TOP SECRET

A Study of SR-71 Utility for Post-Strike Reconnaissance

I. Introduction

This paper will examine the utility of the SR-71 force for the post-strike reconnaissance mission in both a context. The value of the SR-71 for intelligence purposes is the subject of another paper. The issue is whether to phase down (or phase out) the SR-71 force in FY 73 from the level of currently programmed.

The FY 72 budget currently contains \$93.4 million for support of SR-71s with \$80-\$113 million required for each of the next five years. A From FY 71 to FY 72 1/2 resulted in a savings of \$17.6 million from the FY 71 budget (less than 16% but no further justification was made for this; in force.) Table 1 below shows that the total cost is not necessarily a function of the number of aircraft. The major reduction in funding in FY 75 is due to the completion of a major overhaul program on the SR-71 aircraft. The POM costs differ from the 19 February FYDP but the Air Force claims this is in error and funds are to be restored to FYDP levels shown in Table 1.

Table 1

SR-71 UE Aircraft and Costs (\$ Millions)
FY 69 FY 70 FY 71 FY 72 FY 73 FY 74 FY 75 FY 76

UE 1971 February FYDP					To the state of		
		27:4-	21.1-	21 . 1-	-21,1	21.1	21.1
Operations O&M Military Personnel Total Operations TOA	74.0 13.9 87.9 113.2	68.8 12.8 81.6 110.0	61.0 11.2 72.2 93.4	64.3 12.5 76.8 97.9	77.9 13.6 91.5 112.6	47.7 13.7 61.4 82.5	45.8 13.7 59.5 60.6

Section II will describe the SR-71 system in terms of its system characteristics. Section III will discuss pre-launch survival, penetration and target coverage capabilities. Section IV will discuss the utility of the information collected by the SR-71 in terms of satisfying U.S. post-strike objectives and describe alternative systems which can achieve the same capabilities. Section V contains an overall evaluation and summary of the contribution of the SR-71 including the impact of marginal reductions or complete phasing out of the force.

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^{1/} Four UE phased out during last quarter of FY 71 thus causing cost savings to be reflected in FY 72 total rather than FY 71. Savings from FY 70 to FY 72 of 19.8 million is 17.4% of FY 70 total.



II. SR-71 System Description

The current (July Aflect of SR-71s consists of UE (one squadron) based at Beale AFB, California of which three aircraft are TDY at Kadena AFB, Okinawa.

as shown in Table 2. There are currently crews and staff pilots to support SR-71 operations.

Table 2

Distribution of SR-71s

		•
Number	Model	Location/Use
-	A A A B,C	Palmdale, California (AF Plant 42)/Test Kadena Besle/Non-Operational Active Talmdale/Extended Storage NASA Beal/Traindrs Beale Addena/Operational UE
AN ALL PARTY		

The SR-71 is a aircraft capable of altitudes of 75,000 ft.


and is highly Table 3 shows other relevant characteristics. The unrequest range of this a distance.


They on tankers is evidenced by this and the fact that it takes between refueling with essentially loiter time should a KC-135Q fail to appear on schedule. After flameout an SR-71 pilot has approximately 9 miles to find a suitable landing area or bail out.

Table 3

Characteristics of SR-71

Cruise and Max Speed Engines
Cruise Altitude
Refuel Altitude
Refuel Time
Unrefueled Range
Radius of Turn
Take Off-Distance
Take Off-Speed
Landing-Distance
Landing-Speed







In addition to bases at Beale AFB, California and Kadena AFB. Okinawa, JP-7 fuel is available at CONUS Bases: locations are at Plans are being formulated to station two SR-71s at The aircraft crew consists of a pilot in the front seat, and a reconnaissance systems officer directly behind him who has no capability to fly the airplane other than by entering coordinates into the navigation system computer and allowing the autopilot to take over. Normal missions (other than take-off and landing) are flown by the autopilot based on pre-programmed tapes inserted into the navigational systemby an electronics warfare officer prior to take-off. The pilot only maintains altitude after climb and prior to descent but can fly the airplane by switching off the autopilot. inertial navigational system can guide the aircraft to within of the programmed track. Mission profiles are generated by hand and converted to a milision which is fed into the navigational system's comp memory. A minimum of his required to generate such a tape. There are five basic sensor systems on the SR-71: -- High Resolution Radar (HRR) an side looking radar with resolution of of the aircrait and sufficient film for coverage. -- Infrared (IR) -- a scan angle allows coverage of the aircraft with an Čoverage. - Operational Objective Cameras -- provide visual coverage with a resolution and coverage. -- Terminal Objective Cameras -- provide visual coverage vover square are the the aircraft with a resolution of coverage. Technical Objective Cameras -- provide visual coverage width at a resolution of \ for \ roverage...





In addition an Electromagnetic Reconnaissance System (EMR) receiver is available for information (not). It can search simultaneously between and can be preprogrammed to pick up a particular frequency and lock on and record on it. Any defensive equipment (ECM) would have to replace one of the operational objective systems. Two million dollars is in the FY 72 budget for development work on an IR warning system and possible counter.

A fleet of KC-135Q tankers currently exists with special tanks to handle. Fuel for the SR-71 as well as JP-4 fuel for themselves.

for of these to be available exclusively for SR-71 support in the event of a nuclear exchange. Two eq. are stationed at Beale AFB and one at McCoy AFB. Ten KC-135Qs are also stationed on TDY at Kadena AFB. Tankers must be pre-positioned due to the SR-71's factor of speed advantage over the KC-135. In a flight between tankers the SR-71 burns about of fuel per hour and must therefore be refueled every hours. Normal peacetime missions usually use tankers. The for to get SR-71s from to entry points over

There are three basic processing centers for the SR-71 sensor information rous one mobile processing center at Beale AFB. Their capabilities are shown below:

Table 4

Sensor Processing Capability				
Center	Location	Visual	SIR &	EMR D
-		CONTRACTOR CONTRACTOR TO THE PARTY OF THE PA		
				- L
3				


a/ Side Looking Radar

Even after processing the data, it must be transmitted to National Command Authorities (NCA). The minimum processing time is about hours with hours additional required to transmit Initial Photo-Interpretation Reports (IPIR) from Europe to Washington. A KC-135 would take hours to fly the high resolution results from thus, a minimum of the likely estimate under current procedures is the transmitted to plan a mission, fly it, and return results to the likely estimate under current procedures is the likely estimate under completely in Section IV after an examination of survival and coverage characteristics of the SR-



b/ Electromagnetic Reconnaissance System

c/ Reconnaissance Technical Squadron
d/ Overseas Processing Interpretation Center _ Europe



III. Pre-Launch Survival, Penetration and Target Coverage

Pre-Launch

It currently takes about for an SR-71 crew to put on pressure suits prior to a flight though tests have been run in which this time was reduced to Another is required for checkout and takeoff though this can be cut to about minutes. The SR-71 is normally programmed for its
In the event of an SLRM or ICEM surprise attack,
SR-71 crews at Beale go on
tapes pre-programmed to: At Where they are met by maintenance people, and have their pre-programmed where they are met by maintenance loaded.—Each-pilot
could sit in his pressure sure
feasible for long periods. The alternative of the shours because of the seasible either. They then take off
as to arrive after the majority of the ICEM, SLEW and bomber attacks. In
Ther paircraft based at Kadena are sent: however, since there are for them to go to. Kadena is only about 1000 n.m. from Vladivostok and thus within easy reach of Soviet
IRBMs, SLEMs, and medium bombers. Kadena therefore will probably not survive more than a few hours after E hour. Kadena is also 7000 n.m. from Beale AFB 11
Other recovery bases atare within
transfer the information to another aircraft to transport it to a processing facility and after processing, transfer the information to the decision-makers, it is vital to its mission not only that a recovery base be available, but also that detailed plans for transshipment be formulated.
The state of the s

Penetration

The SR-71 begins its penetration att and exits at approximately while planned post-reconnaissance routes will attempt to avoid known SAM locations, to the SR-71

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Table 5

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The SR-71 currently carries several defensive systems for protection. By mid-FY 72 will also be carried. The FY72 budget has \$2 million for RDTZE on Anew systems.

These systems and the threats they are designed to counter are shown in Table 7.

Figure 1



Coverage

Table 8 shows the SIOP target and reconnaissance summary. Note that only about

Two types of assessment of this target base are required:

-- Generalized estimates of how well our ICEM/SLEM forces performed would be of value to NCA since such estimates would increase confidence in estimates of the overall performance of the SIOP

-- Specific target destruction information is required to

The SR-71 missions in Rev. I of the SIOP covered an average of

White the SIOP installations attacked could be covered with

Only

In the new SIOP

As sample of targets must be investigated and

an appropriate sample size (required number of aircraft) must be determined Table 9 below shows the estimates and 95% confidence limits on the estimates of Soviet site destruction as a function of the percentage of sites destroyed in the sample.

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Table 8
SIOP Target and Reconnaissance Summary

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Table 9

Estimated % of Total Targets Destroyed Based on % of Sample Destroyed

of SR-71 Sorties

% of Sample Destroyed					
	17-23	18-22	18-22	19-21	
	37-43	38-42	38-42	38-42	
	<i>57-</i> 63	58-62	58-62	58-62	
	77-83	78-82	78-82	79-81	
Ifare surveyed bysorties, for example, and 20% are destroyed, then we are 95% certain that the total destroyed lies between An increase to borties narrows this estimate to 10-22%. The loss of information of this general nature is thus not particularly sensitive to reductions in the number of SR-71s (i.e., confidence boundaries are widened only 1-2% bynt-8 aircraft reduction over current numbers).					

The dots estimated		
The data collected	alter the	start of a nuclear exchange
_must_be_download_from_th	e SR-/15, transported	to and processed at
	Militario de la companya de la comp	SPER CONTRACT PRODUCTION OF THE PRODUCTION OF TH
Control in statement of their experience of		
		THE REPORT OF THE PARTY OF THE P


IV. Utility of SR-71 Information.


The information provided by the SR-71 should

In all cases data are provided by the SR-71.

SIOP Execution

After the SIOP has been executed, the United States must determine:





The first objective requires a determination of additional or residual targets. The key parameters are time to find targets and time to decide on which of these to attack. The SR-71 will provide photographic information on targets; after its mission if it has been preplanned. If a mission tape has to be generated it will require and information is not available.


If the information is to be used for as in the second objective, then sample target information is required and

A basic premise of the SR-71 mission is that the NCA In a the SIOP this may not be the case.


Nuclear Warfighting

If deterrence fails and the United States is forced into a varwaging environment timely information is

a continue for some time.
The SR-71 information would be valuable in terms of assessment of remaining
forces;
this type scenario, it is not clear who will use the "hard copy" information or the second of it.



rue major alternatives to an SR-71 system for post-strike reconnaissance are:





- -- no system
- -- other manned aircraft systems
- -- satellite systems
- -- drone systems

It is probable that some type of surveillance system will be necessary for the three environments mentioned though the specific requirement for "hard copy" information is not substantial. Other manned aircraft systems in SAC such as the Shich currently provides and the Swhich provides information can be supplemented by shorter range RF-4s and other systems.

current end others can provide photo coverage but at than the SR-71.

may also be vulnerable to direct attack, since are possible or cloud interference. Drone systems have been used for intelligence collection.

Needs more words on the last well as drone systems.

V. Overall Evaluation of SR-71 Utility for Post-Strike Reconnaissance

The current SR-71 force of active plus then-operational active aircraft performs post-strike reconnaissance of of the military targets after that were not targeted in the coverage of about that were not targeted in the SIOP. The requirement for generalized estimates of how well U.S. strategic forces have done can be satisfied by requirement for specific target destruction information increases the demand for SR-71s or other surveillance systems. This requirement is highly scenario dependent.

If the SIOP is executed in response to a surprise attack on the United States.

United States.

If crisis warning is obtained so that the SR-714

of attack. Their only

If they survive this attack they then

criecally on pre-deployed KC-135Q tankers to get them to the SIOP

which may have

from airborne interceptors

ato be effective

with

The cost savings produced by a reduction of h sircraft in FY 71 amounted to only \$3-\$5 million per sircraft since the special legistics systemafor SR-71 support was maintained.