

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority MM0759060  
By WSD NARA Date 2/28/71

DEF 18-8 45

**INCOMING TELEGRAM** *Department of State*

*RM/R*

**43**  
Action

**(55)**

SECRET

Control: 14409  
Rec'd: NOVEMBER 18, 1964  
5:18 A.M.

**55**  
Info

FROM: KARACHI

ACTION: SECSTATE 980

DATE: NOVEMBER 18, 1 P.M. (SECTION ONE OF TWO)

LIMITS

REF: DEPTTEL 462

**RECORDED  
COPY**

1. CRITCHFIELD AND I, ACCOMPANIED BY SHAFFER AND KERR, CALLED ON PRES AYUB BY APPOINTMENT, AT 0930 ON 10 NOVEMBER FOR CRITCHFIELD'S PRESENTATION OF INTELLIGENCE BRIEFING CONCERNING SOVIET AND CHICOM ADVANCED WEAPONS SYSTEMS. ON PAK SIDE, MILITARY INTELLIGENCE CHIEF BRIGADIER RIAZ HUSSAIN WAS PRESENT ALONG WITH FOREIGN OFFICE DIRECTOR GENERAL SALMAN ALI WHO APPEARED WITHOUT NOTICE AT LAST MOMENT AND STAYED THROUGHOUT MEETING AS A DILIGENT NOTE TAKER.

2. FOLLOWING THE CRITCHFIELD BRIEFING, I SPELLED OUT THE INDICTMENT AGAINST CHICOMS FOR RESTORING TO NUCLEAR TEST CONTAMINATION AT THIS STAGE OF HISTORY, IN DEFIANCE OF WORLD OPINION, WORLD INTERESTS, AND TEST BAN PROGRESS TO DATE. I SUGGESTED TO PRES THAT AT LEAST STRONG MORAL PRESSURE COULD BE APPLIED TO CHINA BY COOPERATING NATIONS IN ATTEMPT TO DISSUADE HER FROM FURTHER POLLUTION OF ATMOSPHERE. THUS CHICOMS MIGHT DECIDE TO OBSERVE NUCLEAR TEST BAN RATHER THAN ANTAGONIZE NUMEROUS COUNTRIES. PRESIDENT REPLIED THAT THIS MIGHT BE DESIRABLE TO US BUT WAS NOT REALISTIC. CHINA NEVER WILL AGREE TO STOP TESTING, HE SAID, "UNTIL IT HAS THE SAME EQUIPMENT YOU AND THE RUSSIANS ALREADY HAVE." HE INDICATED THAT IN HIS OPINION CHINESE ARE NO MORE DISPOSED TO RISK ACTUAL NUCLEAR WAR THAN THE US OR THE SOVIET UNION. CHICOM STATEMENTS ABOUT ABILITY TO SUSTAIN A NUCLEAR EXCHANGE ARE BLUFF, AND ARE SIMILAR TO THOSE MADE BY THE USSR BEFORE IT DEVELOPED NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PRES SAID THAT CHINESE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL INFRASTRUCTURE COULD NOT SURVIVE

*Karachi - 980*

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority MM0759000  
By WSD NARA Date 2/28/11

SECRET


-2- 980, NOVEMBER 18, 1 P.M., (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM KARACHI

AN ATOMIC WAR AND CHINESE LEADERSHIP IS FULLY AWARE OF THIS. ADDITIONALLY, HE NOTED, ATOMIC BOMBS ARE NOT PARTICULARLY DISCRIMINATING AND COULD KILL OFF LEADERSHIP AS WELL AS MASSES. PRES SAID "SOVIETS COULD STOP CHINESE TESTING IMMEDIATELY BY GIVING THEM BOMBS--JUST AS YOU COULD STOP THE FRENCH BY GIVING THEM BOMBS."

3. PRES THOUGHT THAT ALL NATIONS WHO COULD AFFORD IT WOULD SOONER OR LATER TRY TO DEVELOP A NUCLEAR CAPABILITY. IT IS INEVITABLY WOULD MEAN TESTING IN THE ATMOSPHERE. THE ONLY ALTERNATIVE WHICH WOULD AVOID THE CONTAMINATION WHICH COMES WITH TESTING, WOULD BE TO HAVE THESE WEAPONS EASILY AVAILABLE FROM THE BIG NUCLEAR POWERS, FROM WHOM, LIKE CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, THEY COULD BE BOUGHT "OFF THE SHELF."

4. PRES EXPRESSED HIS DEEP CONCERN AT PROSPECT OF RAPIDLY DEVELOPING INDIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY WHICH COULD BE READILY CONVERTED FROM PEACEFUL TO WAR-LIKE PURPOSES. HE NOTED LACK OF PROVISION FOR INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION OF INDIAN NUCLEAR PLANTS AND NOTED GROWING INDICATIONS THAT INDIANS MAY BE TEMPTED TO EXPLOIT THEIR OPPORTUNITY TO GET INTO NUCLEAR WEAPONS FIELD. I NOTED CATEGORICAL NATURE OF FORMAL INDIAN PUBLIC COMMITMENT AT RECENT INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE TO RENOUNCE PERMANENTLY AND UNCONDITIONALLY USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. I SAID IT WAS JOINT RESPONSIBILITY OF ALL TO HOLD INDIANS TO THIS COMMITMENT. PRES AGREED, BUT WAS SKEPTICAL AS TO ABILITY OF OTHER NATIONS TO INFLUENCE INDIA IN THIS MATTER.

5. PRES THEN ASKED HOW US NOW IS ASSESSING THE CHANGE IN LEADERSHIP WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. I RESPONDED WITH INTERPRETATION BASED ON INFORMATION PROVIDED BY AMB THOMPSON AND OTHER DEPT SOURCES. PRES THEN SAID HE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR "THE CIA APPRAISAL." CRITCHFIELD ANSWERED WITH SUGGESTION THAT KHRUSHCHEV MAY HAVE BEEN FORCED OUT OF OFFICE IN ORDER TO PRECLUDE HIS TAKING SOME ACTION HE WAS ABOUT TO TAKE, SUCH AS CHANGE IN SOVIET POSITION ON GERMAN REUNIFICATION. PRES THEN SPoke AT



SECRET

-3- 980, NOVEMBER 18, 1 P.M., (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM KARACHI

SOME LENGTH ON GERMAN PROBLEM COMMENTING THAT PERIOD IN HISTORY IN WHICH GERMANY POSED A THREAT TO RUSSIA WAS PAST; SOVIET STRENGTH TODAY IS SUCH THAT GERMANY NO LONGER CAN CONSTITUTE THREAT TO SOVIET SECURITY. PRES SAID THAT USSR MUST BE MOVING TO SAME CONCLUSION. WEST AND SOVIETS CAN ACCEPT A REUNIFICATION OF GERMANY, PRES SAID. CRITCHFIELD REPLIED THAT WHILE IT QUITE POSSIBLE THAT KHRUSHCHEV RECOGNIZED THAT A DETENTE WOULD SOONER OR LATER REQUIRE A GERMAN SOLUTION, IT IS VERY QUESTIONABLE WHETHER A MAJORITY OF THE SOVIET LEADERS TODAY ARE FAR ENOUGH AWAY FROM WORLD WAR II TO ACCEPT GERMAN UNIFICATION WITH ANY CONFIDENCE. PRES NEVERTHELESS REMARKED THAT USSR NO LONGER HAS ANY NEED TO FEAR REUNITED GERMANY. THE ONLY POWERFUL NATIONS, HE ADDED, ARE CHINA, UNITED STATES AND USSR. "DE GAULLE TALKS ABOUT CREATING A 'THIRD FORCE'," HE SAID. "BUT IT MEANS NOTHING IN THE POWER BALANCE." "I CALL HIS THIRD FORCE A 'NUISANCE FORCE'."

6. I OBSERVED THAT SEVERAL WEEKS AGO WE HAD ASKED FOR STANDBY GOP PERMISSION TO BRING IN C-130S FOR ATMOSPHERIC SAMPLINGS OVER PAKISTAN AS NEEDED WITHIN TWENTY-FOUR HOURS AFTER NEXT CHINESE NUCLEAR DETONATION. AYUB SAID HE KNEW ABOUT REQUEST, BUT HE UNABLE TO AGREE TO IT BECAUSE "WE CANNOT AFFORD TO MAKE ANY MORE ENEMIES." I SET OUT CASE THAT SAMPLING OF PAK AIR WITHIN PAK SOVEREIGN AIR SPACE COULD NOT BE CONSTRUED AS PROVOCATION OR CONTROVERSIAL BY ANY STRETCH OF IMAGINATION. PRES CALLED THIS LOGICAL ARGUMENT FROM DIPLOMATIC VIEWPOINT, BUT HE REITERATED QUITE FIRMLY THAT HE COULD NOT TAKE ANY FURTHER STEPS THAT WOULD ALARM HIS ENEMIES.

7. PERHAPS AS A CONNECTED THOUGHT, PRES THEN RETURNED TO SUBJECT OF MISSILES TARGETTED ON PAKISTAN, WHICH HAD BEEN MENTIONED IN CRITCHFIELD'S PRESENTATION. HE COMMENTED THAT PRESENCE OF AMERICAN MILITARY UNITS, SUCH AS AT PESHAWAR, IS CAUSE OF SOVIET MISSILE DEPLOYMENT AGAINST PAKISTAN. CRITCHFIELD PRESENTED CONTRARY THESIS THAT SOVIET DEPLOYMENT OF MILITARY FORCE IN SOUTHERN USSR IS AN ELEMENT OF HISTORIC SOVIET POLICY, AND HAD EXISTED BEFORE EITHER GENTO OR SUCH FACILITIES AS

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority MND 959060  
By WSD NARA Date 2/28/11

SECRET

-4- 980, NOVEMBER 18, 1 P.M., (SECTION ONE OF TWO), FROM KARACHI

PESHAWAR EXISTED. MISSILES ARE MERELY A MODERNIZED VERSION OF SUCH FORCES, HE SAID. AYUB DID NOT COMMENT ON THIS THESIS.

MCCONAUGHY

RDC

SECRET

DECLASSIFIED  
 Authority *MND 959000*  
 By *WSD* NARA Date *2/28/11*

COMING TELEGRAM *Department of State*

*RH/R*

SECRET

Control 14408  
 Rec'd: NOVEMBER 18, 1964  
 5:28 A.M.

FROM: KARACHI

ACTION: SECSTATE 980

DATE: NOVEMBER 18, 1 P.M. (SECTION TWO OF TWO)

LIMITS

8. PRES SAID THAT SHAH OF IRAN, BECAUSE OF "HIS AGREEMENT WITH SOVIETS TO HAVE NO MILITARY BASES IN IRAN," DOES NOT HAVE PROBLEM COMPARABLE TO PAKISTAN'S RELATED TO AMERICAN MILITARY UNIT AT PESHAWAR. CRITCHFIELD TOOK EXCEPTION TO THIS STATEMENT. HE SAID THAT SHAH IN RECENT MEETING WITH HIM HAD ACKNOWLEDGED THAT HE IS MAKING EFFORT TO REDUCE TENSIONS WITH SOVIETS. BUT HE AT SAME TIME HAD BEEN MOST EXPLICIT IN DRAWING A LINE BETWEEN THESE EFFORTS AND HIS MUTUAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, SUCH AS COOPERATION WITH USG IN STRICOM AND OTHER IMPORTANT ACTIVITIES OF TECHNICAL NATURE. THESE HE HAD SAID ARE AN INTEGRAL ELEMENT OF HIS MILITARY ARRANGEMENTS AND ARE NOT NEGOTIABLE. CRITCHFIELD ALSO POINTED OUT THAT SHAH HAD MADE QUITE CLEAR HIS RECOGNITION OF NEED TO MAKE TECHNICAL CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTELLIGENCE ON THE PROXIMATE AREA OF SOUTHERN USSR, WHICH IS SOVIET'S AREA FOR WEAPONS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. PRES QUITE ABRUPTLY AND EMPHATICALLY NOTED THAT PAKISTAN IS MAKING ITS CONTRIBUTION TOO.

9. PRES THEN SAID THAT PAKISTAN, UNLIKE IRAN, IS FACED WITH THREE ENEMIES. THE FIRST TWO OF THESE, CHINA AND USSR, ARE ENEMIES OF IRAN AS WELL AS PAKISTAN, BUT THEY ARE "GLOBAL PROBLEMS," HE SAID, AS THOUGH TO IMPLY THAT BOTH SHAH AND HE ARE PROTECTED AGAINST THEM BY CONCERT OF OUTSIDE MILITARY HELP. IN CONTRADISTINCTION, HE SAID, PAKISTAN'S ADDITIONAL ENEMY, INDIA, IS A "REGIONAL PROBLEM" WHICH PAKISTAN MUST FACE WITH HIS OWN UNAIDED RESOURCES. CRITCHFIELD COUNTERED THAT IRAN WOULD NOT NECESSARILY AGREE WITH THIS; INDEED, SHAH WAS QUITE CONCERNED ABOUT THE LONG RANGE IMPLICATIONS OF GROWING SOVIET

SECRET

REPRODUCTION FROM THIS COPY IS  
 PROHIBITED UNLESS "UNCLASSIFIED"

DECLASSIFIED  
Authority *MM0959060*  
By *WSD* NARA Date *3/28/91*

SECRET

-2- 980, NOVEMBER 18, 1 P.M., (SECTION TWO OF TWO), FROM KARACHI

PRESENCE IN ARAB NEAR EAST AND SOVIET PENETRATION OF ARAB INSTITUTIONS AND GOVERNMENTS. SHAH HOWEVER DOES NOT ARGUE THAT HE IS FACED WITH IMMEDIATE MILITARY THREAT FROM ARAB NEAR EAST, CRITCHFIELD SAID, AND ADDED THAT WE ARE IN AGREEMENT WITH HIM ON THIS POINT.

10. PRES AYUB SPOKE OF HISTORICAL EFFORTS OF RUSSIANS TO OBTAIN ACCESS TO THE SEAS; HE EXPRESSED VIEW IT IS WRONG TO SPEAK OF CURRENT SOVIET AIMS AS BEING CONCENTRATED ON IRAN. MORE LIKELY TARGET IS THE APPROACH THROUGH PERSIA TO THE ENTIRE INDIAN OCEAN AND ARAB SEA LITTORAL, WHICH HE DESCRIBED AS THE "SOFT UNDERBELLY," USE OF WHICH USSR WANTS TO DENY TO US.

11. STILL EVINCING INTEREST IN SOVIET PENETRATION TO MIDDLE EAST, PRES NOTED THAT US POLICY HAS AFFORDED SOVIETS OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE AHEAD IN PARTS OF WORLD OUTSIDE OF NATO-WARSAW PACT AREA. HE EXPRESSED VIEW THAT SOVIETS WILL CONTINUE TO REPRESENT GREATER DANGER THAN CHINESE BECAUSE SOVIETS HAVE FACILITIES AND AN "APPARATUS." THE CHINESE, IN CONTRAST, ARE DEFENSIVE; THEIR AGGRESSIVE STATEMENTS CAN BE ATTRIBUTED TO THIS ATTITUDE, HE SAID. THEY ARE "TALKING LIKE RUSSIANS DID FIFTEEN YEARS AGO AND ARE EVEN USING THE SAME WORDS."

12. AT CONCLUSION OF MEETING PRES WARMLY EXPRESSED HIS APPRECIATION FOR THE CRITCHFIELD'S PRESENTATION AND ASKED THAT HIS PERSONAL BEST WISHES BE CONVEYED TO MR. JOHN MCCONE.

GP-1.

MCCONAUGHY

RDC.