Executive Chairman of UNMOVIC, Dr. Hans
Blix
Mr. President,
Since I reported to the Security Council on 27 January, UNMOVIC has had
two further weeks of operational and analytical work in New York and active
inspections in Iraq. This brings
the total period of inspections so far to 11 weeks. Since then, we have also listened on 5
February to the presentation to the Council by the US Secretary of State and the
discussion that followed. Lastly,
Dr. ElBaradei and I have held another round of talks in Baghdad with our
counterparts and with Vice President Ramadan on 8 and 9
February.
Let me begin today’s briefing with a short account of the work being
performed by UNMOVIC in Iraq.
We have continued to build up our capabilities. The regional office in Mosul is now
fully operational at its temporary headquarters. Plans for a regional office at Basra are
being developed. Our Hercules L-100
aircraft continues to operate routine flights between Baghdad and Larnaca. The eight helicopters are fully
operational. With the resolution of
the problems raised by Iraq for the transportation of minders into the no-fly
zones, our mobility in these zones has improved. We expect to increase utilization of the
helicopters. The number of Iraqi
minders during inspections had often reached a ratio as high as five per
inspector. During the talks in
January in Baghdad, the Iraqi side agreed to keep the ratio to about one to
one. The situation has
improved.
Since we arrived in Iraq, we have conducted more than 400 inspections
covering more than 300 sites. All
inspections were performed without notice, and access was almost always provided
promptly. In no case have we seen
convincing evidence that the Iraqi side knew in advance that the inspectors were
coming.
The inspections have taken place throughout Iraq at industrial sites,
ammunition depots, research centres, universities, presidential sites, mobile
laboratories, private houses, missile production facilities, military camps and
agricultural sites. At all sites
which had been inspected before 1998, re-baselining activities were
performed. This included the
identification of the function and contents of each building, new or old, at a
site. It also included verification
of previously tagged equipment, application of seals and tags, taking samples
and discussions with the site personnel regarding past and present
activities. At certain sites,
ground-penetrating radar was used to look for underground structures or buried
equipment.
Through the inspections conducted so far, we have obtained a good
knowledge of the industrial and scientific landscape of Iraq, as well as of its
missile capability but, as before, we do not know every cave and corner. Inspections are effectively helping to
bridge the gap in knowledge that arose due to the absence of inspections between
December 1998 and November 2002.
More than 200 chemical and more than 100 biological samples have been
collected at different sites.
Three-quarters of these have been screened using our own analytical
laboratory capabilities at the Baghdad Centre (BOMVIC). The results to date have been consistent
with Iraq’s declarations.
We have now commenced the process of destroying approximately 50 litres
of mustard gas declared by Iraq that was being kept under UNMOVIC seal at the
Muthanna site. One-third of the
quantity has already been destroyed.
The laboratory quantity of thiodiglycol, a mustard gas precursor, which
we found at another site, has also been destroyed.
The total number of staff in Iraq now exceeds 250 from 60 countries. This includes about 100 UNMOVIC
inspectors, 15 IAEA inspectors, 50 aircrew, and 65 support
staff.
Mr.
President,
In my 27 January update to the Council, I said that it seemed from our
experience that Iraq had decided in principle to provide cooperation on process,
most importantly prompt access to all sites and assistance to UNMOVIC in the
establishment of the necessary infrastructure. This impression remains, and we
note that access to sites has so far been without problems, including those that
had never been declared or inspected, as well as to Presidential sites and
private residences.
In my last updating, I also said that a decision to cooperate on
substance was indispensable in order to bring, through inspection, the
disarmament task to completion and to set the monitoring system on a firm
course. Such cooperation, as I have
noted, requires more than the opening of doors. In the words of resolution 1441 (2002) –
it requires immediate, unconditional and active efforts by Iraq to resolve
existing questions of disarmament – either by presenting remaining proscribed
items and programmes for elimination or by presenting convincing evidence that
they have been eliminated. In the
current situation, one would expect Iraq to be eager to comply. While we were in
Baghdad, we met a delegation from the Government of South Africa. It was there to explain how South Africa
gained the confidence of the world in its dismantling of the nuclear weapons
programme, by a wholehearted cooperation over two years with IAEA
inspectors. I have just learned
that Iraq has accepted an offer by South Africa to send a group of experts for
further talks.
How much, if any, is left of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and
related proscribed items and programmes?
So far, UNMOVIC has not found any such weapons, only a small number of
empty chemical munitions, which should have been declared and destroyed. Another matter – and one of great
significance – is that many proscribed weapons and items are not accounted
for. To take an example, a
document, which Iraq provided, suggested to us that some 1,000 tonnes of
chemical agent were “unaccounted for”.
One must not jump to the conclusion that they exist. However, that possibility is also not
excluded. If they exist, they
should be presented for destruction.
If they do not exist, credible evidence to that effect should be
presented.
We are fully aware that many governmental intelligence organizations are
convinced and assert that proscribed weapons, items and programmes continue to
exist. The US Secretary of State
presented material in support of this conclusion. Governments have many sources of
information that are not available to inspectors. Inspectors, for their part, must base
their reports only on evidence, which they can, themselves, examine and present
publicly. Without evidence,
confidence cannot arise.
Mr. President,
In my earlier briefings, I have noted that significant outstanding issues
of substance were listed in two Security Council documents from early 1999
(S/1999/94 and S/1999/356) and should be well known to Iraq. I referred, as examples, to the issues
of anthrax, the nerve agent VX and long-range missiles, and said that such
issues “deserve to be taken seriously by Iraq rather than being brushed
aside…”. The declaration submitted
by Iraq on 7 December last year, despite its large volume, missed the
opportunity to provide the fresh material and evidence needed to respond to the
open questions. This is perhaps the
most important problem we are facing.
Although I can understand that it may not be easy for Iraq in all cases
to provide the evidence needed, it is not the task of the inspectors to find
it. Iraq itself must squarely
tackle this task and avoid belittling the questions.
In my January update to the Council, I referred to the Al Samoud 2 and
the Al Fatah missiles, reconstituted casting chambers, construction of a missile
engine test stand and the import of rocket engines, which were all declared to
UNMOVIC by Iraq. I noted that the
Al Samoud 2 and the Al Fatah could very well represent prima facie cases
of proscribed missile systems, as they had been tested to ranges exceeding the
150-kilometre limit set by the Security Council. I also noted that Iraq had been
requested to cease flight tests of these missiles until UNMOVIC completed a
technical review.
Earlier this week, UNMOVIC missile experts met for two days with experts
from a number of Member States to discuss these items. The experts concluded unanimously that,
based on the data provided by Iraq, the two declared variants of the Al Samoud 2
missile were capable of exceeding 150 kilometres in range. This missile system
is therefore proscribed for Iraq pursuant to resolution 687 (1991) and the
monitoring plan adopted by resolution 715 (1991).
As for the Al Fatah, the experts found that clarification of the missile
data supplied by Iraq was required before the capability of the missile system
could be fully assessed.
With respect to the casting chambers, I note the following: UNSCOM ordered and supervised the
destruction of the casting chambers, which had been intended for use in the
production of the proscribed Badr-2000 missile system. Iraq has declared that it has
reconstituted these chambers. The
experts have confirmed that the reconstituted casting chambers could still be
used to produce motors for missiles capable of ranges significantly greater than
150 kilometres. Accordingly, these
chambers remain proscribed.
The experts also studied the data on the missile engine test stand that
is nearing completion and have assessed it to be capable of testing missile
engines with thrusts greater than that of the SA-2 engine. So far, the test stand has not been
associated with a proscribed activity.
On the matter of the 380 SA-2 missile engines imported outside of the
export/import mechanism and in contravention of paragraph 24 of resolution 687
(1991), UNMOVIC inspectors were informed by Iraq during an official briefing
that these engines were intended for use in the Al Samoud 2 missile system,
which has now been assessed to be proscribed. Any such engines configured for use in
this missile system would also be proscribed.
I intend to communicate these findings to the Government
of Iraq.
At the meeting in Baghdad on 8 and 9 February, the Iraqi side addressed
some of the important outstanding disarmament issues and gave us a number of
papers, e.g. regarding anthrax and growth material, the nerve agent VX and
missile production. Experts who
were present from our side studied the papers during the evening of 8 February
and met with Iraqi experts in the morning of 9 February for further
clarifications. Although no new
evidence was provided in the papers and no open issues were closed through them
or the expert discussions, the presentation of the papers could be indicative of
a more active attitude focusing on important open issues.
The Iraqi side suggested that the problem of verifying the quantities of
anthrax and two VX-precursors, which had been declared unilaterally destroyed,
might be tackled through certain technical and analytical methods. Although our experts are still assessing
the suggestions, they are not very hopeful that it could prove possible to
assess the quantities of material poured into the ground years ago. Documentary evidence and testimony by
staff that dealt with the items still appears to be
needed.
Not least against this background, a letter of 12 February from Iraq’s
National Monitoring Directorate may be of relevance. It presents a list of 83 names of
participants “in the unilateral destruction in the chemical field, which took
place in the summer of 1991”. As
the absence of adequate evidence of that destruction has been and remains an
important reason why quantities of chemicals have been deemed “unaccounted for”,
the presentation of a list of persons who can be interviewed about the actions
appears useful and pertains to cooperation on substance. I trust that the Iraqi side will put
together a similar list of names of persons who participated in the unilateral
destruction of other proscribed items, notably in the biological
field.
The Iraqi side also informed us that the commission, which had been
appointed in the wake of our finding 12 empty chemical weapons warheads, had had
its mandate expanded to look for any still existing proscribed
items. This was
welcomed.
A second commission, we learnt, has now been appointed with the task of
searching all over Iraq for more documents relevant to the elimination of
proscribed items and programmes. It
is headed by the former Minister of Oil, General Amer Rashid, and is to have
very extensive powers of search in industry, administration and even private
houses.
The two commissions could be useful tools to come up
with proscribed items to be destroyed and with new documentary evidence. They evidently need to work fast and
effectively to convince us, and the world, that it is a serious
effort.
The matter of private interviews was discussed at length during
our meeting in Baghdad. The Iraqi
side confirmed the commitment, which it made to us on 20 January, to encourage
persons asked to accept such interviews, whether in or out of Iraq. So far, we have only had interviews in
Baghdad. A number of persons have
declined to be interviewed, unless they were allowed to have an official present
or were allowed to tape the interview.
Three persons that had previously refused interviews on UNMOVIC’s terms,
subsequently accepted such interviews just prior to our talks in Baghdad on 8
and 9 February. These interviews
proved informative. No further
interviews have since been accepted on our terms. I hope this will change. We feel that interviews conducted
without any third party present and without tape recording would provide the
greatest credibility.
At the recent meeting in Baghdad, as on several earlier occasions, my
colleague Dr. ElBaradei and I have urged the Iraqi side to enact legislation
implementing the UN prohibitions regarding weapons of mass destruction. This morning we had a message that a
Presidential decree has now been issued containing prohibitions with regard to
importation and production of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. We have not yet had time to study the
details of the text of the decree.
Intelligence
Mr. President, I should like to make some comments on the role of
intelligence in connection with inspections in Iraq.
A credible inspection regime requires that Iraq provide full cooperation
on “process” – granting immediate access everywhere to inspectors – and on
substance, providing full declarations supported by relevant information and
material and evidence. However,
with the closed society in Iraq of today and the history of inspections there,
other sources of information, such as defectors and government intelligence
agencies are required to aid the inspection process.
I remember myself how, in 1991, several inspections in Iraq, which were
based on information received from a Government, helped to disclose important
parts of the nuclear weapons programme.
It was realized that an international organization authorized to perform
inspections anywhere on the ground could make good use of information obtained
from governments with eyes in the sky, ears in the ether, access to defectors,
and both eyes and ears on the market for weapons-related material. It was understood that the information
residing in the intelligence services of governments could come to very active
use in the international effort to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction. This remains true and
we have by now a good deal of experience in the matter.
International organizations need to analyse such information critically
and especially benefit when it comes from more than one source. The intelligence agencies, for their
part, must protect their sources and methods. Those who provide such information must
know that it will be kept in strict confidence and be known to very few
people. UNMOVIC has achieved good
working relations with intelligence agencies and the amount of information
provided has been gradually increasing.
However, we must recognize that there are limitations and that
misinterpretations can occur.
Intelligence information has been useful for UNMOVIC. In one case, it led us to a private home
where documents mainly relating to laser enrichment of uranium were found. In other cases, intelligence has led to
sites where no proscribed items were found. Even in such cases, however, inspection
of these sites were useful in proving the absence of such items and in some
cases the presence of other items – conventional munitions. It showed that conventional arms are
being moved around the country and that movements are not necessarily related to
weapons of mass destruction.
The presentation of intelligence information by the US Secretary of State
suggested that Iraq had prepared for inspections by cleaning up sites and
removing evidence of proscribed weapons programmes. I would like to comment only on one
case, which we are familiar with, namely, the trucks identified by analysts as
being for chemical decontamination at a munitions depot. This was a declared site, and it was
certainly one of the sites Iraq would have expected us to inspect. We have noted that the two
satellite images of the site were taken several weeks apart. The reported
movement of munitions at the site could just as easily have been a routine
activity as a movement of proscribed munitions in anticipation of imminent
inspection. Our reservation on this
point does not detract from our appreciation of the
briefing.
Plans for the
immediate future
Yesterday, UNMOVIC informed the Iraqi authorities of its intention to
start using the U-2 surveillance aircraft early next week under arrangements
similar to those UNSCOM had followed.
We are also in the process of working out modalities for the use of the
French Mirage aircraft starting late next week and for the drones supplied by
the German Government. The offer
from Russia of an Antonov aircraft, with night vision capabilities, is a welcome
one and is next on our agenda for further improving UNMOVIC’s and IAEA’s
technical capabilities. These
developments are in line with suggestions made in a non-paper recently
circulated by France, suggesting a further strengthening of the inspection
capabilities.
It is our intention to examine the possibilities for surveying ground
movements, notably by trucks. In
the face of persistent intelligence reports for instance about mobile biological
weapons production units, such measures could well increase the effectiveness of
inspections.
UNMOVIC is still expanding its capabilities, both in terms of numbers of
staff and technical resources. On
my way to the recent Baghdad meeting, I stopped in Vienna to meet 60 experts,
who had just completed our general training course for inspectors. They came from 22 countries, including
Arab countries.
Mr.
President,
UNMOVIC is not infrequently asked how much more time it needs to complete
its task in Iraq. The answer
depends upon which task one has in mind – the elimination of weapons of mass
destruction and related items and programmes, which were prohibited in 1991 –
the disarmament task – or the monitoring that no new proscribed activities
occur. The latter task, though not
often focused upon, is highly significant – and not controversial. It will require monitoring, which is
“ongoing”, that is, open-ended until the Council decides otherwise.
By contrast, the task of “disarmament” foreseen in resolution 687 (1991)
and the progress on “key remaining disarmament tasks” foreseen in resolution
1284 (1999) as well as the “disarmament obligations”, which Iraq was given a
“final opportunity to comply with” under resolution 1441 (2002), were always
required to be fulfilled in a shorter time span. Regrettably, the high degree of
cooperation required of Iraq for disarmament through inspection was not
forthcoming in 1991. Despite the
elimination, under UNSCOM and IAEA supervision, of large amounts of weapons,
weapons-related items and installations over the years, the task remained
incomplete, when inspectors were withdrawn almost 8 years later at the end of
1998.
If Iraq had provided the necessary cooperation in 1991, the phase of
disarmament – under resolution 687 (1991) – could have been short and a decade
of sanctions could have been avoided.
Today, three months after the adoption of resolution 1441 (2002), the
period of disarmament through inspection could still be short, if “immediate,
active and unconditional cooperation” with UNMOVIC and the IAEA were to be
forthcoming.