORWARD TO AN OPPORTUNITY TO MEET WITH THE SECRETARY AT THE UNGA OR EARLIER. HE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN BRIEFED FULLY BY SAHHAF ABOUT THE EARLIER MEETING WITH DRAPER. FOR THAT REASON, DRAPER SAID HE WOULD NOT REVIEW IN DETAIL WHAT HE HAD DISCUSSED EARLIER, BUT SAID HE WANTED TO STRESS AGAIN THE CO-EQUAL NATURE OF THE TWO BROAD U.S. OBJECTIVES: AN IMPROVED SECURITY POSITION WHICH WOULD ALLOW THE STATES OF THE REGION TO MAKE INDEPENDENT DECISIONS OF THEIR OWN IN THE COMMON GOOD, PLUS PROGRESS ON THE PEACE FRONT WITH RENEWED VIGOR FOLLOWING THE ISRAELI ELECTIONS. DRAPER ALSO REITERATED BASIC U.S. POLICY TOWARD IRAN-IRAQ WAR, SAYING THAT U.S. WOULD NOT SELG LETHAL EQUIPMENT TO EITHER SIDE.

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 04 BAGHDA 00972 01 OF 02 122039Z

MADE THIS POSITION CLEAR TO OTHER GOVERNMENTS, BUT NONETHELESS BELIEVED THAT IT WAS IN THE WORLD'S OVERALL INTEREST THAT THE WAR BE CONCLUDED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

8. HANMADI DESCRIBED THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE AS THE KEY TO STABILITY IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE MEANS THROUGH WHICH THE SOVIETS WERE GAINING INFLUENCE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE U.S. HE CHARACTERIZED THE U.S. POSITION TOWARD ISRAEL AS ONE-SIDED AND HE RULED OUT AL SETTLEMENT ACHIEVED THROUGH THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS. THE U.S. CANNOT HAVE BOTH ISRAELI ALLIANCE AND THE FRIENDSHIP OF THE ARABS AT THIS TIME AND HE STRESSED THAT, WHILE IRAQ WAS NOT COMMUNIST, IT COULD HARDLY BE SURPRISING THAT THE SOVIETS CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT THE ORIGINAL OPPORTUNITY

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 01 BAGHDA 00972 02 OF 02 122042Z
ACTION SS-30

INFO OCT-01 ADS-00 SSO-00 1031 W

-----305310 122103Z 164

O 121650Z APR 81 ZFF4

FH USINT BAGHDAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1669

INFO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE 603

AEMBASSY AMMAN IMMEDIATE

AEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

AEMBASSY CAIRO IMMEDIATE

AEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

AHCONSUL JERUSALEM IMMEDIATE

AEMBASSY JIDDA IMMEDIATE

AEMBASSY LONDON IMMEDIATE

AEMBASSY TEL AVIV IMMEDIATE

AEMBASSY KUWAIT IMMEDIATE

AEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

AEMBASSY RABAT IMMEDIATE

AEMBASSY TUNIS IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 2 BAGHDAD 0972

EXDIS

THEY GAINED FROM THE CZECH ARMS DEAL WITH EGYPT THROUGH
AN INDISFERENT U.S. POLICY

9. DRAPER COUNTER ARGUED THAT, WHATEVER CRITICISMS
MIGHT BE LEVELED AT THE CAMP DAVID PROCESS, IT WAS A
FACT THAT U.S. POLICIES HAD HELPED CHANGE THE STATUS
QUO IN A WAY THAT WAS ADVANTAGEOUS TO THE ARAB WORLD;
FOR EXAMPLE, ALL OF THE EGYPTIAN TERRITORIES WOULD BE
EVACUATED BY THE ISRAELIS BY APRIL, 1982. WE WOULD BE PLEASED,
DRAPER SAID, IF IRAQ WOULD LOOK WITH AN OPEN MIND
AT THE PROGRESS IN OUR EFFORTS EVEN IF THE ULTIMATE RESULTS
ARE DELAYED. AS FOR BALANCE IN U.S. POLICIES, DRAPER

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 BAGHDA 00972 02 OF 02 122042Z

DREW ATTENTION TO OUR DETERMINATION TO ASSIST OUR
HISTORIC FRIEND, SAUDI ARABIA, WITH THE F-15 ENHANCEMENT

SECRET

SECRET

PACKAGE DESPITE SIGNIFICANT ISRAELI AND DOMESTIC OPPOSITION. WE INTEND TO MAINTAIN CLOSE TIES WITH JORDAN, LEBANON, MOROCCO, TUNISIA, SUDAN AND EGYPT AND, OF COURSE, ISRAEL, AND BROADEN RELATIONS AND ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS IN SUCH KEY COUNTRIES AS PAKISTAN AND TURKEY. HAHMADI SAID-- AS REGARDS U.S.-IRAQI RELATIONS -- THAT IRAQ WILL "WAIT AND SEE" WHETHER THE U.S. DOES SOMETHING BASIC, AND THEN EXAMINE QUESTION OF RENEWAL OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS. IN A MANNER THAT WAS DISTINCTLY WARM AND FORTHCOMING, HOWEVER, HAHMADI SAID IRAQ WAS READY TO RAISE THE LEVEL AND INTENSIFY ALL CONTACTS WITH THE U.S. AND IMPROVE COMMUNICATIONS. HE REITERATED IRAQ'S WISH TO EXPAND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND SAID U.S. COMPANIES WERE WELCOME TO COMPETE. HE SAID THAT THE INTERESTS SECTION COULD BE EXPANDED IN SIZE OF A RECIPROCAL BASIS. "SEVERED RELATIONS BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES ARE NOT NORMAL AND SHOULD NOT REMAIN FOREVER".

10. AS FOR IRAN, HAHMADI SAID THAT HE APPRECIATED THE PRESENT U.S. POSITION, BUT WOULD CONSIDER ANY CHANGE IN THE FORM OF SELLING ARMS TO IRAN AS AN UNFRIENDLY MOVE. HE THOUGHT THAT THE ISLAMIC MISSION WAS MAKING MODEST PROGRESS AT THE MOMENT BUT MADE IT CLEAR THAT THE IRANIAN REGIME WAS STILL SPLIT ON THE PEACE ISSUE. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS, HAHMADI SAID HE THOUGHT THE WAR COULD BE CONCLUDED BEFORE THE END OF 1981. WHEN HE ASKED OUR POSITION ON SECURITY COUNCIL ACTION, DRAPER RESPONDED THAT WE DID NOT WANT TO BE UP FRONT NOR JOIN IN ANYTHING PREMATURE, AND WERE KEEPING IN CLOSE TOUCH WITH THE UN ABOUT THE PROGRESS OF THE ISLAMIC MISSION.

SECRET
SECRET

PAGE 03 BAGHDA 00972 02 OF 02 122042Z

11. IN BOTH MEETINGS, DRAPER CLARIFIED THE U.S. POSITION ON THE SALE OF BOEING AIRCRAFT, AND IN THE FIRST MEETING DISCUSSED IRAQI SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. WITH HAHMADI, DRAWING ON THE WHITE HOUSE APRIL 3 STATEMENT, DRAPER CLARIFIED THE ADMINISTRATION'S POSITION TOWARD PREEMPTIVE STRIKES BY ISRAEL.

12. FINALLY, DRAPER REFERRED AGAIN TO HAHMADI'S POINT THAT BASIC CHANGES IN U.S. POLICY WERE NEEDED AND ASKED THAT IRAQ NOT EXPECT MIRACLES BUT BE OPENMINDED IN U.S. EFFORTS TO CHANGE -- POSITIVELY -- THE STATUS

SECRET

SECRET

QUO. HAHMADI SAID THAT HE WOULD LOOK AT SUCH DEVELOPMENTS WITH AN OPEN MIND.

13. COMMENT: AS THE MORE DETAILED REPORTS SHOULD MAKE CLEAR, THE ATMOSPHERICS WERE GOODPH THE WELCOME WAS GENUINE, AND THE STAGE WAS SET FOR A SIGNIFICANTLY EXPANDED DIALOGUE ON GLOBAL AS WELL AS REGIONAL AND BILATERAL ISSUES. EAGLETON SHOULD BE GIVEN A BROADER RANGE OF INFORMATION CABLES AND OTHER GUIDINCE SO AS TO BE ABLE TO TAKE UP WITH THE IRAQIS ON SUTIALE OCCASIONS A WIDE ARRAY OF ISSUES OF MUTUAL INTEREST.
EAGLETON

SECRET

SECRET