

UNCLASSIFIED

E2<sub>3</sub>

SECRET

Date Printed:  
06 Dec 2002

DOC\_NBR: 1978USNATO10805

CHANNEL: n/a  
HANDLING: n/a

<<<<. >>>>  
SECRET

RELEASED IN PART  
B1, 1.5(B), 1.5(D)

PAGE 01 USNATO 10805 01 OF 06 242020Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SAS-02 SP-02 SMS-01 H-01  
INR-10 L-03 PM-05 INRE-00 EUR-12 NSCE-00 CIAE-00  
PA-01 DODE-00 SSO-00 ACDE-00 /065 W  
-----059171 242129Z /14-S

O 241949Z NOV 78  
FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5835  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 06 USNATO 10805  
GENEVA FOR USSALTTWO

E.O. 11652: XGDS-1  
TAGS: PARM, NATO, MNUC, MPOL  
SUBJECT: NOV 20 NAC ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES

REF: STATE 292218

DEPT OF STATE APPEALS REVIEW PANEL (ARP)

FOIPA/PA	Mandatory Review
<input type="checkbox"/> Release	<input type="checkbox"/> Declassify
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> Excise	<input type="checkbox"/> Declassify in Part
<input type="checkbox"/> Deny	<input type="checkbox"/> Class. Ret/Renew

Exemptions B1  
ARP Action Cert DRP Date 9-8-04

1. AT NOVEMBER 20 "OPEN-ENDED PERMREP MEETING" (USNATO 10740) AMBASSADOR DELIVERED STATEMENT ON TNF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES AND DISTRIBUTED CHARTS PER REFTEL. (WE WILL COMMENT SEPTEL ON THE MEETING WHICH WE CONSIDERED EXTREMELY USEFUL.) PATRICK MOBERLY, FCO ASSISTANT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE, OPENED THE DISCUSSION: TEXT OF HIS COMMENTS FOLLOW IN PARA 2 BELOW.

2.

BEGIN TEXT:

SPEAKING NOTE USED BY MR. MOBERLY ON 20 NOV 1978

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 USNATO 10805 01 OF 06 242020Z

GREY AREA SYSTEMS

~~B1~~

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Date Printed:

06 Dec 2002

DOC\_NBR: 1978USNATO10805

CHANNEL: n/a

HANDLING: n/a

3

NOTE THIS IS FREE EXCHANGE, NOT COMMITTING GOVERNMENTS. BUT CONFIDENT MY GOVERNMENT BESIDES WELCOMING THIS DISCUSSION TODAY WOULD ENDORSE ONE FEATURE OF THE US PRESENTATION, NAMELY THAT WE ARE DEALING NOT WITH ONE PROBLEM BUT TWO: I MEAN ARMS CONTROL AND TNF MODERNIZATION. IT BECOMES INCREASINGLY CLEAR THAT THEY ARE CLOSELY INTERRELATED AND EACH HAS MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE OTHER. AMBASSADOR BENNETT'S PRESENTATION HAS COVERED MUCH GROUND AND RAISED MANY IMPORTANT QUESTIONS TO WHICH THERE ARE NO EASY ANSWERS. LIKE TO COMMENT ON JUST A FEW OF THEM.

THE STRATEGIC SETTING

(A) NATO STRATEGY REQUIRES A CONTINUOUS CHAIN OF GRADUATED RESPONSES TO AGGRESSION. HENCE NEED FOR LINKAGE BETWEEN STRATEGIC NUCLEAR FORCES AND TNF. BELIEVE THIS IS COMMON GROUND. WOULD BE DANGEROUS IF GAPS IN THIS LINKAGE BEGAN TO APPEAR.

(B) WE KNOW SOVIET THEATER NUCLEAR CAPABILITY ALREADY MORE THAN ENOUGH TO DESTROY WESTERN EUROPE. THIS NOW BEING MODERNIZED AND IMPROVED - PARTICULARLY SS20, BACKFIRE. INTRODUCTION OF THESE SYSTEMS DOES NOT SIGNIFICANTLY ALTER THE OVERALL BALANCE IN OUR VIEW. BUT UNDOUBTEDLY SS20 MORE ACCURATE THAN PREVIOUS SYSTEMS AS WELL AS BEING MOBILE AND HAVING LONGER RANGE AND THEREFORE POSING A POTENTIALLY GREATER THREAT TO OUR OWN TNF.

(C) WE DO NOT NEED TO TRY AND MATCH THE RUSSIANS IN EVERY RESPECT, NOR TO ESTABLISH ANY KIND OF EURO-STRATEGIC

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 USNATO 10805 01 OF 06 242020Z

BALANCE. INDEED TO DO SO COULD LEAD TO DOUBTS ABOUT THE LINKAGE BETWEEN IN-THEATRE FORCES AND US CENTRAL STRATEGIC SYSTEMS ON WHICH WE IN EUROPE GREATLY DEPEND.

TNF MODERNIZATION

WORK OF HIGH LEVEL GROUP (HLG) SET UP UNDER LTDP CLOSELY RELATED TO THE ABOVE. QUITE INDEPENDENTLY OF DEVELOPMENTS ON THE SOVIET SIDE, THERE IS A CASE FOR CONSIDERING SOME UP-DATING OF NATO'S IN-THEATRE LONGER-RANGE TNF CAPABILITY AS OUR EXISTING SYSTEMS BECOME OLDER AND SOVIET AIR DEFENSES IMPROVE. OTHERWISE COULD BE DANGER OF GAPS IN

Page - 2

~~BT~~

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Date Printed:

06 Dec 2002

DOC\_NBR: 1978USNATO10805

CHANNEL: n/a

HANDLING: n/a

3

OUR CONTINUOUS CHAIN OF DETERRENCE AND GRADUATED RESPONSE.  
I THEREFORE WELCOME REFERENCES TO HLG AND ITS PROGRAMME  
IN TODAY'S DISCUSSION AS BEING AN IMPORTANT PART OF THE  
TOTAL PICTURE.

ARMS CONTROL

SO FAR AS OBJECTIVES GO, IF IT WERE POSSIBLE TO IMPOSE  
RESTRAINTS ON SOVIET SYSTEMS TARGETED AT EUROPE, THIS  
WOULD CLEARLY RESPOND TO CERTAIN EUROPEAN CONCERNS.

THE QUESTION IS WHETHER ANY RESTRAINTS COULD BE NEGOTIATED  
WHICH MADE A SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCE, GIVEN THE DEGREE OF  
EXISTING SOVIET OVERKILL; AND MORE PARTICULARLY WHETHER  
THE ALLIANCE COULD AFFORD RESTRAINTS ON NATO'S NUCLEAR  
FORCES WHICH WERE ACCEPTABLE IN RETURN.

OUR PRELIMINARY CONCLUSION AT THIS STAGE (ALREADY MENTIONED  
IN EARLIER DISCUSSION) IS TO DOUBT WHETHER ON BALANCE IT

SECRET

NNN

SECRET

PAGE 01 USNATO 10805 02 OF 06 242028Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SAS-02 SP-02 SMS-01 H-01  
INR-10 L-03 PM-05 INRE-00 EUR-12 NSCE-00 CIAE-00  
PA-01 DODE-00 SSO-00 IO-14 ACDE-00 /079 W  
-----059282 242131Z /14

O 241949Z NOV 78  
FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5836  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 06 USNATO 10805

GENEVA FOR USSALTTWO

WOULD BE TO OUR ADVANTAGE FOR GREY AREA SYSTEMS TO BE

~~B1~~



UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Date Printed:  
06 Dec 2002

DOC\_NBR: 1978USNATO10805

CHANNEL: n/a  
HANDLING: n/a

3

BROUGHT INTO SALT III: AT LEAST WE HAVE YET TO BE CONVINCED.

ANOTHER CONCLUSION I WOULD DRAW IS THAT IF ANY NATO GREY AREA SYSTEMS WERE TO BE BROUGHT INTO SALT III (AND CRUISE MISSILES HAVE A PARTICULAR STATUS IN THIS REGARD AS AMBASSADOR BENNETT HAS MENTIONED) THEN WE SHOULD CERTAINLY WANT TO BE SURE THAT APPROPRIATE SOVIET SYSTEMS WERE LIKEWISE BROUGHT UNDER NEGOTIATION. HENCE, THE IMPORTANCE OF THE PROPOSED US UNILATERAL STATEMENT IN KEEPING OPTIONS OPEN.

SYNTHESIS

I BELIEVE WE ARE ONLY AT THE BEGINNING OF A LONG PROCESS OF EXAMING ALL THESE ISSUES. FOR OUR PART WE ARE WILLING TO LISTEN, AND TO KEEP OWN POSITION UNDER REVIEW IN THE LIGHT OF VIEWS EXPRESSED BY OTHERS.

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 USNATO 10805 02 OF 06 242028Z

WE HAVE BEEN ASKED HOW WE SEE THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN TNF MODERNIZATION AND ARMS CONTROL. IN VIEW OF WHAT I HAVE SAID, I CAN ONLY REPLY THAT IT IS PREMATURE TO ANSWER. BUT HYPOTHETICALLY IT IS POSSIBLE TO IMAGINE A LINK BETWEEN THE TWO TAKING SEVERAL ALTERNATIVE FORMS, PERHAPS AIMED AT SOME KIND OF NUMERICAL LIMITATION ON ONE OR MORE OF EACH SIDE'S SYSTEMS. NATO COUNTRIES COULD DECIDE TO NEGOTIATE BEFORE EMBARKING ON ANY TNF MODERNIZATION; OR THEY COULD ANNOUNCE THEIR INTENTION TO MODERNIZE AND THEN NEGOTIATE; OR THEY COULD NEGOTIATE ONCE THEY HAD STARTED PRODUCTION; OR THEY COULD NEGOTIATE AFTER THEY HAD BEGUN TO DEPLOY NEW SYSTEMS. THE EARLIER ANY NEGOTIATION WAS ATTEMPTED, THE WEAKER OUR HAND MIGHT BE; BUT THE LONGER WE WAITED, THE STRONGER THE RUSSIANS MIGHT HAVE BECOME.

THIS BRINGS ME TO MY FINAL CONCLUSION. IT SEEMS DOUBTFUL IF WE SHOULD REACH FIRM VIEWS ABOUT POSSIBLE ARMS CONTROL OPTIONS BEFORE GOVERNMENTS HAVE A CLEARER IDEA OF POSSIBLE REQUIREMENTS FOR TNF MODERNIZATION IN THE LIGHT OF HLG'S WORK AND IN ACCORDANCE WITH OVERALL NATO STRATEGY. AS I SAID AT THE OUTSET, WE ARE DEALING WITH TWO INTER-RELATED PROBLEMS WHICH NEED TO BE SEEN AND CONSIDERED TOGETHER: I MEAN TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN. END TEXT.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET


Date Printed:  
06 Dec 2002

DOC\_NBR: 1978USNATO10805


CHANNEL: n/a  
HANDLING: n/a

3


3. PAULS (FRG) READ A VERY GENERAL STATEMENT STRESSING THE IMPORTANCE OF THESE CONSULTATIONS, PARTICULARLY IN LIGHT OF DEVELOPMENTS IN SOVIET MEDIUM-RANGE TNF SYSTEMS AND IN VIEW OF THE FACT THAT SALT II ALREADY DEALT WITH CRUISE MISSILES, "A WESTERN SYSTEM OF IMPORTANCE FOR GAS."



4. AMBASSADOR RUTH (FRG) ALSO COMMENTED BRIEFLY ON THE US PRESENTATION.



6. CHAIRMAN OF THE MILITARY COMMITTEE ZEINER GUNDERSEN THEN MADE THE FOLLOWING REMARKS:



UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Date Printed:  
06 Dec 2002

DOC\_NBR: 1978USNATO10805

CHANNEL: n/a  
HANDLING: n/a

3

SECRET

NNN

SECRET


PAGE 01 USNATO 10805 03 OF 06 242036Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SAS-02 SP-02 SMS-01 H-01  
INR-10 L-03 PM-05 INRE-00 EUR-12 NSCE-00 CIAE-00  
PA-01 DODE-00 SSO-00 IO-14 ACDE-00 /079 W  
-----059390 242135Z /14

O 241949Z NOV 78  
FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5837  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 06 USNATO 10805

GENEVA FOR USSALTTWO



SECRET

UNCLASSIFIED

B1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Date Printed:

06 Dec 2002


DOC\_NBR: 1978USNATO10805

CHANNEL: n/a

HANDLING: n/a

3

7. CATALANO (ITALY) MADE THE FOLLOWING" PRELIMINARY  
REMARKS":



SECRET

NNN

SECRET


PAGE 01 USNATO 10805 04 OF 06 242043Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SAS-02 SP-02 SMS-01 H-01  
INR-10 L-03 PM-05 INRE-00 EUR-12 NSCE-00 CIAE-00  
PA-01 DODE-00 SSO-00 IO-14 ACDE-00 /079 W  
-----059419 242139Z /14

O 241949Z NOV 78  
FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5838



UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Date Printed:  
06 Dec 2002

DOC\_NBR: 1978USNATO10805

CHANNEL: n/a  
HANDLING: n/a

3

AMERICAN DELEGATION WILL HELP US TO ANALYZE FURTHER IN DEPTH THESE ISSUES, WHICH ARE OF PRIMARY IMPORTANCE FOR THE ALLIANCE. WE HOPE THEREFORE TO HAVE ALSO IN THE FUTURE SIMILAR OPPORTUNITIES FOR CONSTRUCTIVE CONSULTATIONS.  
END TEXT.

8. BARKMAN (NETHERLANDS) STRESSED THAT LONG-RANGE TNF SYSTEMS RAISED "SENSITIVE POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS" AND THAT ANY DECISIONS ON TNF SHOULD BE MADE ONLY AFTER THE MOST CAREFUL EVALUATION OF ALL FACTORS, E.G., SECURITY, DETERRENCE AND THE OVERALL BALANCE.

9. VIBE (NORWAY) MADE THE FOLLOWING INTERVENTION:

UNCLASSIFIED


SECRET

Date Printed:  
06 Dec 2002

DOC\_NBR: 1978USNATO10805

CHANNEL: n/a  
HANDLING: n/a

3



SECRET

NNN


SECRET

PAGE 01 USNATO 10805 05 OF 06 242050Z  
ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SAS-02 SP-02 SMS-01 H-01  
INR-10 L-03 PM-05 INRE-00 EUR-12 NSCE-00 CIAE-00  
PA-01 DODE-00 SSO-00 IO-14 ACDE-00 /079 W  
-----059499 242144Z /14

O 241949Z NOV 78  
FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5839  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 06 USNATO 10805  
GENEVA FOR USSALTTWO



UNCLASSIFIED

B1

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

B1

UNCLASSIFIED



UNCLASSIFIED

SECRET

Date Printed:  
06 Dec 2002

DOC\_NBR: 1978USNATO10805

CHANNEL: n/a  
HANDLING: n/a

3


ACTION ACDA-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SAS-02 SP-02 SMS-01 H-01  
INR-10 L-03 PM-05 INRE-00 EUR-12 NSCE-00 CIAE-00  
PA-01 DODE-00 SSO-00 IO-14 ACDE-00 /079 W  
-----059546 242144Z /14


O 241949Z NOV 78  
FM USMISSION USNATO  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 5840  
INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS  
USMISSION GENEVA  
USDEL MBFR VIENNA

S E C R E T SECTION 06 OF 06 USNATO 10805

GENEVA FOR USSALTTWO



10. FROST (DENMARK) SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT TNF  
MODERNIZATION HAD POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS WHICH NEEDED  
ALLIANCE CONSIDERATION.



11. HARDY (CANADA) MADE THREE POINTS:



UNCLASSIFIED


SECRET

Date Printed:  
06 Dec 2002

DOC\_NBR: 1978USNATO10805

CHANNEL: n/a  
HANDLING: n/a

3



12. AMBASSADOR BENNETT INTERVENED AT THIS POINT TO INDICATE THAT WE CONSIDERED THE COUNCIL THE APPROPRIATE FORUM FOR CONSIDERATION OF TNF ARMS CONTROL ISSUES.

13. THE FINAL REMARKS OF THE SESSION WERE DELIVERED BY SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM) WHO STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ARMS CONTROL AND ALLUDED ONCE AGAIN TO IT AND TNF MODERNIZATION AS "TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN." GLITMAN

SECRET

NNN

UNCLASSIFIED