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E.O. 12065: GDS 9/20/79 (GOODBY, JAMES E.)

TAGS: NATO, PARM, MNUC, PFOR

SUBJECT: HLG: US DRAFT REPORT

1. (SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT)
2. PARA 4 BEGINS LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL FROM HLG CHAIRMAN. PARA 5 BEGINS TEXT OF DRAFT. APPENDICES C AND D WILL BE HAND-CARRIED TO NATO HQ.
3. EMBASSIES AND MISSION PLEASE PASS IMMEDIATELY TO HLG

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PARTICIPANTS: ANKARA-MR. A.H. ALP (MFA); ATHENS-MR. HARLAFTIS (MOD); BONN-BG TANDECKI (MOD); BRUSSELS-MR.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE Page - 1
CLASSIFIED BY DEPT. OF STATE, M. GRAFELD, DAS, A/RPS, ACTING
DATE/CASE ID: 8 APR 2003 200204000
CLASSIFICATION: SECRET REASON: 25X6
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WILLOT (MFA); COPENHAGEN-MR. J. WAHL (MOD); HAGUE-MR. E.J. VAN VLOTEN (MFA); LONDON-MR. M. QUINLAN (MOD); OSLO-MR. J.J. HOLST (MOD); OTTAWA-DR. G.R. LINDSEY (DND); ROME-B.G. ,ISA'O (MOD); USNATO-HLG PARTICIPANTS. IN ABSENCE OF DESIGNATED HLG POINTS OF CONTACT, PLEASE PASS TO APPRO-RIATE DEPUTY. TABLES DELETED FROM MESSAGE TEXT WILL BE PROVIDED TO USNATO FOR DISTRIBUTION.

4. FOR ROME: IN PASSING THE HLG REPORT TO GOI, YOU SHOULD MAKE THE FOLLOWING POINTS TO THE HEAD OF THE ITALIAN DELEGATION, GENERAL PISANO, ON BEHALF OF HLG CHAIRMAN MCGIFFERT

-- DURING THE LAST HLG MEETING, THE DUTCH REPRESENTATIVE ARGUED FOR PUTTING IN AN APPENDIX THE BASING SCHEME SPECIFYING THE FORCES PROPOSED TO BE STATIONED IN PARTICULAR COUNTRIES. WE INDICATED THAT WE WOULD TRY TO WORK OUT A WAY OF HANDLING THIS SUGGESTION WITH THE DUTCH. IF A SOLUTION COULD BE REACHED, WE OFFERED TO DISCUSS IT WITH THE ITALIAN DELEGATION BEFORE PUTTING IT IN THE HLG REPORT.

-- WE SUBSEQUENTLY WORKED OUT A COMPROMISE WHICH SATISFIED BOTH THE DUTCH AND OURSELVES. IT ENTAILS MOVING THE BASING SCHEME FOR THE HLG RECOMMEND PROGRAM TO AN APPENDIX, BUT SPECIFYING IN THE REPORT'S BODY THAT THE APPENDIX SHO'LD BE CONSIDERED AS PART OF THE HLG RECOMMEND PROGRAM AND SUBJECT TO DECISION BY MINISTERS. THIS FORMULATION SOLVES THE DUTCH PROBLEM AND PRESERVES THE SPECIFICITY WE DESIRE IN TERMS OF NUMBERS OF SYSTEMS BASED IN PARTICULAR COUNTRIES.

-- WE HAVE BEEN UNABLE TO MAKE CONTACT WITH THE ITALIAN

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DELEGATION TO DISCUSS OUR APPROACH. RATHER THAN DELAY CIRCULATION OF THE REPORT FURTHER, WE ARE CIRCULATING IT WITH THE US/DUTCH COMPROMISE. IF THE ITALIAN HLG DELEGATION FINDS THIS COMPROMISE UNACCEPTABLE, WE WILL BE HAPPY TO DISCUSS IT EITHER PRIVATELY BEFORE NEXT WEEK'S MEETING OR DURING THE HLG MEETING ITSELF.

5. BEGIN LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL:

DEAR COLLEAGUE:

I AM SENDING YOU HEREWITH A REVISED DRAFT OF THE HLG

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REPORT DESIGNED TO REFLECT THE DELIBERATIONS OF OUR LAST MEETING. THE DEPLOYMENT PLAN, WHICH NOW APPEARS AS APPENDIX A, CONTAINS A MINOR ADJUSTMENT WITHIN THE OVER-ALL PROGRAM [REDACTED] IN THE DISTRIBUTION OF GLCM DEPLOYMENTS AS BETWEEN THE FRG AND THE UK; THIS ADJUSTMENT HAS BEEN MADE WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE TWO NATIONS CONCERNED.

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PLEASE CONSIDER NEXT WEDNESDAY'S MEETING AS ONE DESIGNED TO COMPLETE OUR REPORT FOR FORWARDING BY THE HLG TO THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP. THIS WILL ENABLE US TO STAY IN PARALLEL WITH THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL GROUP.

SIGNED: DAVID MCGIFFERT. END TEXT.

6. BEGIN TEXT

NATO LONG-RANGE TNF MODERNIZATION

I. INTRODUCTION

1. THE NUCLEAR PLANNING GROUP (NPG) AT ITS BARI MINISTERIAL IN 1977 DIRECTED THAT A HIGH LEVEL GROUP (HLG) STUDY NATO'S LONG-TERM NEEDS FOR THEATER NUCLEAR

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FORCE (TNF) MODERNIZATION. THE HLG WAS SUBSEQUENTLY ESTABLISHED AS A GROUP OF SENIOR LEVEL EXPERTS FROM NPG COUNTRIES, SPEAKING WITH AN APPRECIATION OF THEIR GOVERNMENT'S POSITIONS WITHOUT COMMITTING THEM. THIS REPORT BY THE HLG IS THE THIRD IN A SERIES DEALING WITH THE QUESTION OF MODERNIZATION OF NATO'S LONG-RANGE TNF (LRTNF). IT AND ITS APPENDICES CONTAIN THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HLG FOR AN LRTNF MODERNIZATION PROGRAM.

2. IN ADDITION TO PROVIDING THE PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE HLG, THIS REPORT REVIEWS THE RATIONALE FOR TNF MODERNIZATION, INCLUDING AN EVOLUTIONARY UPWARD ADJUSTMENT OF NATO'S LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES, DEVELOPS THE STRUCTURAL BASIS OF THE PROGRAM AND EVALUATES IT FOR CONSISTENCY WITH THE CRITERIA ESTABLISHED BY THE HLG -- SYSTEM RANGE, FORCE SIZE, LAND-BASING, PARTICIPATION, AND BALLISTIC/CRUISE MISSILE MIX. FOLLOWING THIS, SUCH FACTORS AS COST, MANNING PARTICIPATION, TIMING ASPECTS, AND EFFECTS ON THE

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OVERALL NATO TNF STOCKPILE ARE DEFINED MORE FULLY.

3. THE RECOMMENDED ADJUSTMENT OF LRTNF IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE DOCTRINE OF THE ALLIANCE (MC 14/3) AND WITH THE IMPROVEMENTS ;. -ONVENTIONAL FORCES OUTLINED IN THE LONG TERM DEFENSE PLAN (LTDP). JUST AS THE LTDP WILL IMPROVE THE CONVENTIONAL LEG OF THE NATO TRIAD, THE IMPROVEMENTS CALLED FOR HERE WILL STRENGTHEN THE

DETERRENT VALUE OF THE THEATER NUCLEAR LEG AND REINFORCE THE LINKAGE TO THE STRATEGIC LEG OF THE NATO TRIAD.

II. SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

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4. BASED ON THE DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS IN THE BODY OF THIS REPORT AND ITS APPENDICES, THE HLG RECOMMENDS THAT NATO'S LRTNF MODERNIZATION GOALS CAN BEST BE MET BY A DEPLOYMENT OF [REDACTED]

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5. THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM WOULD PROVIDE FOR WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION THROUGH DEPLOYMENTS OF LRTNF IN A NUMBER OF COUNTRIES. ON THIS BASIS, THE PATTERN OF DEPLOYMENTS ENVISIONED HERE WILL DEMONSTRATE BROAD, CONCRETE PARTICIPATION. SHOULD ADDITIONAL ALLIANCE MEMBERS DESIRE TO PARTICIPATE IN TNF MODERNIZATION THROUGH HOSTING LRTNF DEPLOYMENTS ON THEIR SOIL, THE PROGRAM COULD BE ADJUSTED TO ACCOMMODATE SUCH PARTICIPATION. IN ADDITION, THE HLG BELIEVES THAT -- CONSISTENT WITH THE ALLIANCE PRINCIPLE OF SHARED BURDENS AND BENEFITS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENCE -- ALL ALLIANCE MEMBERS SHOULD DEMONSTRATE BROAD ALLIANCE CONSENSUS ON LRTNF MODERNIZATION THROUGH PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE PROGRAM THAT IS ULTIMATELY AGREED BY THE ALLIANCE AND THROUGH SOME LIMITED SHARING IN THE FINANCIAL COSTS OF THE PROGRAM.

III. RATIONALE

6. THE HLG REAFFIRMS THE COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK FOR

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TNF MODERNIZATION PRESENTED IN ITS APRIL 1978 REPORT: THE PRIMARY AIM OF DETERRENCE; THE IMPORTANCE FOR DETERRENCE OF A TRIAD OF FORCES AND THE COUPLING BETWEEN THEM; AND IN THE EVENT DETERRENCE FAILS, THE NEED FOR A TNF CAPABILITY TO RESPOND FLEXIBLY, TO DEFEND FORWARD, TO ESCALATE IN A DELIBERATE MANNER, AND TO PARTICIPATE, IF NECESSARY, IN GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE.

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WHILE PRIORITY SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE GIVEN TO IMPROVEMENTS IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, OVERALL NATO STRATEGY AND THE EVOLVING WARSAW PACT CAPABILITY REQUIRE THAT NATO'S TNF CONTINUE TO BE MODERNIZED IN ORDER THAT THEY MAY CONTINUE THEIR ESSENTIAL ROLE IN THE NATO TRIAD AND CONTINUUM

OF DETERRENCE. THERE IS A NEED FOR AN EVOLUTIONARY UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IN NATO'S LRTNF; THAT ADJUSTMENT CARRIES NO IMPLICATION OF INCREASED ROLES FOR NATO THEATER NUCLEAR FORCES BUT RATHER IS DESIGNED TO ARREST A GROWING GAP IN THE SPECTRUM OF DETERRENCE. THE HLG ALSO AFFIRMS THE FOLLOWING RATIONALE SET FORTH IN ITS APRIL 1979 REPORT.

-- A STRONG LINKAGE BETWEEN THEATER AND STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCE" IS REQUIRED BY THE AGREED STRATEGY OF FLEXIBLE RESPONSE.

-- WITHIN THIS FRAMEWORK, CHANGES IN THE STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT, SPECIFICALLY PARITY IN INTERCONTINENTAL NUCLEAR FORCES AND SOVIET TNF MODERNIZATION EFFORTS SUCH AS THE DEPLOYMENT OF THE SS-20 AND BACKFIRE, LEAD DECISIVELY IN THE HLG VIEW TO THE NEED FOR STRENGTHENING NATO'S OWN FORCES.

-- THE PURPOSE OF AN UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IN LRTNF IS TO MINIMIZE THE RISK THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT BELIEVE -- HOWEVER INCORRECTLY -- THAT THEY COULD USE LONG-RANGE FORCES TO MAKE OR THREATEN LIMITED STRIKES AGAINST WESTERN EUROPE FROM A "SANCTUARY" IN THE SOVIET UNION, IN THE MISPERCEPTION THAT WITHOUT STRONG THEATER BASED SYSTEMS OF ITS OWN CAPABLE OF REACHING SOVIET TERRITORY, AND IN AN ERA OF PARITY AT THE STRATEGIC

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NUCLEAR LEVEL, NATO LACKED CREDIBLE AND APPROPRIATE MEANS OF RESPONSE.

-- AUGMENTATION OF NATO LRTNF BASED IN EUROPE WOULD THEREFORE CLOSE THIS GAP IN THE ESCALATION SPECTRUM AND PROVIDE INCREASED OPTIONS FOR RESTRAINED AND CONTROLLED RESPONSES, THEREBY REDUCING THE RISK OF SOVIET MISPERCEPTION AND STRENGTHENING DETERRENCE.

-- LRTNF AUGMENTATION WOULD ALSO CORRECT AN EMERGING IMBALANCE IN NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR FORCE POSTURE: AFTER UK VULCANS ARE PHASED OUT, UK POLARIS SLBMS WOULD BE THE ONLY REMAINING NON-US COMPONENT OF LRTNF AVAILABLE TO SACEUR AND US F-111S WOULD BE THE ONLY LAND-BASED COMPONENT OF THE LRTNF FORCE. T;US, THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILURE TO MODERNIZE COULD BE A PERCEPTION THAT NATO WAS SHIFTING ITS EMPHASIS TOWARD SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS WHILE EMPHASIZING OFF-SHORE COMPONENTS TO SUSTAIN SYSTEMS WHILE EMPHASIZING OFF-SHORE COMPONENTS TO SUSTAIN THE LRTNF.

-- SPIN-OFF EFFECTS INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING: INCREASING PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE FACE OF SOVIET LRTNF MODERNIZATION; PROVIDING A BETTER PROSPECT FOR MEANINGFUL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS INVOLVING LRTNF; AND IMPROVING FLEXIBILITY IN THE USE OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (DCA), THUS COMPLICATING WARSAW PACT PLANNING.

-- FINALLY, A COLLECTIVE ALLIANCE DECISION ON A COORDINATED PROGRAM OF ACTION IN THIS FIELD WOULD HAVE A MAJOR VALUE IN DEMONSTRATING AND REINFORCING ALLIANCE COHESION AND RESOLVE.

7. THUS, AS THE HLG CONCLUDED IN ITS APRIL 1979 REPORT, TNF MODERNIZATION WILL STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE BY REDUCING THE POSSIBILITY OF SOVIET MISPERCEPTIONS ABOUT NATO'S

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CAPABILITIES OR ITS WILL TO EMPLOY NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES. IN ADDITION, SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL, STRENGTHENED MODERNIZATION INVOLVING LRTNF WOULD INCREASE NATO'S CAPABILITY TO RESPOND FLEXIBLY, TO PROVIDE FOR FORWARD

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DEFENSE, TO ESCALATE IN A DELIBERATE MANNER AND TO PARTICIPATE, IF NECESSARY, IN A GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE.

IV. STRUCTURAL BASIS FOR THE PROGRAM

8. A MIX OF BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES IN THE HLG RECOMMENDED PROGRAM PROFITS FROM THE FEATURES OF EACH SYSTEM. BEING LAND-BASED, PERSHING II AND GLCM WOULD VISIBLY DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE RESOLVE TO PROVIDE CREDIBLE IN-THEATER RESPONSES TO ANY SOVIET AGGRESSION AND ADDRESS THE EMERGING GAP IN THE ESCALATION SPECTRUM IDENTIFIED EARLIER BY THE HLG. BOTH SYSTEMS WILL POSSESS A RANGE SUFFICIENT TO REACH THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION FROM AREAS OF NATO EUROPE, THEREBY DENYING THE SOVIETS A "SANCTUARY" FROM WHICH TO LAUNCH ATTACKS ON NATO WITH THEIR LRTNF, AND PROVIDING THE ALLIANCE WITH THE CAPABILITY TO TAKE THIS IMPORTANT ESCALATORY STEP BY MEANS IDENTIFIABLY SEPARATE FROM STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. BOTH SYSTEMS OFFER HIGH ACCURACY AND VARIABLE YIELD WARHEADS (WHICH TOGETHER PROVIDE THE POTENTIAL FOR CONTROLLING COLLATERAL DAMAGE AND STRIKING HARDENED TARGETS) AND ARE EXPECTED TO BE HIGHLY RELIABLE AND SURVIVABLE.

9. EACH SYSTEM HAS DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS WHICH COMPLEMENT THOSE OF THE OTHER. PERSHING II OFFERS A PARTICULARLY HIGH ASSURANCE OF PENETRATING SOVIET DEFENSES, THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE TIME-URGENT TARGETS DEFENSES, THE CAPABILITY TO STRIKE TIME-URGENT TARGETS

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AND THE OPPORTUNITY TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF EXISTING PERSHING IA INFRASTRUCTURE. GLCMS ARE CHEAPER AND HAVE LONGER RANGE, SO THAT THEY CAN ATTACK A WIDER RANGE OF TARGETS AND CAN OFFER A WIDER RANGE OF OPTIONS FOR BASING, THEREBY INCREASING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PARTICIPATION AMONGST THE ALLIES THROUGH BASING AND DEPLOYMENTS ON THEIR SOIL. IN ADDITION, GLCMS AND PII WOULD NOT COMPETE WITH CONVENTIONAL MISSIONS AS WOULD ALCMS ON DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT OR SLCMS ON MULTIMISSION SH-PS. THE INTRODUCTION OF A MIXED FORCE OF PERSHING IIS AND GLCMS ALSO OFFERS SIGNIFICANT MILITARY ADVANTAGES; IT HEDGES AGAINST THE FAILURE OF ONE TYPE OF SYSTEM; IT PROVIDES THE FLEXIBILITY TO SELECT THE BEST WEAPON FOR EACH MISSION; AND IT GREATLY COMPLICATES ENEMY PLANNING. THE MILITARY

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EFFECTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE MODERNIZATION PROGRAM ARE PRESENTED IN APPENDIX B.

10. THE HLG RECOMMENDED PROGRAM EMPHASIZES THE NEED FOR WIDESPREAD BASING OF THE NEW LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR DELIVERY SYSTEMS TO UNDERSCORE ALLIANCE POLITICAL COHESION, RISK-SHARING AND COMMITMENT TO THE FULL TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY OF ALL MEMBERS. SUCH BASING WOULD ALSO ENHANCE OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS BY DISPERSAL. THE BASING SCHEME IN THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM WOULD CONTRIBUTE GREATLY TO THESE OBJECTIVES. SHOULD ADDITIONAL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WISH TO HOST LRTNF DEPLOYMENTS, THE PROGRAM COULD BE ADJUSTED TO ACCOMMODATE SUCH PARTICIPATION.

11. SIZE. THE SIZE OF THE RECOMMENDED NATO LRTNF PROGRAM IS BASED ON A CONVERGENCE OF MILITARY, POLITICAL AND ARMS CONTROL NEEDS. THE SOVIET TNF BUILD-UP, PARTICULARLY IN LONG-RANGE FORCES, POSES A SIGNIFICANT THREAT AND WEAKENS THE SPAN OF NATO MILITARY CAPABILITY IN A WAY THAT NEEDS CONVINCINGLY TO BE REDRESSED. TO DO THIS REQUIRES A RELATIVELY SUBSTANTIAL ADDITION TO NATO LRTNF, AN ADDITION WHICH WILL INSURE THE MILITARY CAPABILITY TO DETER ATTACK,

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

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DEMONSTRATE TO THE SOVIETS NATO'S SERIOUS INTENT TO PRESERVE ITS SECURITY, AND PROVIDE MEANINGFUL INCENTIVES

FOR ARMS CONTROL. A TOKEN BUILD-UP WILL NOT ACCOMPLISH THESE ESSENTIAL OBJECTIVES.

12. CONSISTENT WITH NATO STRATEGY, THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM IS LARGE ENOUGH TO ENSURE AND MAKE EVIDENT THAT THERE ARE NO WEAK LINKS IN THE SPECTRUM OF MILITARY OPTIONS AVAILABLE TO NATO THAT THE SOVIETS MIGHT EXPLOIT. THE PURPOSE OF THE ADJUSTMENT IS TO STRENGTHEN COUPLING BETWEEN STRATEGIC FORCES AND THE DEFENSE OF EUROPE. IT IS NOT SO LARGE AS TO IMPLY A DIMINISHED ROLE FOR STRATEGIC FORCES; BUT IT IS LARGE ENOUGH TO ASSURE A MILITARILY AND POLITICALLY STRONG LINK. NUMBERS SIGNIFICANTLY LESS THAN THE RECOM; END-ED LEVEL WOULD NOT GIVE US HIGH CONFIDENCE OVER TIME THAT THE FORCE WOULD BE SEEN AS A MAJOR FACTOR BY THE SOVIETS WHEN COMPARED WITH THE STRATEGIC FORCES OF BOTH SIDES AND THE SOVIETS' OWN INCREASING LRTNF CAPABILITIES.

13. THE UPWARD ADJUSTMENT IN WARHEADS IN THE RECOMMENDED

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PROGRAM, WHEN ADDED TO THE PRESENT NATO BASE OF LAND-BASED LRTNF WARHEADS, IS WELL BELOW THE SOVIET PROJECTED FIGURE (SEE APPENDIX C). THIS DEMONSTRATES THAT THE PROGRAM IS NOT DESIGNED TO MATCH THE SOVIET BUILD-UP SYSTEM-BY-SYSTEM OR IN AGGREGATE NUMBERS. BUT A NUMBER MUCH LOWER THAN BOTH BY THE SOVIETS AND IN THE WEST, AS A POLITICAL GESTURE RATHER THAN A STRATEGICALLY MEANINGFUL RESPONSE.

--MILITARY REQUIREMENTS FOR SELECTIVE USE

14. A CAPABILITY FOR SELECTIVE NUCLEAR STRIKES AGAINST THE USSR R; INFORCES AND STRENGTHENS THE LINK BETWEEN

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NATO TNF AND US STRATEGIC FORCES. SUCH A CAPABILITY REQUIRES THE ABILITY TO SURVIVE ENEMY CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR ATTACKS, TO PENETRATE TO TARGETS AND TO ATTACK A LARGE ENOUGH SET OF TARGETS TO INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF CONFLICT. THE NEED TO GUARD AGAINST UNCERTAINTIES IN BOTH PRE-LAUNCH AND IN-FLIGHT SURVIVABILITY I' THE FACE OF POTENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVIET THREAT IMPLIES THAT THE FORCE MUST BE LARGE ENOUGH TO HAVE A CREDIBLE MILITARY EFFECT. THE FORCE OF THE MAGNITUDE [REDACTED] [REDACTED] CONTAINED IN THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM WOULD GIVE SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP INCENTIVES EITHER NOT TO BEGIN AN ATTACK IN THE FIRST PLACE, OR TO CEASE THEIR ATTACK AND WITHDRAW IF CONFLICT HAS ALREADY OCCURRED.

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-- PARTICIPATION

,5. THE RECOMMENDED INCREASE IN FORCE SIZE OF NATO'S AND-BASED LRTNF IS WELL SUITED TO WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION.

UNDER PRESENT CIRCUMSTANCES, NUMBERS SIGNIFICANTLY BELOW THIS LEVEL COULD MAKE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION MORE DIFFICULT TO ACHIEVE.

-- ARMS CONTROL

16. A SUFFICIENTLY LARGE FORCE IS COMPATIBLE WITH THE ARMS CONTROL OBJECTIVE OF PROVIDING THE NECESSARY INCENTIVE FOR THE SOVIETS TO ENTER INTO SERIOUS ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS AND TO AGREE TO REDUC; AND LIMIT ITS LRTNF. IF THE SIZE OF THE ADJUSTMENT WERE MUCH LESS THAN THE RECOMMENDED LEVEL, THE SOVIETS MIGHT PREFER TO LET

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THEIR OWN FORCES GO UNCAPPED SINCE NATO WOULD APPEAR TO HAVE ACCEPTED A UNILATERAL AND RELATIVELY LOW LIMIT ON ITS FORCES. IF THE SOVIETS ARE GIVEN AN INCENTIVE TO NEGOTIATE, CONCRETE ARMS CONTROL RESULTS COULD LEAD TO MODIFICATIONS TO THIS PROGRAM.

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17. THESE CONSIDERATIONS DO NOT PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR A DETERMINATION OF THE SPECIFIC SIZE OF UPWARD ADJUSTMENT BUT DO LEAD DECISIVELY TO A FORCE IN THE REGION OF THE PROPOSED LEVEL. IN THIS REGION, FORCE STRUCTURE CONSIDERATIONS PROVIDE THE BASIS FOR THE EXACT CALCULATION OF THE RECOMMENDED LEVEL. THESE CONSIDERATIONS INCLUDE:

-- THE NEED TO STRUCTURE GLCM FORCES BY FLIGHTS INVOLVING 16-MISSILE INCREMENTS;

-- THE ADVANTAGE OF REPLACING ALL [REDACTED] SO AS TO TAKE FULL ADVANTAGE OF EXISTING SYSTEM INFRASTRUCTURE; AND

-- THE ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF HAVING MORE THAN A FEW GLCM FLIGHTS ASSOCIATED WITH A MAIN OPERATING BASE (MOB) SO AS TO AVOID SPENDING A RELATIVELY LARGE AMOUNT FOR AN MOB TO SUPPORT ONLY A FEW MISSILES.

18. RELATIONSHIP TO SPECIAL GROUP: THE PROPOSED UPWARD ADJUSTMENT FOR LRTNF IS DEVELOPED IN PARALLEL WITH AND IS CONSISTENT WITH THE ARMS CONTROL RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL GROUP.

19. COMPARISON WITH SOVIET LRTNF : CURRENT US ESTIMATES (SEE APPENDIX C) INDICATE THAT BY 1985, THE SOVIET UNION WILL HAVE APPROXIMATELY 300 SS-20 LAUNCHERS OF WHICH ABOUT TWO-THIRDS WOULD BE DEPLOYED IN THE WESTERN AND CENTRAL USSR SO AS TO POSE A DIRECT THREAT TO WESTERN EUROPE. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS ARE EXPECTED TO HAVE ABOUT 150 LONG RANGE AVIATION (LRA) BACKFIRE BOMBERS OF WHICH APPROXIMATELY 115 WOULD BE BASED IN

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THE WESTERN USSR. IT IS UNCLEAR TO WHAT EXTENT SS-4'S AND SS-5'S MAY BE RETIRED AS SS-20 IS DEPLOYED. SIMILARLY, UNCERTAINTIES EXIST REGARDING THE RETIREMENT RATE OF OLDER LRA BOMBERS. IF ALL THE SS-4'S AND 5'S WERE RETIRED AND BOMBERS ARE RETIRED AT CURRENTLY PROJECTED RATES, THE NUMBER OF SOVIET DELIVERABLE WARHEADS WITHIN RANGE OF NATO WOULD STILL INCREASE FROM APPROXIMATELY 2100 IN 1979 TO ABOUT 3200 IN 1985, LARGELY BECAUSE OF THE SS-20'S MULTIPLE WARHEADS AND IMPROVED REFIRE CAPABILITIES (SS-20 REFIRE COMPRISE ABOUT 1300 WARHEADS OF THE 3200 TOTAL IN 1985). WITH NO SS-4 AND SS-5 RETIREMENTS, SOVIET DELIVERABLE WARHEADS WITHIN RANGE OF NATO (INCLUDING ALL BALLISTIC MISSILE RELOADS) TOTAL APPROXIMATELY 3900 IN THE MID-1980'S.

20. CURRENTLY, NATO LRTNF CONSIST OF [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] EVEN WITH THE UPWARD ADJUSTMENT FROM THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM, NATO LRTNF WOULD STILL REMAIN CONSIDERABLY SMALLER THAN THE SOVIET FORCE.

AN EXTENSIVE EXAMINATION OF SOVIET LRTNF IS CONTAINED IN THE AGREED NATO DOCUMENT "WARSAW PACT STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES" (MC 161/79 (FINAL), 17 APRIL 79) AND WAS REVIEWED IN THE HLG REPORTS OF APRIL 1978 AND 1979.

V. HLG CRITERIA FOR EVALUATING THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM

21. RANGE: THE HLG BELIEVES THAT LRTNF SHOULD HAVE THE RANGE TO REACH THE TERRITORY OF THE SOVIET UNION SINCE A PRINCIPAL REASON FOR AUGMENTING NATO LRTNF IS TO STRENGTHEN DETERRENCE BY AVOIDING A SOVIET PERCEPTION

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OF SANCTUARY, WHILE MAINTAINING THE COUPLING OF NATO TNF TO US STRATEGIC FORCES. THE RECOMMENDED

--- GLCM PERSHING I1 FORCE MIX MEETS THIS CRITERION. THE HLG CONCLUDES THAT SUFFICIENT RANGE TO REACH MOSCOW, WHILE NOT A PREREQUISITE, SHOULD NOT DISQUALIFY A SYSTEM

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SUCH AS GLCM.

22. SIZE: THE HLG EARLIER PROPOSED AND THE NPG AT ITS APRIL 1979 MEETING ENDORSED AS A BASIS FOR FURTHER WORK, AN ADDITION OF

[REDACTED] WHICH WOULD BE MATCHED BY CORRESPONDING REDUCTIONS IN THE EXISTING TNF STOCKPILE. THE UPWARD ADJUSTMENT OF THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM FALLS WITHIN THE [REDACTED] RANGE OF ADDITIONAL WARHEADS CONSIDERED BY THE HLG.

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23. BASING: THE HEART OF THE DETERRENCE PROBLEM FACING THE ALLIANCE IS A GAP IN THE ALLIANCE DETERRENT SPECTRUM. THE ALLIANCE HAS ONLY A MODEST NUMBER OF LAND-BASED, LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS IN EUROPE CAPABLE OF STRIKING THE SOVIET UNION. MOREOVER, THEY ARE AGING AND VULNERABLE. THE LARGE AND GROWING NUMBER OF MODERN SOVIET SYSTEMS IN A COMPARABLE CATEGORY BOTH PROVIDES THE SOVIET UNION WITH WIDE OPTIONS AND POSES A DIRECT THREAT TO NATO'S SMALLER CAPABILITY. THIS DEVELOPING GAP IN NATO ASSURED RESPONSE OPTIONS TAKES ON INCREASING IMPORTANCE DURING A PERIOD OF STRATEGIC PARITY. HENCE A PRIMARY PURPOSE OF LRTNF MODERNIZATION IS TO FILL THIS GAP. THE SUGGESTED FORCE MIX OF GLCM AND PERSHING II MEETS THIS PROBLEM DIRECTLY. DEPLOYING ADDITIONAL SYSTEMS AT SEA CANNOT FILL THIS IDENTIFIED GAP. FURTHER, SEA-BASED SYSTEMS PROVIDE LITTLE OPPORTUNITY FOR VISIBLE

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NATO MEMBERS' PARTICIPATION IN LRTNF MODERNIZATION AND, IF DEPLOYED ON UNDEDICATED PLATFORMS, WOULD CREATE POTENTIAL CONFLICTS WITH OTHER ROLES. IF DEPLOYED ON DEDICATED PLATFORMS, THE COSTS WOULD BE PROHIBITIVE. ALTHOUGH THE HLG REVIEW INDICATES THE ALLIANCE SHOULD INITIALLY PURSUE DEPLOYMENTS OF LAND-BASED LRTNF, SEA-BASED SYSTEMS MIGHT BE CONSIDERED AS A DEPLOYMENT OPTION IN THE FUTURE TO AUGMENT CURRENT ALLIANCE SEA-BASED ASSETS.

24. PARTICIPATION: THE HLG RECOMMENDED THE BROADEST POSSIBLE ALLIANCE CONSENSUS AND PARTICIPATION IN THE DEPLOYMENT OF NEW LRTNF SYSTEMS. AS DISCUSSED ABOVE, THE HLG BELIEVES THIS CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED THROUGH THE WIDESPREAD PERMANENT BASING IT PROPOSES, AS WELL AS THROUGH PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR THE ALLIANCE AGREED PROGRAM

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AND THROUGH SHARING IN THE FINANCIAL BURDENS OF THAT PROGRAM.

25 A MIXED FORCE OF CRUISE AND BALLISTIC MISSILES: IN ORDER TO MAXIMIZE THE PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY AND PENETRATIVITY OF NATO'S LAND-BASED LRTNF, THE HLG RECOMMENDS A MIX OF NEW SYSTEMS COMPRISING BOTH BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILES. A MIXED FORCE CAPTURES AS MANY OF THE POSITIVE ASPECTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL SYSTEMS AS POSSIBLE BY, AMONG OTHER THINGS, ALLOWING MORE CHANCES FOR PARTICIPATION, HEDGING AGAINST FUTURE DEFENSIVE DEVELOPMENTS, COMPLICATING ENEMY PLANNING, PROVIDING FLEXIBILITY IN EMPLOYMENT AND ALLOWING TIME-PHASING. THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM IS DIRECTLY RESPONSIVE TO THESE OBJECTIVES.

VI. PROGRAMMATIC DETAILS

26. THE PROPOSED PROGRAM, WHICH--AS IS THE CASE FOR THIS ENTIRE REPORT--WILL BE THE SUBJECT OF CONSIDERATION

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BY NATO MINISTERS, WOULD REQUIRE STATIONING

A RECOMMENDED DEPLOYMENT SCHEME, WHICH WILL ALSO BE CONSIDERED FOR DECISION BY NATO MINISTERS, IS AT APPENDIX A.

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28. COSTS. PRESENT ESTIMATES OF THE LIFE CYCLE COSTS OF THE PROPOSED LRTNF SYSTEMS ARE SUMMARIZED IN TABLE 1 BELOW.

TABLE I/

-- ESTIMATED TOTAL COSTS FOR RECOMMENDED PROGRAM

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----- CATEGORY	PERSHING II \$M (FY 79)	GLCM \$M (FY 79)
R AND D TO COMPLETE PROGRAM	460	70
NEW CONSTRUCTION		
- NATO INFRASTRUCTURE	0	164.4
- OTHER	0	19.6

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PROCUREMENT	616	1072
10 YEAR OPERATING AND SUPPORT	1280	1170
LIFE CYCLE COST (TOTAL)	2356 2/	2496

1/ ALL COSTS ARE IN CONSTANT FY 79 US DOLLARS AND ASSUME THAT COSTS FOR A NATO LRTNF ARE THE SAME AS IF THE US PROCURED AND MANNED ALL LRTNF SYSTEMS. ALL COSTS PRIOR TO FY 80 ARE CONSIDERED SUNK.

2/ IF PERSHING 1A WERE RETAINED IN THE FORCE STRUCTURE INSTEAD OF BEING REPLACED ON A ONE-FOR-ONE BASIS BY PERSHING II, ITS TEN YEAR LIFE CYCLE COST WOULD BE \$1.5 B. CONSEQUENTLY, THE COSTS FOR P11 AND GLCM REPRESENT A NEW COMMITMENT OF ABOUT \$3.2 B.

29. THE CONSTRUCTION OF NEW FACILITIES WOULD BE FUNDED THROUGH THE NATO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM. CONSTRUCTION COSTS WOULD INVOLVE \$164M (FY 79 \$) IN INFRASTRUCTURE FUNDS. DURING THE MID-TERM REVIEW OF THE FIVE YEAR CEILING IN 1982-83, THE CEILING WOULD BE INCREASED TO ACCOUNT FOR THE REQUIREMENTS STEMMING FROM LRTNF MODERNIZATION. TO INSURE THAT OTHER PRIORITY PROGRAMS ARE NOT UNDULY DELAYED, A POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO THE NECESSARY INCREASE SHOULD BE PART OF ALLIANCE TNF DECISIONS. THE FUNDING FOR OTHER CONSTRUCTION COSTS OUTSIDE THOSE COVERED BY THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM (E.G., TROOP BILLETTS, FAMILY HOUSING) WOULD BE FUNDED EITHER BY THE COUNTRY WHOSE TROOPS MAN THE EQUIPMENT OR BY THE HOST COUNTRY.

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30. MANNING. TABLE 2 AT APPENDIX A PROVIDES MANPOWER DATA BY COUNTRY FOR THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM. A TOTAL

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OF 7093 PERSONNEL ARE REQUIRED TO DEPLOY THE NEW LRTNF SYSTEMS. OF THIS NUMBER, 5007 WOULD BE ENGAGED IN OPERATIONS AND SUPPORT ACTIVITIES AND 2086 WOULD PROVIDE SITE SECURITY.

31. IN CASES WHERE US FORCES OWN AND MAN LRTNF SYSTEMS, HOST NATION SUPPORT WOULD BE AN IMPORTANT CONTRIBUTION FOR BURDEN-SHARING AND FOR ACHIEVING THE BROADEST POSSIBLE NATO PARTICIPATION IN THE RECOMMENDED PROGRAM. ONE USEFUL FORM OF SUPPORT IS THE PROVIDING OF HOST NATION SECURITY FORCE PERSONNEL TO AUGMENT US SECURITY FORCES. APPENDIX A SHOWS THE POTENTIAL AMOUNT OF MANPOWER INVOLVED IN SECURITY FORCE AUGMENTATION. ALTERNATIVELY, A SIMILAR NUMBER OF PERSONNEL COULD BE PROVIDED FOR OTHER FORMS OF HOST NATION SUPPORT.

32- NATO-WIDE PARTICIPATION. THIS SHOULD BE A NATO PROGRAM. ALL NATO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD EXPRESS PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR IT. NATO GOVERNMENTS SHOULD ALSO PARTICIPATE IN CONSTRUCTION FUNDING THROUGH THE INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM.

33. TIMING ASPECTS: DEPLOYMENT RATES AND IOC'S. PROGRAM DECISIONS ON THE RECOMMENDED PERSHING II-GLCM FORCE MIX, IF TAKEN BY THE END OF 1979, WILL PERMIT THESE SYSTEMS TO ENTER THE FORCE NEAR THE END OF 1983. THE COMMENCEMENT OF THIS PROGRAM SHOULD OCCUR NEARLY SIMULTANEOUSLY IN ALL HOST COUNTRIES TO DEMONSTRATE THE WIDESPREAD PARTICIPATION. PLANNED RATES OF PERSHING II AND GLCM DEPLOYMENTS ARE SHOWN IN APPENDIX D.

34 . INFRASTRUCTURE PLANNING. PLANNING INFRASTRUCTURE

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FUNDING WOULD ALSO BE KEYED TO A LATE 1983 IOC FOR

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PERSHING II AND GLCM. SO THAT THE LRTNF PROGRAM WOULD NOT ADVERSELY AFFECT OTHER NATO FORCE IMPROVEMENTS, A POLITICAL COMMITMENT TO INFRASTRUCTURE PROGRAM INCREASES AT THE MID-TERM REVIEW (1982-83) SHOULD ACCOMPANY THE ALLIANCE CONSENSUS IN DECEMBER ON THE LRTNF PROGRAM.

35. EFFECT ON NATO TNF STOCKPILE. THE HLG STRESSES THAT ITS RECOMMENDED PROGRAM IS NOT INTENDED TO RESULT IN AN INCREASED ROLE FOR TNF IN NATO'S STRATEGY, OR IN AN INCREASE IN NATO'S STOCKPILE OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS. AS NEW WARHEADS FOR THE LONG-RANGE THEATER NUCLEAR SYSTEMS ARE DEPLOYED, THE SAME NUMBER OF WARHEADS WILL BE WITHDRAWN FROM THE EXISTING NUCLEAR STOCKPILE IN EUROPE. TNF MODERNIZATION COULD CONCEIVABLY RESULT IN A REDUCTION OF THE NUCLEAR WARHEAD STOCKPILE IN EUROPE.

36. THE ACCOMMODATION OF THE ADDITIONAL LRTNF WARHEAD REQUIREMENT WITHOUT INCREASE IN THE TOTAL STOCKPILE NECESSARILY IMPLIES A NUMERICAL SHIFT OF EMPHASIS AWAY FROM WARHEADS FOR DELIVERY SYSTEMS OF OTHER TYPES AND SHORTER RANGES. THE PRECISE NATURE, SCOPE AND BASIS OF THE CONSEQUENTIAL ADJUSTMENTS AND THEIR POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE BALANCE OF ROLES AND SYSTEMS IN NATO'S THEATER NUCLEAR ARMORY AS A WHOLE, SHOULD BE THE SUBJECT OF AN EXAMINATION WHICH WOULD FOLLOW THE DECISION ON THE LRTNF PROGRAM.


APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF DEPLOYMENTS AND MANPOWER

TABLE 1 BELOW PROVIDES FOR CONSIDERATION BY MINISTERS

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THE DEPLOYMENT SCHEME OF THE HLG'S RECOMMENDED PROGRAM FOR MODERNIZATION INVOLVING LRTNF.



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
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
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
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1. DATE SHOWN HERE ARE COMPUTED BASED ON US ;ANNING LEVELS FOR LRTNF UNITS. NUMBERS IN PARENTHESES REPRESENT THAT PORTION OF THE TOTAL SECURITY FORCE WHICH COULD BE HOST COUNTRY PERSONNEL TO AUGMENT THE US SECURITY FORCES. ALTERNATIVELY, SIMILAR NUMBER OF ,ERSONNEL COULD ;NDERTAKE SOME OTHER FORM OF HOST NATION SUPPORT.

2. THESE MANPO'ER FIGURES ARE BASED ON THE ASSUM,TION

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3. THESE FIGURES DO NOT INCLUDE GLCM CENTRAL REPAIR FACILITY MANNING WHICH IS ESTIMATED AT 50-150 PERSONNEL.

4. PERSHING 1A REQUIRES 4432 PERSONNEL. IF PERSHING 11 REPLACES PERSHING 1A, THE MANPOWER REQUIREMENT DECREASES TO 3914.

APPENDIX B - MILITARY EFFECTS OF THE PROPOSED TNF MODERNIZATION

1. THE PERSHING II-GLCM FORCE OF 572 WARHEADS WOULD NOTABLY ENHANCE NATO'S OVERALL DETERRENT FORCE POSTURE PRIMARILY BY PROVIDING A BROAD RANGE OF ESCALATION OPTIONS BETWEEN BATTLEFIELD USE AND US EMPLOYMENT OF ITS STRATEGIC

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NUCLEAR WEAPONS. SHOULD DETERRENCE FAIL, THE MAJOR ROLE OF THESE NEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS WOULD BE TO CONDUCT SELECTIVE NUCLEAR STRIKES AGAINST MILITARY TARGETS, ESPECIALLY AGAINST TARGETS IN THE WESTERN USSR. THE PURPOSE OF SUCH STRIKES WOULD BE PRIMARILY TO SEND AN UNAMBIGUOUS SIGNAL TO THE SOVIET POLITICAL LEADERSHIP THAT NATO WILL NOT TOLERATE FURTHER AGGRESSION, THAT THE THEATER NUCLEAR RESPONSE IS NOT DECOUPLED FROM A

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POTENTIAL STRATEGIC RESPONSE, AND THEREFORE, GENERAL NUCLEAR WAR IS IMMINENT UNLESS THE SOVIETS CEASE THEIR AGGRESSION AND WITHDRAW.

2. FURTHERMORE, ADDED BENEFITS ARE DERIVED FROM THE CAPABILITY OF THE NEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS TO RELEASE A PORTION OF NATO'S DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (DCA) ASSIGNED A QUICK REACTION ALERT (QRA) ROLE. AS AN INCREASING NUMBER OF DCA ARE PLACED ON QRA IN ANTICIPATION OF A GENERAL NUCLEAR RESPONSE, A LARGER FRACTION OF NATO'S NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WOULD BE VULNERABLE TO A COORDINATED WARSAW PACT ATTACK THUS INVITING PREEMPTION. DEPLOYMENT OF THESE NEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS COULD HELP TO MITIGATE THIS PARTICULAR VULNERABILITY.

SELECTIVE EMPLOYMENT OPTION (SEO) TARGET COVERAGE

3. TABLE 1 BELOW PRESENTS ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES OF THE NUMBER OF SEO TARGETS THAT COULD BE COVERED BY THE PROPOSED PERSHING II AND GLCM FORCE FOR A CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR SCENARIO. THE ASSUMED SCENARIOS AND THE WEAPON SYSTEM CHARACTERISTICS USED TO DERIVE THE NUMBER OF SEO TARGETS COVERED ARE THOSE USED IN THE COST EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS SPONSORED BY THE HLG, THE RESULTS OF WHICH WERE FORWARDED TO THE NUCLEAR ,LANNING GROUP IN APRIL 1979. FOR A GIVEN NUMBER OF MISSILES, THE NUMBER OF SEO TARGETS COVERED IS A FUNCTION OF PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY (PLS), WEAPON SYSTEM RELIABILITY (WSR), AND PROBABILITY-TO-PENETRATE (PTP).

TABLE 1 -- SEO TARGET COVERAGE

PERSHING II:	- ILLUSTRATIVE		
---	SCENARIO	NO MISSILES	TARGETS

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--- CONVENTIONAL 108 70

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--- NUCLEAR 108 65

GLCM: ILLUSTRATIVE N. MISSILES TARGETS COVERED

--- CONVENTIONAL 464 300

--- NUCLEAR 464 265

4. IN THE CONVENTIONAL SCENARIO, NATO SEO'S ARE EXECUTED AFTER THREE DAYS OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT. UNDER THE NUCLEAR SCENARIO, THE SEO'S ARE EXECUTED AFTER THREE DAYS OF CONVENTIONAL CONFLICT AND A WARSAW PACT NUCLEAR STRIKE LIMITED TO NATO'S LONG-RANGE AIRFIELDS AND THOSE MOBILE MISSILE SYSTEMS THAT COULD BE LOCATED.

5. THE WEAPON SYSTEM RELIABILITY FOR GLCM IS .85; THE GLCM PROBABILITY-TO-PENETRATE VALUE IS .93. ASSUMING THAT ONE-THIRD OF THE GLCM DEPLOYMENTS ARE IN THE UK AND THE REMAINING TWO-THIRDS IN CENTRAL EUROPE, THE PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY IN THE CONVENTIONAL SCENARIO IS .84 AND .72 IN THE NUCLEAR SCENARIO. PERSHING II WEAPON SYSTEM RELIABILITY AND PROBABILITY-TO-PENETRATE ARE .89 AND 1.0, RESPECTIVELY. IN THE CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR SCENARIOS, PERSHING II PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY IS .75 AND .68, RESPECTIVELY.

6. AS TABLE 1 INDICATES, THE PERSHING II-GLCM FORCE IS CAPABLE OF COVERING 370 SEO TARGETS IN THE CONVENTIONAL SCENARIO AND 330 IN THE NUCLEAR SCENARIO. THE PROPOSED FORCE WOULD THUS REPRESENT A SIGNIFICANT STEP TOWARD FILLING THE CURRENT SHORTFALLS IN SEO EXECUTION.

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7. THE THREE FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO THE CALCULATION OF SEO TARGET COVERAGE -- PLS, WSR AND PTP -- ARE ALL UNCERTAIN. FOR EXAMPLE, AS DISCUSSED IN THE APRIL

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1979 HLG REPORT, THERE ARE WIDELY DIFFERING VIEWS ON CRUISE MISSILE PTP. DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET AIR DEFENSE BEYOND THOSE WE CURRENTLY ANTICIPATE COULD SIGNIFICANTLY DEGRADE CRUISE MISSILE PTP. SIMILARLY, ESTIMATES OF BOTH PERSHING II AND GLCM PLS ALSO ARE UNCERTAIN. FOR EXAMPLE, FOR A CONVENTIONAL WAR SCENARIO GREATER THAN THREE DAYS' DURATION ESTIMATED PLS WOULD DECLINE. IN PART,

UNCERTAINTIES SUCH AS THESE, COUPLED TO THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A CREDIBL AND ENDURING LAND-BASED CAPABILITY TO CARRY OUT SEO'S AGAINST SOVIET TERRITORY LED TO A PROGRAM IN THE UPPER PORTION OF THE HLG'S RECOMMENDED 200-600 WARHEAD DEPLOYMENT.

EMPLOYMENT OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT

SACEUR'S SCHEDULED STRIKE PROGRAM (SSP) USES AVAILABLE WEAPONS AGAINST APPROXIMATELY 860 FIXED TARGETS, A SUBSET OF THE ALLIED COMMAND EUROPE THREAT TARGET LIST CONSISTING OF SOME HIGHER PRIORITY TARGETS. NO MOBILE TARGETS ARE INCLUDED AMONG THE TARGETS IN THE SSP.

THE PROPOSED PROGRAM NOT ONLY INCREASES THE TARGET COVERAGE BY PROVIDING NEW LRTNF, BUT IT REINFORCES THE SSP BY REDUCING PRESSURE ON THE QUICK REACTION ALERT AIRCRAFT WHICH GENERALLY HAVE A LOWER PRE-LAUNCH SURVIVABILITY THAN THE NEW SYSTEMS. THE NEW LONG-RANGE SYSTEMS PROVIDE FOR ENHANCED FLEXIBILITY TO TARGET WITH DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT MOBILE FORMATIONS NOT NOW ADDRESSED IN THE SSP. THIS ADDED FORCE FLEXIBILITY ALSO FACILITATES AN IMPROVEMENT IN DCA CONVENTIONAL AND NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES BY PROVIDING INCREASED SORTIES IN EITHER ROLE AS THE

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CONFLICT MAY REQUIRE. HENCE, THE NEW LRTNF PROGRAM WOULD ALLOW SACEUR GREATER FLEXIBILITY TO USE DCA IN A CONVENTIONAL ROLE OR IN SUPPORTING SEO'S, AND TO CAPITALIZE ON THE BETTER SUITABILITY OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT TO ATTACK MOBILE FORMATIONS AND TO PROVIDE, AS NEEDED, A CONTINUOUS RESPONSE IN EITHER MEDIUM-RANGE INTERDICTION OR CLOSE AIR SUPPORT ROLES.

SUMMARY

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TAKEN TOGETHER, THE IMPROVEMENTS IN NATO'S CAPABILITY TO EXECUTE SEO'S AND THE POSITIVE SPIN-OFF EFFECTS FOR GENERAL NUCLEAR RELEASE TARGETING, ESPECIALLY THE CAPABILITY TO RELEASE A PORTION OF DUAL-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT FROM NUCLEAR QUICK REACTION ALERT, INDICATE THAT THE PERSHING II-G-CM FORCE MIX FULFILLS THE HLG CONCLUSIONS ON THE DESIRED CAPABILITIES NATO'S NEW LRTNF SHOULD POSSESS.

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