



ClassNet

Cable Archive Retrieval System (CARS) v2.0

"Our mission is to meet the information needs of our customers
and the United States Government."

- Bureau of Administration
► Intranet Central (INet)
► InfoAccess home

S26

2005ISLAMA00919 - CONFIDENTIAL RELEASED IN PART
B1, 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

ACTION SCT-00

INFO	LOG-00	NP-00	AID-00	A-00	ACQ-00	CCO-00	CG-00
	COME-00	CTME-00	INL-00	USNW-00	DOEE-00	DOTE-00	PERC-00
	DS-00	EB-00	FAAE-00	FBIE-00	VC-00	H-00	TEDE-00
	INR-00	INSE-00	IO-00	L-00	CAC-00	VCE-00	M-00
	AC-00	NEA-00	DCP-00	NRC-00	NSAE-00	OCS-00	OIC-00
	NIMA-00	PA-00	PM-00	GIWI-00	PRS-00	ACE-00	P-00
	FMPC-00	SP-00	SSO-00	SS-00	TRSE-00	USSS-00	SA-00
	ASDS-00	SCRS-00	PMB-00	DSCC-00	PRM-00	DRL-00	G-00
	NFAT-00	SAS-00	/000W				

-----A92666 250247Z /38

P 250231Z JAN 05
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 1463
INFO AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL LAHORE
AMCONSUL PESHAWAR
CIA WASHDC
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC
USDAO ISLAMABAD PK
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
ODRP ISLAMABAD PK
NSC WASHDC
HQ USCENCOM MACDILL AFB FL

C O N F I D E N T I A L ISLAMABAD 000919

E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/20/2015
TAGS: PGOV, PTER, MOPS, PK
SUBJECT: IMPRESSIONS OF WAZIRISTAN

REF: A. (A) USDAO ISLAMABAD IIR 6 873 0129 05 (NOTAL)
B. (B) USDAO ISLAMABAD IIR 6 873 0128 05 (NOTAL)
C. (C) ISLAMABAD 811 (NOTAL)
D. (D) 04 ISLAMABAD 1068 (NOTAL)

Classified By: Ambassador Ryan Crocker. Reasons 1.4 b and d.

1. (C) Summary: As part of a Pakistan military sponsored trip for visiting Congressman Mark Kirk, poloff visited the capitals of North and South Waziristan on January 14. The visit brought home the extreme difficulties the GOP faces in trying to counter terrorist insurgents in these remote regions, the need for a continued political component to the FATA campaign, and the importance of development work as part of the counter-insurgency effort. GOP interlocutors stressed that the success of their efforts would require a joint political/military/development strategy that emphasizes

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: SHARON E AHMAD

UNCLASSIFIED

DATE/CASE ID: 15 APR 2009 200794080

<http://cars.state.sgov.gov/docview.asp?ResultMaxDocs=500&sortSpec=score+desc&quer...> 11/30/2007

reestablishing the authority of the maliks (traditional tribal leaders), winning the support of the local populace, and ultimately integrating FATA's political and legal system with the rest of Pakistan. End Summary.

2. (C) On January 14, Poloff accompanied Congressman Mark Kirk on a visit to Wana, South Waziristan and Miram Shah, North Waziristan [redacted]

B1

[redacted] In addition to briefings at the military headquarters in both locations, poloff visited a forward troop position overlooking the Shakai Valley in South Waziristan. Briefings in South Waziristan were conducted by

[redacted] and in North Waziristan by [redacted]

[redacted]. [redacted]

[redacted] accompanied delegation to both locations. In North Waziristan, [redacted]

[redacted] met the delegation.

In South Waziristan, the delegation met briefly with a group of local Waziri maliks.

The People

3. (C) Lengthy discussions with military and GOP officials operating in the region offered some insight into local culture. The concepts of hospitality and refuge, often cited as traditions exploited by the terrorists, certainly appeared from conversations to be defining factors. However, our interlocutors stressed that there were very narrow parameters under which these were extended and very broad, and often unclear (to the outsider) parameters under which these could be withdrawn. [redacted]

B1

[redacted]

The Politics

4. (C) Prior to the launch of jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, GOP officials said the maliks were fully in control of their respective tribes and able to prevent outside influences from impacting the stability of the tribal areas. Cooperation between maliks and political agents was relatively good and contact between the FATA and the "settled areas" was largely curtailed. The decision by the GOP to actively recruit Waziris and Mehsuds for jihad in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan disrupted this balance. Deobandi and Jamaat-e-Islami religious leaders began recruitment in the tribal areas and ultimately usurped much of the authority

of the maliks. Following the withdrawal of the Soviets, these religious leaders continued to recruit tribesman to fight on the side of the Taliban in the Afghan civil war and encouraged contacts between the tribes and the religious, political, and military leadership of the Taliban largely against the wishes of the maliks. Relationships between the mullahs and the political agents were strained. Following

the defeat of the Taliban, religious leaders in the Waziristans convinced the tribes to open their territories to Taliban remnants and their foreign supporters. Maliks, our interlocutors argued, acquiesced only because they had no further authority to challenge the mullahs.

5. (C) Since the military entrance to the Waziristans, the GOP has attempted to reestablish the maliks as the primary authority. Successful military actions against foreign fighters integrated with the tribes convinced tribesmen of the danger in confronting the military. By refusing to discuss cessation of hostilities with any parties other than the maliks, the military helped undermine the authority of problematic religious leaders. Active pursuit and arrest of maliks who continued support for terrorist elements resulted in a decision by the Waziri tribes to align with the GOP against the terrorists. Military officials were convinced that their new offensive in Mehsud areas would have a similar impact. Throughout this strategy, the military has relied on the provisions of the Frontier Crimes Regulation that allows for collective punishment, including economic blockades of tribes.

6. (C) Over the long term GOP officials were convinced that development assistance was the only way to retain the loyalty of the maliks and ensure maliks' authority in the tribes. If maliks' relationships with the army and the political agents were seen to produce tangible benefits, tribesmen would follow. If not; the military feared the pliable maliks might again be replaced. In this vein, the Army Corps of Engineers stressed the works it had already initiated in the Waziristans, including well, road, health clinic, and school construction. While pleased with the initial impact of these social development projects, officials stressed the need to develop sustainable income generating activities. Military officials, political leaders, and the maliks all stressed the need for international donors to assist in projects in the region.

[Redacted]


B1

The Military


7. (C) Refs A and B provide an overview of military action and plans in both North and South Waziristan. The military strategy appeared to be extremely successful both in destroying concentrations and positions of foreign fighters in South Waziristan and in driving a wedge between the terrorists and their former tribal hosts.

[Redacted]

B1



B1



B1

Comment

9. (C) There is no question that the GOP faces a daunting military and political challenge in trying to drive foreign fighters from North and South Waziristan and an even greater challenge in integrating these isolated areas into Pakistan. The officials that we met on the ground were clearly committed to this challenge and willing to use all resources provided to ensure that it occurs. They were making unprecedented efforts in a difficult and unyielding environment and using an approach that appears to be slowly yielding results. The military leadership is aware that ultimate success in the FATA campaign depends on successful integration of this area into mainstream Pakistani society.



B1

CROCKER

NNNN

2005ISLAMA00919 - CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED