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 Series A.

UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

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SUBJECT: Nuclear Testing

DATE: January 29, 1963
 TIME: 3:00 p.m.
 PLACE: Soviet Mission, NY

PARTICIPANTS:

USSR
 Nikolai T. Fedorenko, Soviet Permanent Representative to the UN
 S. K. Tsarapkin, Soviet Representative to ENDC
 Y. Vorontsov, USSR Foreign Ministry
 Vladimir N. Zherabtsev, Interpreter

UK
 Sir David Ormsby-Gore, British Ambassador
 John Cambridge, UK Mission to the UN

US
 William C. Foster, Director, ACDA
 Charles C. Stelle, Deputy US Representative, ENDC
 James E. Goodby, ACDA/IR
 Alexander Akalovsky, ACDA/IR

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Fedorenko asked Mr. Foster if he had anything to tell the Soviet side. Mr. Foster replied that he thought the shoe was on the other foot. The U.S. had placed before the Soviet Union a number of propositions which appeared to call for a response. Mr. Foster then reviewed the various statements and suggestions made by the U.S. with respect to issues related to the on-site inspection quota, the number and location of automatic stations, the noise levels at proposed automatic station sites, and the lists of national manned seismic stations.

Mr. Foster recalled that the U.S. had stated that ten automatic seismic stations was a reasonable number but had indicated that eight or, perhaps, even seven such stations might be

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might be acceptable if the Soviet side could add some national seismic stations in areas where there appeared to be a scarcity of such stations or if the U.S. could be assured, with appropriate data, of the effectiveness of the present Soviet national seismic detection network. There had been no response from the Soviet side on any of these matters, which made it difficult to reach an understanding. Mr. Foster had hoped that since the last meeting the Soviet side might find itself in a position to give an indication of its thinking on the points raised by the U.S.

Fedorenko said that Mr. Foster had simply repeated his previous statements without adding anything new. He then reiterated the arguments against involving the talks in "technical" debate. He asserted that the U.S. attitude made agreement on the basic questions very difficult if not impossible.

Mr. Foster explained the U.S. view on the purpose of automatic seismic stations and stated that with respect to on-site inspections the Soviet decision to accept three on-site inspections, while appreciated, was not sufficient to produce an agreement which would give necessary assurances. He expressed regret that his efforts to elicit response from the Soviets on the various questions he had raised had met with no success.

Mr. Foster then mentioned that he had examined again the records of Mr. Kuznetsov's discussions with Secretary Rusk and he thought it possible that Mr. Kuznetsov might have been misunderstood. It was possible that Mr. Kuznetsov had been referring to what he thought was an American position when he mentioned two to four on-site inspections. Mr. Foster stated that there must have been a similar misunderstanding with respect to any conversation Mr. Dean might have had with Kuznetsov since there was no question about the U.S. position on the annual on-site inspection quota. No U.S. representative had ever been authorized to suggest that the U.S. could accept fewer than eight to ten on-site inspections annually, and the U.S. position had been clearly stated in the President's letter.

Mr. Foster concluded that it would be a mistake to put all the weight of these negotiations on to the question of the number of on-site inspections since the system was made up of many other elements.

FedorenkoSECRET-LIMITED DISTRIBUTION

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Fedorenko complained that Mr. Foster apparently remained deaf to the Soviet approach. Mr. Foster continued to speak of technical problems and this was the main reason for the difficulty in moving forward. However, the Soviet side appreciated the clarification that Mr. Foster had given with respect to the Kuznetsov discussion. As for the Soviet side, it was not speaking about an error when it said that Mr. Dean had suggested two to four inspections would be acceptable to the U.S., and this had been an important factor in the formulation by the Soviet Government of its position.

Mr. Foster replied that there had been no interpreter present at the Kuznetsov-Rusk conversation, whereas there had been an interpreter present at the Dean-Kuznetsov conversation. He was quite sure that there had been no proposal from an American representative for two to four on-site inspections annually. In any event, the official U.S. position was quite clear and had been stated in the President's letter to Chairman Khrushchev.

Mr. Foster then stated that the reason the U.S. side had been insistent on hearing the Soviet position on issues related to on-site inspection was because it would do no good to get agreement on a number of on-site inspections if inspection as such could be rendered ineffective. All that the U.S. side had been trying to do was to find out if any of the conditions put forward by it were completely unacceptable to the Soviet Union. If so, it would be better to know this now before the hopes of the world were raised only to be disappointed later.

Fedorenko asserted the U.S.S.R. was prepared to discuss what he called technical questions, but only after agreement was reached on the two basic questions. He then claimed that the U.S. side had not been consistent on the question of on-site inspections. Up to the last exchange of letters between President Kennedy and Chairman Khrushchev, the U.S. had said that it was difficult to negotiate with the U.S.S.R. since the Soviet Government accepted no on-site inspections. U.S. representatives had said that if the U.S.S.R. agreed to the principle of on-site inspection everything would change. Now the U.S.S.R. had returned to its position of accepting on-site inspections only to find that the U.S. was creating further difficulties.

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Mr. Foster stressed that the U.S. had always said that many of the features of a verification system were interrelated. The U.S. had said that the principle of on-site inspection should be accepted by the Soviet Union before precise numbers of on-site inspections could be discussed, but the U.S. had never indicated that it would agree to two or three on-site inspections. Now the U.S.S.R. had accepted the principle, and we proposed that the associated elements be considered so as to narrow down the range of the number "x" of on-site inspections and to come to agreed recommendations on the questions under discussion. He continued that the Soviet side had specified two questions as important in these discussions. One of these was automatic seismic stations. The U.S. had already set forth its positions on these stations and had said that it would be prepared to accept a lower number than it had originally mentioned if certain conditions were met. He hoped that at least on this one element agreement would be possible.

Sir David said that it might be useful to review where the two sides seem to be in agreement and where they seem to part company. The two sides seemed to agree that it would be a good thing to have a treaty which would end all nuclear tests. They were also in agreement, broadly speaking, on the form of the treaty and on the elements it should contain to give assurance to the world that the obligations of the treaty were being carried out. It was also recognized that automatic seismic stations and on-site inspections would be two key elements in such a treaty. From this point, differences began to appear. The West had always said that its on-site inspection and automatic station proposals would have to have a scientific basis. Although the U.S. and U.K. recognized that the Soviet Union saw no scientific connections between the number of on-site inspections, the number and locations of automatic seismic stations, and the number of unidentified seismic events, it was a fact that the West did see such a connection if the U.S.S.R. ignored the West's approach. The U.S. and the U.K. had the right to say that, on the basis of their present information, they believed the right number of on-site inspections was eight to ten. Mr. Foster had said that if more knowledge was forthcoming about the capabilities of the Soviet Union's seismic detection network or if more seismic stations could be built in the U.S.S.R., the U.K. and the U.S. could reduce the number of automatic seismic stations they requested on Soviet territory. This was an important offer which, so far, had elicited no response from the Soviet side. Since Chairman Khrushchev himself had said that procedures could be worked out which would protect Soviet security

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interests against the international teams which would visit automatic seismic stations, Sir David saw no reason why the Soviet Government could not accept seven automatic stations just as well as they could accept three such stations. Sir David hoped that agreement could be reached at this meeting or the next on the question of automatic seismic stations and that the discussions could then proceed to concentrate on on-site inspections. On this latter question, it was clear that the range was between two and ten; should it be really impossible to negotiate here and find a mutually acceptable solution? Sir David could not understand that Teerapkin had really come all the way to America to have some good long talks only to have the West accept the Soviet position of 2-3 inspections and 2-3 automatic stations. Surely, there must be some flexibility on the Soviet side.

Teerapkin said that the Soviet Union could not accept Mr. Foster's and Sir David's contention that there were two sets of numbers: one proposed by the U.S. and U.K. and one proposed by the U.S.S.R. The Soviet side was not going to bargain; it had come to get an agreement. It had made a concession of principle and had named a figure for the on-site inspection quota. For the Soviet side, the "x" which had been mentioned by Mr. Foster did not exist at all. The Soviet side had no interest in "x," and the U.S. and U.K. side should not delude itself into thinking that it could involve the Soviet Union in the process of resolving the unknown "x."

Teerapkin then reiterated the political significance of the Soviet moves on inspection and automatic stations and said that if the U.S. and U.K. continued to adhere to their present position they would bear the responsibility for the impossibility of coming to an agreement.

As for the location of automatic seismic stations, Teerapkin thought that agreement could be recorded today on the location of the three stations in U.S. territory. One could be placed in the Santa Fe - Albuquerque area, one in the Spokane - Richland area, and a third at McMinnville, Tennessee. This latter location was in lieu of the Augusta - Columbia, South Carolina area, which U.S. scientists had said was an area of high noise level.

Mr. Foster

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Mr. Foster said that after hearing Tsarapkin speak, he joined the British Ambassador in wondering why Tsarapkin had been sent to America; obviously he had not been sent to negotiate. All that Mr. Foster had been able to elicit from the Soviet side was a shift in one U.S. location of automatic seismic stations. This was indeed a strange sort of discussion.

Tsarapkin rejoined that he had been sent to the United States to negotiate and, in case of success, to share the joy of reaching agreement. In case of failure, he would be able to report in person to the Eighteen Nation Disarmament Committee what had happened in these discussions.

Fedorenko added that it seemed strange to him that Mr. Foster understood the purpose of these negotiations as he did. Evidently the U.S. and U.K. expected the Soviet side to make further concessions to the West. The Soviet Union did not, however, wish to open a market and bargain; it had already made an important decision of principle by accepting on-site inspections. The Soviet Government understood the purpose of the negotiations to be to find out more precisely the positions of the other side and to meet those positions.

Fedorenko then suggested that it might be desirable to end the meeting at this point and in view of a luncheon being given by Ambassador Stevenson tomorrow to have the next meeting on Thursday, January 31.

Tsarapkin interjected that as to the nature of the negotiations the Soviet side could have bargained also. It could have adhered to its position of no on-site inspection and limited itself to accepting only international personnel who would handle automatic seismic stations. The Soviet Government had removed the need for bargaining by placing its entire position on the record with no reservations. The West seemed to be taking the road of prolonged discussions, whereas the Soviet Union had put all its cards on the table.

Sir David said that he failed to see the value in talking with someone who said there were no proposals but his own. If Tsarapkin had been sent to negotiate, Sir David thought he owed his government a very considerable apology because there was no sign of a negotiation on the part of the Soviet side up to this point.

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Mr. Foster added that the record was quite clear as to the willingness of the West to negotiate but he was afraid the same could not be said for the Soviet side.


Fedorenko suggested that the U.S. and U.K. try to put themselves in the position of having declared that on-site inspections were no longer necessary in order to have a test ban treaty. They might then understand the importance of the decision of principle which had been made by the Soviet Government.

Mr. Foster rejoined that when the West had seen justification for changing its position it had done so. If, however, all that the Soviet side had to offer was three on-site inspections and three automatic seismic stations there was very little to talk about.

It was agreed that the next meeting would be held at 3 p.m. on Thursday, January 31, 1963 at the Soviet Mission. The meeting adjourned at 6:10 p.m.

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