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Authority EO 12958
By PT NARA Date 8/24/03



Department of State

War
TELEGRAM

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 3 USNATO 5179

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, MOPS, XF, NATO
SUBJECT: U.S. ACTION REGARDING MIDDLE EAST, COUNCIL MEETING OCTOBER 2.

REF: (A) STATE 2113107
(B) STATE 211307 (EXDIS);
(C) USNATO 5123 (NODIS)

SUMMARY: AT OCTOBER 26 SPECIAL COUNCIL MEETING ON THE MIDDLE EAST, FRANCE SHARPLY CRITICIZED THE U.S. FOR NOT INFORMING AND CONSULTING WITH THE COUNCIL ON DETAILS OF US-USSR BILATERAL CONTACT WHILE U.S. WAS AT THE SAME TIME CALLING FOR ALLIED SOLIDARITY AND FOR ALLIED PRESSURES ON THE SOVIET UNION. ON PERSONAL BASIS BELGIAN AND ITALIAN PERMRERS ECHOED FRENCH LINE. UK AND DUTCH REPS WHHILE NOT DISAGREEING, EXPRESSED UNDERSTANDING FOR SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF US AND NEED FOR SECRECY. OTHER REPS WERE SILENT. RUMSFELD MADE GENERAL STATEMENT STRESSING THAT OUR OBJECTIVE ON OCTOBER 25 HAD BEEN TO BRING PRESSURE TO PREVENT AN INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET FORCES INTO THE MIDDLE EAST AND TO OBTAIN PASSAGE OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION THAT WOULD PRECLUDE IT. THESE STEPS, HE SAID, ARE IN THE ALLIANCE INTEREST AND WARRANT ALLIED SUPPORT. RUMSFELD INDICATED HE WUULD SEEK INSTRUCTIONNS SINCE THE FRENCH CRITICISMS WERE UNDER INSTRUCTIONS. ACTION REQUESTED: INSTRUCTIONS AS REQUESTED IN REF C.
END SUMMARY.

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1. THE SPECIAL COUNCIL MEETING BEGAN WITH MILITARY BRIEFING BY GENERAL STEINHOFF WHICH INCLUDED MENTION OF THE LIFTING OF THE U.S. MILITARY ALERT IN THE CARIBBEAN AND ALASKA, (OF WHICH USNATO HAD NOT BEEN NOTIFIED) AND THE CONCLUSION THAT UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES

THERE WAS NOW NO NEED FOR NATO ALERT MEASURES. THE BRIEFING ALSO MENTIONED A PRESS REPORT QUOTING AN AMERICAN OFFICER AS SAYING THAT U.S. MILITARY ALERT HAD BEEN KEPT IN FORCE IN ORDER TO MAKE THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND HOW SERIOUSLY WE VIEW THEIR THREATENED ACTIONS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. (USNATO HAS NOT SEEN THIS PRESS ITEM).

2. THE FRENCH PERMREP (DE ROSE) THEN TOOK THE FLOOR AND, SPEAKING UNDER INSTRUCTIONS, SHARPLY CRITICIZED THE UNITED STATES FOR ITS ACTIONS AND INACTIONS IN THE COUNCIL DURING THE COURSE OF THE MIDDLE EAST CRISIS. DE ROSE BEGAN BY SAYING THAT HIS AUTHORITIES IN PARIS WERE SURPRISED BY TWO THINGS THAT TOOK PLACE YESTERDAY (OCTOBER 25), THE GENERAL CONDUCT OF AFFAIRS IN THE MIDDLE EAST, AND THE EVENTS WHICH TOOK PLACE IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL AND IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. DE ROSE SAID THAT, IN FACT, HIS GOVERNMENT KNOWS NOTHING OF WHAT IS GOING ON BETWEEN THE SUPER-POWERS

THE ALLIES ARE SIMPLY NOT BEING KEPT INFORMED EITHER IN THE COUNCIL OR IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL. OF THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIETS.

3. DE ROSE CONTINUED BY SAYING THAT HIS GOVERNMENT HAD NOTED THAT LAST WEEK RUMSFELD ASKED THE ALLIES NOT ONLY TO DEMONSTRATE ALLIANCE SOLIDARITY BY MAKING REPRESENTATIONS TO THE SOVIET UNION ABOUT THE DANGERS TO DETENTE OF SOVIET MIDDLE EAST INITIATIVES, -BUT HE ALSO INVITED THE ALLIES TO CONSIDER MEASURES OF POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC PRESSURE ON MOSCOW AND EAST EUROPEAN CAPITALS. FURTHERMORE, THESE MEASURES WERE TO BE UNDERTAKEN NOT ONLY WITH REGARD TO AN AFFAIR THAT WAS OUTSIDE THE GEOGRAPHICAL AREA OF NATO CONCERN, BUT ALSO TO BE UNDERTAKEN BY ALLIES WHO WERE COMPLETELY IGNORANT OF THE SUBSTANCE OF THE EXCHANGES THAT WERE THEN GOING ON BETWEEN THE U.S. AND THE SOVIET UNION.

4. IN THE FIRST PLACE, DE ROSE CONTINUED, FRANCE IS

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OF THE OPINION THAT THERE IS NO PRINCIPLE REQUIREING COMMON NATO POLICY WITH REGARD TO MATTERS OUTSIDE THE GEOGRAPHICAL TREATY AREA. THUS, WHEN ALLIES ARE INVITED TO DEMONSTRATE SOLIDARITY AND TAKE ACTION WITH REGARD TO SUCH MATTERS, MATTERS ON WHICH THE ALLIES DO NOT EVEN KNOW THE ESSENTIALS, THEN THERE SHOULD BE FULL CONSULTATIONS. IN THE SITUATION YESTERDAY, HOWEVER, THERE WAS ALL THE MORE NEED FOR CONSULTATIONS WITHIN THE COUNCIL BECAUSE IT REFERRED TO AN ALERT WHICH TOOK PLACE IN EUROPE.

5. DE ROSE RECALLED THAT THE SITUATION YESTERDAY WAS SIMILAR TO THAT LAST WEEK WHEN THERE WERE SUDDEN DEVELOPMENTS WHICH APPARENTLY TOOK PLACE ON THE BASIS OF A MESSAGE WHICH DOBRYNIN DELIVERED IN WASHINGTON. HE SAID THAT THE ALLIES ONLY KNOW OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE MESSAGE BUT NOTHING OF ITS SUBSTANCE.

6. DE ROSE WENT ON TO SAY THAT LAST WEEK THE COUNCIL HAD MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WAS BEING ASKED TO UNCERTAKE THE DIFFICULT TASK OF TRYING TO FOLLOW THE U.S. RECOMMENDED COURSE OF ACTION WITHOUT THE NECESSARY EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION. DESPITE THIS, HE SAID,

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S E C R E T SECTION 2 OF 3 USNATO 5179

EXDIS

YESTERDAY THE ALLIES WERE CONFRONTED WITH AN EVEN MORE SERIOUS CRISIS, YET AGAIN THEY WERE KEPT UNINFORMED OF THE BACKGROUND OF THE DECISIONS WHICH HAD BEEN TAKEN.

7. THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR SAID THESE ACTIONS RAISED SERIOUS QUESTIONS UPON WHICH THE COUNCIL SHOULD REFLECT. HE SAID HIS GOVERNMENT INSTRUCTED HIM TO CALL THEM TO THE ATTENTION OF THE COUNCIL. DE ROSE RHETORICALLY ASKED "IS THIS THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A POLICY WHICH MIGHT BE CALLED THE POLICY OF JUNE 22, 1973?"

(THE REFERENCE, OF COURSE, IS TO THE DATE OF THE U.S.-SOVIET AGREEMENT ON THE PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR). "WILL THE U.S. IN TIME OF CRISIS SEEK A CLOSER CONSULTATION WITH THE SOVIET UNION THAN WITH ITS ALLIES?"

8. IN VIEW OF THIS SITUATION, DE ROSE WONDERED WHAT IS THE SENSE OF ALL THE WORK WHICH IS PRESENTLY BEING UNDERTAKEN IN SEEKING A NEW ATLANTIC DECLARATION BY THE 14--A DECLARATION WHICH WOULD EMPHASIZE THE VALUE OF CONSULTATIONS.

9. ACTING DYG PANSA SAID HE AGREED THERE WERE MOST SERIOUS MATTERS.

10. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) SAID THAT WHILE HE HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS, HIS PERSONAL REACTION WAS ALONG THE SAME LINES AS THAT OF THE FRENCH PERMREP, WHO HE SAID HAD RAISED "EXTREMELY GRAVE PROBLEMS." WHICH ARE ON THE MINDS OF EVERYONE. DE STAERCKE SAID HE WOULD

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RESTATE ONE OF DE ROSE'S QUESTIONS AS FOLLOWS: "WILL CONSULATIONS BETWEEN FRIENDS NECESSARILY HAVE TO TAKE PLACE AFTER CONSULTATIONS WITH ENEMIES?" DE STAERCKE THEN SAID ONE OF THE MAIN PROBLEMS OF ALLIES IS TO AVOID BEING "MANIPULATED" AND THEN ONLY LATER LEARNING WHAT THE MATTER IS ALL ABOUT.

11. HE CONCLUDED BY SAYING THAT IF THERE IS A QUESTION OF MILITARY ACTION BEING TAKEN BY ONE ALLY WHICH MIGHT HAVE CONSEQUENCES ON ALL OF THE OTHERS, THERE IS A DUTY, A LEGAL AND MORAL OBLIGATION, TO CONSULT. THIS PRINCIPLE, HE FELT, WAS "OBLIGINGLY OBVIOUS."

12. THE ITALIAN PERMREP (CATALANO) ALSO SPEAKING ON A PERSONAL BASIS, SAID THAT THE FEELINGS EXPRESSED BY THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR CERTAINLY WILL FIND ECHO WITHIN CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT. CATALANO SAID THAT SINCE U.S. MILITARY BASES IN ITALY WHERE THE U.S. ALERT TOOK PLACE ARE NEAR SMALL ITALIAN TOWNS, IT WAS NO SECRET TO THE LOCAL CITIZENRY WHAT WAS HAPPENING, YET THE ITALIAN GOVERNMENT COULD TELL ITS PEOPLE NOTHING.

13. ON AT LEAST TWO OCCASIONS WITHIN THE LAST FORTNIGHT, CATALANO SAID, THE ALLIES HAVE BEEN ASKED TO DEMONSTRATE THEIR SOLIDARITY WITH THE U.S. HE HOPED THAT IN A POST-MORTEM OF THIS WHOLE PERIOD, THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR WILL BE ABLE TO TELL THE COUNCIL OF THE RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS AND HOW THEY WERE ARRIVE AT. IN ONE RESPECT CATALANO SAID HE WOULD GO EVEN FURTHER THAN THE FRENCH AMBASSADOR BY ASKING THAT THERE BE A EVALUATION OF WHAT HAPPENED YESTERDAY.

14. CATALANO WAS ALSO CONCERNED ABOUT INDICATIONS IN STEINHOFF'S MILITARY BRIEFINGS OF SUBSTANTIAL TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION BY ISRAELI TROOPS IN THE PERIOD BETWEEN THE TWO CEASE-FIRES. HE WONDERED WHAT WERE THE TRUE FACTS AND WHAT THE IMPLICATIONS WOULD BE IF INDEED THE ISRAELIS HAD PROFITED FROM THE CEASE-FIRE VIOLATIONS.

15. THE UK PERMREP (PECK), SPEAKING ON A PERSONAL BASIS, SAID THAT HE UNDERSTOOD AND TO A CERTAIN EXTENT SHARED THE FEELINGS OF HIS FRENCH, BELGIAN AND ITALIAN COLLEAGUES. HOWEVER, PECK SAID OBVIOUSLY THERE IS A PROBLEM OF STRIKING A BALANCE BETWEEN GETTING RESULTS AND SHARING INFORMATION WITH ALLIES. PECK SAID HE UNDERSTANDS THE ROLE AND PROBLEMS OF A SUPER-POWER, BRITAIN ONCE HAVING

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BEEN IN A ANALOGUOUS POSITION; HTHERFORE, HE COULD APPRECIATE THE NEED FOR SECRECY IF ONE WAS TO GET RESULTS; AND HE ADDED, INDEED, IT APPEARED THAT THE U.S. DID GET RESULTS. UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, PECK SAID, THERE SIMPLY HAD TO BE A SINGLE HAND ON THE DRIVING WHEEL--NOT 15 HANDS.

16. HE WENT ON, HOWEVER, TO QUESTION WHETHER THIS MIGHT HAVE BEEN A CASE WHERE THE AMERICANS OVER-REACTED A BIT BY WORLDWIDE ALERTS WHICH HE NOTED WERE ALREADY BEGINNING TO BE STOOD DOWN ONLY 24 HOURS LATER. HE REPEATED THAT HE HIMSELF DID NOT KNOW THE ANSWER BUT HE DID UNDERSTAND THE NEED ON THE ONE HAND FOR SECRECY AND ON THE OTHER FOR CONSULTATIONS.

17. PECK THEN REQUESTED FURTHER PRECISION ON WHETHER SACEUR (GENERAL GOODPASTOR) HAD VOLUNTEERED YESTERDAY TO CONSULT THE COUNCIL BEFORE ANY NATO MILITARY READINESS MEASURES WERE TAKEN OR WHETHER HE WAS REQUIRED TO DO SO. GENERAL STEINHOFF INDICATED THAT SACEUR HAS THE PREROGATIVE TO TAKE CERTAIN ALERTING STEPS ON HIS OWN AUTHORITY ("MILITARY VIGILANCE") BUT IN THE SPECIFIC EVENTS OF YESTERDAY, HE HAD VOLUNTEERED THAT HE WOULD FIRST CONSULT WITH THE COUNCIL BEFORE ANY NATO MILITARY VIGILANCE MEASURES WERE TAKEN.

18. THE DUTCH CHARGE (BUWALDA) MADE TWO POINTS:

A) HIS FOREIGN MINISTER WAS PREPARED TO JOIN IN A DEMONSTRATION OF THE SOLIDARITY OF THE ALLIANCE, AND HE UNDERSTOOD THE DIFFICULTIES WITH WHICH THE U.S. WAS CONFRONTED IN THIS MATTER;

B) SEVERAL MEMBERS OF THE DUTCH GOVERNMENT, HOWEVER, SHARED THE DOUBTS WHICH HAD BEEN EXPRESSED BY THE FRENCH AND OTHER REPRESENTATIVES.

19. THERE BEING NO FURTHER COMMENTS BY OTHER DELEGATES, AMBASSADOR RUMSFELD MADE A RESPONSE IN THREE PARTS. FIRST, HE DREW UPON REF A, STATING THE POSSIBILITY OF REQUESTS FOR SUPPORT IN MEETING OVERFLIGHT AND LANDING REQUIREMENTS FOR THE U.S. A.F. AIRLIFT AND LOGISTIC SUPPORT FOR 7,000 MAN EMERGENCY FORCE, OPERATING FOR AND UNDER THE AUSPICES OF THE U.N.

20. THEN, DRAWING ON PARA 2, REF B, AND SPECIFYING THAT HE WAS

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SPEAKING ON INSTRUCTIONS, RUMSFELD STRESSED THAT THE ISSUE AT STAKE IN THIS MOST RECENT SITUATION IS THE QUESTION OF SOVIET FORCES IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OUR OBJECTIVE ON OCTOBER 25 WAS TO BRING PRESSURE TO PREVENT THIS AND TO INTRODUCE A SECURITY CONCIL RESOLUTION THAT WOULD PRECLUDE IT. WE FEEL THAT THESE STEPS ARE IN THE ALLIANCE INTEREST AND WARRANT ALLIED SUPPORT. THE PRESENT OF SOVIET TROOPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST WOULD HAVE, WE BELIEVE, A DIRECT IMPACT ON THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN SECURITY.

21. RUMSFELD THEN SAID WITH REGARD TO THE FRENCH COMMENTS JUST HEARD THAT HIS FIRST INCLINATION WAS TO RESPOND TO THEM BUT, RUMSFELD SAID IN

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EXDIS

VIEW OF THE SUBSTANCE OF COMMENTS BY THE DEAN, THE ITALIAN REPRESENTATIVE, AND THE ACTING SYG, HE FELT THERE WAS INTEREST IN HAVING NOT JUST HIS PERSONAL VIEWS, BUT MORE AUTHORITATIVE ONES AS WELL.

22. HE DID, HOWEVER, HAVE TWO POINTS. RUMSFELD SAID IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT IT WAS USEFUL THAT THESE MATTERS WHICH WERRE BEING DISCUSSED IN THE PRESS WERE NOW ALSO BEING BROUGHT UP IN THE COUNCIL. SECONDLY, HE SAID, WITH REGARD TO THE NEED FOR SECRECY JUST UNDERLINED BY AMBASSADOR PECK, EVEN SOME OF THE THINGS WHICH TOOK PLACE YESTERDAY IN THE PRIVATE COUNCIL MEETING, WITH VIRTUALLY NO ONE BUT PERMREPS PRESENT, HAD ALREADY LEADED TO THE PRESS.

23. PANSA, ATTEMPTING TO SUMMARIZE, SAID THAT HE DETECTED GREAT AWARENESS ON THE PART OF THE COUNCIL THAT CONSULTATIONS ARE A NECESSARY PRE-REQUISITE FOR SOLIDARITY. AT THE SAME TIME, HE ALSO DETECTED AN AWARENESS OF THE SPECIAL POISITION OF THE U.S., AND AN UNDERSTANDING OF THE WIDE U.S. RESPONSIBILTIES EXTENDING BEYOND THE ALLIANCE, AND OF THE TIME FACTORS WITH WHICH THE U.S. IS SOMETIMES CONFRONTED. PANSA REPEATED THAT THE PROBLEM SEEMED TO BE ONE OF STRIKING THE RIGHT BALANCE BETWEEN SOLIDARITY AND CONSULTATIONS.

24. RUMSFELD THEN SAID "I TRUST THE AMABASSADOR OF FRANCE WILL CIRCULATE THAT STATEMENT HE MADE EARLIER."

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25. DE ROSE SAID THAT HE HAD MADE HIS DECLARATION ON THE BASIS OF TELEPHONE INSTRUCTIONS, HOWEVER, WITH THE ASSISTANCE OF THE COUNCIL MINUTE-TAKER AND THE NOTES OF HIS DEPUTIES, HE WAS CONFIDENT THAT HE COULD RECONSTRUCT A DOCUMENT THAT, WHILE NOT A FULL TEXT, AND NOT A GUARANTEED WORK-FOR-WORD STATEMENT OF WHAT HE JUST SAID, WOULD REFLECT THE SPIRIT OF WHAT HE HAD JUST SAID. HE DID NOT THINK HE COULD BET AROUND TO RECONSTRUCTING THE STATEMENT TODAY, HOWEVER.

26. THIS REPORT SHOULD BE READ IN CONNECTION WITH REPORT OF CONTINUATION OF DISCUSSION AT PERMREP LUNCH IMMEDIATELY FOLLOWING (SEPTEL).

27. DEPARTMENT MAY WISH TO REPEAT TO EMBASSY PARIS AND OTHER POSTS AS DESIRED.
RUMSFELD

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