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Summary NTB

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RELATIONSHIP OF NUCLEAR TEST BAN TO PROBLEM OF
PROLIFERATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

In considering the effect of a nuclear test ban agreement as it relates to the acquisition of nuclear weapons capabilities of other countries three questions arise: first, is a test ban treaty without French - Communist China and possibly other potential nuclear powers as original parties a sensible arrangement; second, if we negotiate a U.S. - U.K. - U.S.S.R. test ban treaty what steps should we take to provide for ultimate French - Communist Chinese accession to the treaty; third, does such a treaty increase significantly the chances of taking other steps by which we might protect ourselves against the rise of further atomic powers.

A tripartite nuclear test ban treaty would be in our interest even if France and Communist China are not original parties. This judgment is not based on the assumption that the signing of such a treaty would head off the upcoming French series or even in the hope that it could prevent a Chinese test. The French government has made its position on its forthcoming test series

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quite clear. In the case of Communist China, nationalistic ambitions may well impel Peking to conduct tests as soon as it is able despite the existence of a U.S., U.S.S.R. test ban treaty and any pressures the Soviets may be willing and able to apply.

A test ban, however, may put pressures on the French, and put the U.S.S.R. in a position to put pressures on the Chinese Communists, to restrict their programs of nuclear testing in a manner which would help prevent the further proliferation of nuclear weapons more than if there were no test ban agreement.

In the case of France, one could reasonably predict that a French Government might agree to desist from nuclear tests after mating a satisfactory nuclear warhead to intermediate range ballistic missiles. Admittedly, this might require testing through 1965. It is, however, a tangible objective and is clearly a more desirable one than the alternative prospect of French tests across the spectrum of possible weapons applications involving the development of thermonuclear capacity and full utilization of the U-235 capacity now being developed by France. If all the other nations of Europe had signed a test ban treaty, the fact that France was the only European holdout might have a

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sufficiently serious impact when France's other relations to Europe to make France's accession a reasonable possibility.

In the case of Communist China, even if it proves not possible to prevent testing of a nuclear weapon, economic resources, the prospects of Japanese and Indian acquisition of nuclear capabilities are factors which might still persuade Peking that a limited nuclear striking force was sufficient. Add to these factors a nuclear test ban treaty and it is not unreasonable to predict that Red China might be satisfied with a relatively small nuclear arsenal and a consequent early halt to nuclear weapons tests.

It is, of course, necessary to protect the United States from being trapped in a treaty which the other parties were not violating but which we no longer wanted because the Chinese Communists were conducting an extensive test program. The answer is to be found in a withdrawal clause similar to that contained in the August 27, 1962 draft comprehensive test ban treaty. Under this provision, the U.S. could withdraw from the treaty if non-parties tested nuclear weapons to the extent of endangering our national security. This need not imply that a single test would justify dissolution of the treaty. It would probably take several tests by non-parties before one of the present nuclear powers could legitimately conclude that its national security

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was jeopardized. The judge of this, however, would be the party which felt threatened. The underlying assumption is that a party cannot really be expected to stay in a treaty which is beginning to hurt seriously. This is a reflection of a reality, and one which it is not wise to camouflage.

One course which has been suggested to enhance the stability of the treaty is to have a withdrawal clause of this kind become operative only a given period of time, e.g., two or three years after the treaty has come into effect. The result of such a provision -- to permit the French to finish testing before the Chinese really got started -- would be obvious to the Soviets. It does not follow that they would object to it. The provision might raise a ^{domestic} political question in that there might be a period of time in which the Chinese would be testing but in which we would be bound. On balance, ACDA recommends such a proposal but to the extent of exploring it with the U.S.S.R. on an informal basis before making a decision to table amended treaty language.

In considering the impact of a test ban on the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons the question to be considered is not whether a test ban, signed by the U.S., the U.S.S.R. and the U.K., would solve the non-proliferation

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problem. It clearly would not. The question is whether the chances of taking other measures which might successfully cope with the problem of non-proliferation are significantly greater with a test ban than without it.

In addition to France and China, the current estimate as to the time for other countries to produce and test a first nuclear device without outside help is as follows:

Canada	1 - 2 years after decision
Israel	2 - 3 years after decision
Sweden	2 - 3 years after decision
West Germany	4 - 5 years after decision
India	4 - 5 years after decision
Japan	5 - 6 years after decision
Italy	5 - 6 years after decision

In addition, consideration has to be given to Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Netherlands, Norway, Switzerland and UAR as countries which might develop a nuclear weapons capability, either by themselves or with outside assistance.

As is shown by the inclusion of Canada on the list, the motivations of these countries (or at least their present political leadership) varies. But in estimating the probable effect on national decisions to embark on a nuclear weapons program, one must take into account primarily the calculations of individual states vis-a-vis their neighbors,

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and other states of a similar rank in the power scale. A nation like Sweden quite likely would decide not to acquire nuclear weapons if it had reasonable assurances that other European countries were not going to attempt to acquire them. Similarly, Israel might be expected to refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons if it had reasons to think that its Arab neighbors would not acquire such weapons. The continuation of nuclear weapons tests by the French, however, and the initiation of tests by the Communist Chinese would bring pressure on these smaller countries to acquire nuclear weapons. The continuation of nuclear weapons tests by the French, however, and the initiation of tests by the Communist Chinese would bring pressure on these smaller countries to acquire nuclear weapons. To the extent that a test ban signed by the U.S., U.S.S.R., and the U.K. would make it more likely that the French and Chinese series would be curtailed, it is one step in the direction of non-dissemination.

It is only one step, however, and the U.S. should immediately begin considering what, in addition to a nuclear test ban treaty could be done to provide assurances to the smaller countries that a nuclear arms race will not

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be initiated in the ranks of the smaller powers. In Europe the multinational nuclear force is one solution. In other areas of the world some form of assurance that the U.S. would come to the assistance of states threatened by the rise of a nuclear power in that area might buttress the effect of a test ban treaty. There is also the possibility of pushing ahead strongly with other arms control measures, e.g., a non-dissemination agreement, which might have an impact. The basic question, however, should be not whether a test ban treaty is enough to prevent the further spread of nuclear capabilities but what, in addition to a test ban treaty, would help to inhibit the proliferation of nuclear weapons capabilities.

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