


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
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
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
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
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
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SERIAL: (U) IIR [REDACTED]

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TEXT

COUNTRY: (U) AFGHANISTAN (AF), PAKISTAN (PA).

IPSP: (U) [REDACTED]

(b)(2)

CCMBINE: COMPLETE

SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED] /VETERAN AFGHANISTAN TRAVELER'S ANALYSIS OF AL QAEDA AND TALIBAN EXPLOITABLE WEAKNESSES

(b)(2)

(C/ [REDACTED])

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WARNING: (U) THIS IS AN INFORMATION REPORT, NOT FINALLY EVALUATED INTELLIGENCE. REPORT CLASSIFIED ~~SECRET~~ ~~NOFORN~~.

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

DOI: (U) 20010924.

REQS: (U) [REDACTED]

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SOURCE: ~~IS/NE/~~ [REDACTED]

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SUMMARY: (C/ [REDACTED]) EVENTUALLY THE TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA WILL WAR WITH EACH OTHER. THE WEAKNESS OF BOTH IS IN THE MINDS OF THE INDIVIDUALS THAT BELONG TO THE GROUPS AND IN THE POWER THAT IS GIVEN TO THEM BY THEIR NAMES. AL QAEDA HAVE NOT INTEGRATED WITH AFGHANIS OR THE TALIBAN, LEAVING THEM SUSCEPTIBLE TO EXPLOITATION.

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1. TEXT (C/ [REDACTED])

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[REDACTED]

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TEARLINE

2. (C/ [REDACTED]) BACKGROUND. ANY ALLIED FORCE, SMALL OR LARGE, WILL HAVE TO LEARN TO THINK OUTSIDE THE ENVELOPE IN DEALING WITH

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THE SITUATION IN AFGHANISTAN. IN ANY JOINT STRATEGY THERE IS A NEED FOR THOSE WHO, BY VIRTUE OF PAST EXPERIENCE, MIGHT OFFER ALTERNATE INTERPRETATIONS, PERSPECTIVES AND INSIGHTS NOT BASED ON REMOTE STUDY OR SPECULATIVE ASSUMPTIONS. IT IS IMPERATIVE TO DERIVE THIS INFORMATION FROM HUMAN RESOURCES, (WHERE THE WESTERN NATIONS ARE WEAKEST) WHO NOT ONLY KNOW WHERE KABUL, KANDAHAR, KHOST AND KHAGA WAGA MIGHT BE ON A MAP BUT ALSO KNOW WHAT THEY SMELL LIKE WHEN YOU GET THERE. THE GRAVEST APPREHENSION AT THIS POINT IS THE LACK OF CLEAR DISTINCTION, OR UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN AFGHANS, UNITED FRONT (SYNONYMOUS TO THE NORTHERN ALLIANCE), TALIBAN, AND OSAMA BIN LADIN'S AL QAEDA.

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A. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] SEARCH FOR THE ENEMY. TO PLACE THE INFORMATION INTO CONTEXT, THE REMARKS ARE BASED ON THE PRINCIPLE THAT THE DEBATE IS ABOUT A WAR RATHER THAN A SINGLE OR MULTIPLE STRIKE RESOLUTION. IF THIS IS SO AND THE PRESENT FOCUS IS ON RECOGNIZING THE ENEMY AND SEARCHING FOR THE ENEMY'S CENTER OF GRAVITY, THE MOST SERIOUS DANGER LIES IN USING WESTERN POINTS OF REFERENCE AND NOT THE ENEMIES'. IF THE WEST RELIES ON USING ITS POINTS OF REFERENCE, THEN THE BALANCE OF RESOURCES WILL BE GIVEN OVER TO SEARCHING FOR WHAT WESTERNERS MOST EASILY RECOGNIZE. IN THIS THE OBVIOUS CHOICE IS NATION STATE INVOLVEMENT. IT OFFERS WESTERNERS FIXED TARGETS THAT CAN BE EASILY ENGAGED IN THE MANNER WE ARE BEST SUITED FOR AND MOST COMFORTABLE WITH.

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B. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] WHILE NATION STATES MAY HAVE SOME INVOLVEMENT, AND THEIR FINGER PRINTS APPEAR TO BE IN EVIDENCE, THEY ARE NOT, IN THIS INSTANCE, THE PRIME ENEMY. THIS WAR HAS BEEN A LONG TIME IN INCUBATION AND NOW HATCHED IS NOT THE WAR BETWEEN NATION STATES WE ARE FAMILIAR WITH. IT IS A WAR FOUGHT ON TWO FRONTS: ONE AGAINST MATERIAL ASSETS AND THE OTHER IN THE MINDS OF MEN. WHILE THE REDUCTION OF MATERIAL ASSETS AND RESOURCES MUST PLAY A PART IN THE WAR CONCENTRATING ON THEM ALONE CANNOT DELIVER LONG TERM SECURITY. IF THE CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT IS UPON THE MATERIAL FRONT IT MISSES A VITAL POINT. IT IS THE MOST VISIBLE, NOT THE MOST IMPORTANT. IT MEANS THE ENEMY WILL HAVE SUCCESSFULLY DRAWN WESTERN PLANNING AND POLICY AWAY FROM WHERE IT SHOULD BE STRONGEST.

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3. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] THE MINDS OF MEN FRONT. ULTIMATELY THIS IS THE LARGEST FRONT, THE HARDEST TO FIGHT, AND THE HARDEST TO WIN. IT IS ALSO THE FIRST ONE TO ENGAGE. THE TARGET RESIDES IN THE SECRET POWER OF NAMES. IF WESTERNERS CAN ENGAGE (KILL) IT, THEN THEY HAVE SCORED THE FIRST VICTORY. ENGAGING THE POWER OF NAMES REQUIRES NOTHING BUT AN IDEA TO ACHIEVE IT. HOWEVER, WORSE THAN UNDERRATING THE SIGNIFICANCE, WESTERNERS OFTEN TAKE NO NOTICE IT. YET, A NAME HAS POWER AND INFLUENCE OVER THE FOOT SOLDIERS OF BOTH SIDES. IF THE POWER OF NAMES CAN ADD STRENGTH IT CAN ALSO TAKE STRENGTH AWAY. TAKING AWAY THAT STRENGTH FROM THE ENEMY IS A POSITIVE STEP TOWARDS A VICTORY, AND AN EXPLOITABLE WEAKNESS IN THE MINDS OF AL QAEDA MEMBERS.

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A. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] TAKING POWER OF NAMES FROM AL QAEDA. IN THE MINDS OF THE AL QAEDA, THEY HAD STOLEN THE POWER BESTOWED ON THE UNITED STATES, THEIR PRIMARY ENEMY, BY REPLACING IT WITH A NAME OF THEIR CHOICE, THE GREAT SATAN. BUT THE CHOICE IS A CONSIDERED ONE. IT DOES NOT REDUCE THE FOE TO A PAPER TIGER OF NO CONSEQUENCE. IT RECOGNIZES THE ENEMY IS STILL POTENT AND THEREFORE DANGEROUS,

(b)(2)

AFFECTING HOW THEY BEHAVE AROUND IT. EXPLOITING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE OF THE CONNOTATION OF GREEN BERET, SCREAMING EAGLE, RED WEAKEN THE PSYCHOLOGICAL ADVANTAGE. THERE ARE DANGERS IN HUMOROUS CHOICES.

B. ~~(S)~~ NAMING THE ENEMY. IN SELECTING A NAME FOR THE ENEMY, IT IS ADVISABLE TO CONSIDER WHETHER THEIR NATURE AND HABITS ARE THOSE OF A COLLECTIVE FORCE RATHER THAN THOSE OF AN INDIVIDUAL. THE WESTERN PUBLIC WILL NOT CARE WHAT THE TITLE OF THE ENEMY IS, WHY PROMOTE AL QAEDA'S PREFERRED CHOICE? (b)(2)

C. ~~(S)~~ MEASURES TO BE TAKEN. SEEK AN ALTERNATIVE NAME FOR THE ENEMY AND TAKE AWAY AL QAEDA'S CHOICE OF NAMES. GREAT CARE SHOULD BE TAKEN IN SEEKING AN ALTERNATIVE AND AVOID ANY NEGATIVE ISLAMIC STEREOTYPING. WHATEVER THE WIDER TITLE, IT IS PREFERABLE TO THE CULT OF PERSONALITY FOSTERED BY PROMOTING AN INDIVIDUAL SUCH AS OSAMA BIN LADEN. IT WILL CERTAINLY BEGIN TO AGITATE AL QAEDA IF WESTERNERS DO NOT GRANT THEM THE LEGITIMACY OF USING THEIR PREFERRED CHOICE OF NAME. IT IS A SMALL STEP IN EXPLOITING THE PSYCHOLOGICAL WEAKNESSES, WHICH SHOULD BE A FOCUS OF A JOINT WESTERN STRATEGY. (b)(2)

4. ~~(S)~~ EXPLOITATION OF AL QAEDA'S FORCE. AL QAEDA LACKS THE CONVENTIONAL MATERIALS, RESOURCES AND TECHNOLOGY WE EXPECT AND SEEK TO EXPLOIT. THEIR FORCE MAY BE WIDELY DISPERSED, WELL DISGUISED AND CAPABLE OF DELIVERING BLOWS OUT OF ALL PROPORTION TO ITS SIZE. HOWEVER, NOT TO LOSE SIGHT OF WHERE THE ANSWERS LIE AND FOR ALL ITS DIFFERENCES, AL QAEDA'S FORCES CANNOT ESCAPE BEING THE SAME AS ALL MILITARY FORCES IN TWO RECOGNIZABLE WAYS: THEY ARE HUMAN AND THEY MAKE MISTAKES. THERE HAVE MADE AT LEAST THREE RECOGNIZABLE AND SIGNIFICANT MISTAKES SO FAR. (b)(2)

A. ~~(S)~~ FIRST, MEMBERS OF AL QAEDA IN AFGHANISTAN ARE UNABLE TO AVOID GATHERING IN SUFFICIENT NUMBERS TO PRESENT A TARGET THAT IS RECOGNIZABLE AND WORTHY OF OUR TECHNOLOGICAL ADVANTAGES. EXTENSIVE HUMAN RESOURCES ARE REQUIRED ON THE GROUND TO IMPROVE TARGET ACQUISITION AND MAXIMIZE THE IMPACT OF A STRIKE. THIS FAVORS DEPLOYMENT OF SUITABLE SPECIAL FORCES (SF), PREFERABLY AS THE INTERFACE WITH LOCAL RESISTANCE FORCES, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THAT DEAD OR CAPTURED SF IN AL QAEDA HANDS REPRESENTS A DISPROPORTIONAL ADVANTAGE OVER WESTERN LOSS. IN THE CASE OF AL QAEDA THEIR HUMAN ARMOR CRACKS CAN BE EXPLOITED AS PART OF A JOINT "MINDS OF MEN" STRATEGY TO ERODE AND DISMANTLE THEM. PROPERLY APPLIED IT COULD MAKE THEIR LIFE IN AFGHANISTAN UNTENABLE. (b)(2)

B. ~~(S)~~ SECOND, THE STRENGTH OF THE ENEMY IS NOT IN THE MATERIAL RESOURCES BUT IN ITS HUMAN RESOURCES. TO ENGAGE AL QAEDA, THE WEST MUST LOOK FOR DEFECTS IN AL QAEDA'S HUMAN ARMOR. THIS HUMAN ARMOR DISPLAYS PRONOUNCED HUMAN WEAKNESSES. THE CHIEF CRACK STEMS FROM THE VERY SAME LIMITED IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE IT DEPENDS ON IN ORDER TO PRODUCE THE FOOT SOLDIERS IT NEEDS. AS A RESULT, ON BOTH A COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL BASIS, AL QAEDA REGARDS ITSELF AN ELITE FORCE SUPERIOR TO OTHERS. THE EXPLOITABLE WEAKNESS IS AL QAEDA'S INABILITY TO INTEGRATE SUFFICIENTLY WITH THE HOST POPULATION. DESPITE THE RISK OF ATTENTION AND THE RISKS CREATED FOR A COLLECTIVE MISSION, SOME MEMBERS ARE INCAPABLE OF CONCEALING THEIR SENSE OF ELITE SUPERIORITY. IN THIS NEW WAR, WHICH MUST LARGELY TARGET HUMAN RATHER THAN MATERIAL RESOURCES, THE EGO OF THE INDIVIDUAL CAN BE EXPLOITED. (b)(2)

C. ~~(S)~~ THIRD, RATHER THAN DISCREET INTEGRATION AND (b)(2)

SUBVERSION FROM WITHIN, AL QAEDA HAVE LARGELY ALLOWED THEMSELVES TO DEFINE THEIR OWN DIFFERENCES WITH THEIR AFGHAN HOSTS. THIS IS A SERIOUS FLAW IN THEIR STRATEGY OF EXPANSION. INITIALLY, AL QAEDA'S PROSPERITY AND GROWTH WERE GAINED THROUGH THE ABUSE OF THE AFGHAN TRADITION OF MELMASTIA, HOSPITALITY. LATER, WITH SUFFICIENT GROWTH, IT RELIED MORE ON CONTROLLING ITS HOST. IN A LAST PHASE IT WILL CONSUME THE HOST AND REPLACE IT, A MOVE BEST MASKED BY A LARGE ISLAMIC BANNER.

D. (C) [REDACTED] BY FAILING TO FULLY INTEGRATE WITH TALIBAN FORCES AL QAEDA EXTENUATE BOTH THEIR ALIEN OUTLOOK AND ETHNICITY. AFGHANS HAVE SERIOUS PROBLEMS IN DEALING WITH THE DOMESTIC DIVERSITY OF AFGHAN ETHNICITY. THE AL QAEDA REMAIN RATHER LIKE AN INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE, ONE DIFFERENT IN LANGUAGE, HABIT AND INTERPRETATION OF ISLAM (ALTHOUGH BOTH ARE ACTUALLY SUNNI). BY RUNNING THEIR OWN CAMPS AND OPERATIONALLY LUMPING TOGETHER IN THE 055 BRIGADE, AL QAEDA MEMBERS SET THEMSELVES APART. THIS POTENTIAL FOR EXPLOITATION SHOULD NOT BE IGNORED BY WESTERN MILITARY PLANNERS. THE PRIME TARGET MOST SUITED AND DESERVING OF THE CONVENTIONAL FORCE THAT THE ALLIES CAN BRING TO BEAR CAN BE EFFECTIVELY ISOLATED. SUPPORT ON THE GROUND BY THE RIGHT MIX OF ALLIED SF AND LOCAL RESISTANCE WOULD ENABLE THE CREATION OF THE IDEAL WEAPON WITH WHICH TO STRIKE AN OTHERWISE PROBLEMATIC ENEMY, WHICH MIGHT NORMALLY BE BOTH WIDELY DISPERSED AND EFFECTIVELY CONCEALED IN A HOST CIVILIAN POPULATION.

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5. (C) [REDACTED] BIN LADEN'S AL QAEDA NETWORK WAS ABLE TO EXPAND UNDER THE SAFE SANCTUARY EXTENDED BY TALIBAN FOLLOWING PAKISTAN DIRECTIVES. IF THERE IS ANY DOUBT ON THAT ISSUE, CONSIDER THE LOCATION OF BIN LADEN'S CAMP TARGETED BY US CRUISE MISSILES, ZAHAWA (CNA). POSITIONED ON THE BORDER BETWEEN AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN IT WAS BUILT BY PAKISTAN CONTRACTORS FUNDED BY THE PAKISTAN INTER-SERVICES INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE (ISI), AND PROTECTED UNDER THE PATRONAGE OF A LOCAL AND INFLUENTIAL JADRAN TRIBAL LEADER, JALALUDIN ((HAQANI)). HOWEVER, THE REAL HOST IN THAT FACILITY WAS THE PAKISTANI ISI. IF THIS WAS LATER TO BECOME BIN LADEN'S BASE, THEN SERIOUS QUESTIONS ARE RAISED BY THE EARLY RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BIN LADEN AND PAKISTAN'S ISI.

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6. (C) [REDACTED] THE ACHILLES HEEL OF THE TALIBAN LIES IN ITS GENESIS AND THE MOBILE NATURE OF ITS DEPLOYMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. ONE OF THE REMARKABLE FEATURES OF THE AFGHAN MUJAHIDEEN WHO OPPOSED THE SOVIET OCCUPATION, WAS THAT IT NEVER EVOLVED INTO THE SECONDARY STAGE OF GUERRILLA WARFARE, MOBILE GOERRILLA WARFARE. FOR THE VAST MAJORITY OF AFGHAN'S MUJAHIDEEN THE WAR REMAINED A LOCALIZED EVENT. IN A COUNTRY OF DIVERSE CULTURES AND LANGUAGE WITH DEEP HISTORICAL ENMITIES BETWEEN COMMUNITIES AND INDIVIDUALS THERE IS NO SENSE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY. AS A RESULT THE MASS MOBILITY OF THE TALIBAN, ONLY POSSIBLE THROUGH THE SUPPORT OF THOSE MADE THEM, HAS GENERATED A CIVIL WAR OF UNBRIDLED FEROCITY. THE TALIBAN FORCES FEEL NO SENSE OF SHARED IDENTITY WITH POPULATIONS FROM OTHER PARTS OF AFGHANISTAN.

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7. (C) [REDACTED] THERE ARE CRACKS BETWEEN TALIBAN AND ORDINARY AFGHANS. IF PROOF IS NEEDED, THEN LOOK CLOSELY AT THE UPRISING IN THE KHOST REGION IN FEB 2000. AN UPRISING THERE WAS NOTEWORTHY BECAUSE IT WAS THE HOME OF JALALUDIN ((HAQANI)), THE JADRAN TRIBAL LEADER MOST EXPLOITED BY ISI DURING THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR TO FACILITATE THE INTRODUCTION OF ARAB EXTREMISTS. THE TALIBAN BEGAN

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DOCILE; EXTREMISM GREW AS THEIR CONFIDENCE GREW.

(b)(2) A. (C// [REDACTED]) IF THE PUSHTO TRIBES AROUND KHOST WERE PROVOKED TO UPRISING THEY MUST HAVE BEEN VERY UPSET. IT IS RUMORED THAT JALAUDIN ((HAQNI)) WAS INCREASINGLY UNHAPPY WITH TALIBAN. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT AL QAEDA BEGAN TO TREAT THAT PART OF PAKTIA AS THEIR OWN. AL QAEDA APPARENTLY HAVE CAMPS NEXT TO PEWIR KOTAL (CNA), WHICH IS MANGAL LAND, AND ANOTHER IN TUNI

(b)(2) [REDACTED] A FORMER AFGHAN ARMY BASE IN JADRAN LAND. IT IS ALSO LIKELY THAT TALIBAN WAS IMPOSING ALIEN ATTITUDES INSENSITIVE TO LOCAL FEELINGS. WHATEVER THE CAUSE, UPRISINGS TOOK PLACE, AND THIS IS A SURE INDICATION OF CRACKS BETWEEN TALIBAN AND ORDINARY AFGHANS.

B. (C// [REDACTED]) THERE WAS ALSO AN UPRISING IN NIMRUZ PROVINCE IN (b)(2)

SOUTH-EASTERN AFGHANISTAN AND ANOTHER WAS REPORTED TO HAVE BEEN (b)(2)

NARROWLY AVEKTED IN JALALBAD [REDACTED] THE PRIME STOMPING GROUND OF ABDUL ((HAQ)). HAQ'S BROTHER, ABDUL ((KADIR)), CONTINUES TO RESIST THE TALIBAN IN KONAR

(b)(2) [REDACTED] IN AFGHAN TERMS JUST UP THE ROAD. (b)(2)

8. (C// [REDACTED]) INFLUENCING A STABLE AFGHANISTAN. A STRATEGY OF ORDER, INVOLVING GENEROUS HUMANITARIAN AID, SHOULD BE ADOPTED IN AREAS OUTSIDE TALIBAN CONTROL WITH AN AIM AT INFLUENCING A MORE STABLE FUTURE FOR AFGHANISTAN. IT WOULD HELP REINFORCE TO THE WIDER AFGHAN AUDIENCE THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE ARE NOT THE ENEMY. WHEN THEY REALIZE THEY ARE NOT THE ENEMY THEY WILL BEGIN TO WONDER WHO IS. FOR MOST AFGHANIS THAT WILL BE AN EASY ANSWER TO FIND, HAVING TOLERATED UNGRATEFUL FOREIGN GUESTS - AL QAEDA AND TALIBAN.

[REDACTED] (b)(1)

A. (C// [REDACTED]) IF THERE IS ONE THING AN AFGHAN CAN NOT BEAR ANOTHER AFGHAN TELLING HIM WHAT TO DO. EVEN WORSE IS A FOREIGNER ATTEMPTING TO TELL HIM WHAT TO DO. IN ATTITUDE, THE FUNDAMENTALIST ARAB AL QAEDA MEMBER WILL TREAT HIS AFGHAN HOST IN DIFFERING WAYS. SOMETIMES AUTHORITY WITH DEMURE RESPECT (AT LEAST ABOVE THE WATER LINE), OR A PATRONIZING PATERNALISM BASED ON HIS SELF ASSURED CONVICTION THAT HE IS THE BETTER MAN, (NOT LEAST BECAUSE THE AVERAGE AFGHAN CAN NOT READ OR WRITE IN THEIR OWN LANGUAGE LET ALONE IN THAT OF THE ARABIC OF THE KORAN). (b)(2)

B. (C// [REDACTED]) THE AVERAGE AFGHAN PEASANT RESPONSE TO SUPERIORITY EXHIBITED BY AL QAEDA OVER THEIR HOSTS WILL BE LAYERED. FIRST, TOLERANCE BASED ON THE AFGHAN TRADITION OF MELMASTIA, HOSPITALITY. SECOND, RESPECT FOR THEIR SUPERIOR EDUCATION (TO SPEAK ARABIC IS REGARDED AS SCHOLARLY). THIRD, IF IMPOSED UPON TOO MUCH, A SLOW BUT GROWING RESENTMENT AT THE FOREIGNER LORDING IT OVER HIM. (b)(2)

9. (C// [REDACTED]) EVENTUALLY TALIBAN AND AL QAEDA WILL WAR WITH EACH OTHER. THE FEAR MUST BE THAT AL QAEDA WILL HAVE BECOME FULLY FORMED, IN SIZE, STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES WHICH WILL ENABLE THEM TO CONSUME THEIR HOST (ALTHOUGH THEY MIGHT CONTINUE TO USE THE HANDY TALIBAN CLOAK WOVEN BY PAKISTAN TO SHROUD THEIR PROGRESS). (b)(2)

10. (C// [REDACTED]) POTENTIAL ALLIED RESPONSES. THE TERRAIN, THE CLIMATE, THE PEOPLE, AND THE PROBLEM STRONGLY ARGUE IN FAVOR OF A MORE COST EFFECTIVE MILITARY ENGAGEMENT THAN THE MASS DEPLOYMENT OF GROUND FORCES. THE ENEMY DOES NOT HAVE MASS, WHICH MAKES THEM HARDER TO ENGAGE. (b)(2)

A. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] HOWEVER, AL QAEDA IS NOT INDIGENOUS TO THE REGION AND IT LACKS THE ESSENTIAL POPULAR SUPPORT OF THE LOCAL POPULATION REACQUIRED FOR ANY HOPE OF WINNING AN EXTENDED WAR. THE DANGER, EVEN THE TRAP, RESIDES IN THE NATURE OF THE ENEMY.

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AS A NON INDIGENOUS FORCE AL QAEDA MAY LEAVE A HARD-CORE DEDICATED CADRE TO FIGHT, WHILE THE MORE IMPORTANT PARTS SIMPLY RELOCATE TO ANOTHER COUNTRY (POSSIBLY CHECHNYA). THE ISLAMIC FUNDAMENTALIST MOVEMENTS WOULD ALSO GAIN MORE PROPAGANDA VALUE OUT OF ANY ALLIED MASS DEPLOYMENT. IF THE GROUND DEPLOYMENT INVOLVES MASS AND DURATION, THERE IS A STRONG PROBABILITY THAT THE GROUND TROOPS WILL BECOME THE TARGETS OF ANOTHER CONFLICT, EVEN AFTER AL QAEDA ARE ERADICATED.

B. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] RULING OUT MASS GROUND DEPLOYMENT, THE ONLY SERIOUS OPTIONS MUST BE A STAND-OFF AIR REPRISAL. THIS OFFERS SOME IMMEDIATE MATERIAL AND PROPAGANDA GAIN, BUT ONLY IF THE RIGHT TARGETS ARE STRUCK WITH THE RIGHT RESULT. TARGETS LOCATED IN OR CLOSE TO CITIES SHOULD BE IGNORED REGARDLESS OF THE DESIRABILITY THAT THEY MIGHT OFFER. THE ODDS ARE WHAT IS THOUGHT TO BE IN THEM HAS ALREADY BEEN MOVED. ADDITIONALLY, COLLATERAL DAMAGE TO ALL NEIGHBORING AREAS ALREADY SUSTAINED IN THE WAR WILL BE BLAMED ON THE AIR STRIKES. AIR STRIKES WILL ALSO INVOLVE AN INEVITABLE PROPORTION OF CIVILIAN CASUALTIES, PROBABLY DISPROPORTIONAL TO THE SIZE OF THE TARGET. STRIKES AT THESE LOCATIONS WELD A BOND BETWEEN AL QAEDA, TALIBAN, AND THE WIDER AFGHANI POPULATION, AS THEY DO NOT EFFECTIVELY DISTINGUISH BETWEEN THEM. A VITAL COMPONENT OF ANY STRIKE ACTION SHOULD BE DIRECTED AT EMPHASIZING THEIR DIFFERENCES NOT MINIMIZING THEM.

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C. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] IDEAL AIR TARGETS ARE THOSE WELL AWAY FROM ANY LARGE CITIES, SUCH AS KABUL, KANDAHAR, JALALABAD, HERAT, MAZIR-I-SHARIEF. MASSIVE, NEAR TOTAL DESTRUCTION CAUSED BY PREVIOUS CONFLICTS WOULD BE EFFECTIVELY BLAMED ON ALLIED ACTION. INSTEAD THEY SHOULD BE THOSE TARGETS AS CLOSE TO THE FRONT LINE WITH OPPOSITION FORCES AS POSSIBLE. IDEALLY LIMITED TO O55 AND ANY OTHER AL QAEDA RESOURCES.

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D. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] AIR REPRISAL WITH LIMITED SF GROUND DEPLOYMENT IS THE BEST OPTION. GROUND DEPLOYMENT ENABLES AN IMMEDIATE AND SERIOUS APPRECIATION OF THE TERRAIN, WILL REINFORCE THE ERROR OF MASS GROUND DEPLOYMENT, AND IMPROVE THE ACCURACY OF THE AIR STRIKE TARGETING. AS A FIRST STEP, THE ONLY SERIOUSLY TENABLE OPTION IS DEPLOYMENT WITHIN OPPOSITION HELD TERRAIN. ONCE LOCAL RESISTANCE IS ESTABLISHED, THE ENGAGEMENT CAN HAVE WIDER FOCUS THAN AL QAEDA.

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SUBJ: IIR [REDACTED]
THESE STEPS WOULD INCREASE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF A SF LED OPERATIONS AND RECEIVE LOCAL SUPPORT.

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E. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] STAND ALONE SF GROUND DEPLOYMENT. SINGLE RAID OPTIONS MIGHT BE ATTRACTIVE FOR SPEEDY RESULTS TO SATISFY DOMESTIC DEMANDS. BUT, WITHOUT A LOT MORE LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, THEY RUN SERIOUS RISKS DISPROPORTIONAL TO THE SHORT TERM GAINS. SF DEPLOYMENT WOULD ALSO, BY VIRTUE OF THE TERRAIN IDEALLY INVOLVE SIGNIFICANT AIR MOBILITY. WITHOUT AIR MOBILITY, RANGE AND CAPABILITY ARE SERIOUSLY DIMINISHED WHILE RISK IS SERIOUSLY INCREASED.

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11. ~~(S)~~ [REDACTED] TALIBAN AND AIR RESPONSE. TALIBAN GROUND FORCES (DISCOUNTING O55 BRIGADE WITH AL QAEDA) LEFT TO THEIR OWN DEVICES ARE NEITHER VERY GOOD NOR VERY COMMITTED. GIVEN THE SMALL SCALE OF TALIBAN AIR CAPABILITY, ALLIED AIR POWER COULD BE USED TO REMOVE


(b)(2)

THE TALIBAN AIR MOBILITY AND STRIKE CAPABILITY. HOWEVER, UNLESS THAT ARM POSES A SERIOUS DIRECT THREAT TO ANY ALLIED SF DEPLOYMENT IT SHOULD NOT FORM PART OF THE FIRST LIST OF AIR STRIKE TARGETS. TALIBAN AIRCRAFT ON THE GROUND SHOULD BE LEFT INTACT WHILE AN EFFECTIVE NO-FLY ZONE IS DECLARED AND ENFORCED. THIS WOULD SERVE TO REINFORCE TO THE LOCAL TALIBAN THE PERCEPTION THAT AL QAEDA IS THE TARGET AND NOT THE TALIBAN. SIMULTANEOUSLY, THIS ACTION PROVIDES HOPE THAT IF THE TALIBAN ADOPT A NON-INTERFERENCE POLICY OVER STRIKES TARGETING AL QAEDA, THEY MIGHT BE LEFT UNMOLESTED. TARGETING AL QAEDA WOULD ISOLATE THEM AND EMPHASIS THE DISTINCTION MADE BY WESTERN MILITARIES OVER AFGHAN AND NON-AFGHAN FORCES INSIDE THE COUNTRY. THAT DISTINCTION IS NOT ONE THAT WOULD BE LOST ON THE AFGHANS. ALLOWING TALIBAN A HOPE OF ULTIMATE SURVIVAL MIGHT ALSO REDUCE THEIR SUPPORT, IF NOT THEIR RHETORIC, FOR AL QAEDA. (b)(2)

12. ~~(S)~~ THE ONLY EFFECTIVE DEFENSE TALIBAN CAN OFFER TO AIR STRIKE LIES IN WHAT STINGER MISSILES THEY MAY STILL HAVE STOCKPILED. IT SHOULD BE ASSUMED THAT AT LEAST SOME STINGERS ARE IN AL QAEDA HANDS CLOSE TO OSAMA BIN LADEN. THE REST WILL LARGELY BE STOCKPILED NEAR MAJOR CITIES AND AIRPORTS. ANOTHER REASON FOR LEAVING SUCH SITES WELL ALONE, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT TERM. (b)(2)

13. ~~(S)~~ AL QAEDA AND AIR RESPONSE. ANY FAILURE OF SUPPORT FROM TALIBAN WILL INCREASE AL QAEDA PARANOIA AND MAY EVENTUALLY RESULT IN THE TALIBAN PREMATURELY TURNING ON THEIR HOSTS. THE TALIBAN WOULD INDIRECTLY AND UNWITTINGLY BE FORCED TO BECOME PART OF THE ALLIED EFFORT IN ERADICATING AL QAEDA OR AT LEAST MAKING ITS CONTINUED PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN UNTENABLE. (b)(2)

14. ~~(S)~~ LONG TERM. TO ENSURE THE LONG TERM EXTINCTION OF AL QAEDA IN AFGHANISTAN, THE TALIBAN MUST, AS A SECONDARY MEASURE, BE SUCCESSFULLY MODERATED OR REMOVED FROM OFFICE. SHOULD THE TALIBAN BE FORCED TO DEFEND THEMSELVES AGAINST A DISAFFECTED AL QAEDA IT WOULD PRODUCE THE SPIN-OFF BENEFIT OF ALSO MATERIALLY WEAKENING THE TALIBAN. WHAT SHOULD FOLLOW IS THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A MORE STABLE COALITION AFGHAN GOVERNMENT FREE OF THE TALIBAN AND PAKISTANI INTERFERENCE.



(b)(1) (b)(2)