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

~~TOP SECRET~~

ITEMS SPECIFIED IN THE SPECIAL APPENDIX
FILED ON JUNE 21, 1971 WITH THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

- I. Portions of Exhibits 7 and 7A the disclosure of which would present increased risks to the safety of U.S. forces

VOL VI. C. 4, pages 1, 2, Ohio - Quotes
SECRET-EXDIS message, 10 June 1967 OLSO-4531
to Secretary of State and State SECRET-EXDIS
message 213339 to OSLO. Presumably would
assist in breaking codes in use during
period. Many similar examples are interspread
throughout this volume.

Section I, Item 10



UNITED STATES - VIETNAM RELATIONS

1945 - 1967


DECLASSIFIED
 E.O. 11652, Sec. 3(E) and 8(D) of (B)
 State Dept. Order, 8/21/78
 By JK NARS, Date 9/1/78

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VIETNAM TASK FORCE

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Sanitized Copy



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


VI. c. 4.

SETTLEMENT OF THE CONFLICT

Negotiations, 1967 - 1968

HISTORY OF CONTACTS



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NORWEGIAN-NORTH VIETNAMESE CONTACTS, JUNE 1967 - FEBRUARY 1968

June 1-15, 1967 - Meeting No. 1

OHIO began, in effect, with a transmission by Ambassador Tibbetts of a conversation in Peking on 1 June between Ambassador Ole Algard, Norwegian Ambassador to Peking, and the North Vietnamese Ambassador to Peking, Ngo Loan. Norwegian Foreign Minister Lyng gave the substance of the Algard-Loan conversation to Tibbetts. Despite some very interesting and important statements made by Loan, this cable and subsequent cables for several months were EXDIS and were not given a code name.

Loan stressed four points to Algard: (1) NVN fear that the U.S. intended to stay permanently in Vietnam; (2) that Hanoi had only one condition for negotiations (sic), namely the cessation of U.S. bombing; (3) that when Hanoi came to the conference table, it "would be very flexible," and is "ready for very far-reaching compromises to get an end to the war"; and (4) that Hanoi felt it was able to cope with almost any U.S. military activity with its own resources -- except for direct occupation of all North Vietnam.

Algard expressed concern about North Vietnamese treatment of U.S. prisoners. Loan said that formal recognition of these men as anything but "war criminals" would "legalize American participation in the war."

OSLO 4531 to SecState (SECRET-EXDIS), 14 June 1967:

"2. Following is my informal rendition Algard's report, transposed from first to third person:

X605-

K605-4

TIBBETTS.

June 20, 1967

State responded with an expression of interest and a desire to have the Norwegians continue the contact. Noting the four major points in the first Algard-Loan conversation, and admitting that Loan's statement that bombing was the only condition for talks, was "highly plausible," State suggested Algard react as follows: (1) ascertain the authority with which Loan spoke; (2) stress the Manila Communique in general terms in response to Loan's fear of the U.S. intending to stay permanently in Vietnam; (3) ascertain whether North Vietnam was insisting on a permanent bombing cessation; (4) stress the U.S. view that the bombing cessation must be accompanied by "at least some private assurance of appropriate reciprocal action by North Vietnam"; (5) indicate that the Geneva Accords of 1954 could be a basis for settlement and try to probe Loan on the compromises envisaged by NVN.

State 213389 to Oslo (SECRET-EXDIS), 20 June 1967:

"2.c. Expressed concern that U.S. intends to stay permanently in Vietnam is of interest. We assume GON is fully aware of our repeated statements of intent to withdraw and most specifically the precise wording used in the Manila Communique, which you should furnish them.

"d. Discussion of cessation of bombing as only condition for talks fits with other private readings as well as Trinh-Burchett interview and appears to us highly plausible.