

~~TOP SECRET~~

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
Washington 25, D.C.

SM-679-60  
15 July 1960

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Twining  
Admiral Burke  
General White  
General Lemnitzer  
General Shoup

CLASSIFICATION EXTENDED BEYOND  
EXPIRES BY *Sec Def memo, 24 Jan 1980*  
*July 1990*  
REVIEW ON...

Subject: Target Coordination and Associated Problems (U)

Pursuant to the agreement at the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 14 July 1960, the attached spread sheets, reflecting the various views on the National Strategic Targeting Policy, are circulated for consideration at the meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff at 1400, Friday, 15 July 1960.

*F. J. Blouin*  
F. J. BLOUIN,  
Rear Admiral, USN,  
Deputy Secretary.

Enclosure

JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
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JCS FORM 23934

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Gen Wieseman (1)  
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RESEARCH SECTION

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RESEARCH SECTION

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- INTENT -

1 Intent To provide guidance for development of the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and for attack of these targets in consonance with the Executive Guidance on Study 2009 or subsequent Executive Guidance

- INTENT -

1. Purpose. To provide guidance, consistent with Executive policy, for the development of a target system in the Sino-Soviet Bloc, the destruction or neutralization of which is necessary for the attainment of U.S. National objectives. This policy covers the objectives, concept, and target analysis for the development of the National Target List (NTL). In addition, this policy states the damage criteria, assumptions and constraints applicable to the targets of the NTL.

- INTENT -

1 Intent To provide, for implementing action by the Strategic Targeting Authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and for the guidance of other elements of the JCS, definitive instructions for the conduct and control of the strategic offensive effort in general war.

- INTENT -

1. Purpose. The purpose of this policy is to provide a basis for the development of a National Strategic Target List, taking into consideration Study 2009 and the President's action thereon, and to outline the procedure for developing a plan for the attack on the targets so listed.

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- OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS -

2. Objectives. The basic objective of this policy is to establish clear guidance for the development of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and an operational plan outlining the initial task to be accomplished regardless of the conditions under which hostilities are initiated. The attack of the targets on the National Strategic Target List is considered to be a task the accomplishment of which, when coupled with other essential military operations, is critical to preponderance in general war.

3. Terminology

A. General. The essential criterion in developing a targeting concept is the determination that certain basic national strengths of the Sino-Soviet Bloc must be neutralized or destroyed in order to achieve U.S. objectives. Such a determination must be expressed in terms of target complexes.

- OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS -

2. Objectives. The basic objective of this policy is to provide the criteria for the development of a list of the minimum number of targets which must be destroyed or neutralized to prevail in general war. The development of the NTL will be predicated upon the following specific objectives.

1. Destruction or neutralization of the Sino-Soviet Bloc

2. Destruction or neutralization of the Sino-Soviet Bloc

3. Destruction of selected targets of particular importance to the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the extent that, when coupled with other essential military operations, it is critical to preponderance in general war.

- OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS -

2. Objective. The objective of this policy is to provide specific and implementing guidance, in consonance with the basis established by Executive action on Study 2009, for the development and attack of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) regardless of the conditions under which hostilities may be initiated.

3. Concepts

A. Strategic Concept. The concept for the conduct of the strategic offensive effort of the United States in the event of war is to destroy the Sino-Soviet Bloc and ability to wage war, recognizing that the U.S. Armed Forces have the continuing obligation to maintain peace and detente to the United States and its Allies.

(1) National authority may determine, in response to such form of strategic warning such as explicit evidence of Soviet intention to attack the United States, or in response to Soviet attack upon an ally, that the U.S. strategic offensive effort must be initiated before a comparable Soviet effort has been launched.

(2) The U.S. strategic effort may also have to strive after the Soviet attack has been initiated. The available level of U.S. strike capability will vary, depending upon when the U.S. strike is launched, relative to the time of Soviet launch. That level may vary from virtually the total force to a significantly reduced level, if a Soviet attack has been sustained.

- OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS -

3. Objectives. The objectives of establishing a National Strategic Target List are to provide a list of targets which must be attacked at the outset of general war, in conjunction with other operations, to insure that the U.S. will prevail.

2. The successful attack on these targets is the most important single task of our Armed Forces. Specific attack objectives are to destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

1. The objectives of the plan for the attack on the National Strategic Target List shall be to insure the desired level of destruction regardless of the manner in which the war is initiated, such assurance to stem from selections of military means from the entire spectrum of those available, the use of diversified tactics and decentralized execution under unified and specified command, of their approved, integrated plans.

2. Concept.

A. A National Strategic Target List shall be developed containing a minimum number of targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc which must be attacked in order to satisfy United States initial objectives in the event of general war. This list shall consist of an optimum mix of [redacted]

The list shall be based on Study 2009 and the President's action thereon.

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- INTENT -

1 Intent To provide guidance for development of the National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and for attack of these targets in consonance with the Executive Guidance on Study 2009 or subsequent Executive Guidance

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- OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS -

2. Objectives The basic objective of this policy is to establish clear guidance for the development of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) and an operational plan outlining the initial task to be accomplished regardless of the conditions under which hostilities are initiated. The attack of the Targets on the National Strategic Target List is considered to be a task the accomplishment of which, when coupled with other essential military operations, is critical to preponderance in general war.

3. Concerns

A. General The essential criterion in developing a targeting concept is the determination that certain basic national strengths of the Sino-Soviet Bloc must be neutralized or destroyed in order to achieve U.S. objectives. Such a determination must be expressed in terms of target complexes.

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- INTENT -

1. Purpose, to provide guidance, consistent with Executive Policy, for the development of a target system in the Sino-Soviet Bloc; the destruction or neutralization of which is necessary for the attainment of U.S. National objectives. This policy covers the objectives, concept, and target analysis for the development of the National Target List (NTL). In addition, this policy states the damage criteria, assessments and constraints applicable to the targets of the NTL.

- OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS -

2. Objectives. The basic objective of this policy is to provide the criteria for the development of a list of the minimum number of targets which must be destroyed or neutralized to prevail in general war. The development of the NTL will be predicated upon the following specific objectives.

1. Destruction or neutralization of the Sino-Soviet Bloc

2. Destruction or neutralization of the Sino-Soviet Bloc

3. Destruction of selected targets of particular importance to the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the extent that, when coupled with other essential military operations, it is critical to preponderance in general war.

- INTENT -

1 Intent To provide, for implementing action by the Strategic Targeting Authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and for the guidance of other elements of the JCS, definitive instructions for the conduct and control of the strategic offensive effort in general war.

- OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS -

2 Objective. The objective of this policy is to provide specific and implementing guidance, in consonance with the basis established by Executive Action on Study 2009, for the development and attack of a National Strategic Target List (NSTL) regardless of the conditions under which hostilities may be initiated.

3 Concerns

1. Strategic Concept The concept for the conduct of the strategic offensive effort of the United States in the event of war is to destroy the Sino-Soviet Bloc and ability to wage war, recognizing that the U.S. Armed Forces have the continuing obligation to maintain peace and damage to the United States and its Allies.

- OBJECTIVES AND CONCERNS -

1. Purpose. The purpose of this policy is to provide a basis for the development of a National Strategic Target List, taking into consideration Study 2009 and the President's action thereon, and to outline the procedure for developing a plan for the attack on the targets so listed.

2. Objectives.

The objectives of establishing a National Strategic Target List are to provide a list of targets which must be attacked at the outset of general war, in conjunction with other operations, to insure that the U.S. will prevail.

2. The successful attack on these targets is the most important single task of our Armed Forces. Specific attack objectives are to destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

3. The objectives of the plan for the attack on the National Strategic Target List shall be to insure the desired level of destruction regardless of the manner in which the war is initiated, such assurance to stem from selections of military means from the entire spectrum of those available, the use of diversified tactics and decentralized execution under unified and specified command, of their approved, integrated plans.

2. Concept.

A. A National Strategic Target List shall be developed containing a minimum number of targets in the Sino-Soviet Bloc which must be attacked in order to satisfy United States initial objectives in the event of general war. This list shall consist of an optimum mix of [redacted]

The list shall be based on Study 2009 and the President's action thereon.

18 11 26

2 National Strategic Target List

- (1) The NSTL shall consist of an optimum mix of [redacted] target complexes in the Sino-Soviet Bloc.
- (2) The target complexes, when attacked and subjected to the damage levels envisaged in paragraph 6, would reduce the Sino-Soviet Bloc war-making potential to a level approximating that indicated in Annex "G" to Study 2009.

- (3) The NSTL will initially be prepared by utilizing the target complexes selected in Annex "D" to Study 2009 as a basic starting point, and modified as may be appropriate in the light of current intelligence available to the Department of Defense.
- (4) The NSTL will include at least the following:
  - (a) An alphabetical listing of the selected complexes designated by TDI major reference number.
  - (b) An alphabetical listing by country of selected complexes designated by TDI major reference number including a detailed listing of critical individual installations and the proportion of each critical category of the Sino-Soviet Bloc war-making potential which is at risk in each installation.

- (c) An over-all target summary of the Sino-Soviet Bloc together with a summary by category and country (i.e., USSR, China, etc.) of the proportion of each country's principal war-making potential which is at risk.
- d. Changes in the NSTL.

- (1) Additions and deletions of target complexes will be made when necessary on a continuing basis, in light of current intelligence available to Department of Defense. These changes will be brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when considered appropriate by the Director, Joint Staff.
- (2) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will review the NSTL annually.

3 Concept

- a. Issue specific terms of reference as required.
- b. Review and approve the NSL annually.
- c. Review and approve the damage criteria, assurance, and conclusions annually.
- d. Issue additions and deletions of targets will be made when necessary on a continuing basis, in light of current intelligence.

4 Target Selection

- a. National Targets. The NSL is a list of critical targets comprising those elements essential to the enemy war making capability and whose destruction or neutralization must be accomplished if the United States and its Allies are to prevail. The success of an attack on the NSL will require accurate identification of critical targets and effective employment of diverse W.3 atomic strike forces in a thoroughly planned integrated effort. All requisite forces will be employed. The attack on targets of the NSL will be pre-planned to an extent which will permit immediate execution of assigned tasks by the Commanders concerned, when atomic weapons are released by the President, with confidence and effectiveness.

5 All complexes which contain selected as targets

- The NSL shall consist of an optimum mix of the minimum number of [redacted] prevailing in general war. The following criteria shall govern the selection of targets for the NSL.
  - a. Targets in the NSL shall be selected from the current edition of the Target Data Inventory (TDI)
  - b. [redacted]
  - c. All complexes which contain [redacted] shall be selected as targets.

2 The NSTL will include at least the following:

- a. An alphabetical listing of the selected complexes designated by major reference number.
- b. An alphabetical listing of selected complexes designated by major reference number including a detailed listing of individual installations to include the proportion of each category of the Sino-Soviet Bloc war-making potential which is included in each installation.
- c. An over-all summary of the Sino-Soviet Bloc together with a summary by category and country, (i.e., USSR, China etc.) of the proportion of each country's war-making potential which is included in the targets on the NSTL.

- 3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff reserve to themselves the responsibility and authority for making additions or deletions of target complexes to the NSTL.
- b. Annually, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will review the NSTL in sufficient time for changes to be reflected in instructions to the appropriate commanders.

4. The Joint Staff will:

- (1) on a continuing basis, recommend the addition or deletion of target complexes and make corrections and changes to the installations included in each target complex which may be necessary in the light of current intelligence. The changes in installations thus made will be brought to the attention of the Joint Chiefs of Staff when considered appropriate by the Director, Joint Staff.
- (2) Review the summary, paragraph 2. a above, quarterly, and at such other times as requested by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
- (3) Evaluate the above procedures and recommend such changes as may be considered appropriate to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as experience is gained in the maintenance of the NSTL.

- 5. The initial NSTL will be presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval by [redacted]

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(3) With full recognition of these possible circumstances, there is a minimum essential task to be accomplished under more favorable conditions additional tasks could be accomplished. The accomplishment of these tasks is governed by the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP) which applies available capable forces to those Sino-Soviet Bloc <sup>Strategic</sup> strengths to achieve necessary levels of destruction.

b Strategic Targeting Concept

(1) There must be a finite expression of the job to be accomplished by the strategic offensive effort in order to prevail. In NSC Study 2009, the ability of the United States to prevail was measured on the basis of the damage to the enemy's basic military, political, and economic strengths. Hence, the essential criterion in developing a targeting concept is the determination of those basic national strengths of the Sino-Soviet Bloc that must be destroyed. This determination is expressed in terms of broad categories of targets or installations to be attacked and that level of the total in each category that it is considered necessary to destroy or neutralize. These broad categories fall within four general classifications, as follows:

(a)	[REDACTED]
(b)	[REDACTED]
(c)	[REDACTED]
(d)	[REDACTED]

- NSM -

(2) The National Strategic Target List (NSTL) Being the above criterion and in light of available intelligence and consideration of operational characteristics and patterns of employment of available capable forces, an NSTL will be established. The NSTL will contain a list of specific targets whose timely and assured destruction is of critical importance to war prevailing in general war.

N.S. 3

b Designation of a Targeting Agency The Joint Staff is designated as the agency for the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the preparation and maintenance of the National Strategic Target List

- NSM -

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- NSM -

7 Responsibility  
The JCS shall exercise over-all responsibility for the selection of the targets in the NSTL. The JCS will

- NSM -

1. In consonance with the policy set forth in the attachment to SP-60 J/ the Joint Staff, with such assistance from the unified and specified commands, the Services, and other agencies as may be necessary, will, as a matter of priority, select for consideration by the Joint Chiefs of Staff a proposed list of target complexes to be included in the NSTL. In accomplishing this task, direct liaison with any agency of the Department of Defense is authorized.

- NSM -

5. Only [redacted] targets which meet the following criteria shall be selected:

(1) [redacted] - All sites whose locations are known.

(2) [redacted]

(3) [redacted]

(4) [redacted]

(5) [redacted]

(6) [redacted]

(7) [redacted]

(8) [redacted]

ALL

- DAMAGE CRITERIA -

6. Damage Criteria. Plans and operations directed toward the attack of all the targets on the NSPL will be based upon the damage criteria set forth below. In applying the damage criteria, account will be taken of cumulative damage effects, from adjacent nuclear detonations.

a. Ninety percent probability of severe damage to [redacted]

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- DAMAGE CRITERIA -

4. The damage criteria are:

(1) A maximum of 90% probability of severe damage to 50% of the industrial floor space [redacted]

90% probability of severe damage to [redacted] may be substituted.

(2) A maximum of 90% probability of severe damage to [redacted]

- DAMAGE CRITERIA -

5. Damage Criteria. Plans and Operations directed toward the attack of individual targets of the NSPL will be based upon achieving the minimum damage levels set forth below. In applying the damage criteria, account will be taken of cumulative damage effects, from adjacent nuclear detonations.

a. Severe damage to [redacted]

b. Moderate damage to [redacted]

- DAMAGE CRITERIA -

4. Damage Criteria. Plans and operations directed toward the attack of the NSPL will be based upon the damage criteria set forth below. In applying the damage criteria, account will be taken of cumulative damage effects from adjacent nuclear detonations.

a. Ninety percent probability of severe damage to [redacted]

b. Ninety percent probability of moderate damage to [redacted]

3. Ninety percent probability of moderate damage to [redacted]

4. Ninety percent probability of destruction of 50 percent of industrial floor space [redacted]

5. For other installations the damage criteria are the prerogative of operational commanders, but will be no higher than 50 percent probability of severe damage.

- ASSURANCE -

7. Assurance. Taking account of all pertinent operational factors, plans and requirements will be based upon achieving a minimum of seventy-five percent assurance of delivery at each bomb-release line (BRL) of the necessary weapons to achieve the specified levels of damage to the various targets of the NSTL.

- STRIKE PRIORITIES -

5. Strike Priorities. The attack of all of the targets on the NSTL is of maximum essential task, to be accomplished at the outbreak of general nuclear war. This fact precludes assignment of relative strike priorities within the NSTL purely in terms of importance. All of the targets on the NSTL are important and must be neutralized or destroyed. It is recognized that all of these targets cannot be brought under attack simultaneously, and that there are other factors, such as tactics, penetration, survival, timing of strikes by individual commanders in the same area, aborts, malfunctions, count-downs, pick-up schedules, refueling problems, etc., which directly affect the sequence in which the targets on the NSTL could be brought under attack. Appropriate coordination will be effected between the NSJFA and participating commanders and to the extent that, operational considerations permitting, the following strike priorities for accomplishment of the attack of targets

- ASSURANCE -

8. Assurance. Taking into account all pertinent operational factors, assignment of targets and strike plans will be based upon achieving a minimum of 75% assurance of delivery at each bomb-release line (BRL) of those weapons necessary to achieve the specified levels of damage to the various targets of the NSTL.

- STRIKE PRIORITIES -

(None)

9. Severe damage to the principal war support-industries [redacted]

4. For other installations the damage criteria are the responsibility of the operational commander [redacted]

- ASSURANCE -

6. Assurance. Taking account of all operational factors, and because of the urgency attached to the destruction of the first priority targets (paragraph 4a), plans and requirements will be based on seventy percent assurance of achieving the specified levels of damage to these targets of the NSTL. Plans and requirements for the remaining target categories will be based on a minimum of seventy-five percent assurance of achieving specified levels of damage.

- STRIKE PRIORITIES -

4. Strike Priorities. The following priorities, in order of importance for strike planning purposes, are established for accomplishment of the attack on the NSTL.

2. First priority will be accorded to the destruction of Sino-Soviet Bloc [redacted]

within the Sino-Soviet Bloc, to the extent necessary to eliminate the threat of nuclear attacks on U.S. and Allied forces and territories. Specific target categories included in the first priority are

- (1) [redacted]
- (2) [redacted]
- (3) [redacted]
- (4) [redacted]
- (5) [redacted]

5. Ninety percent probability of destruction of 50 percent of industrial floor space [redacted]

4. For other installations the damage criteria are the prerogative of operational commanders, but will be no higher than 50 percent probability of severe damage.

- ASSURANCE -

5. Assurance. Taking account of all pertinent operational factors, plans and requirements will be based upon achieving a minimum of seventy-five percent assurance of delivery at each bomb-release line (BRL) of the necessary weapons to achieve the specified levels of damage to the various targets of the NSTL.

- STRIKE PRIORITIES -

(None)

the sequence in which the targets on the NSTL could be brought under attack. Appropriate coordination will be effected between the NSJFA and participating commanders and to the extent that, operational considerations permitting, the following strike priorities for accomplishment of the attack of targets

within the Sino-Soviet Bloc, to the extent necessary to eliminate the threat of nuclear attacks on U.S. and Allied forces and territories. Specific target categories included in the first priority are

- (1) [redacted]
- (2) [redacted]
- (3) [redacted]
- (4) [redacted]
- (5) [redacted]



a. First strike priority will be accorded to the destruction of Sino-Soviet Bloc [redacted] to eliminate or significantly degrade the threat of nuclear attacks on U.S. and Allied forces and territories

b. Second priority will be accorded to the over-running of large areas of U.S. or Allied territory and to insure the maintenance of control of essential sea areas and the protection of vital communications.

c. Third priority will be accorded to denying the use of [redacted] which could immediately and directly contribute to the enemy's capability to conduct initial military operations

- SUPPORTING TARGETS -

c. Supporting Targets. It is recognized that the successful execution of attacks on target complexes of the KSTL will require the attack of certain additional targets, the destruction of which is essential to the accomplishment of the attack of targets of the KSTL. Such targets are called Supporting Targets, the selection of which is a responsibility of the commanders concerned. These targets will not be included in the KSTL; however, they will be included in the operational plan

b. Other Targets.

In addition to targets which will be assigned to them from the KTL, the Unified and Specified Commanders will be responsible for targets other than those in the KTL. These targets comprise the Commanders' lists and include interdiction, isolation and suppression of air defense and counter measures.

- SUPPORTING TARGETS -

b. Second priority will be accorded to selected targets of particular significance [redacted] to prevent over-running of large areas of U.S. or Allied territory and to insure the maintenance of control of essential sea areas and the protection of vital communications. Specific target categories included in second priority are:

- (1) [redacted]
- (2) [redacted]
- (3) [redacted]

c. The third priority will be accorded to denying the use of [redacted] which can immediately and directly contribute to the enemy's capability to conduct initial military operations. Specific target categories included in the third priority are:

- (1) Critical war supporting resources [redacted]
- (2) [redacted]

- SUPPORTING TARGETS -

(3) Supporting Targets. It is recognized that there is a requirement for the attack of certain additional targets, the destruction of which is essential to the accomplishment of the attack of targets of the KSTL, for example, suppression of enemy air defenses along the main corridors of attack. Such targets are called Supporting Targets, and may be reflected as such in the KSTL

- SUPPORTING TARGETS -

6. Supporting Targets. It is recognized that the successful execution of attacks on target complexes of the KSTL will require the attack of certain additional targets, the destruction of which is essential to the accomplishment of the attack of targets of the KSTL. In conducting such attacks, commanders of unified and specified commands will render mutual support to one another. CINCPAC will coordinate the planning for this effort in order to utilize fully all existing capabilities in a single integrated effort

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- CONSTRAINTS -

8. Constraints Consistent with the necessity of achieving the specified assurance of the damage levels set forth above, certain constraints and restraints will be observed

a. Surface Bursts Because of the relatively unpredictable extent of the lethal effects of downwind fall-out, surface-bursts should not be programmed except when required to achieve necessary damage

Particular care will be exercised on a case-by-case basis, to determine whether or not a surface burst is an overriding military necessity. The combined contamination resulting from all surface burst weapons should not significantly endanger friendly forces and Peoples.

b. [Redacted]

In SM-264-58, dated 10 April 1958. Specific constraints are included in the Atomic Annex to the current Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan

- CONSTRAINTS -

c. Constraints.

(1) In general, the minimum numbers and yields of weapons required to achieve the specified damage levels will be employed. Because the lethal effect of downwind fall-out cannot be reliably predicted, surface bursts shall be employed only where required to achieve necessary damage

(2) Subject to the general constraints, above: (a) [Redacted] in the USSR and China may be programmed for surface bursts. (b) Carefully planned utilization of radioactive fall-out should be exploited where practicable to contribute to the destruction of enemy government and military controls and to the general deterioration of the Sino-Soviet Bloc.

(3) [Redacted] USSR and China shall be so conducted as to minimize non-military destruction and casualties.

(4) In the planning of all attacks a specific goal is [Redacted]

- CONSTRAINTS -

(c) Adhere to established constraints. (Presumably JSCP)

- CONSTRAINTS -

(None)

RESPONSIBILITIES

9 Overall Responsibility. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the overall establishment of, planning for, and supervision of the execution of attacks on the target complexes listed within the NSM. In this regard they will

- A. Review and approve the list of target complexes included within the NSM.
- B. Review and approve the operational plan
- C. Direct and supervise execution of plans by the commanders of the unified and specified commands
- D. Resolve disputes between the target selection and operational planning agencies and the commanders of the unified or specified commands, as required

RESPONSIBILITIES

6. Planning Procedures.  
 A. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall provide to the Unified and Specified Commanders a basic concept of operations that includes target policy and the NSM.

- B. The Unified and Specified Commanders shall submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff the following:
  - (1) Recommendations as to those target complexes on the NSM for which they should be assigned the attack responsibility.
  - (2) A summary of their assigned forces which are available and capable of attack of the targets on the NSM.
  - (3) The degree of assurance that they can attack their recommended assigned targets on a coordinating basis.

C. The Joint Chiefs of Staff shall issue a basic operations plan sufficiently definitive so that Unified and Specified Commanders can develop from it their individual strike plans.

D. The Unified and Specified Commanders shall prepare their detailed plans for the attack of targets on the NSM for which they have been assigned responsibility. The total precise coordinates of those plans are left to the discretion of the Commanders concerned but, to facilitate analysis by the JCS, they shall contain the following:

- (1) Identification of targets assigned.
- (2) Forces employed.
- (3) Dates and weapons to be used at each IZ, including appropriate designation of those planned for use on targets to be attacked in support of the attack of the targets on the NSM.
- (4) Estimates of damage that will result to each target complex, including:
  - (a) The extent to which the specified damage criteria and assurance have been met or exceeded.
  - (b) Any non-compliance with specified constraints and reasons therefor.

E. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will, in conjunction with the Unified and Specified Commanders, review, eliminate conflicts, and approve the Commanders' plans.

F. The approved plans will be distributed to all Unified and Specified Commanders and to the JCS, JCEC and NSM.

RESPONSIBILITY

7 Responsibility  
 A. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for providing clear, specific guidance for the total direction of the military effort. In this regard, they will

- (1) In order to establish a definitive basis for development of the NSM, provide the determination of those basic national strengths of the ~~USSR~~ Soviet bloc which must be destroyed or neutralized in order to achieve appropriate U. S. objectives and define the minimum acceptable level of destruction or neutralization required in each broad target category.
- (2) Designate CIRCUMC as the Strategic Targeting Authority
- (3) Review and approve the NSM which includes the NSM.

B. CIRCUMC, as the Strategic Targeting Authority for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, develops the NSM and prepares the NSDP in this regard he will:

- (1) In accordance with established procedures submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval the NSDP to include the NSM as an integral element thereof

RESPONSIBILITIES

7 Responsibility  
 A. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are responsible for the overall establishment of, planning for, and direction of the execution of attacks on the target complexes listed within the NSM. In this regard they will

- (1) Review and approve the list of target complexes included within the NSM.
- (2) Review and approve the plan of attack for forces committed against the NSM.
- (3) Direct the execution of plans by the commanders of the unified and specified commands.
- (4) Adjudicate such disputes as may arise through the application of coordinating authority by CIRCUMC

B. CIRCUMC is designated as the coordinating authority, and will ensure, in accordance with NSM, that plans of the unified and specified commanders are coordinated for the attack on the NSM.

C. Unified and Specified Commanders will prepare plans for the attack of their assigned portions of the National Strategic Target List, in coordination with each other and under the coordinating authority of CIRCUMC, and submit the plans to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for review and approval. Approved plans, which will constitute a single integrated effort, will be executed on order of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

- OPERATIONAL PLAN -

4 Operational Plan

a. Ultimate Purpose The ultimate purpose to be achieved is preparation of a sound operational plan for the initial attack of all target complexes on the NSTZ. This plan will provide for the scheduled and controlled commitment of the necessary nuclear capable forces against the targets developed from the NSTZ.

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b. Designation of a Planning Agent The Commander, Strategic Air Command, is designated as a NST Planning Agent (NSTPA) for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

c. Responsibilities of the NSTPA (1) The NSTPA, in conjunction with the commanders of unified and specified commands, will prepare and maintain an effective operational plan for the initial attack of all the targets on the NSTZ, utilizing the available nuclear capable delivery forces of the United States.

(2) Recognizing the nature of targeting, the NSTPA will keep this plan under continuous review, revising it as necessary.

(3) The NSTPA will submit to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval once each year the operational plan showing as a minimum (a) Allocation of target complexes which commanders of unified and specified commands have accepted.

(b) DDT's and weapons to be used at each DGT, including appropriate designation of those planned for attack of supporting targets.

(c) Overall estimate of damage that will result to each target complex, including the extent to which the specified damage criteria and measures have been met or exceeded.

5. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will establish staff procedures such that the Unified and Specified Commanders' plans are kept under continuous review.

- OPERATIONAL PLAN -

NATIONAL TARGET LIST (NTL)

1. Purpose.

To provide guidance for planning the attack of the targets on the National Target List (NTL).

2. Objectives.

To assure that an effective plan exists for the optimum employment of the available and capable forces of the United States in a national effort for the timely and decisive attack of the targets in the NTL.

3. Concepts.

a. National Target List (NTL). The designation of the targets on the NTL will denotationaly maintain enemy atomic strikes, retard of halt major land and naval campaigns, designate enemy capability to integrate and control surviving resources. The success of the attack of the targets on the NTL will require optimum employment of the diverse capabilities of all national forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will retain full military responsibility for target planning. The attack will be pre-planned to an extent which will permit execution of assigned tasks by commanders concerned, with confidence that there will be no interference nor needless duplication of effort between own and friendly forces.

b. Other Targets. Unified and Specified

Commanders will continue to plan the additional operations necessary to insure the interdiction, isolation and final defeat of enemy forces. These plans will provide for the detection, location and destruction of major enemy forces which are not included in the NTL but which pose a threat to Commanders concerned. Unified and Specified Commanders will make provision in their plans for follow-on operations as may be dictated by the situation following the initial attack.

- OPERATIONAL PLAN -

5 Single Intersected Operational Plan (SIOP)

The SIOP governs the attack of all targets on the NSTZ. This plan will provide for the scheduled and controlled commitment in one mutually supporting effort of all available capable forces against these targets with the objective of achieving prompt and decisive results.

(1) The STA develop the SIOP.

(2) To assist the STA in applying forces for the accomplishment of his task, the appropriate unified and specified commanders identify those of their forces that can be made available for attack on targets on the NSTZ. Detailed orders reflecting the commitments of each unified and specified command are included in the SIOP.

(3) The SIOP is prepared with recognition of the possible circumstances of how hostilities may be initiated. The STA, utilizing his staff and the representatives of the unified and specified commands, will use optimum targeting procedure to

(a) Select the actual targets to be attacked based on the capabilities and limitations of the available forces

(b) Control the weight of effort consistent with the worth of the DGT

(c) Compute probabilities to insure achieving prescribed damage criteria and assurance.

(d) Integrate individual strikes for mutual support through the establishment of attack corridors, timing, EMI, etc (Supporting Targets require attack are determined)

(4) As a fundamental element in the development of the SIOP, the STA war games the SIOP to demonstrate that the specific military objectives as established by the JCS are accomplished

- OPERATIONAL PLAN -

b. All unified and specified commanders possessing capabilities to attack targets on the NSTZ at all times, and within the prescribed assurance factors will be assigned targets appropriate to their capabilities

c. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will issue, as part of the basic war plan, this policy, the National Strategic Target List, and the target assignments to the unified and specified commanders. For the purpose of insuring a coordinated effort of all unified and specified commanders' capabilities, CINCLAC will be designated as coordinating authority in the preparation of unified and specified commanders' plans

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, JOINT STAFF

Subject: NSTZ Operational Planning (O)

1. In accordance with the National Strategic Targeting Policy you are directed to take such actions as are necessary to insure incorporation in the basic war plan of the strategic guidance necessary to insure that a sound, effective plan exists to employ the available capable forces of the United States in a national effort designed to attack all the targets of the NSTZ. Among other things you will

a. Conduct a conference to determine assignment to appropriate commanders of specific target complexes of the NSTZ for attack.

b. Incorporate, within the basic war plan, essential features of the National Strategic Targeting Policy.

c. Incorporate, within the basic war plan, essential features of the NSTZ with assignment of responsibility to appropriate commanders for the attack of specific target complexes of the NSTZ.

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- (d) Summary of over-all estimate of damage that will result by application of weapons to all of the targets on the NSTL.
- (e) Summary of over-all estimate of damage that will result by application of weapons on supporting targets
- (f) Coordination procedures
- (g) Submit for approval to the Joint Chiefs of Staff as appropriate any major changes in the operational plan.
4. Planning Sequence.

(1) The Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide the NSTL to the commanders of unified and specified commands

(2) The commanders of unified and specified commands will recommend to the NSTPA target complexes on the NSTL for initial attack by forces under their control

(3) Taking into consideration the recommendations of the commanders of unified and specified commands, the NSTPA will allocate target complexes of the NSTL to the appropriate commanders.

(4) Unified and specified commands will prepare their own plans to include the selection of the DGT's and the assignment of their own forces to attack the targets (Nuclear Weapons requirements for these plans will be reflected in the commander's annual requirements studies submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff )

(5) Unified and specified commands will advise the NSTPA of their DGT's, over-all estimate of damage that will result to each target complex, including the extent to which the specified damage criteria and assurance have been met or exceeded

(6) The NSTPA submits the operational plan to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for approval

5. Participating Commands The acceptance of an NSTL target complex constitutes a first priority commitment. Forces designated for attack of accepted NSTL targets will possess a 24-hour, all-weather capability

6. Damage Criteria, Assurance and Constraints. Damage criteria, assurance, and constraints are prescribed in JCS National Target Policy.

5. Target Assignment.

A. Having due regard for the requirements of other essential operations, targets on the NTL shall be assigned to unified and specified commands by the Joint Chiefs of Staff according to the capabilities of their assigned forces to launch timely, effective and efficient attacks against assigned targets. To this end, the following factors will be considered in determining target assignments:

(1) Significance of targets on the NTL to the accomplishment of the mission of the unified or specified commanders

(2) Recommendations of the Commanders as to utilization of forces for strike of NTL targets, defensive targets, and targets on the Commanders' lists in order to avoid overloading the forces of any one Commander to such an extent that his freedom of action is seriously reduced.

(3) Suitability of available weapon systems, considering

(a) Target characteristics, damage criteria, and constraints.

(b) Reliability.

(c) Vulnerability to:

1. Enemy pre-emptive action

2. Enemy defensive measures.

(d) Reaction time.

(e) Time of flight.

(4) The scope and effectiveness of attacks planned by Allied forces on NTL targets, insofar as such plans are known.

B. Targets Other Than NTL.

Assignment of targets other than those on the NTL shall be made by the Unified Commander Commanders and submitted to the JCS for review. Those assignments shall be made so as to avoid interference with scheduled attacks on NTL targets

2. Incorporate, within the basic war plan, provision for CINCSAC to act as coordinating authority in planning the attacks on the NSTL.

3. Review the detailed plans prepared by the commanders of unified and specified commands and prepare appropriate recommendations thereon for consideration and approval by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Relationship Between NSZPA and the Commanders of Unified and Specified Commands.

- (1) These foregoing responsibilities do not include command authority by the NSZPA over forces of other unified and specified commands.
- (2) Unresolved matters will be referred to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution.
- (3) All participating commands and the Joint Staff shall furnish permanent representation to NSZPA to carry out the planning and coordinating functions. The NSZPA will recommend the number, rank, and qualification considered necessary from each command to carry out this function.
- (4) CINCSAC in his capacity as NSZPA for the Joint Chiefs of Staff will carry out the foregoing. In his capacity as Commander, Strategic Air Command, he will function and participate in the same manner as the commanders of the other unified and specified commands.

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