

Coup and Counter Reaction: October 1965– March 1966

142. Memorandum for President Johnson¹

Washington, October 1, 1965, 7:20 a.m.

Indonesia

(Following is the text of a CIA situation report.)

A power move which may have far-reaching implications is under way in Djakarta.

A group which calls itself the "30 September Movement" claims to have forestalled a "Generals' coup" in Indonesia.² A number of unnamed generals and politicians have been arrested, and the homes of Defense Minister General Nasution and Army Commander General Yani are under guard.

A decree issued on 1 October by Lt. Colonel Untung, Commander of the Presidential Bodyguard, stated that the government would be administered by an Indonesian Revolution Council. According to the decree, the council will follow already established government policies, and council membership will be announced shortly.

No mention has been made of any active role by Sukarno. The government radio initially announced that the 30 September Movement was organized to "save President Sukarno whose health was in danger." It later commented that he was safe and "continues to carry out the leadership of the state."

The 30 September group claims that the alleged Generals' plot was American inspired. The US Embassy's external telephone line was cut three hours before the Indonesian Radio announced that the "coup" had been thwarted. Troops are stationed at the Embassy.

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. V, Memos, 10/65–11/65. Secret. There is an indication on the memorandum that the President saw it.

² In Tosec 34 to USUN, October 1, the Department transmitted a memorandum, originally prepared by Underhill for William Bundy, to Rusk and Goldberg both of whom were at the United Nations. The memorandum noted that the 30th of September Movement had installed a 40-man Revolutionary Council led by Untung who had a "military police background and was trained in the United States," although he was unknown to the Embassy. Underhill considered that the way the Revolutionary Council was virtually ignoring Sukarno "suggests he is either dead or completely incapacitated," and noted that as a senior member of the Palace Guard, Untung was in an ideal position to know if Sukarno had been suddenly stricken. Underhill summarized the proclamations issued by Untung, and weighed 4 unfavorable tentative indicators against 3 favorable ones. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 INDON)

The immediate purpose of the 30 September Movement appears to be the elimination of any political role by anti-communist Army elements and a change in Army leadership. Action against similar Army elements apparently is also planned outside Djakarta. The affair may also be used to generate new Anti-American activity.

It seems likely that Sukarno knew in advance of the movement and its intention. Prime movers in the whole affair, however, in terms of timing and detailed planning may well have been First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio and Communist Leaders who are close to him and to Sukarno.

143. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Ball and Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

Washington, October 1, 1965, 9:30 a.m.

Ball thinks the business in Indonesia has a very bad smell. It looks more and more as though this is a PKI operation but he could not be sure. Ball's feeling is that this may be the first step toward a Communist takeover. They have pushed the young officers out in front. The PKI headquarters seem to be going ahead without any strain and the people we have depended on in the Army are under house arrest or have been shot—we do not know. The people on the list are not terribly reassuring. Subandrio is on the list but as number nine. It is not a healthy situation on its present appearance.²

Ball said we are taking a look at the contingency plans that have been made. Ball asked if McNamara's people could take a look and

¹Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Indonesia [4/12/64–11/10/65]. No classification marking.

²Ball also called Rusk at 10 a.m., McGeorge Bundy at 10:35 a.m., and Helms at 11:35 a.m. In the conversations with Rusk and McGeorge Bundy, Ball reiterated his concern as expressed to McNamara, but with McGeorge Bundy Ball noted that there was an FBIS report that the Indonesian Army had retaken the Djakarta radio station. Ball asked Helms "if we were in a position where we can categorically deny this involvement of CIA operations in the Indonesia situation." Helms replied, "yes; that he had been in touch with Rayborn [Raborn] by phone and had gotten his permission to identify himself with Helms in denying it so they are solidly lined up." Helms stated, "they had had absolutely nothing to do with it. [1 line of source text not declassified]." Ball called Rusk again at 3:15 p.m. to inform him that there was a counter coup led by Nasution "which would mean bringing back Sukarno in some way." (Ibid.)

see if there are any ships in the area and perhaps we should talk to the British and the Australians about putting some aircraft into Singapore in the event we have to take some people out. We have a couple of thousand Americans throughout the islands.

McNamara asked Ball if he were only thinking of evacuation and not any other plans. Ball said he would not know about this until the situation clarified. McN asked what kind of clarification could lead to other action—a definite Communist takeover? Ball replied he thought the situation hopeless. McN said what Ball then was really asking was for them to examine possibility of evacuation. McN said they would go to work on it.

144. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Ball and Senator William Fulbright¹

Washington, October 1, 1965, 3:45 p.m.

Ball called Fulbright re the Indonesian situation and said it is very murky still. There has been a coup and counter-coup and we cannot tell how successful the counter-coup has been. Ball said quite definitely the first coup would appear to have been from the leftist side. It was by group of young officers but most of the council they set up are pretty far on the left and there is very big question as to how much PKI were instrumental in this or at least aware of it. There was a lot of activity in PKI Hq which remained open. We have had in past three hours report that Nasution had gotten hold of other army elements and taken back Djakarta radio station and rescued Sukarno and to what extent he has been able to get control of the situation is not known. Ball said if it would be useful to Fulbright he could send someone up to give him drill. Fulbright said Lausche and some others wanted to have a meeting but he had gotten a report that there was not enough information to warrant it. Fulbright said in view of circumstances he did not think it would do much good. Ball said it is very hard to know just what the situation is—they simply say Sukarno is fine and that they had rescued him. The other side said Sukarno was in good health. Ball said he has feeling if Nasution takes over he may keep going and clean up PKI—this is the most optimistic expectation

¹Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Indonesia, [4/12/64-11/10/65]. No classification marking.

but it is unclear at the moment. Fulbright again said in view of tentative nature of it it would be waste of time for Ball to send someone over until Monday.² Fulbright asked if Nasution was best bet and Ball said he is about the best bet but that the army's antipathy to PKI is not based on ideology—but the army may not be in a cushy spot—it is [an] ignoble motive. Ball and Fulbright agreed they could not depend on any Indonesians.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Indonesia.]

² October 4.

145. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Acting Secretary of State Ball and Secretary of State Rusk¹

October 2, 1965, 10:45 a.m.

Secretary wanted to know if there was anything special this morning on Indonesian situation. Ball mentioned the telcon during the night,² which Secretary said he had seen. Ball said situation still pretty opaque, but definite indications that army under General Suharto³ and, from that point of view, doesn't look too bad. Ball said PKI have definitely aligned themselves with Untung side which seems to be the losing side. Secretary said this could work out advantageously later in the

¹ Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Indonesia. [4/12/64–11/10/65]. No classification marking. Ball was in Washington, Rusk was in New York.

² In this teleconference, October 2, Ball asked the Embassy four questions: what was the current situation, who was in ascendancy, what was Sukarno's status and if unknown, what was the Embassy's estimate, and what was the situation with the PKI? The Embassy responded that Djakarta was relatively quiet with forces loyal to Untung no longer a major military threat. Suharto was in ascendancy, Sukarno's status was unknown, but he was not supporting the Army. He was in order of probability either dead, incapacitated, in custody, waiting for the dust to settle, or he masterminded the whole affair to discredit the Army (highly unlikely). PKI was not active but still prepared and able to combat Army repression. Green did not think evacuation of Americans was necessary and could even be counterproductive. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 INDON)

³ The CIA prepared an intelligence memorandum on Suharto's background on October 2. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. V, Memos, 10/65–11/65)

day. Ball said he was surprised that there had been nothing from Sukarno. Secretary said he was probably dead or seriously ill.

[Here follows discussion unrelated to Indonesia.]

**146. Memorandum From the Director of the Far East Region
(Blouin) to the Assistant Secretary of Defense for
International Security Affairs (McNaughton)¹**

I-26491/65

Washington, October 4, 1965.

SUBJECT

Situation in Indonesia

The situation in Indonesia is in an uneasy calm, and President Sukarno seems to be making great efforts to bring about national unity in the face of growing antagonism between the Army and the groups that supported the 30 September Movement. The bodies of the senior military officers who were shot early in the 30 September attempted coup have been discovered. There is report of "brutalization" of their bodies, and the Army is capitalizing on these incidents to build up public support for its position. Sukarno, however, has indicated that he is not prepared to move against the PKI, the Air Force, Subandrio, or other elements who may have been in on the 30 September grab for power. One report indicates that Sukarno was in the hands of the Air Force until Sunday and did not know the true situation. Another report states that he now is fully aware of what happened and who were the culprits. The Army has banned the PKI newspaper but has made no move against PKI headquarters. General Suharto, who seems to have firm control of the military situation in and around Djakarta, went on the radio today with a strong speech denouncing the Air Force for its role in the plot and went to great lengths to build up public support for the Army by describing the brutal slaying of its top generals. This is the first indication we have that the Army may be willing to take issue with Sukarno's policy of trying to gloss over the events of the last few days.

¹Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, Indonesia, 000.1-291.2. Secret. Drafted by D.E. Nuechterlein (OASD/ISA/FER).

Evacuation of Americans

There has not yet been any departure of U.S. dependents from Djakarta via commercial aircraft, although the Embassy indicated that this might begin today. A high Indonesian official (General Rubiono) told the Embassy it would be unwise to evacuate Americans at this time because it would show a lack of confidence in the Army's ability to control the situation. On the other hand there are reports that Colonel Untung is in central Java organizing several battalions for possible further action against the Army and that PKI leader Aidit is in hiding. At noon, Task Force 77 and 76 were holding in two positions about 320 miles apart, with TF-76 at about 5 degrees north latitude. Late this afternoon TF-76 was ordered to steam north and "hold" at 8 degrees north latitude, near the position now being held by TF-77.²

Estimate of Situation

There are several current appraisals of the recent course of events, all of which are supported by the sometimes conflicting information. The two major ones are:

(1) Sukarno knew what was happening all along and was lying low until he could see who was going to come out on top (presumably he hoped the Untung-Subandrio-Dani coup would succeed and the Army high command would no longer be a threat to his pro-Peking policy).

(2) Sukarno was duped into believing that the Untung coup was to save him from a US-sponsored coup by the Army and that he is only now beginning to believe that the Air Force PKI were involved in a plot to get rid of their only major opposition, the Army.

If one assumes estimate (1) above to be true, it follows that Sukarno will do everything possible to prevent the Army from cracking down on the Air Force and PKI and that he will continue his previous policy of close relations with Peking and with the PKI, to our disadvantage. He has already made some attempt at playing up the incident as a mere interservice squabble. If we assume that estimate (2) is correct, then it follows that the Army will be given more authority and that people like Subandrio, Dani and Untung are out. But, Sukarno may fear that if he allows the Army to move too fast against the 30 September Movement, and more particularly against the PKI, civil war will develop and tear the country apart—leaving the outer islands open to foreign penetration and perhaps independent governments. By moving

²The decision to position these naval forces for possible emergency evacuation of U.S. citizens from Indonesia was the subject of multiple telephone conversations among Ball and McNamara, McGeorge Bundy, William Bundy, and Rusk on October 3 and 4. The memoranda of these telephone conversations are at the Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Indonesia, [4/12/64-11/10/65].

slowly and making a great show of national unity, he may be able to prevent disintegration of the Federation and still take care of the elements who sought to topple the government.

I am inclined to think that Sukarno was aware, at least in part, of what was going on from the beginning and that he is now attempting to put the best face on a botched job, hoping to keep his own prestige intact. The big question is whether the Army, having shown its strength and unity in the face of an effort to demolish its influence, will permit Sukarno to exercise the kind of control he had before. In any event, the Sukarno image has been tarnished.

The next two days should tell a lot. If the Army turns the Armed Forces Day celebration (October 5) into a big funeral procession for its fallen leaders, the momentum generated could well put the Army into the commanding position in spite of Sukarno. However, we cannot underestimate the power of Sukarno to manipulate the situation any way he wants, for better or worse. There is probably no other person in Indonesia today who can hold the Federation together, and the Army may well consider this factor more important than taking revenge on the Air Force and PKI.

F.J. Blouin³
Rear Admiral, USN
Director, Far East Region

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

147. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, October 5, 1965, 1435Z.

868. Ref: Embtel 852.²

1. Events of the past few days have put PKI and pro-Communist elements very much on defensive and they may embolden army at long last to act effectively against Communists.

2. At same time we seem to be witnessing what may be the passing of power from Sukarno's hands to a figure or figures whose identity is yet unknown, possibly bringing changes in national policy and posture in its wake.

3. Right now, our key problem is if we can help shape developments to our advantage, bearing in mind that events will largely follow their own course as determined by basic forces far beyond our capability to control.

4. Following guidelines may supply part of the answer to what our posture should be:

A. Avoid overt involvement as power struggle unfolds.

B. Covertly, however, indicate clearly to key people in army such as Nasution and Suharto our desire to be of assistance where we can, while at same time conveying to them our assumption that we should avoid appearance of involvement or interference in any way.

C. Maintain and if possible extend our contact with military.

D. Avoid moves that might be interpreted as note of nonconfidence in army (such as precipately moving out our dependents or cutting staff).

E. Spread the story of PKI's guilt, treachery and brutality (this priority effort is perhaps most needed immediate assistance we can

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Priority. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, Canberra, Karachi, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, New Delhi, Paris, Singapore, Tokyo, and Wellington. Passed to the White House, DOD, CIA, USIA, and USUN. In situation report 9 of the Indonesia Working Group, October 5, this was described as the "first of a series of telegrams recommending courses of action (Djakarta 868, October 5) which generally suggests that the United States avoid overt involvement in the power struggle but should indicate, clearly but covertly, to key Army officers our desire to assist where we can." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. V, Cables, 10/65-11/65, [3 of 3])

² In telegram 852, October 5, 0405Z, the Embassy reported on the implications of the unsuccessful September 30 coup, suggesting that Army had an opportunity to move against the PKI. The Embassy stated, "it's now or never" and estimated that the "agony of ridding Indonesia of the effects of Sukarno and NASAKOM has begun," but it would be wrong "to assume process will be over easily or quickly." (Ibid.)

give army if we can find way to do it without identifying it as solely or largely US effort).

F. Support through information output and such other means as becomes available to us unity of Indonesian armed forces.

G. Bear in mind that Moscow and Peking are in basic conflict regarding Indonesia, and that Soviet Union might find itself even more in line with our thinking than at present. This will be subject of our next Country Team meeting and we may have specific recommendations for exploiting this phenomenon.

H. Continue to consult closely with friendly embassies (who take up much of our time and occasionally our facilities) extending our line of credit and enhancing our image generally through them as a constructive influence here.

I. Continue for time being to maintain low profile and be restrained about any apparent opportunities to rush in with new, overt programs (although need for stepped-up information effort will be great).

5. We will submit further recommendations as these seem to be appropriate to what will undoubtedly be fast-moving or at least uncertain situation for some time to come.

Green

148. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia¹

Washington, October 6, 1965, 7:39 p.m.

400. Ref Embtel 868.²

1. Subject to comments on emphasis and discretion below, we are in basic agreement with policy guidelines set forth para 4 reftel.

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Underhill and Cuthell; cleared by James B. Freeman, Special Assistant in P, Richard L. Sneider, Public Affairs Adviser in FE, and in substance by Daniel E. Moore, Deputy Director, Office of Assistant Director (Far East), USIA; and approved by Ball and William Bundy. Repeated to Canberra, Karachi, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, New Delhi, Paris for TOPOL, Tokyo, Wellington, Singapore, and CINCPAC for POLAD.

² Document 147.

2. Reports of October 6 Cabinet meeting just received via FBIS make it clear Sukarno is attempting to reestablish status quo ante by raising bogey of imperialist exploitation Indonesian differences and submerging Army's vengeful hostility towards PKI in a closing of ranks to preserve national unity.³

3. As you have brought out, major question is whether Army can maintain momentum its offensive against PKI in face Sukarno's practiced political manipulations.

4. Sukarno, Subandrio and PKI sympathizers in Cabinet will be alert to any evidence substantiating their charges that NEKOLIM will attempt to exploit situation. We believe it essential that we not give Sukarno and company opportunity claim that they about to be attacked by NEKOLIM and that we not give Subandrio and the PKI citable public evidence that USG supports Army against them.

5. Army clearly needs no material assistance from us at this point. Over past years inter-service relationships developed through training program, civic action program and MILTAG, as well as regular assurances to Nasution, should have established clearly in minds Army leaders that U.S. stands behind them if they should need help. Reur paras 4 b and c believe we should therefore exercise extreme caution in contacts with the Army lest our well-meaning efforts to offer assistance or steel their resolve may in fact play into hands of Sukarno and Subandrio. In particular, given Nasution's apparent present emotional state and precariousness his position do not believe it wise for you to attempt direct contact with him unless he seeks it, but know you have reliable indirect access to him through politically conscious senior officers who routinely in contact with Mission.

6. We plan and are already carrying out VOA and information program based on citation Indonesian sources and official statements without at this stage injecting U.S. editorializing. At least in present situation we believe ample such material pointing finger at PKI and playing up brutality of September 30 rebels is available from Radio Djakarta and Indo press, but we will look at situation again if in coming days or weeks these sources dry up. Similar coverage will be given by VOA to Indo situation in key broadcasts other than to Indonesia.

7. Reur para 4 d, agree that precipitate evacuation undesirable, but it is essential that you start moving out dependents and non-

³ At 9:19 a.m. on October 5, Rusk and Ball talked on the telephone. Rusk asked about Indonesia. Ball answered that "the army is not moving and this is a matter of concern because Sukarno got away with his press conference and cabinet meeting. It looks as though they are losing a lot of critical time there because PKI disavowed September 30 movement and are moving toward position of respectability." (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Indonesia, [4/12/64-11/10/64])

essential staff as commercial space becomes available on any carrier to any point. Septel this subject follows.

8. Will look forward to further Embassy recommendations as to how we should proceed.

Ball

149. Intelligence Memorandum¹

OCI No. 2330/65

Washington, October 6, 1965.

THE UPHEAVAL IN INDONESIA

Summary

The Indonesian army, having countered what appears to have been a leftist coup on 1 October, is for the time being firmly in control of Indonesia. It would like to use the opportunity to take strong steps against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and elements allied with it. It would be reluctant to take decisive action, however, without the approval of President Sukarno. Sukarno, in the interest of national unity and probably fearing the ascendancy of the army, has asserted that the present situation is a political problem that requires a political settlement and that he wishes to settle it himself. He apparently hopes to conciliate the leftists and return the Communist Party to the favorable political position it enjoyed prior to the events of 1 October.

1. Early on 1 October a group which called itself the "30 September Movement" kidnapped six army generals, including Army Commander Yani, and later murdered them. The movement was led by Lt. Col. Untung, a battalion commander in President Sukarno's bodyguard, the Tjakrabirawa regiment. In addition to Untung's own battalion (which was one of three in the regiment), the movement also appears to have included some elements of the air force and initially was openly supported by the Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Dani. Also reportedly

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. V, Memos, 10/65-11/65. Secret. Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

involved were Communist-influenced army elements from Central Java and members of Pemuda Rakjat—the Communist youth organization, the party's special security force, and GERWANI—the Communist women's front group.

2. A message read over the Djakarta radio on the morning of 1 October claimed that Untung's action was "supported by troops of other branches of the armed forces" and that the "30 September Movement" had acted to forestall an American-inspired "generals' coup." The message stated that President Sukarno and other targets of the "generals' coup" were under the protection of the movement. Shortly thereafter the 45 members of a leftist "Revolutionary Council" were announced. About half of the council's membership was composed of government officials, a few of whom were high-level and none of whom at that time was maintaining an anti- or even strong non-Communist position. The council contained three members of the Indonesian Communist Party Central Committee. The rest were well-known fellow travellers or crypto-Communists.

3. By the early evening of 1 October Army General Suharto, commander of the Army Strategic Reserve (KOSTRAD), informed all military areas that in the absence of Army Commander General Yani, who had been kidnapped, he was assuming command of the army. He was doing so with the understanding and cooperation of the navy in order to destroy the "30 September Movement." Two hours later Radio Indonesia announced that the army controlled the situation, that the police had also joined the army and navy to crush the "counterrevolutionary movement," and that President Sukarno and Defense Minister General Nasution—the latter had been a target of Untung's group—were safe.

4. During the night of 1 October, Lt. Col. Untung apparently fled to Central Java where he apparently hoped to establish a position with pro-Communist elements in that province. Repeated broadcasts of President Sukarno's appeal for restoration of order and the strong pro-Sukarno, pro-army stance of both General Sabur—Untung's superior officer in the Tjakrabirawa regiment—and of General Surjosumpeno—army commander in Central Java—appear to have cut away much of Untung's following. Reports are confused, however, as to his present support. They range from a mere 110 troops to several battalions. There are no present plans to send additional troops into Central Java to deal with him; loyal troops already stationed in that province are deemed sufficient to cope with the situation.

5. On 4 October Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Dani, who had already been absolved of complicity in the "30 September Movement" by Sukarno, by implication denied any connection with the movement. In a special broadcast he thanked Sukarno "for trust in the air force" and

said appropriate action would be taken against any air force personnel involved in the movement.

6. Meanwhile President Sukarno had been maneuvering to reaffirm his own control of the situation. On 2 October he summoned all military commanders and Second Deputy Prime Minister Leimena to a meeting "to settle the 30 September incident immediately." (First Deputy Prime Minister Subandrio was in North Sumatra but has since returned and is with Sukarno in Bogor; Third Deputy Prime Minister Chaerul Saleh is en route home from Communist China.) Sukarno subsequently broadcast to the nation that he had assumed personal command of the army, that he had appointed General Pranoto, an army headquarters staff officer, administrative head of the army and had deputized General Suharto "to implement the restoration of security." A statement by Suharto which followed that of Sukarno affirmed the changes made by the president. A 3 October broadcast by the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI) described Pranoto only as "assisting the president."

7. Suharto, long regarded as apolitical and possibly an opportunist, emerges in the present situation as a strong military leader and apparently a firm anti-Communist. Pranoto, on the other hand, does not belong to the group of officers who looked to Yani and Nasution for leadership and obviously is viewed with some disfavor by Suharto and his colleagues. Sukarno is said to have elevated Pranoto during the present crisis as a means of conciliating and protecting the left, and it would seem that he also did it as a means of imposing disunity upon the army. Appraisals of Pranoto range from passive and soft on the Communists to actively pro-Communist. He has served in Central Java, a Communist stronghold, as a battalion commander and later as the territorial commander; he is reputed during those years to have done nothing to obstruct Communist growth there. Available information, most of it from pro-Suharto sources, has not mentioned any action taken by Pranoto in his present capacity.

8. The US Embassy in Djakarta has a confirmed report that Sukarno's palace guards and air force troops are protecting Sukarno and Dani in Bogor. Reportedly, Suharto's troops have their guns trained toward the palace. The US Embassy now believes that Suharto's forces are allowed access to Sukarno for bargaining and tape recording Sukarno's statements but they do not control him.

9. Sukarno has rejected army suggestions for firm measures against leaders of the "30 September Movement" and the Communist Party. On 4 October he told the army generals that the situation basically involves political issues, that tranquillity and order are needed for a solution, and that the generals should "leave the political settlement to me." Army officers, initially jubilant at the prospect of cracking

down on the Communists, were reported depressed after their meetings with Sukarno.

10. Apparently a few hours prior to this 4 October meeting between Sukarno and the generals and apparently also under the emotion of having just viewed the exhuming of the murdered generals, Suharto made an unusual public statement which strongly implied both doubt and criticism of the president and accused the air force and the Communists of complicity in the "30 September Movement." He stated that the bodies had been found in a well within the jurisdiction of the Halim Air Force Base near Djakarta. He said that an area near the well had been used as an air force training center for volunteers from Pemuda Rakjat (the Communist youth organization) and GERWANI (the Communist women's organization). He went on that "based on these facts, it is possible that there is truth in the statement of our beloved father, President, Supreme Commander, Great Leader of the Revolution, that the air force is not involved in the affair. But it is impossible that there is no connection with this affair among elements of the air force." Suharto said he conveyed the sentiments of "patriots who are members of the army" that "air force patriots will purge such members (of the air force) who are involved in this adventure."

11. A few hours later, General Sabur in his capacity as Secretary General of the Supreme Operations Command (KOTI) broadcast an account of Sukarno's 4 October admonitions to the generals, combat commanders, and all commanders of the armed services. According to Sabur, Sukarno had ordered those present, and inferentially all Indonesians, not to permit themselves to be "set off against each other" since this would "harm our struggle and weaken our potential." Sabur said settlement of the 30 September incident would be handled personally and soon by the president. He quoted Sukarno as warning military leaders "not to fall into the trap of (garble—probably imperialist or neocolonialist) tactics in view of their latest activities for weakening us from inside as a prelude for their attacks against us." He specifically ordered combat commanders to "realize the danger of intrigue of our adversaries," to "remain vigilant and continuously enhance unity." Sukarno did manage to say that those who fell victim to the "30 September Movement" were heroes of the revolution, and he invited prayer for their souls.

12. The Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), after indicating its support of the "30 September Movement" through its official newspaper *Harian Rakjat*, has now largely lapsed into silence. Communist Party leaders apparently are in seclusion or actual hiding. According to a clandestine source, party policy is to disavow the "30 September Movement." Party members caught with arms or found in other ways to be supporting the rebellion will be regarded by the PKI as misguided adventurers.

13. The leftist press in Medan, North Sumatra, has continued to publish, and probably is setting the line the party plans to take when its leaders emerge again. The pro-party press in Medan expresses a hope for increased solidarity between the army and the people "particularly in settling the 30 September affair strictly along lines set out by President Sukarno."

14. Many questions remain unanswered about the "30 September Movement." Most revolve around Sukarno. Did Sukarno have prior knowledge of the "30 September Movement" and its intentions? Was he taken into protective custody by members of the movement or did he, as he publicly announced, visit Halim Air Force Base—the headquarters of Air Force Chief of Staff Dani and probably the headquarters of the 30 September group—of his own will on 1 October because he thought it wise to be near an airplane? Or was his presence there an indication that he, like the air force and the Communist Party, openly and briefly endorsed the movement? Or was this part of the escape route, reportedly engineered by General Sabur, to get Sukarno out of Djakarta to Bogor? Did Sukarno's appearance of illness during an address on the evening of 30 September motivate the events of 1 October—events which seem to have been previously but perhaps incompletely planned?

15. Other questions pertain to Lt. Col. Untung and Communist Party leaders. Most reports claim or assume that Untung was merely a dupe; according to one source, he is a strict Moslem who was outraged by the high living and corrupt practices of high-ranking army officers. If he was only a tool and a front man—and this seems plausible—who did the actual planning? Or did several plans by various elements become entangled, with one being used to justify another?

16. It has been reliably reported that the Communist Party in August had reviewed contingency plans which would be put into effect if Sukarno died within the next few days or weeks. These apparently involved the seclusion of top Communist leaders and moves to protect Communist assets by members of the Communist youth front and the party's special security force. There is at least one report that Sukarno had agreed to the arrest—by whom was not reported—of the anti-Communist generals but that he did not know of plans to kill them and, had he known, would not have approved them. A high-ranking army source (one of Sukarno's physicians and a key figure in army communications), who has occasionally been candid about internal matters, stated on 3 October that among Untung's sponsors were armed Communist cadres who had been armed and uniformed. He said Untung's troops had been among those who had gone to the generals' houses but that it was not clear who had done the firing—implying that uniformed Communists had also been part of the group.

17. A plausible view of the immediate background of the "30 September Movement" is that Sukarno, Subandrio, and perhaps Communist leaders close to them had considered the arrest of certain army generals. Sukarno and Subandrio have repeatedly and publicly warned the armed forces in recent months that individual leaders must cooperate with the "revolution" or be "left behind." More recently they have even implied some sort of action against them. With the knowledge of this possibility, militant Communist cadres both inside and outside of the air force (and it seems well-established that such were involved) may have used it to justify action against the generals to Untung, and may have played also upon his resentment of high living among the brass. Young militants are known to be chafing against the peaceful united front tactics espoused by top Communist leaders and the latter's strong support of Sukarno. The timing of their action could have been influenced by reports on Sukarno's illness on the night of 30 September and by partial or garbled knowledge of Communist contingency plans in the event of Sukarno's death. The militants—probably impetuous, zealous, and none too clear in their thinking—would have assumed that the swiftness and decisiveness of their actions—the death of the generals and the formation of a new government—would force Sukarno and thereby the rest of Indonesia to fall in behind them.

18. Despite *Harian Rakjat's* brief espousal of the movement it does not seem likely that party chairman Aidit would have approved the murder of the generals or even the change of government. The Indonesian situation, both foreign and domestic, was highly favorable to the Communists and—barring Sukarno's immediate death—showed every sign of becoming progressively more so. Possibly a few militant members of the Central Committee approved the plan; future internal party developments may so indicate. The motivation of Air Force Chief of Staff Marshal Dani remains an open question. He has assumed an increasingly leftist position during the past year.

19. With the army's counteraction and Sukarno's subsequent moves, many of the questions pertaining to the promotion of the "30 September Movement" become almost academic. The principal point now is whether the army will go along with Sukarno in papering over the situation and returning to the political status quo prior to the events of 1 October.

20. The previous record of the army seems to indicate, that despite frustration and rage over the murders of six highly regarded generals, most officers will continue to support Sukarno. Although there is considerable individual and collective doubt among the officer corps as to the wisdom of Sukarno's policies, there is also enormous reluctance to oppose him. Sukarno has so presented his position that any specific action against the Communists would be considered an anti-Sukarno

act. It now appears that only if Untung can develop a following in Central Java and renew armed action—and at the moment this does not appear to be a strong possibility—would Sukarno tolerate a significant move against him and his allies.

21. In the aftermath of the "30 September Movement," however, the army temporarily will retain a political ascendancy. This is based in the martial law still obtaining in Djakarta, in the army's physical control of most of the country, and in the present policy of seclusion being followed by Communist leaders.

22. Should Sukarno move too rapidly in favor of the left during this period, he could cause a sharpening of feeling between himself and most army leaders. This could promote a stronger public and political anti-Communist stand by the army than it has maintained in the past year and weaken the political position of the party. Such a development, however, is highly speculative.

23. Sukarno's health continues to be a major factor in determining the course of events. The army is far more likely to act decisively if the president dies or is disabled than if he remains reasonably vigorous. Sukarno's continued seclusion is not necessarily an indication that his health has further deteriorated; he will probably defer a public appearance until he feels that it is to his political advantage. Meanwhile he apparently is holding frequent meetings with various military and civilian officials.

150. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the Under Secretary of State (Ball) and Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Helms)¹

Washington, October 7, 1965, 12:05 p.m.

Helms asked Ball if he were deadset to get the dependents out of Indonesia. Ball replied that he could foresee a real civil war in Indonesia, however, this request had come in from Green himself. Ball said we were trying to get them out as inconspicuously as possible on commer-

¹Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Indonesia, [4/12/64-11/10/65]. No classification marking.

cial airlines.² Ball informed Helms there were several companies in Indonesia. Ball asked Helms if he had doubts.

Helms said in light of the sentiments he guessed this was the right thing to do. The President would be disturbed if there were street fighting.

Ball said he thought the communists would go underground and the country could go up in flames. Ball said he would feel better if the women and children were not there. In three weeks all dependents would have departed. Helms asked if we were keeping them in the area. Ball said we had told them to come on home but we don't really care where they take them.

Helms told Ball he was with him on this.³

² In telegram 401 to Djakarta, October 6, the Department instructed the Embassy to begin moving of U.S. families out of Indonesia by international air carriers. In order to make the operation unobtrusive, the Embassy could explain at least at the beginning of the process that these were routine transfers for home leave, medical reasons, and so on. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-1966, POL 23-INDON)

³ At 5:30 p.m. on October 7, Ball talked on the telephone with McNamara about the possibility of sending the evacuation task force back to home ports. Ball worried that there could be a civil war in 2 or 3 days, but he agreed with McNamara that the evacuation force could return slowly. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Indonesia, [4/12/64-11/10/65])

151. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, October 10, 1965.

Unnumbered. For Assistant Secretary Bundy from Ambassador Green.

1. Following is Ambassador Green's comments on Secretary Bundy's message re pattern of UK actions on Kalimantan and how we should handle with Indonesians.²

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDON-UK. Secret: Eyes Only. There is no time of transmission on this telegram, which was received in the Department of State at 2:46 p.m., October 10.

² Not further identified.

2. I generally agree with your suggested approach. At same time I question contention in Deptel 413³ that "we should credit Indo military with sufficient sophistication to realize that British would not stab Indo army in back while it was dealing with PKI." Latter contention overlooks suspiciousness of hard-pressed army and its poor communications. We just cannot leave to chance that Indos will understand British restraint.

3. In latter connection, Colonel Ethel was told today by his Indo army contact (who is close to Suharto and Nasution) that Indo army hopes British will not escalate Malaysia confrontation at this time because it would weaken army position. Source believes US only nation which could bring pressure to bear on British on this matter. Later on in conversation, source stated that Indo army leadership feels it has situation well in hand and will win this time, provided British do not interfere by escalation.

4. I therefore recommend that Ethel reply to his contact just about along lines Secretary Bundy suggests. This would of course require that British desisted from any kind of aggressive patrolling but it should not involve any weakening of UK defensive position.⁴

5. Colonel Ethel hopes see contact tomorrow.⁵

³ In telegram 413 to Djakarta, October 7, the Department told Green it "had serious reservations on wisdom proposal that British convey to Indonesia military willingness to refrain from attacks as long as Indo Army continues to press PKI." No matter how discreetly passed, it would saddle the recipient Indonesian with the danger of "exposure as traitor to nation." The Department then suggested that the Indonesian military was sophisticated enough to realize that the British "would not stab Army in back while dealing with PKI" without being specifically informed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-1966, POL INDON-UK)

⁴ In telegram 437 to Djakarta, October 10, the Department agreed with Green's recommendation, but asked that the Embassy withhold action until the matter was cleared with the British. (Ibid.) In telegram 1918 to London, repeated to Djakarta as telegram 446, the Department reported that Berger had suggested to a British Embassy official that the United States pass the following message to the Indonesians: "First, we wish to assure you that we have no intention of interfering Indonesian internal affairs directly or indirectly. Second we have good reason to believe that none of our allies intend any offensive action against Indonesia." (Ibid., POL 23-9 INDON) The British agreed, but asked that the phrase, "to initiate," be included between "allies intend" and "any offensive action." (Telegram 447 to Djakarta, October 1; *ibid.*)

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears no signature.

152. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the
Under Secretary of State (Ball) and Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, October 12, 1965, 5:40 p.m.

Ball told the Secretary that he went over with Berger and Cuthell as to what we propose to say to the army in Indonesia. One telegram which we are sending to London for approval is telegram of assurance that we do not propose to interfere in their internal affairs.² The harder question is their request for our assessment of the situation. Ball continued that he is going into detail with Cuthell and he (Cuthell) has great fears and doubts of our expressing encouragement, etc. This is a complex power fight that is going on and we do not know who is on top and we do not know, for instance, whether the army might resolve this by declaring a war on imperialists and we would be left on the limb by the army moving in and exploiting anti-American feelings. The Secretary thought this a very far-fetched likelihood. Ball said this is not an ideological fight but a power fight. Ball thinks that any indication that we are giving army help in its dealing with PKI could be misused.³

The Secretary stated that the telegram to London should go but that he wished to discuss the other⁴ further tomorrow.

¹ Source: Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Indonesia, [4/12/64-11/10/65]. No classification marking.

² See footnote 4, Document 151.

³ At 10:30 a.m., October 12, Ball and Fulbright discussed Indonesia on the telephone. Fulbright asked is the "Sukarno situation as good as it appears to be represented in the papers?" Ball answered that for the first time the army was "disobeying Sukarno." The generals were asking if they might be the next victims. Although they were afraid to move directly against Sukarno and the PKI, they were encouraging the Muslims and other groups to do so. Ball guessed that Sukarno would never regain the power he had and the PKI would have to go underground, but he did not want to underestimate Sukarno. Any U.S. interference could be a serious mistake. (Johnson Library, Ball Papers, Telephone Conversations, Indonesia, [4/12/64-11/10/65])

⁴ Apparent reference to Document 153.

153. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia¹

Washington, October 13, 1965, 7:03 p.m.

452. Ref: Djakarta's 962.²

1. We think time is approaching when it may be desirable to give some indication to the military of our attitudes toward recent and current developments. While we might do this by taking advantage of request for our assessment put to us by Nasution's aide (refel paras 1 and 2), we are reserved for three reasons:

a. We are not at all clear as to who is calling the shots within the military. As examples: although it appears to be Nasution, Suharto seems to be taking a stronger line vis-à-vis Sukarno. We do not know who else is playing what role, or what degree of unity exists among the military leaders, or what their strength is.

b. We have no real knowledge of the military plans and intentions or what debates are going on in the inner circle, without which it is impossible to make an assessment.

c. We are not even certain that Nasution's aide is really speaking for him, or has taken initiative on his own.

2. Under these circumstances we think it would be best to move cautiously.

3. Dilemma is that (a) we do not wish to give army impression that we are trying to inject ourselves into Indo internal situation, or that we wish to channel army's actions for our—as opposed to Indo's—benefit, or that we encouraging action against Sukarno or, in fact, anyone except PKI. On other hand, (b) if army's willingness to follow through against PKI is in any way contingent on or subject to influence by US, we do not wish miss opportunity consider US action. As noted 1 c above, we not sure whether Indos making typically over-subtle approach via Nasution's aide.

4. With respect to aide's question re our assessment of situation, suggest you respond on following lines: We are, as always, sympathetic to army's desire eliminate communist influence, but difficult for us to assess current situation since we do not have clear picture of military aims and plans. Realize situation fast moving, but would be helpful if we could be given indication to army's assessment and intentions.

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Cuthell and Berger, cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Rusk.

² Dated October 12. (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel, Djakarta)

5. Purpose of throwing ball back to Nasution is to see how forthcoming he is prepared to be with us.

6. Request your comments.³

Rusk

³ In telegram 1002 from Djakarta, October 14, Green commented that it was "reasonably clear Nasution calling the shots" and was working through Suharto. The Embassy agreed that it did not have detailed knowledge of the military's plans and intentions, but wondered if they existed beyond a desire to keep the pressure on the PKI and to force Sukarno to face the fact of its treachery. The Embassy was "quite sure Nasution's aide speaks for him." The Embassy agreed that the United States needed to move cautiously and give the impression that it was not interjecting itself into Indonesia internal affairs. The Embassy did not want to discourage the Army from discreetly approaching the United States and preferred a slightly more "understanding posture." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON)

154. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, October 14, 1965, 1020Z.

1006. 1. Colonel Ethel conveyed to Nasution's aide today our oral message (Deptel 447 and previous)² re confrontation; aide took it down on a piece of paper and said he would give it to Nasution within the hour.³ He commented to effect that this was just what was needed by way of assurances that we (the army) weren't going to be hit from all angles as we moved to straighten things out here.

2. Aide said that army is now rounding up suspect Chinese businessmen and seeking to find out through Chinese just what role Chi-Com Embassy here played in aborted coup. Aide cautioned however that, even if army got the goods on Peking, Djakarta would have to be very careful about its relations with China. Army could not go after

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and passed to the White House.

² See footnote 4, Document 151.

³ In telegram 2005 to London, October 15, the Department reported that Nasution received the message and was very satisfied with it, hoping that the "British will lay off." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON)

the ChiComs frontally, he said, but made a gesture with both his hands as if to suggest a subtle envelopment technique.

3. Aide said that army rounding up Communist cadres but having a hard time finding guns which had been disseminated. Asked if rumor were true that Lukman or others were starting a new Communist Party to replace the discredited PKI, aide said he did not know but he was looking into that kind of question.

4. Aide said that Antara would be allowed to continue its anti-NEKOLIM line but it would be played in lower key.

5. Aide heard about my talk with Suwito re Lovestrang. He thought that approach should work (Embtel 991).⁴

Green

⁴ Dated October 13. (Ibid., PS 7-1 US-INDON/LOVESTRAND) Harold L.B. Lovestrang was a missionary of the Evangelical Alliance Church. He, his wife, and four children were taken into custody by Indonesian authorities at Manokawari in August 1964. All but Harold Lovestrang were released in March 1965. After considerable U.S. representations, Harold Lovestrang was released on March 23, 1966. (Telegram 2710 from Djakarta, March 23, 1966; *ibid.*)

155. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, October 14, 1965.

Unnumbered. Please pass Secretary Bundy from Ambassador Green:

1. Reference Deptel 458.² In addition reply regular channels. We were approached yesterday through Col. Ethel by Nasution's liaison officer for help with portable voice communications gear for use by guards protecting Nasution and other top army people and their fami-

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 21 INDON. Secret. There is no time of transmission on this telegram, which was received at the Department of State at 9:33 a.m. on October 14.

² In telegram 458 from Djakarta, October 13, the Department informed the Embassy of an Associated Press story based on an "informed source" that Suharto had sent a colonel to the United States to procure communications equipment to contain the Communist threat of civil war in Indonesia. The Department asked for the Embassy's comment. (*Ibid.*)

lies. Unclear whether AP story based approach here or in US. We have carefully limited knowledge of liaison officer's request to several key officers. In this Embassy, none of whom have talked to AP or anyone else about this.

2. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has, with my approval, offered to provide three Motorola P-31 handy-talkies 49.9545 with batteries and battery chargers. Army Attaché will covertly turn over the above to the Indonesian army on October 14.

3. We are taking cautious approach to providing further assistance of this kind [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] although it is in our interest to preserve present army leadership from danger assassination which we assess very real. Also believe small quiet gesture such as this (or help to Nasution's child) could be important in terms of helping a friend in need and will be remembered accordingly.

4. Conceivably army has intention to seek again from US sources equipment for communications with outer islands. As you know, this is old story which could be basis AP report.

5. I would appreciate your comments.³

³ In telegram 470 to Djakarta, October 14, Bundy told Green that he completely concurred in the action that Green took on portable voice communications. The Department had no indication that the Army would renew its request for a major communications project with the outer islands. Such would be a long-range project and the Army probably had sufficient control of civilian communications network for the time being. If the Army renewed its request, the Department suggested it should be given serious consideration. (Ibid.) Printed from an unsigned copy.

156. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, October 17, 1965, 0030Z.

1047. 1. Indonesia's political crisis seems to be moving toward a "political settlement" which we believe will do little more than paper over the deep cracks which have appeared in the nation's leadership. Many basic issues will remain unresolved. Prolonged maneuvering

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, CINCPAC for POLAD, Karachi, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, New Delhi, London, Singapore, Tokyo, and Wellington.

among the various elements is likely and, whatever the outcome, the Sukarno image and leadership will never be quite the same.

2. The following basic factors underlie Indonesia's present political maneuvering:

A. There are now two power centers in Indonesia, not one. These are Sukarno and the army. Each needs the other and at the same time each is trying to undermine the other. But in true Indonesian fashion they are trying to reach an agreed settlement which will give the outward impression that all is well and that national unity has been preserved.

B. Sukarno's image has been damaged but there is little likelihood of any serious move to dump him. Many Indonesians privately believe he was aware of, or even back of, the Sept 30 affair. Nonetheless, they do not want to make this fact public or to face openly its logical consequences. They will probably whitewash Sukarno, for to them, and despite his faults, he is Indonesia and national unity depends on allegiance to his father figure, but the army, for its part, finds its public support of Sukarno a useful symbol that it is the protector of national unity.

C. The present political jockeying takes place in an atmosphere of considerable national tension. The attacks on PKI installations which started in Djakarta have spread to other regions of Indonesia. In some areas it could strike a spark leading to the outbreak of real conflict. The army regards central Java as politically sensitive, even though the security situation has been brought into line. Communists and non-Communists have been at each other's throats in east Java and in north Sumatra for months and some observers fear civil war in those areas. This situation cuts both ways for the army. It strengthens the hand of the military in bargaining with Sukarno who fears national disunity. But the army also fears civil war, particularly in any situation which would pit them publicly against Sukarno, who might rally forces against the army that would make their position untenable, and thus move the army toward compromise.

D. The basic framework of Indonesia's domestic ideology will be retained but there will probably be changes of emphasis, for the present at least, and possibly and hopefully of longer duration. Elements such as NASAKOM will not be completely dominant theme they had become in recent months although lip service will probably continue to be paid to these concepts. In this connection, song "NASAKOM Unity" is now heard again on radio after two week absence. Suharto also expressed support for NASAKOM at his installation ceremony. (NASAKOM is, of course, the Indonesian acronym and cover for Sukarno's drive to establish a Communist-oriented Indonesian political unity. That Moslem elements maintain a healthy resistance to this forced adjustment

of their religious convictions to Communist ideology has become apparent in a way that is both surprising and heartening during these last few days.)

E. No dramatic changes in Indonesia's foreign policy are likely. The army and large sections of the Indonesian public suspects Communist China's hand behind recent events. Sukarno does not, or at least he will not admit this possibility. However, as one general said, "We already have enough enemies. We can't take on Communist China as well." The Sept 30 affair will almost certainly cause strains between Djakarta and Peiping, but close cooperation will probably continue because both parties find it useful. But there latent explosiveness against the Chinese in the minds of many, particularly strong Moslem elements, among the Indonesians.

F. Indonesia's basic "anti-NEKOLIM" policy will probably also be retained although the army may well seek to twist definition of the term when this suits the army's purposes.

3. Appears likely that partial deal between army and Sukarno may already have been reached while other matters are still under negotiation. (It is even more commonplace here than elsewhere to come up with vague phraseology to reach agreement on obstinate points leaving future in-fighting to determine final outcome.)

A. One side of deal may be that army will hush up any indications of Sukarno's involvement in Sept 30 affair. We have in fact already noted that army sources are now playing this down following earlier open talk that President was involved. Army has probably also agreed to continuation of certain essential aspects of Sukarno's foreign policy and this will produce competition and perhaps confusion in weeks ahead.

B. There are several different versions of army's five point demands on Sukarno but these appear generally to involve following: (I) Appointment of Suharto head army, (II) all persons involved in Sept 30 movement to be punished in accordance with Indo law, (III) Indo air force to be retooled, (IV) all mass organizations and political parties which supported Sept 30 movement to be banned, and (V) replacement of PKI, Subandrio's intelligence organization.

C. Appointment of Suharto is only point in above list which Sukarno has completely carried out. He has agreed to send Dani abroad but has not yet selected a regular replacement for him as head of air force. Army, of course, is going ahead on its own to punish many of those involved in Sept 30 movement.

4. While firm evidence lacking we believe there are two major ways in which internal political crisis might be resolved. First in formation of new "pure" and "indigenous" Communist Party to replace bad old PKI. Sukarno would probably like new party to be headed by

Njoto but this would be subject to negotiation. This seems more likely outcome, but possibility of single national party should not be ruled out. Both Sukarno and Nasution have in past advocated one-party system of substitution of "National Front" for all parties although they would have different views on nature of single party. Army leadership wants complete ban of PKI but, if Sukarno insists, would reportedly propose single party which, in contrast to Sukarno, they would want to be "right-wing" with heavy representation of "functional groups."

5. Activities of Indo press and other information media here are almost certain to be continued bone of contention between Sukarno and his backers and army leadership and other anti-Communists. Sukarno will want to push his anti-NEKOLIM program in which he identifies Indonesia with other Communist countries. He will want to play down anti-PKI complexion which has been introduced under recent army direction of Indo information media. Army still seems dissatisfied with activities of Indonesia's sole news agency, Antara, and continues to interrogate and harass its staff which, of course, was heavily Communist infected.

6. The activities of the National Front, especially those relating to demonstrations (that peculiarly Indonesian method of political expression), will probably, like the press, be subject to tugging and pulling between Sukarno and his leftist advisers and the army.

7. Sukarno and army may already have reached ostensible, *modus vivendi*, on basic political issues. If not, odds are that they will in near future. However, working out details will be serious problem, as will probable differences of interpretation between Sukarno and army on points already accepted. While recent crisis is likely to be papered over, basic problems have been brought to surface and will not easily or successfully or for very long be sublimated. Role of Subandrio, and others in cabinet spiritually akin to if not active in September 30 movement, many of whom now appear likely to survive present crisis, will be source continued friction between Sukarno and army. But issues, such as those mentioned above, and many others including personal feelings of revenge, are likely continue plague GOI and reduce effectiveness and cohesion of government for foreseeable future.

Green

157. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, October 18, 1965, 0845Z.

1055. For Assistant Secretary Bundy from Ambassador. Re Embtel 1017.²

1. Colonel Ethel has had two more meetings with Nasution's aide who made a number of interesting points as follows:

2. Police say they have caught Aidit in central Java, but this fact is not being released now. For publication, he remains still at large. One reason given for this is to obstruct PKI from naming new head of party.

3. Sukarno trusts Nasution about 80 percent of the time and discussions continue between them. Nasution has been pressing for acceptance of five following points, first two of which already granted: (a) appointment of Suharto as Chief of Staff, (b) ouster of Dani (there is a report that Dani left for K.L. yesterday. We are checking), (c) PKI totally banned, (d) re-tooling of cabinet, (e) disbanding of BPI, which is Subandrio's intelligence organization.

4. In latter connection army is out to get Subandrio and is worried lest Subandrio succeed in his current efforts to poison Sukarno's mind that there was in fact a plot master-minded by the NEKOLIMs, to be executed by the army, navy and police, against the air force. Sukarno has told Nasution that he wants all the facts of this 30 September incident in order to reach his final political solution on current crisis. The army is working hard, along with police, to get the facts and they already have a good deal of incriminating evidence against Subandrio and others.

5. There is a major split between Subandrio and Suwito (Subandrio's Chief Deputy in the Foreign Office). Suwito has the support of almost all the foreign office.

6. If Subandrio has anything to say about it, it is questionable how long Suharto can remain as Army Chief of Staff. There is strong mutual dislike between them. Furthermore, Sukarno did not wish to appoint Suharto, but was forced to do so by Nasution.

7. Earlier report we had from another source to effect that Sukarno was ousting Sughardi as information officer of Department of Defense

¹Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 INDON. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Repeated to CINCPAC for Manila and to the Department of Defense. Passed to the White House.

²In telegram 1017, October 15, the Embassy reported that Nasution was satisfied with the U.S. assurance concerning British military intentions. (Ibid.)

is not true. It is true that Sukarno at first considered Sughardi as being too outspoken against PKI and Tjakrabirawa, but Sukarno has relented, partly because he now knows more of the facts and partly because Sughardi used to be one of Sukarno's aides. Sughardi now sees Sukarno every day.

8. There is danger of trouble in the navy, where Subandrio is attempting to stir up dissidence. Martadinata is aware of this and is trying to head it off.

9. Untung is proving to be a problem to his interrogators who have been unable to extract much of interest from him. (Note that this conflicts with a German Embassy source, but we believe that Nasution's aide's information correct.)

10. Army is now screening all of its officers to eliminate those who are untrustworthy. In past several days forty have been picked up for detention, including Lt. Col. Soewasono who, working directly under General Pronoto, was largely responsible for personnel assignments and who used his office for infiltration of leftists into key spots.

11. *General Comment:* In reviewing telegrams I have drafted during past two weeks reporting Colonel Ethel's regular contacts with Nasution's aide, I gain distinct impression that army is proceeding methodically against Communists and Subandrio, though being prepared to co-exist with Sukarno for reasons Embassy has recently reported in detail. Also looking back over record I note that Nasution's aide has given us much accurate information as to up-coming developments, which helps to establish his reliability as well as fact that army leadership seems to know where it is going, at least in short run.

Green

158. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, October 20, 1965, 0330Z.

1090. 1. Army and other actions against PKI have been covered in detail in our sitreps and regular reporting.² Question now is extent to which party's effectiveness and potential have actually been impaired.

2. While situation still fluid, evidence to date indicates party has received major, though not necessarily mortal, blow to its image, considerable damage to its communications and command structures, and some damage to its organizational strength through arrest, harassment and, in some cases, execution of PKI cadres.

3. Extent of this damage cannot be definitely fixed but is certainly significant. In area of communications and command, we have direct evidence [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that PKI itself already regarded its communications to be virtually shattered a week or so ago, even before army repression had reached its peak. Some thousand of PKI cadres have reportedly been arrested in Djakarta area alone and several hundred of them have been executed. We know that Njono, head of Djakarta PKI and Politburo member, was arrested and may have been executed and there are unconfirmed reports of other arrests of top leaders including Anwar Snauee. Army sweeps of Kampung areas have also disrupted channels of communication, and loss of buildings, effects of curfew in Djakarta shut-down of telephone and telegraph system, etc., are forcing PKI to employ inefficient and cumbersome devices no matter how well prepared their underground network may have been.

4. Thus far, however, basic PKI organizational potential would appear to be largely intact and capable of recovering quickly in a purely organizational sense if its status were recognized by the government and army attacks were stopped. However, there would still be severe damage to its image that, taken by itself, would tend to impair recruitment and decrease possibilities for successful prosecution of United Front tactics. Also, even now party will face uphill fight in regaining degree of popular acceptance and ostensible prestige it enjoyed before Sept 30. At same time, if return of PKI did take place and could be

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 INDON. Confidential. Repeated to Canberra, CINCPAC for POLAD, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, Moscow, Paris, Tokyo, and Wellington.

² In telegram 923 from Djakarta, October 8, the Embassy reported that the Army had arrested several thousand PKI activists and it has recovered many, but far from all, of the weapons distributed to Communist troops. (*ibid.*, POL 23-9 INDON)

shown as sign of anti-PKI weakness and indication that opposition to PKI was useless, loss popular image could be at least partially offset by psychology of intimidation and by terror.

5. If army repression of PKI continues and army refuses to give up its position of power to Sukarno, PKI strength can be cut back. In long run, however, army repression of PKI will not be successful unless it is willing to attack communism as such, including associations with China and other bloc countries and Communist ideology, including many of key pillars of Sukarno doctrine. Army has nevertheless been working hard at destroying PKI and I, for one, have increasing respect for its determination and organization in carrying out this crucial assignment.

6. PKI capability for insurgency reported septel.³

Green

³ In telegram 1098 from Djakarta, October 20, the Embassy stated it had no real evidence that the PKI was planning insurgency. On balance, the Embassy concluded that the Army could cope with insurgency on a national basis, but it would have serious and perhaps prolonged trouble rooting the PKI out of some areas of Java and North Sumatra. The Embassy added that should Sukarno side with the PKI, the difficulties would be greatly increased. (Ibid.)

159. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia¹

Washington, October 22, 1965, 7:14 p.m.

508. 1. Following thoughts on current and prospective Indo situation are based primarily on Mission's excellent reporting during past few weeks, are tentative, and are intended to solicit Embassy's comment.

2. Main elements current situation are:

- a. Indo Army still cleaning up situation;
- b. Sukarno resisting elimination PKI and trying to reassert control;
- c. PKI apparently undecided between pursuing legal struggle if possible or resorting to insurgency and terrorism;

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Cuthell, cleared by Berger, and approved by Bundy.

d. Non-communist civilians who have been inactive in past years becoming actively anti-PKI, but their leaders still much in background and not playing major role. Situation likely settle down slowly in some new pattern. To date and probably in near future issue regarded as domestic (except for question of Chicom involvement), and our only role has been to give quiet assurance that we and allies will not interfere. As situation takes new shape believe it likely Army and perhaps others who will be responsible for running country will feel need to know our position toward their regime.

3. Obviously premature to assess what shape new situation will take. Alternatives seem to include, in broad terms,

a. Restoration pre-September 30 situation—i.e. Sukarno-run PKI dominated Indonesia;

b. Some version of NASAKOM with Army having ultimate responsibility for success, and "KOM" being successor to PKI;

c. Army-backed, and in part operated, civilian regime with substantial Marxist-Socialist civilian component;

d. Out and out Army regime.

4. In unlikely event a. above develops, our relations with Indo clearly back where they were and probably much worse. d. seems equally unlikely in view Nasution's and Army's often stated desire avoid military vs. civilian situation and importance military has long given to need for development anti-PKI, non-communist civilian government. This course would also involve direct challenge to Sukarno and subject Army's real cohesion to major and unwanted test (Embtel 1098).²

5. b. and c. above, which we currently believe more likely, are essentially variants of same situation but probably with different internal backgrounds. b. implies settlement with Sukarno which tolerates existence weakened PKI, while c. might well result in PKI hard core being out of power, underground, and engaged in insurgency and terrorism. Likelihood in both cases is that Subandrio would be out or reduced to non-control position, while Sukarno, if present, would not have final authority in basic issues.

6. Regardless of which form new regime takes it will be faced by three major problems apart from basic issue internal security:

a. Priorities: While operating behind façade of current domestic policies regime will be oriented more toward Indonesians' domestic problems, and this in turn will mean greater attention to long neglected and critical economic problems.

²See footnote 3, Document 158.

b. Foreign Policy: Indoctrination in NEFO-NEKOLIM and other acrostics so deep (and often swallowed by military themselves) that changes can only be gradual in short term and likely to be in style rather than substance;

c. Communism: As indicated para 3 your 1021,³ PKI is one thing, communism another. As most educated Indos have large Marxist element in their thinking, regime will have to try to educate opinion slowly to recognize that communism is more than economic theory, and that it is not simply aggressive form Indonesian nationalism (para 5 your 1090).⁴

7. New regime will obviously need external aid to deal with economy. Will have difficult task of doing so while handicapped by foreign policy and hobbled by confusion on economic theory. Despite this problem, approaches to Thai, Japanese, Germans and apparently others which already made will have to extend toward something more formal than simple search for emergency bailing out in terms of food.

8. Basic to getting such foreign assistance will be establishment abroad of fact that Indonesia has new face, and in this Indos likely want to know how U.S. views them and what position U.S. will be conveying to other countries whether or not Indos choose seek direct help from us. As Indos probe us on question, and recognizing we dealing in still very hypothetical situation, suggest our description of our attitude should include following:

a. Like Indo Army, we have long assumed that at what it considered appropriate time PKI would make overt bid for power. We were surprised that PKI chose present period for open assault re Army, as events in past months seemed to us to have been moving steadily in PKI's favor. Only tenable conclusion we have been able reach after considerable study of available info is that Aidit and PKI were under heavy pressure from Chicoms to produce abrupt and prompt victory for Chicom interests in Asia in view recent setbacks for Chinese in Africa and elsewhere—without, of course, considering Indo interests.

b. Our hope continues to be that Indos will produce government and policy dedicated to Free Indonesia and to full development of country for benefit of Indo people;

c. As Army and non-PKI elements move into control of and responsibility for welfare of country they are going to have to take rapid and effective steps to correct current economic mess, and for this they

³ In paragraph 3 of telegram 1021 from Djakarta, October 15, the Embassy noted: "There is a subtle but important difference in Indonesia between being anti-Communist and anti-PKI. It is okay now to be the latter but not former." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON)

⁴ Document 158.

will need foreign help. Indos have many friends in non-communist world who have long desired help, their objectives ranging from desire see Indo strength develop as force supporting freedom of other states to simple desire for normal and mutually profitable trade and commerce. We unaware of any free country which foolish enough to wish simply "exploit" Indonesia or its people in colonial sense. We are disposed to help Indos locate such help if they wish, but believe they will find it available without difficulty;

d. Our own bilateral relations have been poisoned by sea of hatred (of sort which produced September 30) which PKI has poured into Indonesia in past years. We recognize this background cannot be eliminated over night nor can it be ignored by Indo Government or by us;

e. In view foregoing, we assume Indos will want avoid anything looking like overt GOI turn toward U.S. For short run our assistance to them would probably have to be on covert or semi-covert basis related specific, small, ad hoc needs. We quite willing go along with this. In addition showing Indos we will not take advantage of difficult internal situation to intervene, we recognize probable need for passage of time to allow cooling off period, and will not seek or expect public evidences of pro-American feeling. (FYI: Further down road we would hope situation might stabilize to point where structured economic support along lines 1963 consortium idea could be considered, but think speculation about this, except as indicated sub-para c. above, not likely be useful in near future. End FYI.);

f. If real PKI insurgency situation develops we would, of course, try to meet Army needs as expressed to us by Army. Problem here could be continuation military aspects of confrontation and continuation stridently aggressive anti-American propaganda. If former stopped or suspended and latter moderated, we believe U.S. public and Congress would go along.

9. Foregoing obviously very tentative but believe Department and Embassy should try to agree on main lines of U.S. response if and as Indos probe our position in days and weeks ahead. Embassy's comments requested.⁵

Rusk

⁵ In telegram 1236 from Djakarta, October 27, the Embassy agreed with this analysis and recommendations. The Embassy recommended that the Department explore the possibility of "short-term, one-shot aid on covert, non attributable basis assuming Indo Army clearly solicits such aid." The Embassy was less pessimistic than the Department about changes in Indonesian foreign policy, especially towards China. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON)

160. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, October 22, 1965, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

The Week's Developments in Asia

There follows a summary of significant developments in Asia during the past week. Information classifications are given in brackets.

[Here follows material on Vietnam.]

Indonesia (secret)

Events in Indonesia since the abortive September 30th coup are so far a striking vindication of U.S. policy towards that nation in recent years: a policy of keeping our hand in the game for the long-term stakes despite recurrent pressures to pull out, break relations, recall our Ambassador, etc. More specifically, they are a vindication of our post-1963 approach and the recommendations of last spring's Bunker Report.

In the past week we have continued to grope with the obscure but very promising forces set free by the defeat of the September 30th plot. Ambassador Green's early analysis that there are now two Indo Governments—Sukarno and the Army—still seems valid; and since each Government needs the other (or rather, is too weak to topple the other), the uneasy balance may continue for a while. The Army is showing considerable courage, and the populace is with the Army to an extraordinary degree so far. Our Embassy is performing well.

Important unknowns remain: Sukarno's health, his degree of involvement in the September 30th plot, the whereabouts of Aidit (reportedly under arrest), anti-Chinese passions, etc. Whatever happens, we should expect no abrupt major change in Indonesia's vocal fuzzy Marxism or in its foreign policy—regardless of who runs the country. The longer we remain restrained and discreet (and the same for our press), the better.

[Here follows material on the Philippines, Ryukyus, and Chinese representation.]

McG B

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 16, 10/15-11/19/65. Secret.

161. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, October 26, 1965.

1184. 1. Pouching today detailed analysis of Sept 30 Movement.² Many key facts still not known but I believe we now have adequate information for informed assessment and suggest report be given wide dissemination. Following for immediate use are major highlights of report.

2. Sept 30 Movement. This Movement consisted of several army units, air force chief and several of his colleagues, and paramilitary elements formed from Communist cadres. Leaders included Lt. Col. Untung of Palace Guard (tough, dissatisfied soldier with Communist background); Army Brig. Gen. Supardjo (Pontianak); Lt. Col. Heru (Air Force Intelligence); and Navy Col. Sunardi. Principal culprits, however, are at very top: Sukarno, Subandrio, Aidit and his PKI, Omar Dani and elements of his air force. Communist China was involved, at least to extent of supplying several thousand guns which smuggled into Indonesia and distributed to Communist RBP. There circumstantial evidence that Peking aware of or perhaps even had hand in plot but this not established.

3. Objective. Plot probably had two options: (a) total coup except for Sukarno, or (b) limited coup involving removal of army leadership. Plot perhaps failed because it climaxed between these two. Additional complicating factor is likelihood that not all elements were working for same objective. Untung, for example, appears to have been fall guy who went along because of pro-PKI sympathies and resentment over high living of top GOI leaders. Others (PKI, Dani, possibly Subandrio and Sukarno) probably wanted to cut army down to size now in order accelerate Sukarno's rapid "turn of wheel" to left. Possible fear of army pre-emptive coup may have sparked move but this not known.

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Canberra, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila for FELG/RSO, Medan, Singapore, Tokyo, Wellington, Paris, Hong Kong, Surabaya, and CINCPAC for POLAD. There is no time of transmission on this telegram. Passed to the White House, DOD, NSA, CIA, and USIA.

² Airgram 300 from Djakarta, October 22. (Ibid., POL 23-8 INDON) The Central Intelligence Agency's Office of Current Intelligence also prepared an analysis of the 30 of September Movement, OCI No. 2342/65, October 28. The memorandum's summary stated that the purpose of the coup was to "destroy the army leadership and presumably to redirect the army's political thrust," but beyond these ends the motivation of Untung and Vice Air Marshal Yani remained unclear. As for the PKI, elements were involved, but the "role of the party leadership remains obscure." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. V, Memos, 10/65-11/65)

4. What Probably Happened. At 0200 Oct 1 less than three battalions army troops began move and by 0400 had sealed off palace, taken telegraph office, telecommunications building and perhaps National Bank, and assumed position around Merdeka Square. Other key objectives obtained through inside cooperation. Between 0300 and 0500 raids by element army, Palace Guard and PKI youth occurred on homes of 7 top generals resulting in murder Gen. Pandjaitan, kidnapping (with some wounded) of Gens. Yani, Soetojo, Parman, Harjono, Suprpto. Armed Forces Chief of Staff Nasution escaped over wall and Gen. Suharto apparently missed because he not at home. Generals and Nasution's aide were hauled off to secluded spot on grounds Halim Air Force [Base] and tortured and murdered. Mutilated bodies found Oct 3. There seemed to be no close coordination in provinces except possibly central Java where Sept 30 Movement forces held several points briefly and Joga changed hands several times before reverting to government control Oct 4.

5. Movement forced into early retreat by quick reaction under Gen. Suharto of Strategic Command (Kostrad) and dwindling support for Untung. During evening Oct 1 Suharto, joined by cavalry battalion from Adjie's Siliwangi division recaptured strategic points and secured city. Rebel troops retreated to Halim; Untung and Air Force Chief Omar Dani flew to his Swahjudi air force base near Madiun early Oct 2. Sukarno went to Bogor Palace.

6. Probable Role of PKI. Since 1952 PKI has pursued United Front strategy proceeding cautiously toward peaceful transition into socialist stage. In mid Sept party began taking vigorous security measures. Whether it feared army attack or was itself preparing for coup attempt not known. In any event there no question of PKI involvement in Sept movement. Aidit and other top leaders almost certainly in on planning, PKI unions in transport and communications fields assisted movement and PKI newspaper was only one to support it. Whether timing was triggered by concern Sukarno's health or fear imminent army coup, PKI decision to participate seems to have been hurried one.

7. Role of Sukarno. Many knowledgeable Indonesians join most foreign diplomats here in believing Sukarno involved in Sept 30 Movement, although extent his complicity not clear. Sukarno's long term political record of close association with PKI merged over past year into virtual public identification with PKI. On Sept 29 in speech to Communist youth, he referred to former "loyal generals" who had become "protectors of counter-revolutionary elements. These we must crush." Important circumstantial evidence lays critical questions at Sukarno's door. His actions during and after coup are suspect, including his lack of any real public remorse over murdered generals. There are reservations, but odds seem overwhelming that, at very least, Sukarno

knew what was afoot and had given tacit blessing to seizure of generals, probably having let himself be convinced (not a hard job) that they planning coup against him. He may not however have been in on all details.

8. What Went Wrong. Coup came dangerously close to success. It perhaps failed because of differing objectives of those involved and fact it climaxed between being standard coup attempt and pure act of terror. Untung quickly gained control of capital, and Dani and Aidit came to his support. However, army regrouped quickly around Nasution and Suharto, masses failed to rise against "capitalist bureaucrats," and it possible Sukarno backed out when he learned generals killed and all not going well.

9. Conclusions

A. PKI has received serious setback to prestige and organization. Road back will be long one but with Sukarno's support party could eventually make it if army permits. This is key to situation.

B. Seems army will not now move directly against Sukarno, whom they probably believe necessary as symbol national unity.

C. Sukarno likely remain single most important figure in Indonesia but will not for foreseeable future regain power and prestige he had before Sept 30.

D. To date army has performed far better than anticipated in attacking PKI and regrouping. Degree to which it will stand up to Sukarno not yet proven, but seems almost certain army will continue exercise considerable restraining influence on him.

E. Communists could cause considerable difficulty through insurgency, strikes or mass action but will probably not resort to this tactic except as very last resort. Some elements in army hope PKI will take to hills so army can use its military strength against them.

F. If Sukarno dies in near future, recent events give major boost to army in assuming effective control and countering PKI.

G. Comments on implications recent events for Indonesian foreign policy reported Embtel 1166³ (Notal).

Green

³ In telegram 1166 from Djakarta, October 23, the Embassy suggested that the outcome of the power struggle between Sukarno and the Army had the potential for a significant shift in Indonesia's foreign policy. Complete victory by the Army might well make expansionism and concomitant anti-Westernism outmoded. Even a partial Army victory would produce a change for the better. The central question was how to help the Army to win, but without revealing that assistance and thereby becoming a handicap rather than an asset. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDON-US)

162. Editorial Note

The Embassy in Djakarta was hampered in its reporting on events in the areas outside the capital by the general confusion and chaos of the initial conflict between the Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) on one hand and the Indonesian Army and anti-Communist forces on the other. At first the Embassy viewed the fighting and violence as a potential *military/guerrilla conflict and concentrated on the PKI's armed activity and its potential for terrorism*. In telegram 1215 from Djakarta, October 27, 1965, the Embassy recounted multiple reports of increasing insecurity and mounting bloodshed in Central Java, but could not determine whether it was caused by the PKI moving towards terrorism and sabotage, "local PKI cadres reacting uncoordinatedly to pressures upon them," or the Army "purposely moving to wipe out questionable elements and gain control." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 84, Djakarta Embassy Files: Lot 69 F 42, POL 23) On October 28 the Embassy reported that a PKI source alleged that the PKI was about to engage in a "war of liberation" and cited incidents of PKI terrorism to support this conclusion. The telegram stated, "There [is] no question, even allowing for exaggeration, that PKI acts of terrorism have increased." (Telegram 1248 from Djakarta, October 28; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON) On October 28 the Embassy Country Team reviewed the situation and sent its appraisal. Although the report emphasized the deteriorating security situation in Central Java, East Java, Bandung, and Djakarta, the team could not say "whether these incidents were isolated acts of local communists or beginning of a coordinated act of terror and sabotage." The report concluded that Indonesia was heading for a "period of chaos, since PKI has residual strength and arms, but balance seems on Army side." (Telegram 1255 from Djakarta; October 28; *ibid.*)

At the end of October 1965, the Embassy began to receive reports of killings and atrocities against PKI members, which were generally reported upon in the context of continued armed PKI resistance. On October 29 the Embassy reported that "Moslem fervor in Atjeh apparently put all but few PKI out of action. Atjehnese have decapitated PKI and placed their heads on stakes along the road. Bodies of PKI victims reportedly thrown into rivers or sea as Atjehnese refuse 'contaminate Atjeh soil.'" (Telegram 1269 from Djakarta; October 29; *ibid.*, RG 84, Djakarta Embassy Files: Lot 69 F 42, Pol 23-9) By November 8 the Embassy reported that in North Sumatra and Atjeh "the Army with the help of IP-KI Youth organizations and other anti-Communist elements has continued systematic drive to destroy PKI in northern Sumatra with wholesale killings reported." On November 13 the Embassy had a report from the local police chief that "from 50 to 100 PKI

members were being killed every night in East and Central Java by civilian anti-Communist troops with blessing of the Army." A missionary in Surabaya reported that 3,500 PKI were killed between November 4 and 9 in Kediri and 300 at Paree, 30 kilometers northwest of Kediri. (Telegrams 1374 and 1438 from Djakarta, November 8 and 13, and telegram 171 from Surabaya, November 13; *ibid.*) These types of anecdotal reports continued well into the first months of 1966. In airgram A-527 from Djakarta, February 25, 1966, the Embassy reported estimates of the PKI death toll in Bali at 80,000 with "no end in sight." The Embassy attributed the murders to sharp conflict there between PKI and the Indonesian National Party (PNI), but also to the "tradition of family blood feuds" and suggested that "many of the killings that are taking place under a political cover are actually motivated by personal and clan vendettas." (*Ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON)

Gradually the Embassy came to realize that Indonesia was undergoing a full scale purge of PKI influence and that these killings were overlaid with long standing and deep ethnic and religious conflicts. The fact that many of the killings took place in outlying areas tended to obscure their magnitude. The Embassy still had no good estimates of the number of Indonesians who perished. In airgram A-641 to the Department, April 15, 1966, the Embassy stated that the problem was the impossibility of weighing "the countervailing effects of exaggeration (which is especially common in Indonesia) and the interests of persons involved to cover up some of the crimes. The truth can never be known. Even the Indonesian Government has only a vague idea of the truth." The Embassy admitted, "We frankly do not know whether the real figure is closer to 100,000 or 1,000,000 but believe it wiser to err on the side of the lower estimates, especially when questioned by the press." (*Ibid.*, POL 2 INDON)

In 1970, Foreign Service Officer Richard Cabot Howland, an officer at the Embassy in Indonesia in 1965 and 1966, published an article in the classified publication, *Studies in Intelligence* (Vol. 14, Fall 1970, pages 13-28) which has subsequently been declassified and is available at the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 263, CIA Records, *Studies in Intelligence*. Howland's article attempts to refute three misconceptions popular at the time of his article: that the Indonesian military was encouraged to move against the PKI by the forceful U.S. stance in Vietnam, that the Chinese were behind the September 30 coup attempt, and that from 350,000 to 1.5 million PKI members were killed in reaction to the September 30 coup. Howland described his own efforts in Indonesia to elicit information from Indonesians in 1966 and his difficulties in obtaining accurate answers and hard data. He suggests that PKI death numbers were inflated by local Indonesians to demon-

strate their anti-PKI sentiments to the new anti-Communist authorities in Indonesia. Howland does make his own estimate. He recalls that he received figures from a Lieutenant Colonel in the Army's Supreme Operations Command's "Social Action Affair Section" which the military man assured him were accurate from field reporting. Howland writes: "The totals were 50,000 dead on Java; 6,000 dead on Bali; 3,000 in North Sumatra. I was skeptical of his methods but accepted his estimates *faux de mieux*, and combining them with my own data produces a figure of 105,000 Communist dead." (Ibid., page 23)

163. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia¹

Washington, October 29, 1965, 3:48 p.m.

545. 1. Following is our tentative analysis of developing situation in Indonesia and implications for US. We very conscious you have most or all of what follows in mind, but would like your comments and observations in order to develop it into policy recommendations.²

2. Nasution's speech October 25 and the openly declared campaign against Subandrio are first conclusive evidence that Army leaders are determined make all-out fight against PKI and its fellow-travelers, and will not be deflected from this purpose by Sukarno's opposition.

3. Army leaders are increasingly asserting themselves against Sukarno. Their game appears be to separate him from his anti-Army advisers; isolate him; and then use him, or possibly dispose of him, as situation requires. Seems inconceivable, at this stage, they can afford let initiative slip from their hands back to Sukarno's.

4. PKI in headlong retreat in face of mass attacks encouraged by Army. However, at some stage PKI will reconstitute some of their forces and fight back—by strikes, sabotage, or guerrilla action, against

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Priority; Lindis. Drafted by Berger, Cuthell, and Underhill and approved by Berger. Repeated to Tokyo, and CINCPAC also for POLAD.

² In telegram 1304 from Djakarta, November 2, the Embassy agreed with the general conclusions in this analysis, although it stressed that the outcome of the continuing struggle between Sukarno and the Army was not clear. On balance the Embassy believed the Army would continue to exercise an important political role, but would make concessions to Sukarno because it needed him and because some Army leaders still revered him. The Embassy anticipated a long, difficult political struggle. (Ibid.)

background of propaganda that Army is reactionary tool of imperialist powers and C.I.A. Army will have no choice except meet this counterattack and will need more or less coherent government to back up their efforts.

5. Army has traditionally maintained that its role is non-political and has shied away from any idea taking power or sharing direct responsibility for governing. But appalling fact in Indonesia, with collapse NASAKOM concept, is that there is no organized or disciplined force capable of providing leadership and direction to successor government, except Army. Unless Army accepts the responsibility for taking lead in new government, however unready or unwilling it may be, there will be anarchy in government, further economic chaos, and Army will be handicapped in meeting the PKI challenge. Sooner or later, and probably sooner, it will become increasingly clear to Army leaders they are only force capable of creating order in Indonesia, and that they must take initiative to form a military or civilian-military provisional government, with or without Sukarno. The Army is already making top policy decisions independently of Sukarno and is more and more acting as de facto government.

6. Relations with Red China are increasingly strained, and given the suspicion of Army leaders that Chinese Communists were behind the coup, and the course Army must take—i.e., destruction of PKI—a break with China cannot be ruled out. The Soviet Union has begun to exert pressure on Army to call off its campaign against the left, even hinting aid would be cut off. Army cannot capitulate to this pressure without endangering its whole position.

7. If foregoing analysis correct, we can begin see shape of some problems that may be posed for us:

a. As the Army begins to think in terms of new government, they may move toward military junta, a civil government, or a military-civil coalition. If our views are sought, any doubts they may have should be resolved by encouraging them to form a civil-military coalition, on grounds that their presence in government as a unified and disciplined force is essential in at least early stages, to stability of such a government, to campaign against PKI, to economic reform, and to plotting Indonesia's new course independent of outside influence.

b. Chinese Communist open hostility toward Indonesian Army bound to increase as Army moves against PKI. Soviets are in somewhat different position, since they blame Peiping for aborted coup, but they will also be embarrassed as Army engages the PKI. If they support the PKI against the Army, they will put strain on their relations, but they cannot support Army. They will probably take nebulous and opportunist position. Both China and Russia are probably hoping Sukarno can

still reestablish his control and force Army to accept "purged" leftist party in a reconstituted NASAKOM.

c. If our assumption correct that Army must carry on its campaign against PKI, that PKI will react, and that China and Russia cannot ignore Army's destruction of PKI and may criticize it—in fact they are already doing this—then Army will be forced to examine its attitude toward China and Russia.

d. From there it is only one step for Army to conclude that they must look elsewhere for friends and support. We can expect they will approach Japanese, other powers, and, no doubt, us. They will need little education in fact that Sukarno's and PKI's extreme foreign and domestic policies have isolated Indonesia and led Indonesia to brink of economic, political and social chaos. But given warped Sukarno thinking to which they have been exposed for so long, they will be less certain what to do about all this and fearful or suspicious of our advice and assistance. The Indonesian Army leaders' close service-to-service relations with our military provide important channel of influence.

8. The next few days, weeks or months may offer unprecedented opportunities for us to begin to influence people and events, as the military begin to understand problems and dilemmas in which they find themselves.

a. We should try to fortify their confidence that Indonesia can be saved from chaos, and that Army is main instrument for saving it.

b. We should get across that Indonesia and Army have real friends who are ready to help.

c. When asked for help by Nasution we should respond by saying we are ready to help as they begin tackling their problems in sensible way.

d. They will need food, and we can point out that the International Red Cross can supply it, if they find direct help from us or others embarrassing. (Japan, Brazil, Malaysia, Thailand, Taiwan, and even the Republic of Korea have rice.) Raw materials and spare parts for machinery may be needed soon.

e. Indonesia's currency and credit chaos needs immediate expert attention. We can point out that IMF can provide advice and that IMF and Indonesia's real friends can provide assistance. But this will require change in recent attitude toward the IMF and toward friends.

f. Small arms and equipment may be needed to deal with the PKI. (Would the Soviet Union supply Army with equipment so long as it is attacking PKI?)

g. As events develop, the Army may find itself in major military campaign against PKI, and we must be ready for that contingency.

h. POL requirements may give us opening to suggest a de facto moratorium on nationalization of oil industry so as permit companies to give all-out support to Army's and the country's needs.

9. It may well be that Army will turn to Japanese in first instance. Japan can play notable part in this evolution toward more rational Indonesia. Japanese have a vital national interest in success of Army's campaign against PKI and in a stable and independent Indonesia. The Japanese are already taking initiative. (See Djakarta's 1238.)³

10. For the moment Japan is still hypnotized by Sukarno as the "essential" man and they are being careful not to antagonize him. But if events move in direction we have indicated, and Sukarno is isolated or removed, very different situation will present itself to Japanese. At some stage we must have quiet discussions with Japanese, compare notes on developments, and work out with them agreed lines of action. The time for that may well be not long after Subandrio is removed. We shall, of course, want to consult with British, Australians, and others as well.

Rusk

³ Dated October 28. (Ibid., AID 1 INDON)

164. Memorandum From the Assistant for Indonesia
(Nuechterlein) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs (Friedman)¹

I-36439/65

Washington, October 30, 1965.

SUBJECT

Establishment of Inter-Agency working group on Indonesia

On October 29 Mr. Cuthell, Director of the State Department's Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, called a meeting to discuss measures that might be taken to prepare for an insurgency situation in Indonesia. Present were Mr. Cuthell, his deputy Mr. Underhill, State's Indonesian

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 5127, Indonesia 000.1 Sensitive, 1965. Top Secret; Sensitive. Friedman was the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in charge of Far Eastern Affairs. Also sent to Admiral Blouin, Director of the Far East Region, ISA.

desk officer Mr. Goodspeed, Mr. [name not declassified] of CIA and myself representing DOD.

The current situation in Indonesia was discussed briefly and it was agreed that there has been a sufficient deterioration in the security of central Java to warrant contingency planning in Washington of how the United States might aid the Indonesian Army if it requested our assistance. A joint State-Defense cable to Embassy Djakarta was finalized, asking for the Embassy's estimate of what items of equipment and other materials the Indonesian Army might need if armed insurgency should develop suddenly.² In addition, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] submitted a report [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]³ which indicated that the security situation in Java might be considerably worse than reported thus far by the Embassy and that the Army might have difficulty coping with large-scale Communist insurgency. It is apparent that the Army's greatest deficiency is in short-range communications equipment to support sustained operations against PKI guerrilla operations. Longer range communications equipment, between islands and perhaps also with other countries, may also be required if large-scale warfare breaks out. As DOD no longer has a military officer in Indonesia with communications expertise, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is sending a specialist in this field to review the communications situation with U.S. Mission officers (he will not talk to Indonesians) and his report should help clarify the Indonesian Army's needs in this field.

It was agreed that for the moment, at least, the Indonesian Army probably has most of the equipment it needs to deal effectively with any PKI insurgency. What the U.S. might be requested to supply would be small quantities of specific items which are in short supply or in a poor state of repair. We would probably be requested to channel delivery of such items through a third country, such as Thailand or the Philippines. Therefore, it was agreed that we should not plan in terms of a resumption of MAP but rather a covert plan of assistance in which DOD would work [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to insure the minimum risk of exposure. If the amount of equipment turns out to be more costly than [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is able to handle, DOD may be asked to find ways to augment this effort. DOD was requested to determine quietly what stocks of communications equipment and other items that might be requested by the Indonesian Army are available in Thailand and what would be the means of getting it quickly in response to an urgent request.

² Telegram 544 to Djakarta, October 29. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON)

³ Not further identified.

The working group will meet again on November 3. It is expected that a reply to the joint State-Defense message as well as a report from the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] specialist will then be in hand. Hopefully, it will then be possible to plan more precisely for the types of equipment and other materials that the Indonesian Army may need to meet a serious insurgency situation.

D.E. Nuechterlein⁴

⁴Printed from a copy that indicates Nuechterlein signed the original.

165. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, November 1, 1965, 1200Z.

1288. Ref: [1 line of source text not declassified].²

1. Reftels [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] mark first instance of a senior Indonesian Army official asking us specifically for assistance. Sukendro's approach entails questions which we are still not in a position to answer satisfactorily. For example, does Sukendro represent Nasution-Suharto in this approach? To what extent does he have approval of at least friendly civilian authorities here? To what extent should we grant assistance to the army behind the backs of the civilian authorities? Could such assistance be concealed? Or if it became revealed how damaging would it be to the army and to ourselves?

2. At same time, we remain in the dark regarding army's future planning and capabilities on a broad range of issues and until we know more about their intentions and capabilities it would be hazardous to be drawn into any extensive assistance to military. (This problem was subject of Embtel 1271.)³

¹Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Exdis; Immediate. Repeated to Bangkok. Upon receipt at the Department of State, passed to the White House.

²These telegrams reported that Sukendro asked for medical supplies, tactical communications equipment, rice, and raised the possibility of obtaining small arms, see Document 168.

³In telegram 1271 from Djakarta, October 30, the Embassy suggested establishing informal contact with a key figure in the military, not from the top leadership for reasons of conspicuousness, but someone who was close to the "so-called Army Braintrust" led by General Sukendro. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDON-US)

3. On one hand, we have to bear in mind army leadership continues to knock US policies and play the same old tired records against NEKOLIMs. Confrontation continues and Indo military evidently feel that any concession in our direction (e.g. our oil properties) would be politically damaging. Hence there seems to be little prospect of break-through on a range of major issues of interest to US at least in near future.

4. On other hand, we have seen important changes past month that could foreshadow further major gains from our viewpoint. Nasution seems at long last to have been spurred to act on and, in tandem with Suharto and other [tough?] deeply motivated military leaders, is moving relentlessly to exterminate PKI as far as that is possible to do. Military and police here face precarious situation, outcome of which means much to free world and where we clearly have a stake. US, along with other like-minded countries, including Japan, have good reason to lend a helping hand to the extent that that help is really needed and to the extent that that help does not compromise army or detract from our interests.

5. If this Embassy, through its various channels, can establish fact that Sukendro is acting at behest of Nasution-Suharto, then I believe we should do what we can as soon as we can, to meet request for medical supplies. Cost is not prohibitive and quantity is such that both financing and shipping could probably be handled covertly. In the event that word were to leak out, adverse reaction would be largely mitigated by humanitarian nature of material provided.

6. As to request for communications equipment, we could tell army that we would give sympathetic consideration to providing certain types of equipment in reasonable quantity but that we would have to have a more explicit statement of army's needs and of purpose to which equipment is to be put before we can proceed. (Presume we would want to consult with UK and Australians on all of foregoing.)

7. As to provision of small arms I would be leery about telling army we are in position to provide same, although we should act, not close our minds to this possibility. There is a chance that situation in central Java might take such a turn for the worse that we would wish to move quickly with packages of certain types of arms. Meanwhile, we could explore availability of small arms stocks, preferable of non-US origin, which could be obtained without any overt US Government involvement. We might also examine channels through which we could, if necessary, provide covert assistance to army for purchase of weapons.

8. As for providing rice, I note that Sukendro does not specifically ask our assistance in this regard. He is merely explaining problem and

stating his intentions. Our view on rice question already submitted in Embtels 1164 and 1238.⁴

9. Unless you perceive objection we will check through contacts here to determine whether Sukendro's approach reflects wishes of Nasution-Suharto. Would also appreciate having your comments on foregoing.

Green

⁴ In telegram 1164 from Djakarta, October 23, the Embassy explored the range of possible economic assistance to Indonesia. (Ibid., POL AID (US) INDON) Regarding telegram 1238 from Djakarta, see footnote 3, Document 163.

166. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia¹

Washington, November 1, 1965, 8:10 p.m.

562. Ref A: Embtel 1288;² Ref B: [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]; Ref C: [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*];³ Ref D: Embtel 1271.⁴

1. We share your view reflected para 1 Ref A that Sukendro approach [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] surrounded by complex of unanswered question relevant to our continuing relationships with Indonesian Army. We have now established contact with Army [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] but, as you bring out in Ref D, political contact through Galbraith to senior officer under Sukendro would close third side of triangle providing essential perspective on Army's program and intentions.

2. Before we become involved in furnishing assistance, we will want to establish through this political channel basic framework our relations with the Army as distinct from Indonesian Government. Secondly, will want to set up single reliable channel through which requests

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Underhill, cleared by William Bundy, and approved by Berger. Repeated to Bangkok.

² Document 165.

³ See footnote 2, Document 165.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 165.

for aid would be submitted. Finally, we must bring home to Army that while we want to be helpful, our ability to be of assistance will depend in turn on the ability of the Army to influence Indonesia's foreign and domestic policies that have put so great a strain on our relations.

3. Concur that you proceed immediately to check through your contacts to determine whether Sukendro's approach reflects Nasution-Suharto wishes. At same time suggest you proceed with effort establish discreet link at political level as proposed para 5 Ref D.

4. Following thoughts, in addition to questions noted Ref A, suggested by Sukendro approach:

A. [¹/₂ lines of source text not declassified] Does Sukendro not have reliable subordinate in Djakarta whom he trusts?

B. Request for medicines, which not considered of sufficient priority this year to warrant allocation foreign exchange, appears somewhat calculated effort appeal American sympathies. Parenthetically, we find it curious that funds available for Martidinata aero-commanders, but not for medicines.

5. While Sukendro has placed November 3 deadline on response his request we are disposed proceed cautiously. Your reporting thus far indicates no other element urgency and for time being we are disposed give him temporizing reply that his request is under consideration. We are proceeding analysis and costing of medical request so that we can move rapidly if situation warrants.

Rusk

167. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs (Cuthell) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)¹

Washington, November 3, 1965.

SUBJECT

Indonesian Army Attitude Towards the United States Government

1. Ambassador Green has noted that we are now dealing with two Indonesian governments. The first is the established, Sukarno-

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, EA/Indonesia Files: Lot 68 D 467, POL 23-9, 30 September Movement. Secret. Drafted by Underhill. Printed from an unsigned copy.

led Dwikora Cabinet. The second is the Indonesian military. There is evidence that the Indonesians see a somewhat comparable split image when they look at the United States, and this memorandum presents an estimate of the Indonesian Army's view of the American Government.

2. The Indonesian Army sees itself as dealing with three American governments. With some over-simplification for the purpose of rough identification, they may be described as the Pentagon, the CIA and the State Department. Recognition of the separate military, intelligence, and political aspects of the American governmental structure is not in itself remarkable. What is striking is the degree to which the Army feels it can keep its relationships with each in separate compartments, and deal with each on a separate plane in isolation from the other two.

3. The relationship with the Pentagon is a friendly, professional association developed at Ft. Leavenworth, Fort Benning and Fort Sam Houston. It is a service-to-service tie between military men which transcends political differences between the governments. It is an association founded on trust, respect, and a network of deep personal friendships.

4. [11 lines of source text not declassified]

5. The Army's relations with *State* have not been extensive. The Army has in the past regarded this manifestation of the American Government as the proper province of the civilian branch of the Indonesian Government. While not regarded as hostile to the Army as such, *State* is identified in the Army mind with policies and actions inimicable to Indonesia's basic national objectives.

6. The Army knows that all three United States governments approve of its actions against the PKI, and that all three are disposed to help the Army in this effort. The basic problem which now confronts it is how this American desire to help can best be exploited, first in the interests of the Indonesian Army, and, second, in the interest of Indonesia. (The Army naturally sees these two objectives as almost identical.)

7. Help from the Pentagon, i.e., large amounts of arms and material in a MAP pattern, for the time being is foreclosed because it cannot be concealed, and is therefore politically unacceptable. Non-military assistance from *State* also could not be kept covert and has therefore the same major political drawback. [5 lines of source text not declassified]

8. Looking beyond its current campaign against the PKI, the Army is undoubtedly aware of the problems it will have with *State* before any large-scale resumption of American assistance is possible. Among these are the following:

a. The Army opposes western military presence in Southeast Asia.

b. The Army favors continuation of confrontation. It may have some differences with Sukarno and Subandrio on tactics, but not on basic policy. Confrontation provides a desirable unifying influence. It provides a foreign enemy against which to channel popular hostility. It provides a rationale for continuing sacrifices from the civilian population and it justifies a continuing lion's share of the budget for the military establishment.

c. The Army opposes our policy in Viet-Nam. It considers our military presence as western intervention encouraging rather than deterring Chinese intervention in Southeast Asia.

d. The Army is strongly nationalistic in economic orientation, and favors the takeover of western economic interests. We could be seriously mistaken if we believe that the Army does not favor a takeover of the American oil industries. It has undoubtedly calculated very carefully the repercussions of such a takeover and may have already made careful preparations with the Japanese and other powers to compensate for any ill effects. Transportation and marketing would obviously be the main problems confronting a national oil industry, and the Japanese are in a position to help on both. The Army may be quite prepared to force Stanvac and Caltex out, go ten or twenty cents per barrel below the world market price in return for Japanese cooperation, and pocket the remainder of the company's share of the profits. On this basis the Army may calculate that Indonesia's foreign exchange position would be improved rather than damaged by a takeover. From the political point of view, such a strongly nationalistic action would be applauded by virtually all Indonesians. It would cut the ground from under the PKI and establish the Army as a firm foe of NEKOLIM.

e. The Army has a major stake in continuing good relations with the Soviet Union. These relations, they feel, will probably survive the current campaign against the PKI, but might suffer serious damage through any highly visible rapprochement with the United States. The Army has a tremendous investment in Soviet hardware, and without spare parts this hardware becomes a pile of junk. The Army's prestige and its position as a major military force in Southeast Asia depends on continued functioning of this equipment. The Army must persuade the Soviet Union that it is anti-Chinese and that despite its actions against the PKI it will continue with policies that will serve Soviet interests in Southeast Asia.

9. If the foregoing analysis of the Army's position is valid, it has the following implications for U.S. policy:

a. In the life and death struggle which has finally been joined with the PKI, the Army deserves our support.

b. For the time being we should accept the fact that the best we can hope for is a more truly non-aligned Indonesian Government still

hostile to the United States in many ways, but also hostile in many respects to the interests of both the Soviet Union or Communist China.

c. For the time being we must accept a minor role in influencing the course of Indonesian events. The United States has been too firmly established as the enemy of Indonesian national hopes and ambitions to permit Indonesian individuals and organizations to work publicly with us. We can, however, play an important supporting role with the Japanese and other acceptable foreign governments, and we have an obvious contribution to make in selecting small-scale covert assistance.

d. With the passage of time a more truly non-aligned Indonesian Government may gradually come to recognize that American and Indonesian interests are in harmony and not in opposition. Under these circumstances our investment in training of Army officers under MAP, and civilians under a variety of AID programs will bear fruit. This is, however, a process which must proceed at its own pace and any well-meaning efforts to hurry it are likely to have the reverse effect.

168. Memorandum From the Assistant for Indonesia
(Nuechterlein) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for International Security Affairs (Friedman)¹

I-36462/65

Washington, November 4, 1965.

SUBJECT

Indonesia Working Group

The second meeting of the Indonesia Working Group took place on 3 November in Mr. Cuthell's office at State. Present were Mr. Cuthell, Mr. Underhill and Mr. Goodspeed from State; Mr. Friedman and Mr. Nuechterlein from DOD; Mr. [name not declassified], CIA; and Mr. Thompson, White House Staff.

The major subject for discussion was the request of General Sukendro, General Nasution's apparent emissary, for medical supplies, tactical communications equipment, rice and possibly small arms to assist the Army in dealing with PKI dissidence during the next few months. As Sukendro's request was [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 5127, Indonesia, 000.1, sensitive, 1965. Top Secret; Sensitive. Also sent to Blouin.

stated in somewhat vague terms, State has queried Embassy Djakarta in order to determine whether Sukendro is acting with full support from General Nasution and if so, whether the Embassy believes that the USG should agree to financing all or part of this limited assistance.² At the time of the meeting, no reply had been received from Djakarta. Neither had there been any reply to the Joint State-Defense request of October 29 asking for an appraisal of the kind of military assistance that might be requested by the Army in case of PKI insurgency.³ There was considerable discussion over whether it was in the interest of the USG to make limited medical, economic and military assistance available to the Indonesian Army without conditions. State is of the view that Sukendro's request for assistance was an opening wedge designed to find out how willing the United States is to grant aid and on what conditions. State therefore believes that before committing itself to aiding the Indonesian Army, the USG should have a better idea than it presently does of what future Army policies are likely to be. DOD and the White House Staff believe that the USG should not attach conditions initially because they feel it is important to assure the Army of our full support of its efforts to crush the PKI, which is the basis of Sukendro's request. It was decided [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Sukendro should be advised his request is being considered in Washington. If we determine from Djakarta that Nasution supports Sukendro's request, we will then decide what items should be made available and the extent to which the USG will pay for them.

There was considerable discussion of the desirability of consulting at a high level with the Japanese Government to enlist its support for a policy of aiding the Indonesian Army. One problem is that the Japanese prefer to work with a government headed by Sukarno and it is not certain at this point whether Sukarno will eventually be persuaded to work with the Army against the PKI. However, the Japanese show signs of disenchantment with Sukarno's leadership, and it may be possible to get their support for an aid program that would support the Army's position. State will look into the possibility of a high-level approach to the Japanese Government. The meeting also agreed that it might be desirable at some point to bring the Thai Government into the picture, in view of its good relations with Indonesia and because it could serve as transit point for assistance we might wish to give the Indonesian Army.

[*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] now has the report of its communications specialist who was sent to Djakarta to determine the needs for tactical communications equipment. These needs are not

² See Document 166.

³ See footnote 2, Document 164.

large and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] will be able to fill them without difficulty if a decision is reached to proceed. DOD will consider the possibility of augmenting [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] funds if requirements for covert assistance become large.

[less than 1 line of source text not declassified] has alerted its contacts to report any increase in commercial shipping headed for Indonesia that might be carrying arms to the PKI. This information will be made available to Embassy Djakarta for possible transmittal to the Indonesian Army. There is no requirement as yet for DOD to augment surveillance over shipping in the vicinity of Indonesia; but this may be desirable if the security situation in Java becomes critical.

Another meeting of the Working Group is scheduled for November 10. However, it may be called sooner if a decision is required immediately on some of the items requested by General Sukendro.

D. E. Nuechterlein⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

169. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, November 4, 1965, 0845Z.

1326. Ref Embtel 1271.²

1. DCM saw contact mentioned reftel in informal, easy-to-talk setting and achieved some clarification on army's thinking about current problems as well as being able plant idea that dialogue between this Embassy and someone close to Nasution and Suharto on future political, economic and foreign problems and policies of Indonesia would be useful to both sides. Emerging from discussion were following salient points:

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Immediate; Lindis. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD. Upon receipt, passed to the White House, CIA, NSA, and USIA.

² See footnote 3, Document 165.

2. Suharto, not Nasution, is one who gives orders, conceives his own strategy and faces Sukarno directly. But he and Nasution are close, Nasution advises him, and there is general understanding that they will not permit wedge to be driven between them as happened in case Nasution and Yani. Source said, "We are saving Nasution for later."

3. DCM probed at some length to discover whether there any civilian political figures especially close to army with whom it would be useful to discuss future. If there are any civilian political figures working closely with army now, other than some of Cabinet ministers in their respective fields, it is being carefully concealed. Only name source proposed as civilian spokesman close to army was Suwito. He said Suwito had been completely disillusioned about Subandrio. DCM said his experience with Suwito had not shown latter to have very friendly or cooperative attitude towards Americans but we of course glad to talk to anyone army felt they could trust.

4. In Central Java army (RPKAD) is training Moslem youth and supplying them with weapons and will keep them out in front against PKI. Army will try to avoid as much as it can safely do so direct confrontation with PKI.

5. With top PKI leadership most of whom are in Djakarta, army is avoiding frontal attack. While carefully limiting their freedom of action and movement, army is letting groups other than army discredit them and demand their punishment, and awaiting developments. Smaller fry being systematically arrested and jailed or executed.

6. Similarly indirect tactic being used with Subandrio. Army discussed removing him but decided against frontal attack, instead is keeping in background and letting other groups attack and slowly demolish Subandrio's image. It requires more time to do it this way but it runs less risk of alienating Sukarno from army.

7. Suharto recently had a three hour discussion with Sukarno trying to convince Sukarno that firm measures army taking against PKI correct and necessary. Sukarno appears to have been convinced (another well-informed source told DCM same thing evening of Nov. 3) that Suharto should have his support. Both these sources believe that Sukarno now accepts Suharto, mainly however in sense of force majeure. DCM asked source whether Sukarno had really accepted Suharto's approach or was merely pretending to do so. Source said he wasn't sure.

8. With reference to solicitation of aid, Sukendro and Sukendro alone speaks for Nasution-Suharto now. Procurement of rice particularly is exclusively concern of Sukendro. Rice is not to be procured by private entrepreneurs.

9. Although Suharto is moving slowly and as much as possible through parties and mass movements in Djakarta and much of Java,

in outer islands local military commanders have free hand to take direct action against PKI and they are doing so.

10. Army confident it can break back of PKI attempted insurgency before it get[s] too serious.

11. Army is not thinking purely in military terms or intending turn political future of Indonesia over to civilian elements. Army is moving its people into all aspects of government and organizational framework with view keeping control on political trends and events.

12. Atmosphere of sloganeering aimed at West generally and US particularly would be subject to gradual change but it could not be done all at once. (DCM has made strong point that there would have to be drastic change in this atmosphere before it would be possible for US representatives to work effectively with army or other Indonesians.)

13. DCM made clear that Embassy and USG generally sympathetic with and admiring of what army doing. We felt it essential that we not get involved in any way in present struggle fearing to do [so] would handicap effort army making. We thought it would be well, however, if we could find some way to carry on dialogue with someone or preferable more than one, including civilians, as close as possible to thinking of Nasution and Suharto. Objective would be to lay foundation of understanding between us. This would involve no commitment by either side but would make it easier for us to act effectively if at some future date army should want help from US. There were problems between US and Indonesia which, if not handled in context good understanding between us could grow to proportions which would make it harder rather than easier for us to help Indonesia if in future assistance of any kind desired. One such problem was position American oil companies. Source, who is among most articulate and comprehending of Indonesian Army officers in English, indicated understanding and said he would think it over, consult with his colleagues and be in touch with DCM later.

14. DCM makes following conclusions:

A. On basis this conversation Suharto is much more important political as well as military figure in fact as well as in minds of those around him than DCM, at least previously thought. It is also reflected in other evidence that at least in minds public Suharto is more and more emerging as strong man in Indonesia.

B. Although this is highly speculative, it seemed implied that there is longer term as well as short term army strategy (army, probably wisely, is saying as little about that as possible) which involves plan to make Nasution candidate for the top position after Sukarno.

C. Implication of saving Nasution for later (para 2 above) seems to mean that Suharto will assert carefully applied army pressure and

control government but will not, if he can avoid it, take over in name so long as Sukarno is alive.

D. DCM speculates that Nasution-Suharto strategy is for Suharto to activate and *instill confidence* in Moslem elements. But not to bring Moslem leaders into limelight now. In the post-Sukarno era, Nasution may well play leading political role with Moslem support. People like Hatta, Adam Malik and others, whom we know CAS and other reports are in contact with army leaders, also probably being saved for post Sukarno era.

E. In typically Indonesian, if not Javanese fashion Suharto strategy calls for extreme patience and slow moving time framework. It will require an equally patient approach on part of US if at any point we are to mesh our efforts with army's. Army being very careful not to move too fast, probably out of concern for Sukarno but also because it is Indonesian way.

F. Not much thought has apparently been given yet to what army's conception of future relations with US are to be, or army is for moment keeping that carefully concealed.

15. We believe we have planted seed that may lead to useful political dialogue with army and we think we should continue to cultivate this garden being careful, however, not to overwork soil around still delicate plant constructive potential for us in Indonesia.

Green

170. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand¹

Washington, November 4, 1965, 7:34 p.m.

749. Ref: Djakarta's 1333.²

1. In view assurances reftel re Sukendro's role, agree we should proceed to process request for medical supplies, both because request explicitly made and because medical supplies relatively innocuous if fact of our assistance surfaced.

2. We are looking separately into question of communications equipment passed from Djakarta [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], prefer to keep this subject in Djakarta-Washington channel, and do not believe subject should be discussed with Sukendro. If he raises it, we would, however, like to know more precisely what he has in mind.

3. We do not have specific request from Sukendro for anything else. Apart from medical supplies, what he has done to date is to give us general outline of supply problem which Army faces and general outline his prospective shopping list. Since other questions such as supply of arms would present us with additional serious problems not involved in medical supplies issue, we do not wish to pursue subject with Sukendro for the present.

4. We understand Sukendro still in Bangkok. Mission should approach him through established channel and tell him following:

A. We are willing to act on his request for medical supplies, and are now reviewing list in terms availabilities, locations, means of covert purchase and pricing. We are having trouble with some items on list

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Cuthell, cleared in draft with William Bundy and with Henry Koren, Deputy Director for Intelligence Coordination, INR, and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Also sent to Djakarta and repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD and DOD for the Office of Secretary McNamara. U. Alexis Johnson sent a memorandum to the 303 Committee explaining the Army's request for medical assistance and submitting a draft of this telegram for approval. McGeorge Bundy approved the draft with minor changes, CIA gave its approval directly to Koren, and Vance telephoned U. Alexis Johnson with Defense approval. (National Security Council Files, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Indonesia) The 303 Committee noted on November 4 that these approvals were obtained by telephone. (Ibid., 303 Committee Minutes, 11/16/65)

² In telegram 1333 from Djakarta, November 4, Green stated that he was "completely satisfied as to General Sukendro's credential as a spokesman for Nasution-Suharto on aid matters." Green recommended urgent action on limited covert assistance, especially Sukendro's request for medicines—"a one shot operation involving relatively small amounts of money"—while holding back on long term aid. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON)

which we cannot identify by nomenclature given, and would like keep in touch with Sukendro or someone he designates for clarification. If Sukendro wishes to handle personally, we would like to know where he will be in next few days so that list of questioned items can be sent to him.

B. When we have completed study of package we will communicate again with Sukendro and will inform him re size of package and any large discrepancy in time of availability of component parts. In meantime we would like Sukendro's views as to preferred method and place of delivery.

5. In delivering foregoing message would like to be sure our representative does not speculate about possibility favorable action any further items other than to indicate our general willingness to consider Army requests for small-scale covert assistance. Representative should also tell Sukendro that we will be glad to talk to him outside Indonesia about limited covert assistance, but that before Washington can consider any substantial assistance it will need to know more about Army's political views and intentions and Army's attitude toward US-Indonesian relations. Representative should add that in order obtain this information he understands we are attempting to set up political contact with Indonesian Army in Djakarta through our DCM.

Rusk

171. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, November 5, 1965, 1200Z.

920. Ref: A. Deptel 750;² B. Deptel 749;³ C. Deptel 748.⁴

1. CAS Bangkok acting on authority contained para 1 Ref A conveyed the substance para 4 and 5 Ref B to General Sukendro on Novem-

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Djakarta and CINCPAC for POLAD.

² In telegram 750, repeated to Bangkok and sent to Djakarta as 576, November 4, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Indonesia that it had authorized informing Sukendro that the United States was prepared to furnish medical supplies. (Ibid.)

³ Document 170.

⁴ Not found.

ber 5. The meeting was necessarily short in view of Sukendro's then pending departure for Rangoon. Sukendro was obviously pleased with the favorable response to his request on behalf of the Indonesian Army leadership. There ensued a discussion of the covert arrangements to be made for the Indonesian Army's ostensible purchase of the medicines and a review of the medical list by Sukendro's doctor, a Col. (Dr.) Achmad Soemantri. The revised list and proposed covert arrangements will be reported in CAS channels.

2. Although the guidance contained in the referenced messages was strictly adhered to, Sukendro specifically stated the Indonesian Army leadership does desire to pursue further in subsequent discussion here the possibility of covert limited provision of weapons and communications equipment. General Sukendro specifically asked, and it was felt unwise to question the propriety of his request, that there be further discussion in Bangkok on possible covert provision of additional limited covert assistance to the Indonesian Army.

3. Sukendro advised that Col. Firmansjah is to arrive in Bangkok early next week. He stated the Colonel is being sent here to discuss the Indonesian Army small arms requirement. (This had earlier been approached by Sukendro as reported para 5, CAS Bangkok 0256⁵ and presumably has reference to para 4, Ref C.) He further stated police Colonel Soebianto is scheduled to arrive by the beginning of the week with the list of communications equipment needed by the army. There was no discussion of the planned arrival of these officers nor any discussion relative to assistance for the provision of communications equipment or weapons. It was felt best not to be drawn into a discussion of what we could or could not consider in terms of support beyond that presently approved. It was additionally believed unwise to attempt to discuss the propriety of further substantive discussions here in view of Sukendro's repeated statements that the army wishes to handle these matters here on a covert basis and security circumstances in Djakarta are not in their opinion conducive to working out details inherent in the provision of such support.

4. Sukendro will be returning from Rangoon on either 6 or 8 November in view of information which he had just received from his advance party in Rangoon to the effect that there is no additional rice available for export from Rangoon beyond that already committed for next year.

5. In view of Sukendro's apparent intention to pursue further the possibility of U.S. Government covert assistance in obtaining communi-

⁵ Not found.

cations equipment and small arms to arm Moslem and nationalist youths in Central Java for use against the PKI, we necessarily need more explicit guidance as to how this matter is to be handled here.⁶ This is particularly important in view of Sukendro's early return to Bangkok and the fact that he will perform here for a very short period of time *within which the basic arrangements will apparently need be made before his departure for Cairo*. His present schedule will require his departure on about 10 or 11 November for Cairo. He stated that he plans to leave his senior aide here to work out the implementing details of any mutually agreed assistance.

6. Although circumstances did not permit a discussion in depth of the army's political views, intentions and attitudes toward Indonesian-U.S. relations the following impinges on this subject. When substance of guidance contained in para 5, Ref B conveyed to Sukendro he responded by stating that he fully appreciates the U.S. concern and need to have the earliest possible exposition of Indonesian Army policy on these subjects. He made it clear however that any *discussion on this matter would in his opinion necessarily be academic at this point; that the army must of necessity first succeed in eliminating the PKI, Subandrio and all others in positions of leadership and authority who are responsible for the present Indonesian policy*. He stated that until and unless the army succeeds in this, it is not possible to change or openly advocate a change in Indonesian foreign policy. He stated there is no question as to the army's desire to normalize relations and this will follow naturally and automatically with the elimination of these elements. Sukendro stated that he and others of his group have discussed their hopes and plans for Indonesia so often in the past and they are embarrassed to discuss this now in view of their obvious inability to take those actions.⁷

Wilson

⁶ In telegram 762 to Bangkok, November 6, the Department of State authorized meeting with Sukendro or his representatives at his initiative, listening to what he had to say and reporting to Washington. There was to be no implication of providing anything more than medical supplies already authorized, but the U.S. officials could ask questions to clarify any Indonesia requests for additional aid. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9) According to notes of the November 8 meeting of the Indonesia Working Group, this reply went out before comments of the Embassy in Djakarta were received. (Memorandum by Nuechterlein, November 8; Washington National Records Center; RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 5127, Indonesia 000.1, sensitive, 1965)

⁷ In telegram 1353 from Djakarta, November 7, Green commented on telegram 920 from Bangkok with a reiteration of his views expressed in Document 165. As for communications equipment, he believed that low visibility equipment covertly provided would have maximum immediate utility to Indonesian armed forces. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON)

172. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, November 9, 1965.

SUBJECT

Covert Assistance to the Indonesian Armed Forces Leaders

1. The requests of the Indonesian military leaders for covert assistance in their struggle against the Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI), create a definite risk for us of deliberate assistance to a group which cannot be considered a legal government nor yet a regime of proven reliability or longevity. Early assessment of the political direction and longevity of this military leadership must be accomplished and, before any overt or readily visible assistance could be offered, its legal authority as well as its de facto control must be confirmed explicitly. As long as Sukarno fights a clever rear-guard delaying action politically, this is not likely soon to occur.

2. On the other hand, the Army leaders appear determined to seize the opportunity of the current confused circumstances to break the organizational back of the PKI, to eliminate it as an effective political force, and to prevent emergence of any crypto-Communist successor party. Recent intelligence from within the PKI party ranks clearly indicates that the PKI has begun to abandon hope of salvation through Sukarno's political legerdemain and has therefore decided it must, however ill-prepared and disorganized, fight back against the Army. Despite the overwhelming military superiority of the Armed Forces, the roots of Communism, of PKI membership, and of mass support nurtured for years by the constant flood of pro-Communist media, are so deep in many areas that the Army is very likely to be faced with a lingering insurgency situation. Specifically, much of Central Java is in very poor shape. Hard intelligence on the area shows a sizeable potential for resistance, and PKI sources indicate plans for a redoubt area there. Considering the economic problems Army leaders will face as they gradually assume more and more authority under their own program for a non-Communist future, the law of rising expectations is against them; they cannot divert popular attention from economic ills as Sukarno has for many years, and the weight of several years neglect of economic problems and realities may fall upon them. Therefore if the PKI can build even small areas of resistance in Central Java and West Sumatra, they will have the ideal bases from which to mount campaigns of harassment, subversion and sabotage as the emergent

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Indonesia, 1963-1965. Secret.

non-Communist government attempts to grapple with responsibilities already close to overpowering.

3. In addition, the Army must find some formula for continuing its relationship with Sukarno in a way that will retain real control for themselves without necessitating a preemptive hostile move against Sukarno which might cause him to defy or deny them, and thus provoke divisions in their own ranks. In this insurgency situation therefore, the Army has no real guarantee of ultimate success; hazards to its survival are many and varied.

4. One of the Army's major needs will be civilian support. They have instituted psychological warfare mechanisms, control of media prerequisite to influencing public opinion and have harassed or halted Communist output. They have also mobilized certain bases of mass support, especially among Moslems. Unfortunately in these areas where the PKI has been able to initiate an insurgent campaign or local resistance, as in Central Java, the Army has not been able to protect those anti-Communist civilians who have fought the PKI and pro-Communist rebel troops. If this situation continues, the populace in some of these areas may be intimidated from affording aid to the government forces regardless of their convictions, or they will be decimated.

5. True, the future policy of the Indonesian Army if it should succeed in controlling or eliminating Sukarno as an effective factor is not entirely clear. Two probabilities do however seem fairly significant about its future stance:

a. It will certainly be less oriented towards Asian Communist Bloc and will be decidedly Nationalist (though not without some Marxist and anti-Western concepts), perhaps with a strong neutralist flavor and hopefully with a concentration upon Indonesia's internal welfare.

b. Its future attitude regarding the West and the U.S. in particular will certainly be affected favorably by the degree to which the U.S. can now provide what limited aid the military leaders feel they require in their struggle to survive.

6. In short, we must be mindful that in the past years we have often wondered when and if the Indonesian Army would ever move to halt the erosion of non-Communist political strength in Indonesia. Now that it has seized upon the fortuitous opportunity afforded by the PKI's error in the 30 September affair and is asking for covert help as well as understanding to accomplish that very task, we should avoid being too cynical about its motives and its self-interest, or too hesitant about the propriety of extending such assistance *provided* we can do so covertly, in a manner which will not embarrass them or embarrass our government.

7. In reviewing the types of assistance which can be provided covertly, we believe that mechanisms exist or can be diverted or created

to extend either covert credits for purchases or to deliver any of the types of the matériel requested to date in reasonable quantities. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] The same can be said of purchasers and transfer agents for such items as small arms, medicine and other items requested. [1 line of source text not declassified] wherein we can permit the Indonesians with whom we are dealing to make desired purchases and even indicate to them where items may be purchased without our being in on the direct transaction. Some degree of control can be exercised through these accounts to insure that the letters of credit cannot be misused for other than specified purposes. [2-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] which can be made available on very short notice. [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] equipment would be more expensive and would require a little more time to deliver. It would however probably be more appropriate if equipment is to be handed by Indonesian Army officers to selected civilian auxiliaries.

8. We do not propose that the Indonesian Army be furnished such equipment at this time. This should be determined only after exhaustive conversations with Sukendro and his associates and, to the extent securely feasible, with Nasution's subordinates at Djakarta. In these we would probe for necessary details, e.g., precisely why they need additional arms, how they intend to use them, to whom they intend to give them, how they intend to control the release and registration of weapons and to control the groups who receive them, and many other questions.

9. If the Indonesian Army leadership continues to insist to us that they need this type of assistance to crush the PKI, and even if they furnish the above details, we would still be incurring political risk and the possible risk of loose handling of the arms in satisfying the request. These risks, however, must be weighed against the greater risks that failure to provide such aid which the Army claims it needs to win over the PKI might result in reduction of the Army's future political position and concomitant erosion of what may be a unique opportunity to ensure a better future for U.S. interests in Indonesia. It is difficult to predict definitively that aid of this type is absolutely vital to that future. If the Army leaders justify their needs in detail, however, it is likely that at least will help ensure their success and provide the basis for future collaboration with the U.S. The means for covert implementation, either of transmittal of funds for necessary purchases or delivery of the requested items themselves in discreet fashion, are within our capabilities.

173. Telegram From the Embassy in Thailand to the Department of State¹

Bangkok, November 11, 1965, 0614Z.

951. Ref: A. Djakarta's 1353 to SecState, 120 to Bangkok;² B. Deptel 762 to Bangkok, 585 to Djakarta.³

1. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] 10 November met with General Sukendro at latter's request. This meeting immediately preceded Sukendro's departure for meeting with Malaysian Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Dato Ghazali and Sukendro's subsequent departure for Cairo.

2. Implementation details for the covert provision of the medicines per Deptel 750⁴ and our Embtel 920 to Washington and 63 to Djakarta⁵ were reviewed with Sukendro at this time to insure the latter's full understanding and approval of the arrangements being made with Sukendro's designee—Col. (Dr.) Achmad Soemantri. As earlier noted Soemantri has been ordered by Sukendro to remain in Bangkok to act as his liaison officer to work out the details for the covert implementation of medical agreement. Sukendro continues, of course, to be quite pleased with the expeditious and favorable responses to the Indonesian Army's request for covert medical assistance. He stated he has reported to Generals Nasution and Suharto that arrangements were being made for the early delivery of the requested medicines. He has additionally reported in his capacity as head of the purchasing mission to President Sukarno on the arrangements for the purchase of rice and medicines. Naturally the latter report is on the basis of this being a straight commercial transaction negotiated by his mission.

3. Sukendro again referred to the army's urgent need for communications equipment. He specifically requested that arrangements be made for the covert procurement and provision to the Indonesian army of a limited amount of commercially available communications equipment. He noted that the army while hoping and working for the best must nevertheless be prepared for the worst. Despite that which has been accomplished in the past five-six weeks in crushing the PCD, he believes the army has a long way to go.

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Djakarta and CINCPAC for POLAD.

² See footnote 6, Document 171.

³ See footnote 5, Document 171.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 171.

⁵ Document 171.

4. Sukendro identified essentially three basic communications requirements. He cited two as being particularly urgent and requested US Government covert assistance in bridging what the army considers a serious communications gap. He stated the senior army leaders in the Djakarta area have no voice radio communications facilities. The army leaders need portable voice equipment to provide communications from one to the other and to perhaps two of the military units in the Djakarta area. They have in mind perhaps a dozen sets which would be assigned to Nasution, Suharto, Umar, Sukendro and other senior military leaders plus the Para Commando Unit and possibly one of the guard battalions in the metropolitan area.

5. The second requirement specifically identified by Sukendro as a significant gap in Indonesian army communications has to do with the establishment of an army voice circuit based in Djakarta and connecting the army commands at Medan, Palembang, Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya, Makassar and Bandjermasin. Security conditions permitting, they will probably want to position another set at Jogdjakarta and possibly one other principal command location. Sukendro noted the army has no long range voice communication net. The intent here is to establish a controlled quick-reaction emergency backup to the existing army CW system and commercial telephone and telegraph. Sukendro stated the deficiencies in voice communications equipment available to the army has been further aggravated by destruction of communications equipment in the course of the 30 September incident and subsequent actions.

6. He stated the army's experiences since 30 September have made them acutely aware of the inadequacies of the communications facilities presently available to them. The senior army leaders feel particularly exposed by their lack of voice communications for their personal protection, particularly in the Djakarta area. Hence the request in para 4 above. They believe in a fast moving, fluid situation such as they are now confronted with, their ability to talk immediately to the commander on the spot could be of tremendous assistance. In emergencies they recognized that time often does not permit the use of CW and the telephone system is both vulnerable and unreliable.

7. The third communications area of concern to the Indonesian Army leadership is in the area of more effective communications on the tactical unit level in the Central Java area. This problem is the subject of a staff study by Col. Soebianto in Djakarta. Soebianto however was not able to get to Bangkok prior to Sukendro's departure. Sukendro did not pursue this problem area other than to make passing reference. He specifically identified their request for equipment as having to do with the requirements set forth above. He neither stated nor implied that there would be a subsequent request for support in addition to that noted in the preceding paragraphs.

8. The army does not have funds available to purchase this equipment. If the decision is made to accede to their request it will necessarily have to be on the basis of covert procurement and delivery [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] from which point Sukendro assures the army's capability to receive and arrange onward movement to Indonesia. Sukendro stated this will not present a problem for the army. Presupposing that the equipment is sterile and commercially available the army does not believe this would present a problem of security or potential embarrassment given the requirements as identified above.

We suggest consideration might be given to the covert procurement of commercially available stock items as set forth in our immediately following telegram.⁶ The estimated cost of these units which are believed to be fully adequate to the requirement and would additionally provide a CW as well as voice communications capability, would be approximately \$40,000. Gen. Sukendro's liaison officer is locally available to follow through on this request as appropriate.⁷

Wilson

⁶ Telegram 952 from Bangkok, November 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON)

⁷ In telegram 1427 from Djakarta, November 12, the Embassy strongly recommended providing this communications equipment on the grounds that it was "critical in current, delicately balanced struggle between Army and Sukarno and cohorts." The Embassy added that the importance of the equipment to the Army far outweighed its "relatively minor costs." (Ibid., POL INDON-US) In telegram 373 to Canberra, November 12, sent also to Djakarta, London, Wellington, and New Zealand, the Department reported that Berger had informed the Australian, New Zealand, and British Embassies that the United States had agreed to send \$100,000 of medical supplies and was seriously considering giving the Indonesian Army Command \$50,000 worth of commercial communications equipment. (Ibid., DEF US-INDON)

174. Telegram From the Consulate in Medan to the Department of State¹

Medan, Indonesia, November 16, 1965, 0115Z.

65. 1. Two officers of Pemuda Pantjasila separately told Consulate officers that their organization intends kill every PKI member they

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Confidential. Repeated to Djakarta.

can catch. November 14 Secretary Medan City Pemuda Pantjasila said policy his organization is to ignore public calls for calm and order by Sukarno and other leaders. He stated Pemuda Pantjasila will not hand over captured PKI to authorities until they are dead or near death. He estimated it will take five years to eradicate all PKI. Similar statements were made few days earlier by leader North Sumatra cultural arm of Pemuda Pantjasila.

2. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] sources indicate that much indiscriminate killing is taking place (FNM-1516).² [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] Consulate sources have connected some of this violence with declaration "holy war" against PKI by local Moslem leaders. While press has carried relatively little on such violence, November 10 newspapers carried account of "revolutionary youth" cornering and beating to death PKI member North Sumatra legislature.

3. Press has also in recent days carried reports of five mutilated bodies discovered in Medan streets. PKI terrorists blamed. Commenting on these reports, above sources stated it is press policy to play up deaths of anti-Communists in order justify attacks on PKI members.

4. Same sources indicate strong hostility toward PNI and expressed determination "clean up" that organization.

5. Secretary Medan Pemuda Pantjasila at one point said bitterly that only way solve Indonesia's problems is to shoot dead both Subandrio and Sukarno. His companion agreed. Other Pemuda Pantjasila leader said on separate occasion that if Sukarno refuses ban PKI he likely be overthrown. Comments by other Consulate sources suggest growing hostility toward Sukarno generated by his evident reluctance ban PKI. Worth noting that Medan press to date has carried no word of Sukarno's recent attacks on U.S.

6. *Comment:*

(A.) Attitude Pemuda Pantjasila leaders can only be described as bloodthirsty. While reports of wholesale killings may be greatly exaggerated, number and frequency such reports plus attitude of youth leaders suggests that something like real reign of terror against PKI is taking place. This terror is not discriminating very carefully between PKI leaders and ordinary PKI members with no ideological bond to the party. FNM-1515² suggests that army itself is officially adopting extreme measures against PKI with plans to put many thousands in concentration camps.

(B.) PNI was out in force on both November 9, when they presented statement to General Mokoginta, and on November 10 heroes

² Not further identified.

day celebration. PNI avoided endorsement of demand for ban on PKI on both occasions. PNI remains large and apparently strong here and there is real possibility of violence between PNI and militant anti-Communist groups. (Pemuda Pantjasila and PNI youth clashed briefly on November 2, and Pemuda Pantjasila members reportedly carried knives and clubs to November 10 mass meeting in anticipation of clash with PNI.)

Heavner

175. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee¹

Washington, November 17, 1965.

SUBJECT

Supply of Communications Equipment to Key Anti-Communist Indonesian Army Leaders

1. Summary

The purpose of this operational proposal is to assure that certain key anti-Communist Indonesian Army leaders will have adequate communications equipment for use in their fight against the Communist insurgents. Such equipment is in insufficient supply in Indonesia. This lack has, in consequence, imperiled the personal security of important anti-Communist Army leaders and has jeopardized their effectiveness in combating the Communists' efforts to eliminate non-Communist influence favorable to us in their Government.

This request for equipment by several leading Indonesian officials has the support of the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia and is concurred in by the State Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

There are some risks in the delivery of this equipment, but [1 line of source text not declassified] with proper precautions in making deliveries to the ultimate recipients will minimize such risks. The Indonesians cannot now ostensibly nor actually purchase this equipment in the U.S. without exception being made to U.S. export license controls, thereby implying U.S. Government collusion. Any exposure of this activity would embarrass not only the U.S. Government, but certain

¹ Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Indonesia. Secret; Eyes Only.

high Army officials in the Indonesian Government. Much care will be taken in this regard.

The cost of the requested equipment is approximately [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. The supplies themselves come to [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] will be required to package and ship.

On 5 November 1965 the 303 Committee approved a similar request to send medical supplies to Indonesia.² This operation is proceeding on an urgent basis. It is hoped that the 303 Committee will approve the above program, which it is expected will proceed with the same urgency.

2. Problem

The immediate need is to provide on an urgent basis the present Indonesian Army leadership with secure voice and CW communications. Such equipment will provide a continuity of communications among the various Army units and their anti-Communist leaders and between certain of these leaders and U.S. elements. Given the uncertain loyalties within various Army commands and within Army communications proponents, existing communications equipment cannot be relied on to satisfy this need.

3. Factors Bearing on the Problem

On 13 October 1965, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] were furnished from [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] stocks for use of the guards protecting Nasution and other key Army officers. The continuing insufficiency of this equipment in the hands of leading anti-Communist Army leaders has imperiled their own personal security and could make it difficult for them in a crisis to communicate securely with each other and/or with the U.S. A [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] communications expert surveyed the needs in late October in conjunction with the Djakarta country team. The Indonesian Army does not have funds to purchase the equipment but asks that it be given to them covertly and as rapidly as possible.

a. Origin of the Requirement

The various requirements for communications equipment came [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] from the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia, from the Minister of Defense Nasution's aide, and from General Sukendro.

² See footnote 1, Document 170.

b. Pertinent U.S. Policy Considerations

On 5 November 1965 the 303 Committee approved an operational proposal for Indonesia responding to a request for medical supplies.

c. Operational Objectives

A covert contact [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] must be maintained with certain Indonesian Army leaders who also require additional means of communicating securely among their own components in their struggle with the Communists. In the confused situation of conflicting loyalties in the Indonesian scene today, the security and personal safety of the leading anti-Communist leaders and safety of their families from intimidation and kidnapping, is of vital importance to their continuance of the struggle to prevent any return to the status quo before the 30 September coup. The possible assassination of Nasution, Suharto, Umar or a number of other generals would constitute serious setbacks for the U.S. Furthermore, in order to coordinate planning with trusted subordinates, they must have private communication facilities, frequently out of direct channels, in order to be really secure. There is equipment available within the Indonesian Army units for routine communications but recent events have shown clearly that not everyone, even in high ranks of the Indonesian Armed Forces, can be relied on to be loyal to, or even sympathetic with, the desires of Nasution and Suharto to crush the PKI, especially if in virtual defiance of Sukarno.

d. Equipment

[*6 paragraphs (13 lines of source text) not declassified*]

e. Risks Involved

Any publicity on this operational program would be highly embarrassing both to the U.S. Government and to the Indonesian Army leadership. Extreme care will be taken in all aspects of this operation, especially that pertaining to shipment of the requested equipment. [*4 lines of source text not declassified*] A covert delivery procedure has been devised to the ultimate Indonesian recipient.

f. Training

A qualified and senior Army communications officer, designated by Sukendro, would be provided [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] with special covert training at a safe site in use of the equipment. He would be required to bring with him the following necessary data: details of the several proposed net patterns, including locations of components and general concept of operations for the net; the frequencies between 45 and 52 megacycles which could be used in Indonesia (to afford maximum security from local monitoring) so that, based upon these specifications, our communicator would be able to

tune the equipment to the desired frequencies and provide advice concerning a secure signal plan and communications procedures.

g. Funding

The overall cost is estimated at [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. The equipment itself will be approximately [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for shipping and packaging.

4. Coordination

This operational proposal has been recommended by the U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia and has been concurred in by the State Department's Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

5. Recommendation

That the 303 Committee approve this program.³

³ At the November 19 meeting of the 303 Committee, the members believed that assistance was "highly desirable," but McGeorge Bundy thought that "the provision of this support on as non-attributable basis as possible was far more essential than simple speed of delivery." He requested that a search be made to see if Japanese or U.S. surplus equipment were available, rather than the latest U.S. equipment. Colby agreed to try, but if other sources were not available, the matter would be referred to the Committee again. (National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Minutes, 11/19/65) At the December 17 meeting, Colby reported that CIA had located and purchased equipment similar to that already provided and thus solved the problem of attribution. (Ibid., 12/17/65)

176. Intelligence Memorandum¹

OCI No. 2942/65

Washington, November 18, 1965.

POSSIBLE DEVELOPMENTS IN INDONESIA'S
CONFRONTATION OF MALAYSIA

Summary

A major source of instability in Southeast Asia has been Indonesia's "confrontation" of Malaysia which began in early 1963. Following the change of political climate in Djakarta, there has been speculation that

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. VI, 11/65-5/66. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

the Indonesian army might bring an end to confrontation. It is unlikely, however, that the army because of the political liabilities involved and its own anti-Malaysia orientation, is now ready to take such action. In the near future military activity against Malaysia, already at a low level, should not be significantly affected by the Indonesian upheaval.

1. Although there was a massive Indonesian buildup along the Borneo border and in Sumatra, beginning last December and largely completed by May, military activity directed against Malaysia has declined during the past six months. With few exceptions, only routine patrolling and minor probing action has taken place along the Borneo border. The last Indonesian attempt to infiltrate an armed-guerrilla unit into the Malayan peninsula occurred last March. Indonesian planning for demolition sabotage against the Malayan peninsula has continued but implementation has been limited. During the past two months there has been only one explosion attributed to an Indonesian agent.

2. This lag in Indonesian activity has resulted in large part from the almost total lack of success the Indonesians have had in their past operations in Borneo and in the Malayan peninsula. In Borneo, effective British cross-border operations have disrupted Indonesian planning and have placed the approximately 17,000 Indonesian troops in the area on the defensive. Since August 1963, when Indonesian infiltration attempts against Malaya began, British and Malaysian security forces have captured or killed over 500 of the nearly 700 Indonesian guerrillas involved in these unsuccessful efforts.

3. Several recent reports have indicated that the Indonesian army now intends to reach a modus vivendi with Malaysia. However, there is reason to doubt whether the army favors an end to confrontation. While opposed to many of Sukarno's internal policies and his fostering of Communist influence, the army in the past has accepted enthusiastically Sukarno's expansionist policies and has apparently been convinced that Malaysia is a British scheme aimed against Indonesia. A good example of the army's somewhat naive international view is the lingering and apparently sincere belief among the army leadership that the British, as well as Communist China, played a role in instigating the "30 September" plot against the army.

4. If the army eventually becomes the ruling force in Indonesia it will inherit a number of pressing economic and social problems compounded by the current unrest. In the past Sukarno made use of foreign adventures and international issues to divert attention from these problems. The army could conceivably feel the need to borrow a page from Sukarno and re-emphasize confrontation.

5. Even should the army want to end confrontation, it would be difficult for it to move in this direction in the near future. After two years of anti-Malaysian propaganda, the average Indonesian considers

confrontation a patriotic duty. Even a hint of a conciliatory army position toward "neocolonialist" Malaysia would give Sukarno the ammunition he needs to undermine the army's attempts to maintain its present political initiative.

6. Although, for the above reasons, an early end to confrontation seems unlikely, military activity against Malaysia is likely to remain at a low ebb while the army is deeply involved in political maneuvering and suppression of the Communist Party. The current level of confrontation activity does not require the large numbers of troops now deployed around the periphery of Malaysia. One brigade of troops has recently been returned from the confrontation theater to the now critical areas of Central and East Java, and other similar redeployments can be expected.

7. Malaysian leaders, in recent statements, have indicated they have little hope for a settlement with Indonesia in the near future. However, a new generation of political leadership, more nationalistic, parochially Malay and anti-Chinese in outlook, is now emerging in Kuala Lumpur. If an Indonesia emerges in which Communist influence has been muzzled, Sukarno has been ousted from real power and more moderate leadership prevails, Kuala Lumpur, anxious to present a more "Afro-Asian" image, will be eager for an accommodation with its "Malay brothers" to the south and might take the lead in seeking a settlement.

8. The new nation of Singapore would look with disfavor upon a sudden normalization of relations between Malaysia and Indonesia which would also bring the elimination or reduction of British military presence in the area. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, noting the current anti-Chinese activity in Indonesia, has already expressed alarm over the prospects of a Malay "encirclement" of Chinese Singapore.

177. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, November 19, 1965, 1135Z.

1511. 1. We believe that US and allies should be extremely cautious about offering help to General[s?] at this time. In any case, our help should be contingent upon whether we believe army really intends to

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 6 INDON. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to London.

remain firm against Sukarno/Subandrio. There are conflicting indications as to whether army will remain firm or whether it will bow gradually to President's will. In view of Indo tendency to procrastinate and avoid hard decisions, we should take care lest premature, unconditional offers of assistance strengthen army tendency to avoid facing issues. Above all we should not provide assistance that will redound to benefit of Sukarno who remains head of state and govt. At present time, army would seem to be in general agreement with above approach (see Embtel 1479 reporting my latest conversation with Saito).²

2. At present there is conflicting evidence as to whether, when and how army will move against Sukarno. As long as Sukarno retains power army and anti-Communist will probably be inclined to maintain "anti-imperialist" and "anti-colonial" policy which has corollaries of continued confrontation of Malaysia and anti-Western posture generally (although viciousness of anti-US propaganda may be reduced as long as army can continue to exercise balance to Sukarno). We also foresee continued and probably increasing chaos as result of impasse between Sukarno and army that makes any kind of economic development program absurd unless and until one or other is eliminated entirely as political force.

3. Although US prospects may be better in long run (post Sukarno), we do not foresee any great improvement in US position in short run even if army can hold on as half of sort of triumvirate power structure. Furthermore, Sukarno counterattacks to regain his former power (or, ultimately, even more) will undoubtedly make use of anti-US themes. We have already seen evidence of this in President's 150 million rupiah charge.³

4. Accordingly, we recommend following line to be advanced at prospective meeting (and as basic US position):

A. We take no steps that would enhance Sukarno-Subandrio image whether desired by Indo Army or not.

B. We should not provide any significant economic assistance to Indo Army unless and until we know where they are going politically and economically. (Carefully placed assistance which will help army cope with PKI actions different.)

C. We should consider assistance to genuinely non-Communist government if there is altered atmosphere in which such assistance could be effective.

D. In discussing requests for assistance with Indo groups or third countries, we would do well to mention Sukarno's condemnation of

² Dated November 17. (Ibid., AID (JAPAN) INDON)

³ In a speech to the Cabinet on November 6, Sukarno charged that former Ambassador to Indonesia Howard Jones gave a "certain Indonesian" 150 million rupiahs for the purpose of "spreading the Free World ideology in Indonesia." (Airgram 331 from Jakarta, November 16; *ibid.*, POL 2-1 INDON)

US aid and unfounded charges of US subversion, as well as lack of evidence that Indonesia prepared to make most effective use of outside assistance.

Green

178. Intelligence Memorandum¹

OCI No. 2943/65

Washington, November 22, 1965.

INDONESIAN ARMY ATTITUDES TOWARD COMMUNISM²

1. For six weeks the Indonesian Army has been engaged in a major campaign against the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI). Party members and sympathizers are being rounded up and interned by the military; others are being purged from local government positions; and in Central Java PKI adherents are reported to be shot on sight by the army. The army has risked much of its prestige and political future on this campaign. It wants to ban the PKI and to cripple the party permanently, but its attitude toward Marxism is far more complicated than simple anti-Communism.

2. The army has a long record of opposition to the PKI as a political force. In addition, some army leaders undoubtedly view Communism as an ideology which is essentially evil, totalitarian, and alien to the "Indonesian way of life." But this view is by no means universal. Army officers and enlisted personnel, like Indonesians in all other walks of life, have for the past several years been subjected to a fairly constant barrage of pro-Communist propaganda. This propaganda, echoed and often initiated by President Sukarno, has had its effect. While some

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. VI, 11/65-5/66. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Background Use Only. Prepared by the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency.

² The Office of Current Intelligence prepared related intelligence memoranda including: OCI No. 2940/65, November 8, a biographic assessment of Suharto and analysis of his role during and after the September 30 coup; OCI No. 3041/65, November 12, entitled "The Indonesian Army: Objectives and Problems"; OCI No. 2395/65, November 17, examining the Army's concern about the rice situation in Indonesia; and OCI No. 3096/65, December 2, which examined the "Leadership Prospects in Indonesia" and concluded that Sukarno would remain chief of state with the army playing a strong national political role for the foreseeable future. (All *ibid.*, Vol. V, 10/65-11/65 and Vol. VI, 11/65-5/66)

army officers' beliefs are firmly rooted in a fundamentalist and essentially anti-Communist Moslem tradition, many others, particularly in the lower ranks, equally firmly consider themselves to be Marxist socialists. Nearly all army leaders, however, are united in regarding the PKI as a rival for power within Indonesia. They are at present engaged in a power struggle, not an ideological struggle, with the party.

3. A well-placed army source recently told the US Embassy that the army was anti-Chinese and anti-PKI, but not anti-Communist. This is a good capsule summary of the military's position, for clearly a large segment of the army is by no means opposed to Marxism per se. Indeed, officially the army gives full assent to the frequently stated proposition that the Indonesian revolution is a socialist revolution. Probably few army leaders would oppose some sort of state-controlled Marxist party, even one calling itself Communist, if this party were clearly nationalistic—that is, wholly oriented toward Indonesian national interests. The Yugoslav model is instructive in this regard.

4. The army leadership at present finds itself opposed to the PKI on a variety of grounds. First, the murder of a number of high-ranking officers in the course of the insurrection on 1 October has made it clear to the army leadership that its very survival may be at stake in the present struggle. Second, the PKI, with its high degree of political motivation and discipline, has developed an independent power structure that is not necessarily responsive to the organs of government. Finally, the army believes the PKI's ties to Peking make it in effect the agent of a foreign power. For all these reasons the army finds the PKI a threat to its own power position. But it also finds in these factors useful arguments in the propaganda war it is now waging against the PKI. It is claiming the party is out of phase with Indonesian ideals and a "traitor" to the Indonesian revolution, and is emphasizing Chinese Communist involvement in the 1 October uprising. This last argument is particularly effective, given the Indonesians' general antipathy to the numerous Chinese merchants living in their midst.

5. In pressing this campaign against the PKI, however, the army has had to tread a delicate path with respect to President Sukarno, who is not only emotionally committed to Marxism, but is also convinced that the PKI, with its high degree of discipline, is a unifying factor on the Indonesian political scene, where centrifugal forces have plagued the government from its inception. In addition, the army must consider Moscow's attitude. The Indonesian military establishment is almost totally Soviet-supplied, and the army is well aware of its dependence on the Soviet Union for spare parts, replacements, and ammunition.

6. Whatever its feelings about Peking, the army certainly wants no break with Moscow. It has been careful to exclude the Soviet Union

from its recent denunciations of the PKI and of the Chinese Communists. A recent report suggests that Defense Minister Nasution has worked out an understanding with the Soviets whereby Soviet arms would continue to reach Indonesia while the army attempted to eradicate pro-Chinese influence within the PKI. Nasution is said to have promised that Indonesia would adopt neither a policy of hostility to Communism as an ideology at home nor to the Soviet Union and its satellites in international affairs. Such an understanding, either formal or informal, seems likely, although it is probable that the Soviets would also be willing to assure Sukarno that relations with Indonesia would remain firm should he, rather than the army, emerge the victor in the present tug-of-war.

7. Moscow has been playing the recent events in Indonesia in a low key in its current propaganda. It has been making the minimum noises necessary when Communist Party members are being harried and shot by government forces—criticism far milder, for example, than that directed at Iraq in 1963 when similar conditions obtained in that country. Arms deliveries have continued to reach Indonesia without interruption over the past six weeks. There is no indication that they will be cut off.

8. Nasution is reported to have told Sukarno of his arrangement with the Soviets. He undoubtedly hopes to cut the ground from under any potential Sukarno allegation that the army, in its anti-PKI campaign, is exhibiting reactionary tendencies and is tied to "neocolonialism." The army leaders may also feel that continued evidence of Soviet good will, as expressed in uninterrupted arms shipments, may infuriate the Chinese Communists and lead to recriminations that the army could then use to advantage in its attempt to orient Indonesia away from Peking.

9. The embassy suggests that in reaching an understanding with the Soviets on the arms shipment question the army may leave itself open to Soviet pressure to resuscitate the PKI along pro-Moscow lines. While this is possible, it is by no means likely. The army would not be happy at the appearance of a revived Communist Party with strong ties to a foreign power, even if this power were Moscow rather than Peking. Furthermore, it is likely that the Soviets themselves do not particularly wish to become entangled in the thickets of Indonesian politics. They have before them the clear example of Peking's involvement in this manner—an involvement which has led to a diminution of Chinese influence in Indonesia. Moscow is primarily interested in close government-to-government relations with the Indonesians, and may well feel that its virtual arms-supply monopoly affords it greater influence on Indonesian policies than would a Moscow-oriented PKI, which the army may at some future date come to consider to be as great

a threat to it as it does the present party. Government-to-government relations supplemented by the leverage of continued arms shipments and the training of middle-grade Indonesian officers in the USSR, gives the Soviets the same sort of influence they enjoy in Egypt.

10. Indeed, even the rehabilitation of the PKI as a "national Communist party" would prove difficult in present circumstances. While the army might have no ideological difficulties in accepting such a party, it has the present PKI on the run and almost certainly would like to destroy the party's organizational structure while it has the chance. It has made no attempt to cultivate the less militant element of the PKI that might be expected to form the core of a new party. In practice it has made no distinction between those elements directly involved in the 1 October insurrection and other "safer" party members when making arrests and purging local government machinery. Moreover, the PKI, like other traditional Communist parties, is organized from the top down, and its members are inclined to follow the lead of its constituted leadership. These leaders have international considerations as well as Indonesian interests in mind, and if forced underground would probably take a large portion of the more dedicated rank-and-file with them. On the other hand, the PKI has a strong nationalist coloration, and some lower level party members may eventually be induced to join a tame, government-organized and sponsored party professing Marxism. The army would, however, attempt to see that such a party did not have a real voice in governmental policy making.

11. Even a development along this line, however, presupposes a victory for the army in its present attempt to influence Sukarno to accept its view of the PKI as a threat to the Indonesian state. This outcome is by no means certain; the army may yet be outmaneuvered by the politically astute President. In the end, the army may be forced by Sukarno to acquiesce in a rehabilitation of the PKI, or to accept the party almost whole but reconstituted under a different name. For that which worries the army most—the PKI's tight organizational structure—is precisely what makes it so attractive to Sukarno. And while it is true that the army has gone further in present circumstances in pursuing its own ends, it has retreated in the face of presidential pressure before and may do so again.

12. Whatever the outcome of the present scramble for power, it is unlikely that there will be a major change in Indonesian foreign policy. Should the army emerge on top, Indonesian policies would probably be more genuinely neutral in balancing between East and West, and the tendency to follow Peking's lead in international affairs certainly would be reduced. However, no break with Moscow is in the cards, and the army would find it difficult to extricate itself from present foreign policy attitudes to reach a genuine rapprochement with the

West. In part this is true because the army itself believes these policies to be correct, and in part because to reach an accommodation with the West would expose the army leaders to charges of "selling out to the neocolonialists" from leftist Indonesian elements independent of the PKI. Specifically, the army is deeply involved in confrontation with Malaysia and, despite some indications that its leaders are having second thoughts about this policy, it is unlikely that they can stand down on confrontation without a considerable loss of face. Furthermore, the army leadership, like Sukarno, would probably find confrontation a useful symbol around which to unify the many divisive forces at work in the archipelago.

179. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, December 2, 1965.

1628. For Assist. Sec. Bundy from Amb Green. Ref: Deptel 708, Dec 1, 1965.²

1. This is to confirm my earlier concurrence that we provide Malik with fifty million rupiahs requested by him for the activities of the Kap-Gestapu movement. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified]

2. The Kap-Gestapu activities to date have been important factor in the army's program, and judging from results, I would say highly successful. This army-inspired but civilian-staffed action group is still carrying burden of current repressive efforts targeted against PKI, particularly in Central Java.

A. Malik is not in charge of the Kap-Gestapu movement. He is, however, one of the key civilian advisers and promoters of the movement. There is no doubt whatsoever that Kap-Gestapu's activity is fully

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Indonesia, 1963-1965. Secret; Priority; Roger Channel; Special Handling.

² [text not declassified] (Ibid.)

consonant with and coordinated by the army. We have had substantial intelligence reporting to support this.

B. I view this contribution as a means of enhancing Malik's position within the movement. As one of the key civilians, he is responsible for finding funds to finance its activities. Without our contribution Kap-Gestapu will of course continue. On the other hand, there is no doubt that they need money. The latter, despite inflation, is in tight supply, and the comparatively small sum proposed will help considerably.

C. [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Our willingness to assist him in this manner will, I think, represent in Malik's mind our endorsement of his present role in the army's anti-PKI efforts, and will promote good cooperating relations between him and army.

D. The chances of detection or subsequent revelation of our support in this instance are as minimal as any black bag operation can be. [2 lines of source text not declassified]

Green

180. Memorandum From the Chief, Far East Division, Directorate of Operations, Central Intelligence Agency (Colby) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, December 3, 1965.

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, DDO Files: Job 78-00061R, Indonesia 2/2—State Department Liaison (1959-1966); Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

181. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Coordination,
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Koren) to the Director
(Hughes)¹

Washington, December 4, 1965.

SUBJECT

Mr. Berger's Meeting with Mr. Colby, December 4, 1965

PARTICIPANTS

Messrs. Berger, Cuthell and Moore for FE
Messrs. Colby, [names not declassified] for CIA
Messrs. Cooper and Thomson for WH
Mr. Stuart for INR/DDC

Indonesia

The meeting was called for the purpose of discussing the latest developments in the project to supply medicines and medical equipment to the Indonesian Army [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Attached at Tab A is a lengthy report of conversations between [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] which were held in [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] on December 1 and 2.² At Tab B is a short paper suggesting alternative methods for providing medicines and medical equipment to the Indonesian Army.³

Mr. Berger said that as a result of his reading of the conversations with [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] he had come to the conclusion that the Department and perhaps CIA too had been "conned" into taking on this project. It was perfectly obvious that Nasution knew nothing of the financial arrangements that were to have been made as cover for the project, despite the Department's insistence that he be advised. It was clear that Sukarno had sent Sukendro out to get medicine, but hadn't given him any money. Did this mean that Sukarno was merely trying to get rid of Sukendro and had no idea that the latter would take his supposed mission seriously? There was also the possibility that this whole project was a provocation. Instead of considering alternative methods of getting medicines to the Indonesian Army, what we ought to be considering was how to drop the project. Mr. Colby attempted to counter all of these assertions, but was hampered

¹ Source: Department of State, INR/IL Files, Indonesia, 1963-1965. Secret. Also sent to Denny and Evans. Drafted by Koren on December 8.

² Not printed. (FE-239; *ibid.*)

³ Dated December 3. (*ibid.*)

somewhat by necessity of arguing on policy rather than on intelligence grounds. He cited a number of times our need to show the Indonesian Army that we supported them in their campaign against the PKI, [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*]. In addition, the Army really needed the medicines. We didn't know but what a civil war was in the offing in Indonesia. The Indonesians needed to know who their friends were.

Mr. Cuthell said it was quite obvious that the Indonesian Government could scrape up a half million dollars easily if they really believed the medicines were necessary. He cited the fact that the Indonesian Navy was buying two Aero Commander planes at a cost of 575 thousand dollars, and that DC-8s which would cost 50 million dollars were also on order.

At this point Mr. Colby found support from unexpected quarters. Mr. Cooper, backed by Mr. Thomson, argued the necessity of indicating approval in a practical way of the actions of the Indonesian Army. The [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] that the medicines would cost was a mere pittance compared with the advantages that might accrue to the US as a result of "getting in on the ground floor." Mr. Thomson added that he believed that the request by Sukendro offered us an unparalleled opportunity to give an earnest of our intentions toward an Indonesia in which a moderate army leadership held the balance of power.

[*2 paragraphs (16-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified*]

After considerable further discussion it was agreed on suggestion of Mr. Cuthell that we probably had to go through with this project only because it had gone beyond recall. Mr. Berger insisted, however, that nothing further be done until [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] a detailed step-by-step plan for covering the extension of the line of credit [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*], and had submitted that plan for the Department's approval. Indicating that there was some urgency about getting the matter settled, since [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] was shuttling about various European capitals with considerable rapidity, Mr. Colby said that such a plan would be presented to Mr. Berger within the week.⁴

⁴ This was done in a memorandum from Colby to Bundy, FE-244, December 7. (Ibid.)

182. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee

Washington, December 8, 1965.

[Source: National Security Council, Special Group/303 Committee Files, Subject Files, Indonesia. Secret. 4 pages of source text not declassified.]

183. Memorandum From the Director of the Far East Region (Blouin) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Friedman)¹

I-28064/65

Washington, December 13, 1965.

SUBJECT

Emergency rice assistance to Indonesia

Ambassador Green has reported an increasing number of approaches from high Indonesian civilian officials for USG assistance in financing emergency rice shipments "to help tide Indonesia over next few months and help Army avoid losing on economic front what it has gained on political". He asked State's views on the feasibility of arranging export credit guarantees for US and/or third country's rice, whether covert financing is practicable, and what alternative methods there might be for assisting the Army if we need "to move rapidly and effectively" to support the Army's position.² Subsequently, Green reported that General Achmad, recently appointed by General Suharto to head the Economic Group of the KOTI Staff, said that he wanted to alert the USG to the Army's desire to discuss US assistance in obtaining rice from Thailand or Burma on a covert basis.³

State has advised Green that it does not believe covert assistance to be practicable, that the political situation in Indonesia is still so fluid that such assistance could benefit Sukarno-Subandrio rather than the Army, and that emergency assistance for rice should not be separated

¹ Source: Washington National Record Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, Indonesia, 400.73 (430 Indonesia). Secret. Drafted by Nuechterlein.

² As reported in telegram 1634 from Djakarta, December 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, E 1 INDON)

³ As reported in telegram 1722 from Djakarta, December 11. (Ibid., POL 23-9 INDON)

from such broader political questions as Indonesian policy on Viet-Nam, confrontation and nationalization of US oil properties. Although State's instruction does not close the door to further consideration of emergency aid to the Indonesian Army, it gives the clear impression that the USG should be in no hurry to give such aid and that when we do we should tie definite "strings" to it.⁴

In view of the probability that the USG will receive a firm request from the Nasution-Suharto leadership in the near future for aid in purchasing rice, DOD should formulate a position on this matter and relay it to State, (State's outgoing instruction was not discussed with DOD). I am inclined to think that emergency assistance to help the Indonesian Army consolidate its position should be granted promptly when and if a bona fide request is made by the Army leadership. Such short-term aid should be considered separately from long-term economic assistance and should not be conditional upon a commitment to end confrontation and to suspend plans to negotiate the withdrawal of American oil firms. Although covert financing probably is too risky, it should be possible to get the Indonesian Army's agreement on some method of handling this transaction that would not embarrass the leadership if it becomes known.

The real question, it seems to me, is whether the Army requires this rice to win its struggle for power with Sukarno, or whether it can cement its authority without our help. If our assistance is essential and is requested by the Army leadership, I think we should give it without strings. If the Army emerges on top politically, which now seems likely, we will get many requests for large scale assistance. That will be the time to talk about a change in Indonesian foreign policy and other conditions on our aid. In this connection see Djakarta telegrams 1712 dated 10 December⁵ and 1722 dated 11 December, which contain a firm Indo request for rice.

You might be interested to know that although Bill Bundy suggested in his letter of November 3 to Mr. McNaughton⁶ that the working group on Indonesia should meet at regular intervals to discuss contingency planning, no meeting has been held in nearly a month. Frank Underhill has told Don Nuechterlein informally that he doesn't believe the working group need be involved because this question involves only economic assistance.

⁴ Telegram 741 to Djakarta, December 9. (Ibid., E 1 INDON)

⁵ Not printed. (Ibid.)

⁶ Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, Indonesia 320.2-400.3295 (381 Indonesia).

Recommendation

That in discussions with State Department, DOD's position on rice aid to Indonesia be as set forth above.

F. J. Blouin⁷
Rear Admiral, USN

⁷ Printed from a copy that indicates Blouin signed the original.

**184. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in
Indonesia¹**

Washington, December 16, 1965, 5:15 p.m.

777. Ref: Djakarta's 1780 rptd addressees.²

1. Appears from here that Indonesian military leaders' campaign to destroy PKI is moving fairly swiftly and smoothly, that Subandrio's days numbered,³ and that Sukarno might be travelling abroad before long giving military even freer hand to develop and install new govt. May well be that these developments will move so rapidly that we may be confronted within weeks with situation we have hoped for, i.e. a new govt, emerging or in being, that we can begin to talk to and deal with.

2. As you indicated in para 5 reftel, Japan and Germany are in best position to offer early assistance. In these circumstances would

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Berger and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Tokyo, Bonn, and CINCPAC for POLAD.

² In telegram 1780 from Djakarta, December 15, the Embassy reported on discussions with the German and Japanese Ambassadors in Indonesia about requests for economic assistance from North American Director Helmi of the Indonesia Foreign Office on behalf of the Army. (Ibid.)

³ In Intelligence Memorandum OCI No. 3164/65, December 13, the Office of Current Intelligence of the Central Intelligence Agency provided background on Subandrio and suggested that he was "a barometer of the President's relations with the army. If Sukarno feels that he is not strong enough to resist army pressure, Subandrio is likely to be removed from Indonesian political life. If he continues to survive in office, this may be a sign that the President feels he can out-wait and out-manuever the army leadership." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. VI, 11/65-5/66)

like your views on feasibility (from point of view of exposure) and desirability of you, Saito and Wertz meeting informally together as required to concert on tactics and strategy and block out suggested lines of action for the three countries and possibly others. If idea commends itself to you, we would make this suggestion formally to Japan and Germany. We would, of course, inform UK, Australia and New Zealand of foregoing and keep them clued in.

Ball

185. Editorial Note

The question of the role the U.S. Embassy in Indonesia in compiling and providing lists of Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) members to anti-Communists and Indonesian military authorities has been the subject of controversy. In 1990 a journalist interviewed Robert J. Martens, political officer in the Embassy, and then published an article, "U.S. Officials' Lists Aided Indonesia Bloodbath in 60's." (*The Washington Post*, May 21, 1990) Martens sent a letter to the editor of *The Washington Post* on June 2, 1990, in which he stated: "It is true that I passed names of the PKI leaders and senior cadre system to non-Communist forces during the six months of chaos between the so-called coup and the ultimate downfall of Sukarno." Martens continued, "the real point, however, is that the names I gave were based entirely—I repeat entirely—on the Indonesia Communist press and were available to everyone. This was a senior cadre system of the PKI—a few thousand at most out of the 3.5 million claimed party members." Martens stressed that these lists of PKI members were "not party rank and file." Martens also stated categorically in his letter that, "I and I alone decided to pass those 'lists' to the non-Communist forces. I neither sought nor was given permission to do so by Ambassador Marshall Green or any other embassy official." Martens concluded with the statement that he did not turn over classified information nor was he the head of an Embassy group that spent 2 years compiling the lists as stated in the article in *The Washington Post*. He stated that there was no such group.

Between December 17, 1965, and August 10, 1966, the Embassy sent the Department three airgrams listing PKI members. On December 17, 1965, the U.S. Embassy in Djakarta transmitted to the Department airgram A-398 that contained as enclosures lists of the PKI leadership and a compilation on the fate of PKI leaders. The airgram was drafted by Martens who informed the Department that the Embassy had received a

number of reports concerning the arrests of prominent PKI leaders, often based on suspect evidence. Martens also cautioned that there was widespread falsification of documents, such as "alleged confessions some of which can be easily detected and some not." He then explained that enclosed in the airgram were two lists. The first was an unclassified list of the PKI leadership bodies (Politburo, Central Committee, Central Control Commission, Central Verification Commission, and Secretariat Central Committee-PKI) with the names of their members as they existed in May 1965. The second enclosure was a "fragmentary compilation on the present whereabouts of PKI leaders based on limited information available." The May 1965 list contained 95 PKI positions (comprising only 67 individuals since PKI members often had multiple positions and one official was identified by two different names). The second list described the whereabouts of 18 PKI leaders of which all but 2 were either dead, arrested, or believed to be arrested. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 INDON)

On March 11, 1966, the Embassy sent the Department airgram A-564 which was drafted by Martens and signed by Edward Masters and contained as an enclosure an update on the fate of PKI leadership from the Central Committee, Central Control Commission, Central Verification Commission and Heads of Provincial PKI Organizations who were not members of the Central Committee. The airgram indicated that information on PKI officials "remains extremely fragmentary but sufficient additional information has been received to make a new compilation advisable." The enclosure was a list of 80 PKI leaders and their status. (Ibid., RG 84, Jakarta Embassy Files: Lot 69 F 42, POL 12 PKI)

On August 10, 1966, Ambassador Green sent airgram A-74 to the Department, drafted by Marten and approved by Masters, which provided as an enclosure another update of the fate of PKI leaders. Airgram A-74 provided new information available since March 1966 on 15 senior PKI figures and listed 4 senior PKI officials reported dead and 20 reported imprisoned. This airgram, which was signed by Green, indicated that: "A sanitized [ie. Embassy attribution removed] version of the lists in A-398 has been made available to the Indonesian Government last December [1965] and is apparently being used by Indonesian security authorities who seem to lack even the simplest overt information on PKI leadership at the time (lists of other officials in the PKI affiliates, Partindo and Baperki were also provided to GOI officials at their request)." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 12 INDON) Partindo was a small left wing party that was closely allied with larger and more influential Baperki, an association of Indonesians of Chinese descent.

186. **Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹**

Djakarta, December 22, 1965, 1250Z.

1843. Reference: A. Embtel 1515. Reference: B. Embtel 1519.²

1. Indo politics has continued to move in "right" direction since our last assessment (reftels). PKI is no longer a significant political force, and Djakarta-Peking axis is in tatters. Meanwhile, army has gained in political experience and has further consolidated its position. Most notable change, however, has been further weakening of Sukarno's prestige and marked failure of his mid-November bid to get full authority back in his own hands. This failure has opened real possibility of far-reaching changes in local power structure during next few months, but many problems and hazards remain.

2. Indonesia is now in midst of basic political revolution. Final outlines this revolution still obscure, and there will almost certainly be slippage from time to time, but we do not believe Sukarno/Subandrio can reverse present trend. Following significant developments underlie this interpretation:

A. Sukarno's image is tarnished. From all sides we hear comment that he will no longer be decisive political factor in future. Even newspaper editorials and corner columns are beginning to snipe at his hitherto sacred image. Sukarno's dogged adherence to his discredited slogans and in particular to his insistence on continuing Communist role in Indo society and Indo alliance with Asian Communist regimes has furthered public disillusion. Meanwhile army leaders and others are ignoring his admonitions to extent which inconceivable three months ago.

B. Subandrio has been stripped of much of his authority. Even though earlier army hope to force him out before now has not materialized, Subandrio has lost ground. His intelligence agency (BPI) has been taken out of his hands and placed under army-dominated supreme operations command (KOTI). He has been smoothly eliminated from top leadership position in KOTI at time when that body apparently

¹Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, Canberra, CINCPAC for POLAD, Department of Defense, Kuala Lumpur, Hong Kong, London, Manila, Medan, Paris for NATUS, Singapore, Tokyo, and Wellington.

²In telegrams 1515 and 1519, both November 20, the Embassy assessed the struggle between the pro-Sukarno leftists forces and the Army/non-Communist civilians and suggested that while clear cut predictions were difficult to make, the unresolved political situation meant that regionalism was reasserting itself in Indonesia to the detriment of both Sukarno and the Army. (Both *ibid.*)

being groomed as real power center. Even within Foreign Ministry, there large faction headed by his first deputy (Suwito) which not loyal to him.

C. KOTI has developed into potential rival government. Existing cabinet (105 portfolios) must eventually be changed into more efficient governmental tool. Appointment of Nasution, Sultan Hamengku Buwono, and Ruslan Abdulgani as Deputy Supreme Commanders of KOTI, with authority over military, economic, and political affairs, seems first step in this process and virtually creates rival to Sukarno's presidium and cabinet. Below the three KOTI deputies command structures are being created reaching into every sphere of governmental activity.

D. Army's internal position is stronger. Military cohesion has tightened to extent Nasution/Suharto can now expect loyalty most key commanders in any showdown. Efforts by Sukarno to shunt aside anti-Communist military leaders have flopped, and army has retained effective urban as well as rural control despite indications month ago that control might be slipping in cities.

E. Moderates seem about to regain control of Nationalist Party (8). Sukarno support for party's radical left wing has had little effect in saving Ali/Surachman leadership. This further evidence of major shift in locus of power which has taken place.

F. Old foreign policy has been discredited. Indonesia's close alignment with Communist China is shattered. Even confrontation with Malaysia is beginning to respond to new atmosphere and we aware of as little support outside immediate Sukarno entourage for lengthy pursuit of this ill-conceived policy.

G. Indos are starting to do normal business with us again. It is apparent that high level decision has been made to clean up old problems between FonDep and Embassy. Yesterday Embassy received payment for damage to Medan and Surabaya Consulates by demonstrators earlier this year. This first reimbursement we have received since 1962. We also informed yesterday that private property of two Embassy military officers which seized when house they rented from William Palmer taken over early this year will be returned to us, ending nine months of bickering. This morning USIS books which held in storage since March were turned over to Ministry of Higher Education for use by Indo universities.

3. Indo political change not yet complete, however, and old government structure still stands in way of positive actions in some fields. Major problem for army is fact it still saddled with Sukarno. Army obviously not happy with what he says and does but still reluctant to take any direct action to remove him. It thus possible he will remain head of state although we do not believe he will regain dominant political role. In any event, we as well as army may as well face fact we may have to live with him for a while.

4. Even if Sukarno remains, we believe odds are that Subandrio will go and that locus of power will center more and more on army and civilians cooperating with it. While such government will have number of shortcomings (particularly in skilled personnel), and while it will face problems of staggering proportions, at least it likely to be government with which we can deal realistically on matters of common concern. Whether such government will be able in long run to maintain its authority and prevent fragmentation of control over these scattered islands will depend in large measure on whether army able to maintain momentum which is sweeping it to power and show concrete results in handling enormous economic and administrative problems. Continuing elimination of Communists in most areas and attacks on Chinese in some have definitely weakened public order and this is another of many problems which army will have to tackle. For time being, however, attacks on tattered remnants of PKI are being allowed to continue, although purely racial excesses against Chinese are being held in partial check.

5. As we approach 1966, we are primarily still remaining as far in the background the Indonesian scene as possible, but on near horizon is necessity to be prepared to work with a new order which will still contain many problems for us but will be infinitely more healthy and more promising than what we had before Oct 1.

Green

187. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara¹

JCSM-909-65

Washington, December 30, 1965.

SUBJECT

Aid to Indonesia (U)

1. (S) A recent message from the US Embassy, Djakarta, contains information indicating that President Sukarno might be re-

¹Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 70 A 3717, Indonesia 320.2-400.3295 (381 Indonesia). Secret.

moved from power after 1 January 1966 and Indonesia may request US aid.²

2. (S) Should this occur followed by an Army takeover, requests for overt economic assistance—especially for foodstuffs—may be substantial. Requests for the overt provision of military matériel probably would not be large. Items which might be requested include ammunition, man-portable radios, light automatic weapons, vehicles, and perhaps C-130 and C-47 aircraft spares. Some training assistance might also be sought.

3. (S) The displacement of President Sukarno by the Indonesian Army could benefit US security interests in the area. While political philosophies within the Army cover the full spectrum of those existing in Indonesia, the Army as a whole appears to be searching for a non-aligned policy which runs counter to President Sukarno's previous alignment as a junior partner of the ChiComs. The Army appears to be the strongest single anticommunist force in the country but will eventually call for civilian leadership which, in turn, probably will represent a nationalist-religious-communist coalition. The US interests would be best served if the government which follows President Sukarno's removal were to be pro-Western. It is more likely that it would be neutralist. In any case, opportunities to influence the course of events will be presented to the United States and it is appropriate to investigate at this time ways in which they can be exploited to US advantage.

4. (S) There are several factors, however, which impinge upon the advisability of immediate overt provision of military aid to the Indonesian Army by the United States:

a. The position of the Indonesian Army is precarious and any overt provision of US military aid at this time could tend to reinforce charges by Sukarno, Subandrio, Peiping, and Moscow that the Army is a "tool of (US) imperialism."

b. Without a demonstrated willingness on the part of Indonesia to discontinue the "crush Malaysia" policy, the United States could be in a position of subsidizing Indonesian aggression and opposing US/UK interests in the area. On the other hand, relaxation and eventual elimination of the confrontation with Malaysia would reduce the cost to the United Kingdom of maintaining military commitments in Malay-

² Telegram 1797 from Djakarta, December 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON) In telegram 1924 from Djakarta, December 30, the Embassy suggested that although dissatisfaction with Sukarno had increased, opinions differed on whether he would be ousted in the near future. The Embassy stated that "on balance we believe Army would prefer not to oust Sukarno at this time unless their hand is forced, most likely by Sukarno himself." (Ibid.)

sia and Singapore and could lead to advantageous economic relations among Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore.

c. Problems concerning expropriation of US economic assets, subversive intent toward the Philippines, and recognition of international law in the matter of free passage of the sea straits between Indonesian islands all require resolution.

d. Considering present US commitments in Southeast Asia, the logistics implications of aid to Indonesia must be evaluated.

e. In view of Indonesia's past tendency to export aggression, the impact on neighboring countries of aid to Indonesia should be considered.

5. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that:

a. The United States, if requested, be prepared to provide Indonesia a limited quantity of emergency foodstuffs/medicines in the interest of showing support for the new government.

b. Since the campaign of the Indonesian military leaders against the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) appears to be progressing according to plan and no US military assistance appears required for internal security, the United States should not overtly provide military aid to Indonesia at this time.

c. Prior to giving favorable consideration to additional requests for overt aid, the problem areas outlined in paragraph 4, above, must be substantially resolved.

d. The Department of State and the Department of Defense jointly establish criteria for the resumption of overt military and economic assistance.

e. A memorandum substantially as contained in the Appendix hereto be forwarded to the Secretary of State.³

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
David L. McDonald⁴
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ Printed from a copy that indicates McDonald signed the original.

188. Memorandum From the Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to Chester L. Cooper and James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, January 19, 1966.

Since you guys are less suspicious than Bundy that I am horning in on Indonesia, note Djakarta's 2092.² Here's the first time I've seen Marshall Green himself shifting ground and recommending that he be allowed to tell the Army we would join in providing emergency aid if really needed.

Marshall is a quick study; he's also the man on the spot. So perhaps we should use his views as a lever to move our reluctant FE friends.

It's also worrisome to me when we do nothing but discourage the Japs, Germans, and others who come in to ask whether *they* should now contemplate aid. It's one thing to say that we think it too soon to talk of aid, but quite another to avoid even indicating that if things continue to go well we would probably change our tune.

With things still breaking our way in Indonesia,³ I cannot understand the reluctance of State even to get ready to exploit it. If they think the President would be reluctant, I'll bet they're wrong. He was very forthcoming on Ceylon, and even bought aid to the UAR when we convinced him.

RWK⁴

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Indonesia, Nov. 63-Mar 66, [1 of 3]. Secret. A copy was sent to McGeorge Bundy.

² In telegram 2092 from Djakarta, January 19, Green reported that Helmi of the Indonesia Foreign Office reiterated his plea for emergency assistance for the Army from western countries. Helmi suggested that 300,000 to 350,000 tons of rice, 50 million yards of cotton cloth, and medical supplies were needed to prevent friction within the Army ranks and disillusion among the general public. Helmi estimated the cost at \$50 million and suggested that western donors share the burden. Green recommended telling Helmi that he (Green) would meet with Suharto and Nasution to explore the question of aid and at least give them assurances that emergency aid would be forthcoming when the time was right. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON)

³ In OCI No. 0481/66, January 3, "The Changed Political Scene in Indonesia," the Office of Current Intelligence of CIA stated that Indonesia was at "a major turning point in its history. The era of Sukarno's dominance has ended." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. VI, 11/65-5/66) In a January 7 memorandum to William Bundy, Cuthell suggested that "in the months and years ahead it is clear that the Indonesian military, and more particularly the Army, will dominate as it has never before the Indonesian political scene." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, EA/Indonesia Files: Lot 70 D 3, Pol 2 Gen)

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.

189. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia¹

Washington, January 20, 1966, 1:48 p.m.

969. Ref Embtel 2092.²

1. Suggest DCM reply to Helmi along following lines: We wish to convey to Helmi and through him to Generals Nasution and Suharto two basic interrelated and inseparable thoughts:

a. The US continues to be interested in the welfare, progress and independence of the Indonesian people and is prepared assist GOI in its efforts achieve these objectives, and

b. Only the Government of Indonesia can create the conditions in which it is possible for USG to play this role.

2. The lack of favorable response to Helmi's previous overtures is not due to any negative attitude or lack of friendship or sympathy, but rather to fact that Indonesia has not yet created situation in which the US can be of assistance to Indonesia.

3. Following are major elements still missing:

a. In regard both emergency and development aid, we must be sure we are dealing with cohesive and effective GOI which can and will use it effectively.

b. We can only deal openly and publicly with Indonesian Government on matter of aid. It is impossible for a democratic country such as the US, responsible to Congress and to its people, to give substantial assistance covertly.

c. Cooperation with Indonesia has never been conditioned on US-GOI agreement on all issues, but US people could not give, nor Indonesian people accept, assistance when the US is being publicly identified by highest GOI officials as arch enemy of Indonesian people.

4. Under these circumstances US can do nothing but wait. Initiative is in Indonesian hands not in our own.

5. FYI. We do not wish Helmi, nor through him Suharto-Nasution, to get idea US assistance merely awaits green light from Army leadership. Process of basic political and economic change begun in weeks following October 1 with elimination PKI has slowed down. (It is significant Helmi-Suharto now see substantial aid from West given to a GOI still headed by Sukarno with Sukarno hopefully prepared accept aid as act of grace.) There is presently no evidence that assurance of

¹Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) INDON. Secret; Priority; Lindis. Drafted by Underhill, cleared by Cuthell and Barnett, and approved by Berger. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD.

²See footnote 2, Document 188.

US and other foreign assistance would accelerate and not retard changes which Indonesia in its own interest must make. Army discouragement on aid prospects under present circumstances may in fact by necessary additional spur to move it into further action.

6. Believe DCM should not suggest direct contact between you and either Suharto or Nasution on subject US assistance at this time. Fact of meeting at our initiative will be interpreted as conclusive evidence US in fact eager provide assistance in present circumstances if way can be found. Also, in context current Sukarno-Subandrio campaign against you and Embassy, meeting with either of top generals would seem inconsistent with both Nasution's and Malik's advice.³ End FYI.

Rusk

³ In telegram 2138, January 22, the Embassy reported that DCM Galbraith made the points enumerated in this telegram to Helmi who accepted with "relatively good grace although he was obviously disappointed." Helmi clearly believed that the United States was being too negative in the face of the Army's real needs and achievements of the past four months, but he would pass the U.S. position to the Army. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) INDON)

190. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, February 2, 1966, 1210Z.

2204. 1. Following message summarizes some personal opinions as to course of events in Indonesia and implications for US policy.

2. During first three weeks of December army scored considerable gains in its power struggle with the palace. During this period a prestigious triumvirate was named to direct KOTI (top policy and coordination body) with expanded powers, Subandrio was under heavy challenge, his intelligence branch (BPI) was reported to have been transferred to control of KOTI, KOTOE was abolished, Gestapu trials were announced, and left-wing political groups were being driven more and

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Canberra, CINCPAC for POLAD, Bonn, London, Medan, Paris for NATUS, Tokyo, and Surabaya.

more to cover. A number of specific though small irritants in US-Indo relations were removed. By the end of the month there were rumors, some emanating from well informed sources, to effect that major shifts expected in January which would also see departure of Sukarno for extended trip abroad.

3. January, however, was marked by a number of set-backs for the army's position and by a recrudescence and regrouping of palace forces. In retrospect it appears that important showdown occurred at conclusion of three-day KOTI session on December 18 when President apparently refused to ban PKI and reasserted all his old positions. Up to that point army leadership had been operating on wishful theory that President could be brought into line on such key issues as banning the PKI and reorganizing government structure to give due attention to mounting economic crisis. However, his views were set forth in such uncompromising terms during crucial KOTI session December 16-18 that all present realized he was not going to concede one inch. Question arose: What should the army and moderates now do? There followed a short period of indecision with majority of army group, led by Nasution, favoring no action to confront President Sukarno directly and decisively. Their unwillingness to tackle Sukarno may have reflected concern as to loyalty of rank and file in the military were army to find itself in open opposition to Sukarno. Army may also have rationalized that since Sukarno and his clique refused to cooperate willingly it might be better tactic to leave them in power and let them bear full responsibility for economic deterioration.

4. When it became revealed to President in late December that army was unwilling to take any concerted action against him, he saw wider scope for his operations.

5. Public reaction during first two weeks of [garble—January?] to high prices on rice, kerosene, transportation, etc. permitted the army to move behind public opinion and encourage students to take to streets denouncing PKI, Subandrio, Sukarno's monuments and other things offensive to army and moderates. This agitation culminated on January 15 when thousands of students tried to storm gates of Bogor Palace, requiring Suharto's personal appearance before them to urge restraint. President was obliged to promise that his economic ministers would review the situation to see whether prices could be lowered.

6. Bogor Palace episode seems to have shocked the army, as much as Sukarno, re serious consequences which army would face were these disorders to get out of hand as they almost did. Thereafter army and President were genuinely united in a resolve to prevent further disorders and to crack down on students, Moslems, and others who might go to extremes. Army made its position clear to these various groups.

7. Net effect of recent events has been to discourage some of army's civilian allies and give Sukarno additional leeway to maneuver. Moderate political leaders tend increasingly to regard army as untrustworthy ally that is willing to push civilian groups to fore but deserts them when Sukarno attacks. This attitude will reduce army's ability to use such groups later.

8. Sukarno has been operating on the theory, I believe, that the longer he can delay his political solution the better chance he has of being able to accelerate realization of his cherished goals of NASAKOM and CONEFO. Possibly he feels that to announce such a solution today would invite more serious risks of counter action than to make such an announcement, say, two months from now when further divisions amongst the army, parties, religious and youth groups would have weakened his opposition. Moreover, uncertainty over political solution may feed policy differences within army itself. As long as Sukarno can sustain idea that he may ban PKI or otherwise make decision for which army leaders hope, it seems likely that a number of army voices would favor policy of "not rocking boat."

9. On the other hand, Sukarno is obviously under a great deal of pressure from many quarters to announce his decision. There is also the compelling factor that foreign governments from which Sukarno hopes to get additional assistance and relief on debt payments will be leery about actions to help Indonesia pending clarification of political situation and more importantly evidence that Indonesia has at long last come up with sound organization and plans.

10. Although we have reports from at least two reliable sources that Sukarno may very shortly announce his political decision involving promotion of NASAKOM, there would seem to be a somewhat better chance that Sukarno will go no further at this time than announcing some limited reorganization of his cabinet that would give the appearance of providing Indonesia's economy with better direction and organization. Such an announcement might, in Sukarno's opinion, set the stage for sending out missions to foreign capitals looking for debt relief and credits. He might feel that this was all that was required, particularly if men selected for top economic roles both in Djakarta and on these missions enjoyed good reputations with the countries concerned.

11. Army leaders might find such a quasi-solution acceptable on several grounds. A full-scale political decision would probably involve a Sukarno announcement they would not favor, and could also touch off sharp reactions and even disorders of a nature which army obviously wishes to avoid. Moreover army would rationalize that, if economic situation continues to worsen and if missions Sukarno sends to other countries come back empty-handed, President may be forced by events

to accept the kind of reorganization of cabinet and attention to economic problems which the army and other moderate elements seek. Hopefully Sukarno could thus be brought to heel.

12. At present and for at least the near future, Nasution seems to regard the army's role in the power struggle as directed toward maintaining law and order and preventing any kind of excesses either from the students or Moslems, or even the Presidium. The kind of Presidium excesses which army would probably not countenance would include outright legalizing of PKI, close Djakarta relations with Peking, and actions that might isolate Indonesia even further from friends on whom army and moderates might later on have to count in accepting greater responsibility for government. I believe army would regard breaking of diplomatic relations with US to fall in this category of impermissible actions. Whether it would include unfriendly acts toward the US such as the eviction of some of its diplomats here is less certain.

13. I continue to feel that, as long as Sukarno has as much power as he has today, current political and economic chaos will continue and probably deepen, and that he will be working relentlessly to drive the revolution leftward in direction of his goals of NASAKOM and CONEFO.

Current army strategy of trying to chip away at powers of President may succeed, but there is in my opinion an almost equal chance that President can successfully divide and conquer his opposition.²

14. US capabilities to shape events are very slight, but we do have some common interests with countries like Japan which have aid programs and considerable influence in Indonesia. If these countries require a realistic attack by GOI on its basic economic problems before they are willing to grant Indonesia relief on debts and to extend further credits, this might in itself have a salutary impact and could strengthen the hands of those in Indonesia who seek such changes.

15. It might be useful to draw upon this theme in our discussions with the countries concerned taking extreme care, of course, not to expose ourselves to any appearances that we trying to get friendly

² The Office of Current Intelligence at CIA, produced an Intelligence Memorandum, OCI No. 0494/99, February 4, entitled "Paralysis in Indonesia." It concluded that neither Sukarno nor the Army were able to impose their will on the other, but Sukarno believed that time was on his side in achieving his goal of reestablishing himself at the center of Indonesia political life and reviving the left in Indonesia. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. VI, 11/65-5/66) In telegram 2260, February 9, Green reported a conversation with Malik in which Malik's "interpretation of events and trends almost entirely accord with view I expressed in Embtel 2204." Green reported that Malik added additional information on the disintegration of Indonesia's economy and the political consequences. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON)

countries to gang up against Indonesia. As Embtel 2195 points out,³ donor countries have reasons enough to require reasonable assurance re Indonesia's economic and other policies before extending additional assistance.

Green

³ Dated January 31. (Ibid., POL 2-3 INDON)

191. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 14, 1966.

SUBJECT

Indonesia—Consultation

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Marshall Green—U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia

H. Kent Goodspeed—Officer-in-Charge, Indonesian Affairs

1. Ambassador Green reviewed the present situation in Indonesia, four and one-half months after the abortive Communist-backed coup of October 1. He noted that there have been several favorable achievements, albeit mostly of a negative nature: the PKI has been destroyed as an effective political force for some time to come; the axis with Communist China is in disarray; the Afro-Asian solidarity movement has suffered; and Sukarno's personal image has been tarnished. On the other side of the ledger, Sukarno's ideology still pervades Indonesian society, Subandrio and other leftist ministers have managed to retain a large degree of their power, and the momentum evident in November and December to reorganize and drastically reform the governmental structure has been lost, largely because of the Army's fear of widespread civil disorder and chaos. The Army has, in a sense, bought unity at

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 2 INDON. Secret. Drafted by Goodspeed on February 16. The meeting took place in Rusk's Office and began at 4:47 p.m. Rusk's next appointment was at 5:10 p.m. (Johnson Library, Rusk Appointment Book) Berger sent Rusk a short briefing memorandum for this meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, EA/Indonesia Files: Lot 70 D 3, PER 9-3 Consultation)

the expense of further action. The Army, as well as Moslem political groups who have a vested interest in preventing the resurgence of the Communists that have been decimated by wholesale massacre, will prevent a renaissance of the PKI. The Army will also oppose attempts to revive close relations with Communist China. Beyond that, the Army is unlikely to openly confront Sukarno, who retains his charisma with the Indonesian people and his domination of the older generation of political and military leaders.

2. The impetus for change at present comes mainly from the younger generation, particularly from student groups, and is sparked by dissatisfaction with the incredibly bad management of government coupled with increasingly chaotic economic conditions. Inflation and the increase in money supply are rampant, and there are some areas suffering from food shortages. In addition, years of living on a structure of pyramiding credits have brought on a severe foreign exchange crisis that is likely to be the spark igniting further political change. Indonesia has a total foreign debt of approximately \$2.5 billion on which payments due in 1966 are \$470 million. Since foreign exchange earnings are expected to amount in the neighborhood of only \$450 million, service on the debt will obviously have to be rescheduled. However, to date Indonesia has offered no signs of being willing to talk with creditors as a group or to demonstrate it is prepared to tackle its problems in a rational manner to induce capital exporting countries to be able or willing to be of any assistance. The Army is following a policy of remaining aloof from assuming the responsibility for economic problems; and although the Army leadership has put out some feelers, it has made it known privately that it does not want outside assistance at this time.

3. Reviewing the present state of relations of various countries with Indonesia, Ambassador Green noted that the U.S. position was at least much better than in the pre-October 1 period, ChiCom-Indonesian relations are becoming increasingly strained, and the Soviet position is at best unenviable. The Russians are in the embarrassing situation where an Army in which they have a large investment is actively suppressing a Communist Party, but at the same time they are not displeased with the destruction of the power of a thoroughly ChiCom oriented Communist Party. The Soviets probably would not object to a situation developing in Indonesia somewhat analogous to India, with both the U.S. and the USSR providing aid and with Communist China out of the picture.

4. The Secretary noted that if the U.S. were ever able to play a role in Indonesia again, particularly in regard to providing economic assistance, there were two important prerequisites: some satisfactory resolution of the Malaysian confrontation irritant, and some rational

policy toward U.S. oil companies that would not terminate in precipitous action that would bring the Hickenlooper Amendment into effect.² Ambassador Green said that the military viewed confrontation as an unproductive drain on Indonesian resources that only served to divert military power from more pressing internal security functions, but that a termination of confrontation would more likely take the form of a gradual withering away rather than be the result of a negotiated settlement. The American oil companies are faced with difficult problems, but Ambassador Green expressed the hope that through a moderate and far-sighted approach to negotiations they would find a formula to remain in Indonesia; or that if impelled to pull out, they would do so without retaliatory measures that would set off severe anti-American reactions.

² The Hickenlooper amendment was to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and was revised in 1963. It forbade U.S. assistance to nations which expropriated U.S. foreign property and assets without compensation. (77 Stat. 386)

192. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson¹

Washington, February 15, 1966.

Marshall Green Appointment. This is a good time for you to talk with our man from Indonesia, because of simmering policy differences within the USG. We all agree that the Army/Sukarno split is a good thing, and want to encourage the military—no matter how neutralist they are, they're much better than Sukarno. But he's been regaining ground against them recently.

The issue is whether to give a bit more quiet support to the Army. As Indonesia's economy slides downhill, we've had numerous approaches asking that we at least underwrite emergency rice purchases

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Indonesia, Nov. 63 to Mar. 66, [1 of 3]. Secret.

by the Army. The latest is at Tab A.² State turned it down (Tab B)³ on grounds of conflicting advice from the Army *not* to help them yet.

Now the VP is in, saying the Thais see this as our great opportunity and urging we not miss the boat (Tab C).⁴ I've talked with Green, who would like authority to move when he sees the right opening, but is dubious that this latest play is it. He's probably right. But if you give him (and Bill Bundy who'll be along) a sense of *your own desire not to miss the boat in Indonesia*, it will encourage State not to be too unimaginative when we may at last have Sukarno on the run.

R. W. Komer⁵

² Tab A, telegram 1663 from Bangkok, February 14, in which Chester Cooper, who was traveling with Vice President Humphrey, reported a conversation of February 12 among himself, Humphrey, and Thai Air Chief Marshal Dawee. During this conversation and in a meeting with Cooper the next day, Dawee encouraged the United States to grant emergency assistance to the Indonesian Army, specifically a request from General Achmed Tirtasodior for a letter of credit to allow him to purchase 200,000 tons of rice in Thailand. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, INCO RICE 17 INDON-THAI)

³ Tab B, telegram 1439 to Bangkok, February 14, in which reasons were cited for the denial including the inability to keep covert such a letter of credit, and the Army's apparent access to Indonesian foreign exchange earnings as evidence by advance payments of \$18 million for two DC-8 aircraft and \$11 million for another project. (Ibid.)

⁴ Tab C, telegram 1608 from Karachi, February 15, from Humphrey to President Johnson and Rusk. (Ibid.)

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

193. Briefing Notes for President Johnson¹

Washington, February 15, 1966.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Ambassador Marshall Green Tuesday, February 15

Marshall Green has returned for consultations at a moment when Sukarno's political adroitness is recouping for him much of the

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Indonesia, Nov. 63 to Mar. 66, [1 to 3]. Secret. These notes were originally prepared as a draft memorandum for the President, but Komer changed them to Briefing Notes for the President's meeting with Marshall Green on February 15; see Document 194. Attached but not printed is a brief biographical sketch of Green. The Department of State also prepared a February 12 briefing paper for the President. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, EA/Indonesia Files: Lot 70 D 3, PER 9-3 Consultation)

power assumed by the military following the PKI's abortive coup last fall.

After employing brilliant "salami" tactics in eliminating the PKI as an effective political force, Generals *Nasution and Suharto* are now *temporizing* in using the political leverage they have gained against Sukarno. *The military* fear their unity will not hold up under a direct challenge to Sukarno and are *once again* reverting to a policy of *pursuing limited political objectives*. *Sukarno* is exploiting the military's hesitation to *reassert his full powers* and *continue* in force his *radical left* domestic and foreign policies.

In effect, "*two governments*" are now *competing for power* and attempting to administer the country. The struggle is likely to continue for some months without clear resolution, but *Sukarno* has *maneuvered into a somewhat better position* to come out ahead.

Without effective government, *severe inflation* is *rampant* and the economy continues its dangerous slide into chaos. The military are attempting to saddle Sukarno with responsibility for national mismanagement while seeking their own essential rice supplies through private channels abroad.

Our policy during this period has been to *maintain correct relations* with the government without attempting to initiate new aid or other programs of support. We are *reluctant to bolster Sukarno* through new monetary stabilization and other aid, are still awaiting clarification in the current political confusion, and are coupling aid with the *necessity for improved diplomatic relations and changes in Indonesian policies*. The military have been opposed to new, overt foreign economic assistance until they have achieved certain (undefined) political changes.

Our ability to respond to Indonesian requests for aid when they are made may be *hampered* by the simmering crisis between the Indonesian Government and U.S. oil companies. The momentum of Indonesian harassment has continued since the abortive coup last fall.

Green considers the next six months critical. You may wish to raise with him:

1. Whether our present posture remains viable in the face of Sukarno's reassertion of his authority.

2. A specific question might be whether expanded quiet U.S. assistance to the military might place them in a better position to blunt Sukarno's impetus toward restoring his radical left policies.²

² Komer sent a February 10 memorandum to the President to obtain approval of the meeting with Green. In that memorandum he noted that "The power struggle between Sukarno and the Army is the second biggest story in Southeast Asia" and the outcome was still uncertain. Komer suggested giving "a little more discreet help to the Army; or at least to tell them we'd do so if and when they made the right noises. A word from you to Green would stimulate contingency planning." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 20, Feb. 5-28, 1966)

We have serviceable channels to the military if more extensive quiet support is desired. We have so far limited this to the provision of medical supplies and communications equipment.

R. W. Komer³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

194. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 15, 1966, 11:55 a.m.-12:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

Indonesia

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy
Ambassador Marshall Green
Mr. Robert Komer

At the President's request, Ambassador Green discussed current and prospective trends in Indonesia, concluding with some general recommendations as to United States policy in dealing with Indonesia. The Ambassador pointed out that, even though relations between Indonesia and the United States continue to be far from satisfactory, the abortive coup last October 1 had resulted in a crushing of the Communist Party; a great loss of international prestige for Peking, whose hand was suspected as involved; a continuing worsening of relations between Indonesia and Communist China; a blow to Sukarno's pretensions as leader of the "new emerging forces" against the Western world; and a certain loss of prestige and standing for Sukarno among his own people. However, Sukarno remains on as President and leader of the

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL INDON-US. Secret. Drafted by Green and approved in the White House on February 23. The meeting was off the record. The time of the meeting was taken from the President's Daily Diary. (Johnson Library)

revolution. He is succeeding to some extent in playing upon the divisions and fears of his opponents in regaining power. He seems bent upon getting the revolution back on leftward course. He is clever and persuasive and still seems to have extraordinary physical reserves.

According to Ambassador Green, the Army-led opposition to Sukarno, though unwilling to oppose Sukarno directly or frontally, is deeply opposed to any revival of the Communist Party and to close relations with China. The opposition would also like to see better organization and more pragmatism in government. However, fearful of civil disorders, concerned over the loyalty of their own rank and file and infected with a good deal of Sukarnoism, the Army is reluctant to oppose Sukarno directly. The military may also be reluctant to assume too much responsibility for events as long as Indonesia continues its downward course, economically and politically.

Ambassador Green felt that the deepening economic chaos, especially the crisis over foreign exchange and the tendency of various ministries to bypass the central bank, may force things to a head within the next six months or so. The situation in Indonesia is going to be extremely messy for some time to come, he added, and it is impossible to predict with any degree of accuracy the relative likelihood of a whole series of possible eventualities. What does seem to be relatively clear is that we are now in an extended transition phase between Sukarno and an unknown successor.

In this situation, the Ambassador felt that the United States should continue to maintain a low profile and preserve its options. The Ambassador said he greatly appreciated the way American officials from the President on down had avoided public statements about Indonesia. Maintaining this kind of low posture continues to be essential, since anything the United States says or does about Indonesia is subject to distortion and misinterpretation. We continue to be deeply suspect of trying to interfere in their affairs, which we of course are not doing and must not do.

The President asked whether all United States assistance to Indonesia, including assistance to the military, had been terminated. The Ambassador said it had, and he recommended that the United States not extend further assistance to Indonesia until it really begins to set its house in order. He pointed out that Sukarno is outspokenly opposed to any United States assistance to Indonesia whereas the top Indonesian military leaders have themselves secretly conveyed to us and to the Japanese that they are opposed to any assistance at this time since it would benefit Sukarno and Subandrio.

The Ambassador nevertheless felt that we should keep an open mind with regard to aid. A situation might suddenly arise where supplying Indonesia with limited quantities of grain might be desirable

on humanitarian grounds as well as to help prevent outbreaks of food riots and disorders that could endanger foreigners in Indonesia.

If the Indonesians do begin to undertake significant measures for improving their organization and direction, then, in the Ambassador's opinion, we should be prepared to lend a helping hand, preferably through a consortium arrangement or through international bodies like the ADB.

Summary of Action

The President said he appreciated having these observations and that he would leave it to the Ambassador to make specific recommendations as to the timing and conditions under which the United States might extend assistance to Indonesia.

195. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Thailand¹**

Washington, February 15, 1966, 7:13 p.m.

1451. Embtel 1663.²

1. We have again reviewed reftel matter, including general consideration at all levels, and believe we must adhere to basic position stated Deptel 1439 to Bangkok,³ on which we gather you have not yet acted. In reaching this decision, we have taken full account of additional conversation with Thanom and Thanat reported in Karachi 1608⁴ (being repeated addressees).

2. In view of strong affirmative urgings of Thanom and Thanat, we now believe best tactical method might be to discuss matter frankly,

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, INCO-RICE 17 INDON-THAI. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by William Bundy, cleared in substance with Komer, cleared by Green, Berger, and Underhill; and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Djakarta and New Delhi.

² See footnote 2, Document 192.

³ See footnote 3, Document 192.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 192.

probably with Thanat, before we make any response to Achmad.⁵ Accordingly, you should see them and make following points fully and frankly:

a. We accept Achmad's authorization to try to buy rice from Thailand, and even to seek US credit backing for so doing. However, our own contact with Indo military in Djakarta has left us with clear understanding that Nasution and Suharto do not wish anything at present time that could be identified as US aid. Accordingly, we are at present skeptical of validity Achmad's statement that he is not worried by possibility that Sukarno would discover US involvement. Our own contacts leave us with directly contrary understanding, so that our present impression is strongly that any US role would have to be totally covert.

b. Any transaction on the scale of 50,000 tons, involving roughly \$7 million, simply cannot be handled by USG on covert basis. We have examined this question exhaustively and believe reports to the Congress of action taken, if not an outright Presidential Determination, would be required, which in the existing state of Congressional opinion, with at least a few vocal questioners of such action, would mean that our action would almost inevitably become public at US end.

c. Moreover, Indonesian lack of credit is well known in rice market and any credit transaction would lead to immediate questions whether Thailand could conceivably be carrying on such operation from its own resources and to surmise in wide circles that USG was actually backing transaction. This factor alone would appear to us to remove any possibility that sizable transaction could be kept covert.

d. Assuming that US role would thus come to light, there is our strong judgment that exposure would be used by Sukarno and Subandrio against Army leadership as evidence US efforts interfere Indo domestic affairs. This could have serious and indeed potentially disastrous effect on Army's current efforts to get clear upper hand in face Sukarno's increasingly resourceful political tactics.

e. In addition, from policy standpoint, USG would have some doubt whether direct assistance to Army at this time might lead to weakening Army resolve to work for basic economic reforms necessary

⁵ In telegram 1694 from Bangkok, February 17, Martin suggested that Dawee was the principal Thai official supporting Achmad's efforts and Thanat had suggested U.S. support only if the transaction could be a "completely 'clean' deal." Since Thanat and Thanom were leaving for Australia, Martin had his frank discussion with Dawee who said he understood the U.S. decision, but regretted it. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, INCO-RICE 17 INDON-THAI) In telegram 1701 from Bangkok, February 18, the Embassy reported that Achmad had been informed of the U.S. decision and at the same time assured of U.S. sympathy for Nasution and Suharto. Achmad regretted the decision, but stated he understood the U.S. position. (Ibid.)

to create foundation on which outside assistance would have regenerative effect.

f. As to Thai argument that Chicoms likely to give rice to Sukarno, our own judgment is that Peiping/Djakarta relations are now at a new low and that Chicoms must be well aware that Army in fact would control disposition any rice arriving in Indonesia and would see to it that military needs met first.

g. Net of above is that we simply cannot see our way clear at this time to take risks, amounting we believe to certainty, of disclosure USG role, in return for doubtful benefits.

3. You should then discuss frankly with Thanat whether they or we should convey any message to Achmad for time being. FYI: Although they have clearly thought any transaction depended on us, our response may cause them to reflect on handling at least modest trial deal on their own. If so, we might wish to concert our response to Achmad with what Thai say. End FYI. In any case, we would not wish Thai to speak for us to Achmad other than along lines Deptel 1439, and if Thai have no other ideas we should probably get this message to Achmad ourselves after quick turnaround here.

4. In conveying all of above, you should of course make clear that our reluctance proceed with this proposal indicates no lack of sympathy in Indonesian problem nor unwillingness to help when we feel time is ripe and preferably when assistance would be of maximum benefit to Army. If for humanitarian as well as political reasons some injection rice and other essential consumer commodities became necessary we would be prepared consider rapid action. However, we do not believe situation has reached this critical a point as yet. In any event, we wish continue close consultation with Thai on Indonesian developments.

Rusk

196. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in New Zealand¹

Washington, February 18, 1966, 6:12 p.m.

620. Wellington for Vice President and Harriman. Ref Canberra's 604.²

1. We are repeating to you Bangkok telegrams 1694 and 1701³ and Djakarta's 2313,⁴ which provide further information on Achmad rice purchase project.

2. Ambassador Green returning Djakarta this week-end and prior his departure for Baguio meeting he will explore food situation and Army interest in rice purchase.

3. Achmad approach is one of a number of semi-official Indonesian efforts probe availability of rice under favorable terms from range of possible suppliers. Japanese have in past indicated readiness to supply if they are convinced of real need and favorable political impact. There are, in short, alternative sources of supply less dangerous to Army and donor country.

4. We now have in final stages of approval project to increase PL-480 Title IV shipments of foodstuffs from current 10,000 tons annual level to 50,000 ton level under Catholic Relief for distribution in areas where Army considers greatest need exists. Details worked out directly between CRS and Indo authorities with a view to minimizing political risks while giving Army tangible evidence of our desire to help.

Rusk

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, INCO-RICE 17 INDON-THAI. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Underhill, cleared by Berger and in draft with Green, and approved by William Bundy. Repeated to Djakarta and Bangkok.

² In telegram 604 from Canberra, February 18, Humphrey and Harriman stated that despite the "elaboration of familiar doubts and risks," they still favored giving Achmad's approach serious consideration. The risks cited were less potentially damaging than "missing a key opportunity to affect outcome Indo power struggle at critical pre-harvest juncture." (Ibid.)

³ See footnote 5, Document 195.

⁴ In telegram 2313 from Djakarta, February 16, the Embassy fully agreed with the Department position. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, INCO-RICE 17 INDON-THAI)

197. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and Chester L. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson¹

Washington, February 21, 1966, 7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Indonesian Developments

Sukarno has ousted General Nasution as Indonesian Defense Minister, removed several other moderates from the cabinet, and added seven leftist ministers.² Unless the Indonesian military challenge these decisions, this development will restore Sukarno to full political control and will negate Indonesia's anti-Communist tendencies that have been at work since October. If the military decide to reverse Sukarno's decisions, and it is not at all clear that they will, the situation could degenerate into civil war.

Reports from our Embassy tend to conclude that the military, and particularly Army Commander General Suharto, may not contest Sukarno's move at this time.³ This would be consistent with the military's past record of avoiding direct political confrontation with Sukarno and of playing out a game of maneuver.

There are factors currently at work, however, which make this situation more fluid than usual. In pressing a nationwide campaign of five months against the Indonesian Communist Party, the military have unleashed religious and political emotions that have even been directed against Sukarno, himself, and that might be difficult to hold in check. This would be particularly true if Moslem and youth elements receive any encouragement from the military. There are some reports that the military plans to foment demonstrations to afford a pretext for their re-imposition of martial law and the reversal of Sukarno's decisions. This would lead to the direct confrontation with Sukarno that the military has always avoided. But some Army elements might be ready

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. VI, 11/65-5/66. Secret. There is an indication on the memorandum that the President saw it.

² In telegram 2341 from Djakarta, February 20, the Embassy reported a "real crisis shaping up between Sukarno and Army." Telegram 2360 from Djakarta, February 22, contains a complete list of the "reshuffled Dwikora Cabinet" announced by Sukarno on February 21; telegram 2364 from Djakarta, February 22, contains biographic data on new members of the cabinet; telegram 2365 from Djakarta, February 22, contains the Embassy's comments on the new cabinet organized by major functions. (All National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15-1 INDON)

³ As reported in telegrams 2353 and 2363 from Djakarta, February 22. (Ibid., POL 23-9 INDON and POL 15-1 INDON, respectively)

to accept the risks of internal military strife rather than lose the opportunity of completing the internal political changes their moves against the Indonesian Communist Party set in motion.

Although the situation is confused and fluid, one thing is clear: few if any U.S. initiatives to influence the course of events are apparent.

CLC

McG. B.

198. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, March 4, 1966, 0830Z.

2469. 1. Following is Embassy analysis of present political situation and future prospects insofar as these can be determined in highly fluid situation.

2. Tactics of major participants in political struggle have emerged more clearly during past week. According present indications they are as follows:

A. Students. Students appear to realize that they themselves cannot bring down present Indonesian Government and that only army can do so. However, they feel strongly that army has waited too long and that they must goad it into moving despite itself. Student demonstrations and other activities are thus designed to force army to act.

B. Army. According some [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] reports army, for its part, hopes use students and other groups to heat up atmosphere and then move against Subandrio and other leftists in high places using excuse of need to restore security. Sukarno is not direct target of this strategy but some within army reportedly realize he would probably resist any action against Subandrio and that army must therefore be prepared meet him head on if necessary. (Note:

¹Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Priority. Repeated to Bangkok, CINCPAC for POLAD, Hong Kong for Ambassador Green, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, Medan, Singapore, Surabaya, and Tokyo.

Strategies of army and students fit neatly together if army does, in fact, move before student campaign loses steam.)

C. Sukarno. Sukarno apparently believes that strong stand will divide and weaken his opponents. During past week he has returned number of radical leftists to positions of power, banned Student Action Command, prohibited demonstrations and closed university. He is apparently aware that many within army are reluctant to confront him directly and believes that policy of firmness will further intimidate military, as it has in past, and lessen chances that army and civilians can unite against him in effective action.

3. Thus far old Sukarno magic is not working as usual. Student activities have continued unabated despite clear evidence of his displeasure. Yesterday's activities were most open attack to date on Subandrio, and Sukarno himself has come in for some criticism. As campaign progresses students seem to be developing greater self-confidence and sense participation in significant historical turning point. Their determination is increased by numerous indications that majority of people of Djakarta are with them.

4. There is still no firm indications that army will act although some knowledgeable Indonesians during past few days have become more optimistic. General Sukendro, in contrast to his earlier pessimistic moods, told New Zealand Chargé March 2 that generals may soon decide to become "patriots instead of soldiers." However, exact nature and timing of any army move against Subandrio or others in top positions remain uncertain and it seems likely that army itself has not firmly decided on these crucial questions.

5. Despite uncertainties in present situation there are number of elements which make present situation more encouraging than it has ever been in past:

A. Students and other civilian activists now seem to realize more than ever before that they must lead army rather than simply wait for it to act.

B. Younger officers within military are also dissatisfied with lack of action by their superiors. This is additional element which could at some point tip balance in favor of military action.

C. Army tactic of soliciting petitions from lower ranks could also increase role of activist elements in determining army policy. Suharto, who has reportedly asked for such petitions to strengthen his hand with Sukarno, could actually get more than he has bargained for.

D. Increased student activity places greater pressures on palace for countermeasures. Escalation in present campaign could be dangerous for palace since it might eventually lead to more open army intervention on side of students.

6. Balanced against these favorable elements is not inconsiderable ability of Sukarno to manipulate forces, as he recently did with Nu and Muhammadiyah. Army's position itself has a number of built-in vulnerabilities. Its tactics are overly complex and lack clear focus, particularly in continued unwillingness to face up to fact that Sukarno himself is the real problem. Army does not really need excuse of deteriorating security situation to act if it really has will to do so. Moreover, by continuing to reign students in from key targets army is actually hindering creation of "unrest" which it hopes to exploit. There is also possibility that Sukarno-Subandrio might be able to unify elements now against them through dramatic move on international level. Possible new summit on Malaysia, stepped up confrontation, troubles with Philippines, contrived crisis in relations with US or other issue might be used for this purpose, particularly if Sukarno and his supporters become desperate as result of increased pressures against them.

7. In short run, and balancing factors, we believe chances for firm army action to topple Sukarno directly are slim. Action to eliminate Subandrio and other left-wingers and thus break Sukarno's power in two stage process is considerably more likely but odds are probably not much better than 50-50. Nonetheless this is significant improvement over earlier situation.

8. Even if army does not act in short run, longer range prospects are now far more favorable as result student campaign which has ushered in new political atmosphere.

A. Students' enthusiasm and heroism have galvanized heretofore disparate and passive opposition to Sukarno's regime. Several western-oriented Indonesian intellectuals, for example, who had retired completely from political scene, suddenly appeared on streets with students and we have many reports of organized middle-class housewife network for feeding and clothing students and even of spontaneous provision of free food by street merchants and other lower class elements.

B. Students have also torn hole in political doctrine which identified Sukarno with state and which has allowed President to beat off clearly superior forces. Students have shown many of their elders that one can be patriotic without being pro-Sukarno or pro-government. They have done this by adopting causes popular with broad segment of population (lowering of prices and elimination of ineffective managers) and by conducting their campaign in surprisingly orderly fashion which smacks neither of anarchy nor rebellion.

9. In summary, we believe political struggle will be protracted. Student demonstrations are likely to continue for some time despite Sukarno's efforts to suppress them. They will not bring about change

in regime in near future unless army joins in openly, and we see only about 50-50 chance for this. Viewed in longer range, however, student demonstrations have begun healthy reorientation of Indo political thinking which will work against Sukarno and can eventually lead to downfall of his regime.

Lydman

199. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, March 10, 1966, 0900Z.

2536. 1. Minister Adam Malik, who seemed to be in higher spirits than I've ever seen him before, told me at rendezvous last night that situation is explosive, with army prepared to move at any moment using 22 army battalions loyal to Generals Nasution and Soeharto in and around Djakarta area.

2. I said I understood Sukarno was planning to dismiss Soeharto. Was this true? He said President was planning to dismiss either or both Soeharto and Adjie; and Malik hoped Sukarno would do so because this would be precisely the action which would incite armed forces to move physically against Presidium and bring about long-needed changes.

3. I remarked that on past occasions when army seemed united in its resolve, Sukarno was able to recapture initiative by calling in all the military brass including regional commanders and putting on one of his performances which seemed to leave military commanders uncertain as to how each other stood and therefore they wavered at the crucial hour. Sukarno has called for such meeting this weekend; will history repeat itself?

4. Malik replied that he did not think it would. All the Panglimas are behind Soeharto only awaiting his order. However, army will not take initial step against Sukarno/Subandrio to avoid chances of being the aggressor, but army action will be in the form of a counter-action. Thus students and laborers will continue their demonstrations until

¹Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to Taipei for Bundy. Passed to the White House.

Sukarno/Subandrio provoked into taking some action which will justify army counter-moves. This could be touched off by a dismissal of Soeharto or Adjie or Sarwo Edhie or Mokoginta or by Tjakrabirawa troops shooting students. An example of how close Sukarno is to triggering army move was when he and Subandrio inspected ransacked Foreign Ministry March 9. Sukarno so angry that he ordered Tjakrabirawa troops to shoot at students.

5. Malik continued that even young air force officers are now organized into teams supporting anti-Presidium movement and have plans to sabotage any aircraft engaged in escape of leftist cabinet ministers from Djakarta.

6. Malik said that by far the most important new element in situation since last we met a month ago was student movement against Subandrio and other leftist cabinet ministers. These students more powerful than all parties put together and command much wider sympathy and support. In fact, all previous anti-government movements here have lacked this kind of popular support. Student demonstrators include sons and daughters from most prominent families including those who are in pro-Sukarno camp and they naturally exert considerable influence on their parents. Moreover, soldiers and policemen most reluctant to shoot at student demonstrators. As example, he cited dilemma of one policeman charged with protection of Foreign Office on March 8. When he pointed his gun at a student, he discovered this was son of his superior officer. Policeman so shocked he disappeared from scene. Same has happened to members of Tjakrabirawa battalion, a number of whom have deserted.

7. Additionally, trade unions are getting into the act. Most of trade unions will be supporting students actively by joining in demonstrations and by strikes beginning this week.

8. I asked Malik whether dismissal of Nasution had been serious setback for anti-Subandrio forces. He said not at all; Nasution, who continued to command nationwide respect, could now operate more effectively behind scenes than from office in Defense Ministry. Nasution and Soeharto remained close but it was better to have Soeharto the front man. I inquired about position of General Machmud (Kodam V Commander in charge of Djakarta area). Malik said he was completely with Soeharto.

9. Finally and most importantly, I asked Malik about general security situation as it affected Americans and American property. I pointed out that Subandrio reaction to attacks by students on his Foreign Office and against him personally seemed almost certain to result in his trying to retaliate as well as divert attention. He could not target the army or the students, so it was quite probable he would incite his goon squads against our Embassy. We've already had two examples of that in past

two weeks.² I also had some rather disturbing reports from unevaluated sources that Sukarno has indicated in his anger that he would do to the Americans what he had done to the British several years ago. This meant danger to our residences as well as the Chancery. What did Malik think of that?

10. Malik replied that undoubtedly Subandrio will attempt anti-US actions. However, this will receive no support from overwhelming elements here, and the army will definitely step in to protect the Americans. Malik felt there was no need to evacuate members of American community from Djakarta but suggested that they remain out of sight as much as possible, particularly during next week or so when things likely to be hyper-tense.

11. I told Malik once again that I hoped for a new relationship between our governments, one that was productive and helpful from Indonesia's viewpoint, and that meanwhile it was absolutely vital that nothing occur, such as anti-American actions, which would gravely, if not permanently, injure our relations and eliminate future possibilities for fruitful friendship and cooperation. He said he fully understood my point. He felt the same way. He said he was more assured than ever that things would work out the way we both wanted. Certainly his mood reflected this assurance.³

12. I asked Malik to feel free to share the burden of our conversation with Nasution and Soeharto. He said he would do so.

Green

² On February 23 and March 8 small, well-organized groups of leftists attacked the U.S. Embassy. There were no injuries and no attackers penetrated the Embassy building. (Telegram 2509 from Djakarta, March 8; *ibid.*)

³ In telegram 2564 from Djakarta, March 12, 0150Z, the Embassy reported that a reliable source indicated that the Army was in the process of arresting 20 cabinet ministers. (*Ibid.*)

200. Telegram From the Embassy in Indonesia to the Department of State¹

Djakarta, March 12, 1966, 1000Z.

2579. 1. Indonesia has just gone through its own peculiar form of military coup.² At long last Sukarno has pushed his luck too far, and his plans to dump top army leadership and bring known-Communist in as Army Minister have triggered army action to curb his power. Way coup handled preserves Sukarno as unifying force and establishes army's legitimacy. Army believes both of these are essential. At same time Suharto has in KOGAM order number one³ full authority if he chooses to use it.

2. People of Djakarta are clearly with army. Moderate political parties and other organizations have all issued statements pledging support to Suharto. Students, who created atmosphere which permitted, and in fact forced, army to act, are understandably jubilant. They are roaming through city today on foot and in trucks repeating their slogans against Subandrio, Sumardjo, "Gestapu Cabinet" and high prices.

3. Key now is whether army will move quickly and effectively to consolidate its position. Indications to date are that it will.

A. Parade this morning (septel)⁴ has provided emotional outlet for people after weeks of growing tension, and has demonstrated army's popular support. Whole affair was carefully and effectively staged.

B. PKI and all its front organizations were formally banned by Suharto at noon today. While this somewhat academic since PKI has ceased to exist as effective organized party, ban is clear signal that army prepared to go directly against Sukarno's well-known wishes. Army may well now move against PKI elements in Djakarta which has been virtual safehaven for them in past several months.

4. It is not yet clear extent to which army will dominate new government and extent to which it will be willing to share real power with its civilian allies from anti-Communist political parties. However,

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9, INDON. Secret; Immediate. Repeated to CINCPAC for POLAD, Department of Defense, Canberra, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, Bangkok, London, Manila for FELG, Medan, Singapore, Surabaya, and Tokyo. Passed to the White House, USIA, NSA, and CIA.

² Telegram 2571 from Djakarta, March 12, contains a preliminary reconstruction of the events of March 11 and 12. (Ibid.)

³ In this order issued on March 12, the PKI was dissolved and permanently proscribed throughout Indonesia. The order also dissolved and proscribed all organizations based on, protected by, or affiliated with the PKI. Under this order Suharto had authority to act on his own initiative and was only required to report to Sukarno on actions taken. (Telegram 2573 from Djakarta, March 12; *ibid.*)

⁴ Not found.

odds would seem to favor coalition between army and moderate political leaders such as Adam Malik, Sultan of Jogjakarta, and others. Group previously banned by Sukarno and older leaders, some of whom are imprisoned and some merely on shelf, may play role as advisers but we doubt groups which survived and which will play key role in government will be willing to share fruits of their victory and yield important posts to these elements.

5. If army moves to consolidate its position, and we believe odds are that it will, we can probably expect following moves:

A. Major change in cabinet. Subandrio has had it, and other pro-Communists and incompetents can be expected to be replaced. Cabinet will probably be reduced in size and streamlined. There could, however, be deal with Sukarno which would save some of his less obvious cronies.

B. Crackdown on corruption and effort by army to get its hands on illegal funds many of present Ministers have salted away. Serious attention to basic economic problems will probably follow later.

C. Re-evaluation and gradual reorientation of basic foreign policies. Army will end Sukarno's "axis" with Peking and might well drive ChiComs to point of breaking relations. CONEFO is likely to be scrapped. Confrontation with Malaysia will remain on books but likely slowly wither and die as far as serious military action is concerned. At same time, army will be cautious in moving too close to West.

D. Root out political undesirables from positions of authority in army and other military services.

6. Sukarno is still on scene. As long as he is there is danger of comeback but we believe chances of full return to former position are remote. Army has taken first step. If Sukarno again pushes too far, next step against him directly will be far easier.

7. Major government appointments and treatment present ministers will quickly give indication of precise direction government will now take. Government will continue to use many of the old slogans, as indeed Suharto has done in his order of the day (septel).⁵ However, deeds will be far more important than words and it on former basis that government should be judged. As far as USG concerned there are number of immediate issues (Lovestand case, return American journalists, compensation for March 8 attack on Embassy, etc.) which will test GOI attitudes. Early next week when situation hopefully more clear we will send our recommendations for US policy.

Green

⁵ Not found. According to telegram 1157 to Djakarta, March 12, responding to telegram 2579 from Djakarta, March 12, the Department noted that "Suharto's reiteration of anti-NEKOLIM slogans and policies, including confrontation suggest he would not welcome overt western support at this point." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 23-9 INDON)

201. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Komer) to President Johnson¹

Washington, March 12, 1966, 10:30 a.m.

Backing up success. It is hard to overestimate the potential significance of the army's apparent victory over Sukarno (even though the latter remains as a figurehead). Indonesia has more people—and probably more resources—than all of mainland Southeast Asia. It was well on the way to becoming another expansionist Communist state, which would have critically menaced the rear of the whole Western position in mainland Southeast Asia. Now, though the unforeseen can always happen, this trend has been sharply reversed.

The coup in Ghana is another example of a fortuitous windfall. Nkrumah was doing more to undermine our interests than any other black African. In reaction to his strongly pro-Communist leanings, the new military regime is almost pathetically pro-Western.

The point of this memo is that we ought to follow through skillfully and consolidate such successes. A few thousand tons of surplus wheat or rice, given now when the new regimes are quite uncertain as to their future relations with us, could have a psychological significance out of all proportion to the cost of the gesture. I am not arguing for lavish gifts to these regimes—indeed, giving them a little only whets their appetites, and enables us to use the prospect of more as leverage.

But my experience is that the bureaucracy will err on the side of caution rather than initiative; hence my suggestion that, in expressing your pleasure to SecState and others over the Indonesia and Ghana coups, you make clear that we ought to exploit such successes as quickly and as skillfully as possible. You have no idea how important a word from you can be in setting the tone for the bureaucracy. And in this case I strongly suspect that my own suggestion is quite in accord with your own political instinct.

If you prefer, I would pass this word to Rusk and Bell; but at the moment there is simply no substitute for direct word from you.

R. W. Komer

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. XXI. Confidential. There is an indication on the memorandum that the President saw it.

202. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Berger) to Secretary of State Rusk¹

Washington, March 14, 1966.

SUBJECT

Recent Developments in Indonesia

October 1 and Indonesia

1. Although there has been little tangible improvement in the state of our bilateral relations with Indonesia during recent months, recent developments there may eventually lead to significant long-range changes in Indonesia's internal and external policies. There have been several major results of the abortive October 1 coup attempt including: 1) the decimation of the PKI as an organized political force; 2) a severe strain in Sino-Indonesian relations; and 3) the emergence of new forces that are articulating demands that run counter to President Sukarno's fundamental philosophy and the way he has been governing.

Background to Recent Developments

2. During the five months that followed the September 30 attempt, President Sukarno and Foreign Minister Dr. Subandrio jockeyed with the military for political advantage. On February 21, Sukarno announced his decision to reshuffle his cabinet in order to cut the ground from under the military leaders who were offering the greatest threat to his power. Eliminated in the shuffle were several prominent non-communists, including Defense Minister Nasution, while all of Sukarno's known leftist advisers were retained. This triggered a mass reaction. During the February 22-March 12 period, thousands of students demonstrated almost continuously in the streets of Djakarta demanding the banning of the PKI; ouster of Subandrio; and reduction of prices. During the past week they occupied and ransacked the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, forced the Education Ministry to close its doors, and violently attacked the offices of the New China News Agency, Chicom Consulate General and the Chicom Trade Mission in Djakarta, injuring several Chinese in the process.

3. In weak counterpoint to these large demonstrations were two raids staged on February 23 and March 8 against the U.S. Embassy by small but well-organized groups of leftists. No one was injured, nor was the Embassy building penetrated by the attackers.

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 15 INDON. Secret. Drafted by Meyers and Conlon. Rusk initialed the memorandum.

The March 12 Affair

4. In a supreme effort to blunt the impact of the student demonstrations Sukarno scheduled a series of three meetings over the weekend of March 12 that were intended to divide and eventually conquer his opposition. The military, however, reportedly concerned by reports that Sukarno planned to replace Suharto with a leftist general responded by handing Sukarno an ultimatum. In response to the ultimatum, Sukarno transferred responsibility for maintaining security to the Army. Since that time Suharto has been issuing decrees "on behalf of" Sukarno. A cabinet reorganization is in progress and early indications are that Subandrio and other leftists will be out.

The Future²

5. While the final resolution of the ongoing power struggle is not yet certain, it would appear that the military has for the moment regained the initiative. Their eventual success or failure depends largely on their ability to: 1) retain their present momentum; and 2) maintain internal unity within their own ranks. We will, of course, be watching the development of the situation to see how we can adjust our relations with a hopefully more moderate Indonesian government. We will also be examining the advisability of some form of economic aid, at an appropriate time.

6. The final question mark is Indonesia's newest political power group—the students. Although they will side for the moment with the military, they may in the long run prove to be Indonesia's most significant "new emerging force."

² INR Director Hughes sent Rusk Intelligence Note no. 154, "The Situation in Indonesia," March 14, which stated that the army, although prepared to restore security and revamp the government, was unlikely to assume the leading role in the government. Hughes also suggested that "Sukarno's submission to army pressures is probably only a strategic retreat and he can be expected to attempt a comeback after a short time." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. VI, 11/65-6/66)

203. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia¹

Washington, March 17, 1966, 6:53 p.m.

1173. Ref: A. Djakarta's 2628 (Notal); B. Djakarta's 2633² (Notal).

1. *Following is our current assessment as to how Indo situation likely develop and summary our current thinking as to nature of US response to Indo requests for assistance, which seem to be inevitable and probably in near future.*

2. *We do not expect either return of Sukarno/Subandrio to real power or rapid emergence strong, economy-minded regime in near future. Even if new moderate government emerges along lines para 5 ref B,³ it will likely represent compromise between various remaining elements of Indo power structure, collectively concerned about problem of establishing itself in effective control over country, and both unwilling and unable to take dramatic or surgical action on Indonesian economy. We assume Sukarno would preserve at least titular power, and that effective exercise of responsibility by new regime will be limited by a felt need to keep him reasonably happy through at least continued lip service to Sukarno's official mythology for sake of maintaining continued national unity.*

3. *Government of this sort is likely to be aware of and concerned about basic economic problems of Indonesia, but will feel that it must get through months ahead with palliative help from outside rather than by taking on basic problems. Expect it will, for example, not dare make significant reduction in size of civil service or army.*

¹Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) INDON. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Drafted by Cuthell; cleared in draft with Barnett, Vladimir Toumanoff, Officer-in-Charge of Multilateral Political Relations (EUR/SOV), and Poats; cleared by Mann and Richard W. Petree, Officer-in-Charge of Japanese Affairs; and approved by Bundy. Also sent to Tokyo and repeated to Moscow, Bonn, Paris, The Hague, Kuala Lumpur, and Hong Kong. In a note to Komer, March 18, Thomson reported that this cable went out without White House approval and was the "end product of a reluctant and hand wringing approach to contingency planning" strongly encouraged by the NSC staffers. Although "irked" by some preemptory judgments, Thomson "welcomed even this bit of glacial progress on the part of the Department." Thomson concluded, "Clearly the Japanese are being set up as our front men, and I suppose that makes sense." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. VI)

²Both dated March 16. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, FN 14 INDON and POL 23-9 INDON, respectively)

³In paragraph 5 of telegram 2633 from Djakarta March 16, Embassy suggested that, "there would almost certainly be an eventual rehabilitation of old pro-Western elements like Masjumi and PSI but probably under different names." Leaders like Malik, Suharto, and Nasution would probably play a key role.

4. This government likely make complicated series of bilateral appeals through the usual traveling teams and through foreign ambassadors in Djakarta for food and fibers and for debt rescheduling and new credits overtly from Japanese and Europe, and, at least initially, covertly from us.

5. When approached by Indonesians we might react as follows:

A. US interest in giving help depends on some showing that a constructive Indonesian government is establishing itself firmly in power desiring to pull country out of its present economic shambles. We are ready to help such a government out with rice and cotton on terms which Indos could advertise as commercial but which are in fact very concessional (along lines Ambassador Green's discussions in Washington, using mechanisms like PL 480 and CCC guaranty).

B. Concealment is impossible for us. We do not desire embarrass GOI or give erroneous impression that we are trying to move back into Indonesian scene, but fact of life is that any real role we can play in helping Indos will be public knowledge.

C. With respect to debt rescheduling or other aid apart from above immediate food and fiber relief, following considerations apply:

i. We feel that support for Indos other than limited emergency measures can only be effective or possible politically on multilateral basis.

ii. Our thought is that one or more nations friendly to Indos—such as Japan—should be asked by Indos to take lead in arranging meetings of creditor and perhaps other interested countries to analyze debts and need for cash and credits during months while GOI is attempting to reverse present deterioration and to establish itself, and to decide how to proceed collectively in helping Indos out of predicament. We would be glad to participate.

iii. Problem of Indo situation is international, and action taken must involve equality of treatment of creditors, for which reason we believe it important attempt secure participation USSR. We and other creditors could not, for example, accept an arrangement on credits and debt rescheduling which simply freed Indo assets to service Russian debt. We believe Russians should be asked to participate in aid meetings (ii. above) even though they may well refuse attend.

iv. We are willing to help GOI but we cannot do so if GOI continues to hammer at us as its greatest enemy, is pursuing military confrontation or confiscates US oil properties. These are not onerous preconditions and we would not ask sharp changes in public policy of sort which might endanger GOI existence.

6. We have it in mind that early if not first Indo request for support will be to Japanese in course visit frequently deferred Indo economic mission. When we and addressees have reached agreement as to US position we believe we should review it in some detail with Japanese, both to correct view reported para 4B ref A and to help Japanese prepare respond to Indo request for aid. Action addressees requested comment

soonest on foregoing and on other aspects of problem they may wish raise.⁴

Rusk

⁴ In telegram 2682 from Djakarta, March 19, Green judged the Department's analysis and proposed response to Indonesian requests for aid to be "excellent." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID 1 INDON)

204. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Indonesia¹

Washington, March 22, 1966, 8:50 p.m.

1182. 1. As new Indonesian government attempts to build up international support for Indo economy fact that GOI has cut itself off from almost all international organizations will present growing problem. We assume that responsible people like Sultan and Malik aware of need to re-join the world, but that they will feel need to proceed slowly and to avoid challenging Sukarno decisions directly.

2. We believe Indos should be encouraged to start reentry into at least those organizations which can help them directly or through coordination multilateral assistance. We expect GOI will be receiving advice to this effect from other countries they are or will be approaching for help, but think it would be unwise for USG to take initiative with Indos as they likely both to suspect our motives and to assume our interest indicates they have new bargaining asset with us.

3. At same time, Indos will probably worry about our reaction if they attempt either rejoin any of organizations they have left or join others they have not been in, notably Asian Development Bank. If feelers put out indicating such concern, believe you should make clear

¹ Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 1 INDON. Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Cuthell, cleared with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs David H. Popper, Barnett, Ewing, and Officer-in-Charge of Japan Affairs Richard W. Petree. Repeated to Bangkok, Bonn, Canberra, The Hague, Hong Kong, Kuala Lumpur, London, Manila, Moscow, Paris, Rome, Tokyo, Wellington, CINCPAC for POLAD, and USUN.

we would support Indo applications quietly and would not seek exploit their action as western victory. If your advice sought, you might suggest that Indo statement of intention join ADB (with which GOI has no history) could be useful opening gambit.

4. Foregoing position is, of course, based on our conclusion that Indos should be drawn back into real world, that they likely prove unreliable and often unfriendly voice and vote, but that importance of former outweighs risk of latter.

5. Djakarta comments requested.²

Rusk

² In telegram 2732 from Djakarta, March 24, the Embassy agreed it was in U.S. interest to draw Indonesia back "into the real world" by joining useful international organizations and that the United States should remain in the background. (Ibid.)

205. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant (Moyers)¹

Washington, March 31, 1966.

SUBJECT

Rice for Indonesia

I have just learned that the President has instructed the Secretary of State to move ahead on the attached proposal for the one-shot emergency shipment of 50,000 tons of rice to Indonesia under PL 480 Title IV.²

¹ Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Indonesia, Vol. VI, 11/65-5/66. Secret. Copies were sent to Bromley Smith, Executive Secretary of the NSC, and to Edward Hamilton of the NSC Staff.

² Rusk informed British Ambassador Dean of this decision in a meeting on March 31 and Berger informed Australian Ambassador Waller in a meeting the same day. (Memoranda of conversation, March 31; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AID (US) 15-6 INDON and AID (US) INDON) Thomson sent Rostow a background paper describing Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Affairs MacArthur and his staff's briefings of key Congressional leaders about the impending decision on rice. All the briefed Congressional leaders either approved or had no objection. (March 31 attachment to a note from Thomson to Rostow, April 2; Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vol. VI, 11/65-5/66) The proposal was attached, but is not printed.

This decision makes good sense. At the same time, however, I thought you—and perhaps the President—should be aware of some of the additional factors surrounding this recommendation:

1. There is a continuing argument between advocates of a PL 480 route and advocates of a straight export credit sale arrangement (with CCC guarantee of a letter of credit from the Bank of Indonesia). In the present decision, the PL 480 advocates prevailed on the grounds that such an arrangement would be speediest and would avoid a CCC guarantee of an apparently bankrupt bank. There is a question, however, whether this arrangement will be satisfactory to the Indos who would prefer a less conspicuous U.S. Government involvement and would probably regard the CCC route as the less conspicuous of the two.

2. A third route was also considered: U.S. financing of Thai rice for Indonesia. This, however, would have involved use of Supporting Assistance funds and, according to our lawyers, a Presidential Determination (under the Broomfield Amendment) that aid to Indonesia was in our national interest. Such a step would become public and would probably be an embarrassment to the Indonesians at this juncture.

3. The PL 480 route has some worrisome implications for the future: as you may know, cotton dealers have been attempting for some months now to obtain CCC guarantees for Indo letters of credit in order to push the sale of raw cotton to Indonesia.³ Such dealers—and their supporters on the Hill—are apprehensive that the Government may opt for a PL 480 provision of cotton, rather than straight commercial sales under CCC guarantees. Our action on rice will increase the apprehensions of the cotton people and their supporters on the Hill.

James C. Thomson, Jr.⁴

³ Komer sent President Johnson a March 28 memorandum in response to a query from a lawyer friend of the President's, who was writing on behalf of client (a Texas cotton company and cotton growers cooperation). Komer explained that since the Bank of Indonesia was virtually bankrupt, a Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) guarantee of cotton sales was tantamount to direct U.S. assistance. The chances of default by the bank were extremely high. To add to the problem, top Indonesian leaders like Suharto and Nasution had been saying for the past 6 months that they wished to avoid anything that looks like overt U.S. Government aid. For these reasons the Departments of State and Agriculture rejected the CCC arrangement. (*Ibid.*, *Memos to the President*, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 21, March 1966)

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.