1 22 February 2001 - Certified 2 Vancouver, B.C.

(PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 10:01 A.M.)

THE REGISTRAR: In the Supreme Court of British Columbia in Vancouver at this -- on this, the 22nd day of February 2001, in the matter of the United Mexican States versus Metalclad Corporation, My Lord.

11 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Foy. Please continue.12 MR. FOY: Thank you, My Lord.

I was in the chronology in April of 1995. And I'm going to ask you to start with tab 60 of the selected extracts.

Just to remind Your Lordship and put it in context, at this time there was a federal closure order that was put in place in 1991. Secondly, there's a federal prohibition on the introduction of new waste put in place in August of 1994. There's an audit of the prior contamination, an audit that is ongoing, in order to determine the extent of the problem and the means to remediate it.

In the meantime Metalclad, representing to federal officials that it needs to construct works for remediation and for the audit -- and if you see the -- if you go back to the description of those works, they're at tab 43, you'll see they basically describe the -- the landfill -- representing to federal officials that they need to construct those works for the purpose of remediation, and those federal officials in -- twice in -- at tab 47 and tab 49 reminding Metalclad of the need for a municipal construction permit. And having applied for a municipal construction permit, but that permit not -- that application not yet having been dealt with, Metalclad goes ahead and does that construction.

Now, at tab 60 there are described meetings that occurred in furtherance of the audit, meetings started in April, technical meetings, including representatives of the State, representatives of the municipality, university

- 45 46 47 experts, and environmental groups acting as advisors to the municipality on technical issues, not surprising given the lack of infrastructure in

this municipality, and including a reference to Metalclad, and that -- and asking Metalclad to provide certain information in respect of the audit. And that's described in the -- in tab 60.

Over the -- tab 61 reports the results of the audit to the public in August of 1995, and I'd ask you to -- to look at that.

We've looked at page 2 of that already, which was a description of what -- how the contamination came to -- to be there.

Over the page on page 3 at the top it's noted under the heading "Exposivity" that:
[All quotations herein cited as read]

"In two of the three containers..."

These are the containers of the contaminated waste.

"...levels of exposivity of up to 100 percent were found in the monitoring of the covered pits. Due to the risk this represents, any activity carried out in them should be done with maximum security measures."

This was due to the presence of volatile organic compounds. You'll recall that the -- there was dumped both inorganic and organic compounds mixed in those -- in those containers, and that's referred to down the page.

Over the page, they examine the -- the soil. And in the fourth line at the top of page 4 it's noted that:

"It became evident that the soil is contaminated from the inadequate handling of hazardous wastes in the storage area of the transfer station."

Gasses emitting and other effects on the healths (sic) of -- of workers are investigated. And it is noted in the penultimate paragraph:

45	"Because of the above, one cannot put off
46	the need to carry out the treatment of the
47	site through a series of programs related

to the workers' protection and the prevention of possible effects on the environment: monitoring, safety, cleaning and control of the drums existing in the restricted area."

They go on to note -- that describes the existing contamination. And they go on to deal with the proposed new storage site, the proposed commercial operations. And they note at page 5, in the third paragraph on that page, the fact that in August COTERIN obtained one of its federal permits subject to certain conditions, and noted that in September Metalclad acquired most of the capital of COTERIN, describing that as follows: With that, Metalclad acquired an environmental liability, in other words, the liability brought with the contamination caused by the transfer station and its treatment, as well as an asset. which was the authorization to set up a new disposal centre. The exercise of the rights coming from that authorization are subject to compliance with various conditions.

And the federal authorities conclude from their perspective that -- and this is over the page at the top of page 6:

"If proper..." operational
"...construction and operational
precautions are taken, the physical
characteristics of the site are adequate
for the construction of a controlled
hazardous waste deposit site."

The -- in their -- in the -- from the federal perspective, the -- the characteristics of the physical site would be appropriate for that use. They go on to note that that requires careful monitoring and also that they -- the -- to recognize that the municipality will have to be involved. And they do that at pages 8 and 9 in the third paragraph from the bottom, the second sentence:

45	"The monitoring systems will make it
46	possible in the future for the company,
47	authorities and representatives of the

population of Guadalcazar to be able to verify at all times that the subsoil is not being contaminated."

They go on to talk about participation of the community in this. And they note the limits of their jurisdiction. They say:

"Ever since we started this, PROFEPA made known to the municipal authorities its intent in promoting a mechanism to allow the population of Guadalcazar to participate in the monitoring of the facilities. Given that it is not in the competence of the federal authorities to determine the way in which the local community should be organized for this...for this end, PROFEPA is hoping that at the local level that form of organization will be determined."

So the federal authorities want remediation. They are of the view that the site could be used for hazardous waste landfill, and they hope that the municipality will organize itself in a way to -- to participate in that.

In the chrono -- in the chronology at this time and under the next tab is a draft NAFTA complaint. At this stage Metalclad is already considering bringing a claim under the NAFTA. This is a draft that was not proceeded with. But I just take you to one paragraph of that at page 15. This was provided to Mexico and was -- was in Mexico's files.

At that time the gravamen of the complaint is set out in paragraph 15 as follows -- and -- and you'll note that this complaint names personally Pedro Medellin, the State official responsible for environmental matters and states in paragraph 30 at page 15 that:

"The gravamen of this complaint is the sinister, confiscatory, discriminatory, fraudulent and conspiratorial activities of

45	Medellin in his capacity as an official of
46	the State of SLP."
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That's paragraph 30 at page 15. Now, in November of 1995 and again in furtherance of the federal authorities' desire to obtain remediation, and the federal authorities' determination that from their perspective this site could be used for hazardous -- for a hazardous waste landfill, in the exercise of their regulatory powers INE and PROFEPA, the Attorney General's office, determined to lift the closure

order, the federal closure order that had been

placed on conditions which are set out in what is called the Convenio of November 24, 1995.

The federal objective is to achieve what it saw as the results of the audit, to achieve remediation and was prepared to allow COTERIN five

years of commercial operations to treat and dispose of the existing contamination.

You'll note that the State and the municipality are not involved in this Convenio.

And in the next tab the federal authorities make the announcement of the Convenio, and note that the federal -- sorry, that the State and municipal authorities are not involved.

And at tab 64 in the public announcement with respect to this Convenio it is stated:

"Finally, it is important to clarify that the federal authorities..."

This is the last paragraph on -- I'm sorry, the last paragraph under page 2272, tab 64.

"...it is important to clarify that the federal authorities are a necessary requirement but not a sufficient one for the hazardous waste landfill operation. The company shall comply with the State legislation in this matter whose interpretation and application is exclusively within the local authority's jurisdiction."

Recalling that the municipal permit requirements are contained in State legislation

- 45 46 47 and are subject to the application and interpretation by the local municipality.

 So at the time of the announcement of the

Convenio the federal authorities make it clear that they are from their perspective satisfied with this form of proceeding, but they are not -- their authorization is not sufficient.

Now, as I mentioned, neither the State nor the municipality were involved at this stage. And under the next tab you have the State response.

The State response of November 26th, the next day, is that the State authorities know nothing about the terms of the signed agreement. They note that there was a -- the State land use permit had been issue -- issued in 1993, but go on to say:

"On the other hand, the power to issue the construction licence is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the municipal authority, and this licence has been denied to date by the Guadalcazar municipal council."

 Note that in their view the coordination between State and municipalities and the federation is required. Now, this is no different really than the statement made by the federal authorities; each is a -- necessary, but none is sufficient authorization for this facility.

And in the fourth paragraph there, note -noting that -- what you've heard before in other documents, that it is strictly necessary to respect -- to re -- fully respect the will of the people and of the authority of the free municipality of Guadalcazar.

Now, there -- there are -- the -- there is no direct municipal response at this time. There is a legal response that I will take you to in a moment.

But in the chronology, the next document records the municipal consideration of the earlier permit application, construction permit application, that had been made by Metalclad in November of 1994. And I'd like to point out some aspects of this -- of this -- this document, which again is the -- the public minutes -- public

record, rather, of a public meeting taking place in the municipal council on December the 5th. It notes the -- who's present and the -- of

the municipal councillors and the order of the day being, number 3:

"Resolution regarding the application for the construction licence dated November 15, 1994 presented before the town hall by Ariel Miranda, COTERIN, related to the site denominated as La Pedrera."

The -- over the next page, the municipality reviews its records, its public records, and notes that in 1991 the -- an application by the same applicant, COTERIN, had been made and denied in October of 1991. And that document you've been taken to; it's at tab 12.

They note as well the new administration's confirmation of that denial. And that document was dated January 20, 1992, and that's at tab 14.

And I remind Your Lordship that those matters were admitted by Metalclad to be matters of corporate record of COTERIN. And that's at tab 13, that document.

So that earlier history is noted.

And then these four reasons are given for the denial of the permit application: The first reason is that it's been applied for by the same applicant and denied once already. The -- and that's noted under number 1 at the bottom of page 613.

Secondly, the municipal council, on the top of the next page, notes that construction has already occurred in advance of the application for a permit.

In the third note, the -- and the application for the -- on its face is purported to be for new construction, not for work that's already been done.

Focusing on this, it -- they -- the third reason that is given is that it appears to the municipal council that this construction -- that this application is contradictory, and again it's a repetition of -- on another basis, a substantive basis, the fact that the construction has already occurred.

And the fourth point that is noted is that it appears that this construction may have been done under the aegis of the State land use permit. And

in the municipal council's reading of the State land use permit, any violation of that permit results in a nullity or voiding of that permit.

And you'll recall when we went to the State land use permit, which was at tab 19, that it expressly did not authorize construction. And it goes on -- the -- the State land use permit goes on to say that non-compliance with any points in the -- in the State land use permit invalidates it. So the municipal council is of the view that having constructed under the aegis of the State land use permit, you have invalidated the State land use permit on its own terms.

Then over the page another reason is given, the fifth reason is given, and that is that there is present in this public meeting in the town council a great number of residents of the municipality who continue to be opposed to the granting of a construction licence in these circumstances.

And you'll recall the ELSI case in which the mayor of Palermo was acting in part in requis -- in requisitioning the -- the facilities there in response to local -- in -- as a representative in response to local concerns. And that -- there's an example of that happening here.

Now, under the -- on the same page it's resolved that the -- the permit application is -- first, will be denied and, secondly, that COTERIN will be notified of this. And I want to emphasize the notification to COTERIN, because it becomes relevant in terms of the due process that was accorded to COTERIN in this respect. The tribunal in this case was critical of the municipality for not giving COTERIN an opportunity to be heard before this was done.

Well, in fact, in -- again, in -- in -- notice was given and, you will see in a minute, legal steps were taken where COTERIN was given a full opportunity, both back before the municipal council and then in the courts, to argue its case.

And I'd also ask you to look at -- when you're looking at this document, to recall the

45 aspects of ELSI that talked about when identifying 46 whether something was arbitrary at international 47 law, to look at the legal system as a whole and

 the legal context and ask whether or not this document and the considerations in it reflect legal consideration or a legal framework for the consideration of this permit application, and I'd suggest it clearly does.

The municipality goes to its public records. It looks back and sees what was done by previous administrations with respect to this same applicant. It notes certain facts with respect that have -- that are not disputed. The fact is construction had occurred in -- and in fact, as you'll recall, that was done by Metalclad voluntarily ignoring the advice of its lawyers. We would prefer to ignore the problem rather than raise it to the level of attention.

The municipality takes a legal view of a provision of the State land use permit. And it takes it -- its view of the concerns of the local inhabitants. It then notifies COTERIN in a -- in a formal way of its decision.

And the next tab describes to you -- this is a memorandum of -- by one of Metalclad's lawyers which describes legal proceedings taken by COTERIN which were not mentioned by the tribunal with respect to the denial of the municipal permit. And it also refers to some other legal proceedings, and I'll just quickly take you through it.

The first set of proceedings that are noted by the lawyer are the recourse of reconsideration filed with the municipality against the denial of the said municipality to grant the municipal licence to construct the landfill.

So having received notice of the denial on February the 28th, 1996, a petition was filed with the municipality offering proofs and requesting the issuance of a resolution, a reconsideration. The municipality issued a resolution on April 23, 1996 and gave notice on April 29, 1996 denying the reconsideration.

We have prepared -- and they ratified the denial of granting the construction permit.

"We, the lawyers, have prepared and filed

45	a writ of Amparo against the resolution
46	issued by the municipality."
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And you'll recall from the option agreement that the writ of Amparo was the very remedy predicted and transparent and available and identified by this investor when acquiring this investment.

The Amparo is now established in the fourth federal district court of SLP, and it's referred to as the dates of what hearing -- of when the hearing will occur.

And it's noted above -- or over the next page:

"In this Amparo we'll also try that, in the event SLP denies the Amparo, recourse or revision be handled by the Federal Supreme Court in Mexico City, although we cannot assure that such will be the case because of the nature of the responsible authority."

If you go back to -- just briefly, what happened to this application in the courts is that it was initially denied on the -- by reason of the failure to exhaust more appropriate -- more administrative remedies that were available. That denial was appealed. And then that appeal was abandoned voluntarily in favour of negotiations with the community.

Now, the -- tab 51 of the brief records what happened to the -- the legal steps as to what happened with the -- that particular Amparo action. The recording of the withdrawal of the appeal was admitted and is at tab 69, one -- one more tab over.

In paragraph 630 of Mexico's brief it was noted:

"On October 31, 1996 COTERIN filed a motion before the Supreme Court withdrawing from the appeal regarding the district judge's decision to reject the Amparo that it filed challenging the municipality's denial of the construction permit."

 And then over the next page is Metalclad's admission to paragraph 630 where it's noted:

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"...admitted claimant notes that it withdrew its Amparo actions as a demonstration of good faith in the negotiations undertaken with the State and municipality."

Those legal proceedings, their initiation, their abandonment in favour of negotiations, are not mentioned by the tribunal anywhere in its award.

Now, this memorandum back at tab 67 describes other legal proceedings that ensued at this time.

The next set of legal proceedings that was discussed but did not ensue are noted at page 2. It was suggested by Metalclad's lawyers that they ask the federal SEMARNAP department to file a lawsuit called a constitutional controversy in which one authority, one level of authority, the federal authority, challenges the level of the other authority, in this case the local authority, the municipality, on the -- and it was suggested that they, the federal authority, challenge on the basis that the municipality was invading the jurisdiction of the federal authority.

Now, the federal authority declined to initiate that constitutional challenge, and that's noted here.

A third set of legal proceedings under Roman numeral 2 there refers to another Amparo lawsuit filed by COTERIN. And this lawsuit was filed against the acts of the -- the State and State officials. I don't need to go into the de -- details of that. It too was later -- was unsuccessful and dismissed, I think in January of 1997.

Then we have, under Roman numeral 3, the Amparo filed by the municipality against the -- against SEMARNAP. And in connection with that, that -- in -- in that Amparo, what the municipality was seeking to achieve was its view that the Convenio violated the August 1994 federal resolution prohibiting the introduction of new hazardous waste into this area before remediation. That was the basis of the

- 45 46 47 municipality's Amparo action that -- described
- there.

 I think you've already been advised in the

course of the -- taking you through the award that the municipality was unsuccessful in that application. An injunction that it obtained temporarily in the course of that was later set aside, and that that lawsuit was, for jurisdictional reasons, unsuccessful.

So four sets of different legal proceedings surrounded the -- or, rather, followed the events of November of 1995, and they are described there. The tribunal refers only to one. They refer only to the municipality's Amparo. And they criticize the municipality and infer -- for taking that step, and infer that the municipality lacked confidence in its jurisdiction for some reason. The -- none of the other legal proceedings are referred to.

I can skip tab 68 and I can skip tab 70 and take you to tab 71. And there, having filed a notice of intent as required under the NAFTA on October 2, 1996, having done that, Metalclad filed its notice of claim in January of 1997. So as of that date, and in fact before some of these domestic legal proceedings had been finally resolved, Metalclad is commencing this arbitration and seeking the appointment of a Chapter 11 tribunal to consider the alleged violations that it includes in its notice of claim.

At this time, as I just mentioned to you, there were -- COTERIN admitted that they were in negotiations with the municipality, that they had withdrawn their legal actions in good faith in order to negotiate with the municipality. Negotiations were ongoing.

And the next tab, tab 72, records an agreement of understanding, which is also referred to from time to time as the Acuerdo in which the municipality made it clear that it was prepared to allow operation of the landfill as a deposit for non-hazardous industrial waste. That appears in clause 1.3.

This preparedness did not result in an agreement. This -- this document was not to be considered a binding contract. It was intended to be a guide for future discussions on the

- remediation and operation of a non-hazardous waste landfill. And that appears over the next page in clause 3.1.
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And as Your Lordship is aware, Metalclad was not prepared to operate solely as a -- a -- as a non-hazardous industrial waste landfill and remediate, and by this time of course had, instead of continuing to -- had launched this NAFTA claim instead.

Now, some eleven months after filing the notice of intention to bring this claim, and some eight or nine months after the filing of the claim, the Ecological Decree is promulgated by the State. And that's under the next tab of September 30, 1997.

I'm going to be coming back to the Ecological Decree, but I'll just note at the second-last page of that that it -- it states on its face, page 606 in the fourth article:

"Those permits, licences or authorizations granted before the date of this order come into use [sic] will be legal."

It has no impact upon existing authorizations. It also gives a 90-day grace period for irregular ones to become regularized.

By this time the -- Metalclad has abandoned any attempts to either regularize its permitting situation with respect to the landfill, it has abandoned the landfill -- and, as the tribunal points out in my reading of its reasons, this was never implemented in respect of the landfill. The landfill -- Metalclad had by January of 1997, once before this, alleged that its landfill had already been expropriated.

And under the next tab is a letter that was -- questions were asked about the effect of this if it were implemented. And answers were given at tab 74 which indicate that the decree in its -- at the bottom of that page, that:

"The decree in itself does not constitute any impediment for the municipality which is able to issue the necessary construction and operating licences for the operation of a dangerous residue landfill within a zone

45 46 47 protected by the ecological reserve."

Now, there's no finding but -- like many

other things, by the tribunal there -- there's no finding with respect to the actual effect of the decree upon this landfill because, as I read their reasons, it had not been implemented and it was not necessary for them to do so.

But I'm going to be saying more about that when I deal with the -- with the -- with the point that I touched upon yesterday when Mr. Cowper and I were -- were up, and that's the question of the tribunal's jurisdiction to consider the decree, the question of whether or not it was an ancillary claim within the meaning of the rules governing this arbitration and, if so, what would the consequences of that. And I -- I'll be coming back to that later in my submissions.

Now, what I've done by taking you through the documents themselves is I -- is that I have covered most but not quite all of Chapter 11 of the outline. And I just note that those paragraphs of Chapter 11 that I haven't touched upon expressly, I con -- in my recitation of the documents themselves, I continue to adopt and commend to Your Lordship.

I'd ask you though to turn briefly to a portion that I haven't dealt with, and that's at page 121 at paragraphs 408 and following, issues with respect to Mexican domestic law.

Now, Your Lordship is aware that in -Mexico's position was that it was no part of this
tribunal's jurisdiction to interpret or decide
issues of Mexican domestic law as if a Mexican
appellate court. And these submissions are made
in the alternative to that and really simply to
point out that in the determinations that this
tribunal did engage in, they again failed to have
regard to significant and relevant matters.

Those are set out at paragraphs 408 and following, and I'll summarize them simply as follows: First, the tribunal referred to -- made this finding at the top of page 122, holding:

"...that the exclusive authority for siting and permitting a hazardous waste landfill resides with the Mexican federal

45 46 47 government."

The -- I have mentioned to you countless

federal documents -- November 1994, the -- the announcement of the Convenio -- just this morning, and many others that indicate that the federal authorities themselves did not take that position, that they were a necessary but not a sufficient authority or authorization for the siting of a hazardous waste landfill.

This tribunal says that:

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"This finding is consistent with the testimony of the Secretary of SEMARNAP and, as stated above, is consistent with the express language of the..."

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19 20 Federal law.

Now, what the tribunal failed there to refer to was the evidence of the secretary of SEMARNAP

who testified:

"Any project in our country requires municipal, State and federal approval."

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The tribunal failed to have regard to the constitutional principles affecting the jurisdiction of municipalities. It made no reference to the text of municipal laws, the applicable municipal laws. And I took Your Lordship to those laws, saying that these permits were required where there was a, quote, significant impact on the environment. And I took you to that language in the -- in COTERIN's own permit application in which they referred to that language and said, as a means of justifying their application, that this project has a significant impact on the environment.

We took you to the permitting history of the site. And again, the tribunal makes no reference to the permitting history of this particular site and the assertion of jurisdiction by the try -- by the municipality of the consideration of environmental considerations.

Your Lordship will recall from the terms of the original denial, from the terms of the subsequent denial, that the municipality itself

- 45 46 47 considered it was entitled to take into account the risks generated by the project and the views of the local inhabitants with respect to those

risks.

There's also no reference to the rele -- relative expertise of the -- of the expert testimony with respect to Mexican domestic law.

The -- Metalclad filed a report prepared by a 1994 graduate of the University of Arizona who was an LL.M. candidate at a university in Monterey, Mexico.

Mexico filed two reports, one from two former justices and a scholar, and a third from the university, the institute of legal research at the federal university.

Although the president of the tribunal indicated to the parties during the course of the hearing that they would be requested to address the expertise of the relative -- of the -- the relative expertise of the experts that -- of the reports that were received, the tribunal itself never addresses that issue.

They also -- as I've mentioned a number of -- of times, and this really ties back to the -- to the earlier submissions, also never failed to ask themselves the correct question, and that was: Well, was there a mechanism open to foreign investors to resolve any issues as to the extent of the municipality's jurisdiction?

Now, I'd like to, before handing the podium over to my colleague, Mr. Thomas, just briefly note the following: In the -- in the short time since yesterday afternoon I have, primarily by reference to Metalclad's own documents, shown you a very different version of the events than you can glean from reading the award.

If we were under the -- if we are under the Commercial Arbitration Act and the reasonableness simpliciter standard applies to questions of law, I will argue that the tribunal acted upon a view of the facts that could not reasonably be entertained. And I take that language from your summary of the -- that issue as a question of law in one of the -- in the Beazer case. And I would say that the tribunal, on all of the points that I've set out in the written outline, acted upon a view of the facts that could not reasonably be

- enter -- entertained.
- If we are under the International Commercial Arbitration Act and we are applying the patently
- 45 46 47

unreasonable standard, I would say that the result -- the result that the tribunal expressed as the -- Mexico did not have a transparent and predictable framework for foreign investors, that that result was patently unreasonable. Mexico did provide a transparent and predictable framework. It provided the means for an investor to identify the applicable laws and order its affairs. It applied -- it -- it provided for the means to obtain legal advice and to identify the legal steps necessary to resolve issues of Mexican domestic law.

And I've shown you the documents where this investor in taking up this very investment in the amendment agreement ordered its affairs against the prospect that the municipality might deny the permit, and referred in that document to having taken legal advice, to which you've been referred, referred in that document to the legal means necessary to resolve any legal issues, the writ of Amparo, which steps it instituted and then later abandoned voluntarily in favour of negotiations with the municipality.

All of this the tribunal did not refer to by reason of its imposing a duty on the central government to remove all legal doubt and uncertainty for the benefit of foreign investors. And I say that that in the result is patently unreasonable.

In my submission you don't see in these facts an established hazardous waste landfill fully permitted being taken away by a municipality. You see instead illegal construction in advance of permitting, prior contamination, and the municipality's refusal of a proposed investment rather than the taking of an investment, a refusal based upon reasonable grounds arising both from that prior contamination and the conduct of the applicant.

You see as well the municipality prepared to allow another use of this land, non-hazardous waste landfill. But most importantly you see, from the transparency perspective and this perspective, this investor at the time of

- 45 46 47 acquiring this investment being aware of this as a prospect.

 I would like now to turn over the podium to

rules.

my friend -- or my colleague Mr. Thomas. I will be coming back to the final portions of the brief at the end. MR. THOMAS: My Lord. 5 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Thomas. MR. THOMAS: I am now going to turn to a -- another distinctive feature of investor-State arbitration. We've made the point already that investor-State arbitration differs fundamentally from private international commercial arbitration. And the topic that I'm going to address now is a further example of where investor-State differs. And I'm going to be discussing the emphasis that is placed upon the tribunal's compliance with the governing arbitral

With respect to this part of our submission, Mexico will argue that, if the international act applies, then this Court has jurisdiction to review this set of errors by virtue of article -- or Section 34(2)(a) of the International Commercial Arbitration Act, which allows judicial intervention where the arbitral procedure was not in accordance with the agreement of the parties, and Section 34(2)(b), the award is in conflict with the public policy of British Columbia.

Now, if the application is governed by the Commercial Arbitration Act, then we say that under Section 30 there would be a loss of jurisdiction to the tribunal by virtue of its failure to deal with the questions that it was obliged to deal with. This could be characterized either as a loss of jurisdiction or a denial of natural justice. But in either event we say that it's arbitral error within Section 30 of that act.

Now, I'm going to begin this part of the presentation, My Lord, by discussing the ICSID annulment process with respect to a specific issue, which is the obligation or the duty which is imposed upon the tribunal to deal with every question submitted to it.

And if you turn to paragraph -- or to page 139 of the outline of the argument, it's after tab

- 13, you'll see that at paragraph 472 we've quoted Article 53 of the ICSID additional facility arbitration rules. And this was the applicable
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rule for this particular tribunal, and it states:

"The award shall be made in writing, shall deal with every question submitted to the Tribunal and shall state the reasons upon which it is based."

And we point out at paragraph 473 that Article 53 of the rules that governed our arbitration is derived from similar language in the ICSID Convention's Article 48(3) which states:

"The award shall deal with every question submitted to the Tribunal, and shall state the reasons upon which it is based."

Among the publications that ICSID issues is something called ICSID Review - Foreign Investment Law Journal. And at paragraph 474 of the outline we quote Professor Christoph Schreuer's comment on ICSID Article 48. So this comment, we say, applied to ICSID Article 48 is applicable to Article 53 of our additional facility rules.

And Professor Schreuer states:

"The requirement that the award must deal exhaustively with the dispute as submitted by the parties is one of the general principles underlying arbitration. A tribunal may not hand down a partial award leaving questions submitted to it undecided. This principle is mandated by the parties' will underlying the arbitration, as well as by requirements of procedural economy. An award that is not comprehensive and exhaustive of the parties' questions is the obverse of an excess of powers committed through a decision on questions that have not been submitted to the tribunal."

In his article, which is included in the materials, Professor Schreuer summarizes some of

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- the criteria that had been developed by ICSID annulment committees when reviewing arbitral tribunal decisions under the convention.

And we quote a paragraph at -- at paragraph 477, where he says:

"The reasons need not deal with all arguments that the parties presented to the tribunal. The reasons are complete if they address all arguments of the parties that were accepted as necessary or relevant for the decision. They must also address all arguments made by the parties that were rejected and which, had they been accepted, would have changed the decision's outcome."

Now, another commentator on the convention is in fact the former -- really the man who is credited with the drafting of the convention and the former general counsel of the World Bank, Dr. Aron Broches. And at paragraphs 478 and 479 we cite two of his articles where he discusses the annulment process. And I direct you to the first quote where Dr. Broches says about the requirement to address every question raised by the party:

"Moreover, the explicit requirement to deal with such questions constitutes a fundamental procedural protection of the parties against arbitrary decisions. Failure of a tribunal to observe it is a serious departure from that fundamental rule of procedure which is a ground for annulment under Article 52..."

And then in the -- in paragraph 479 we quote Dr. Broches where -- where he responds to a suggestion by Professor Michael Reisman of Yale University that a tribunal may decline to answer questions that are submitted to it. And he calls that contention formalistic and incorrect. He says:

"The formalistic approach leads to the absurd result that a tribunal may pick and choose among the questions submitted to it by a party and deal only with those on

which it will base a reasoned award, acting as if the other questions had not been raised."

Now, in Mexico's submission that is precisely what happened in this particular arbitration. The tribunal dealt only with the questions on which it sought to base the award, acting as if the other questions had not been raised.

And I do want to emphasize that at the international level this is viewed -- this requirement to deal with every question in the award is viewed as a procedural protection.

There is law in Canada with respect to private international commercial arbitrations that say that the award -- the -- the reasons in the award are not part of the arbitral process.

We referred you to a case, and I'll come to it in some time, and Metalclad relies upon this case as well. It's called Food Services. And I'm going to distinguish that case and show that it does not bear upon the questions that confront the Court in this particular application. But at the international level it's very clear in investor-State, as understood by the ICSID, that this is a procedural protection; it's part and parcel of the arbitral process.

And I would add that Mexico entered into this arbitration with the expectation that the arbitration would be conducted in accordance with the agreement of the parties. It filed lengthy written pleadings. It filed many contemporaneous documents, many of which were of Metalclad's own making, to inform the tribunal of the factual and the legal issues which this claim gave rise to.

And you will note, as I take you to some of these ICSID cases, you cannot help but be struck by the much more thorough treatment of the evidence and the legal submissions by these other ad hoc tribunals under the ICSID when compared to the work of this tribunal. Mexico expected that this tribunal would discharge its obligation in the same way.

Now, a number of essential questions were raised by Mexico in the -- in this particular arbitration, and the -- the first issue of course is what is a question. And I'm going to take you

- 45 46 47 to some of these cases to illustrate how this issue has been approached at the international level.

The first case is a case called Klockner. Mr. Foy has referred to it. It's at tab 31 of the materials, Volume 1. Oh, I'm sorry. Is it Volume 2? 5 MR. FOY: Yes. MR. THOMAS: I'm sorry, Volume 2. I should note that there are four annulment decisions. Three of them have been published. The fourth is unpublished to our knowledge. We're also instructed by ICSID that there are two more annulment proceedings that are underway at present, but there's been nothing published with respect to those. Now, Klockner -- I just want to reiterate. We did make the point a couple of days ago, My Lord. But the ICSID convention permits one of those tribunals to apply the domestic law of the host State. And so when we're looking at this case, we're looking at it not for its treatment of the law, we're looking for its analysis of

Klockner was a -- a claim brought by a company that was -- that built a fertilizer factory in Cameroon that turned out to have performance problems. And a commercial dispute between the government of Cameroon and Klockner arose. Klockner commenced an arbitration. And in the event its claim was dismissed. The claim presented to the arbitral tribunal was essentially a breach of contract claim.

questions. What were the questions which were put

Now, when Klockner lost the arbitration, it commenced an annulment procedure. And it alleged numerous grounds of annulment under the -- Article 52 of the Convention.

We're not going to be going through the various grounds; we're just going to be looking at this issue of the question.

And if you'd turn to paragraph 131 of the annulment committee decision, it's under the heading "Failure to Deal with Questions Submitted to the Tribunal," it says in the -- in the -- the second paragraph at the very bottom of the page:

to the tribunal?

45	"According to a general principle embodied
46	in Article 48(3), the award must deal with
47	every question submitted to the tribunal.

Given the relative ambiguity of the term 'questions,' it should first be noted that these may be formulated separately at the end of an application or a memorial or constitute part of an argument. It may therefore be that certain questions submitted to the tribunal are presented formally in the main text of the parties' documents rather than, for example, in the form of final conclusions or submissions."

And if you go to paragraph 132 over the page, it talks about Klockner's approach to it. And it says in the second paragraph after it -- in its application, it says:

 "This approach is misleading. In order to judge the admissibility and then the validity of the complaints, it need only be determined whether these essential arguments constituted or involved questions submitted to the tribunal and whether the tribunal dealt with them in the award, regardless of whether it undertook any study of them."

 Now, in this case the complaints that Klockner made -- again, they're with respect to national law -- one complaint was that it had been found to have an obligation of result when it constructed this -- this facility. And it argued that it didn't have an obligation of result. The tribunal failed to deal with that issue. The annulment committee said that that complaint was borne out.

It argued that it -- the tribunal had failed to examine the conditions under Cameroon's law for wrongful inducement to contract. That was rejected.

It argued that the tribunal had taken no account of its pleas regarding contractual limitations of warranties and liability. That was accepted.

It argued that the tribunal had taken no

- account of Cameroon's acknowledgment of its debt and its arguments regarding that. That was accepted.
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And it argued that there had been no -- the issue that it had advanced with respect to the rules of French law limiting a -- a supplier's liability for hidden defects and time-barred claims was also established by the annulment committee that that had not been addressed in the award by the tribunal.

Now, in examining the complaints that were made by Klockner, the tribunal looked back at the pleadings of the parties.

And I know that from the material that we've received so far it's been suggested that this is a very narrow scope of review and that you shouldn't be looking beyond the award.

Well, in this type of exercise the annulment committee accepted that it was appropriate to look at the pleadings of the parties, because as an international proceeding it's done in writing primarily.

And of course it makes sense. How can you determine whether or not the tribunal has failed to deal with questions which have been submitted to it if you're confined to the award?

So if you take a look at -- at paragraph 149 for example, My Lord, just as an illustration, it just talks about this complaint, and it says:

"It must be noted that the award says nothing on this essential question and contains no reason on this topic or, more precisely, no expressed reason."

And then it goes through. And at the bottom of the page it says that:

"The tribunal could have referred to or adopted the respondent's arguments in its counter-memorial, or it could have used reasoning analogous to that which it employed at page 136 of the award to reject the counterclaim."

So it's looking at the pleadings.

41 42

43 44

- "Be that...be that as it may, it's not
 for..." this committee "...for the
 committee to imagine what might or should

have been the arbitrator's reasons any more
that it should substitute correct reasons
for possibly incorrect reasons, or deal ex
post facto with questions submitted to the
tribunal which the award left unanswered."

So that was the approach.

Yeah. That's paragraph 151 (sic), bottom of the page, My Lord, the last paragraph on the page.

And then over the page, top of page 152, the -- the second paragraph to conclude on this point:

"The ad hoc committee can only note that the complaint is not only admissible but well-founded given the failure to state reasons and to deal with the claimant's pleas concerning the application of contractual clauses limiting liability."

That's just an example of the approach that the -- that the annulment committee took to the examination of the question and the review of the award in light of the pleadings.

And this award was annulled completely on a variety of different grounds.

I'm concerned only with the analysis that this tribunal -- that the annulment committee employed in terms of determining whether or not questions had been addressed by the tribunal.

Now, I note again from the first section of Metalclad's pleadings that they've noted that the arbitrators in this case were very eminent. We don't disagree.

But I want to point out that in Klockner the tribunal that was annulled included the former president of the International Court of Justice. It was presided over by Dr. Arechaga. You may recall I cited before the Southern Pacific Properties case; he was the presiding arbitrator in that. He presided over the Klockner arbitral tribunal. And he and two other very distinguished arbitrators were party to that award. One

dissented. But the fact of the matter is that
 Dr. Arechaga was annulled by this committee.
 In fact, I'm instructed by an expert in ICSID

arbitration -- Mr. -- Mr. Alvarez probably already knows this -- that this is called the Arechaga syndrome, where a -- a president who is a very, very well established and internationally recognized expert presided over -- presides over a new proceeding, doesn't understand the nuances or doesn't take account of the nuances and -- with the subsequent effect that his decision is annulled. And that's what happened in Klockner.

Now, in Amco another very eminent arbitral tribunal was annulled as well. And Amco was a case -- it's at tab 4 of the -- of the cases. It was a claim brought by a company against the government of Indonesia.

And this was a case where the foreign investor had entered into a joint venture with a company, an Indonesian company, which was controlled by the Indonesian army. Apparently this is quite common in Indonesia. And they developed a hotel complex. A commercial dispute arose between the parties. And there was a breakdown in the relationship between the joint venture parties. And eventually the military in Indonesia seized the hotel complex and occupied it. And this gave rise to this claim under the ICSID Convention.

Now, I would note parenthetically, I -- I don't think I have the original decision, but the original decision actually rejects the contention by Amco that this was an act of expropriation by the force -- the use of ar -- of military force to take control of the complex. It said that it did not constitute an expropriation at international law. But I say that just parenthetically, because Mr. Foy will be coming back to this issue in his arguments on the law.

But what you find again is the annulment committee being presented with questions about -- that are raised by -- by Indonesia in this annulment proceeding saying that there are issues that were not addressed by the arbitral tribunal.

And if you look at paragraph 30 of the annulment committee decision, it says:

45	"The ad hoc committee has before it an
46	Indonesian claim of nullity relating to an
47	alleged failure on the part of the tribunal

to answer all of the questions submitted to it in disregard of the requirement of Article 48(3) of the Convention."

And then it sets out the specific claim. It goes down to the bottom of the page, paragraph 32:

"The ad hoc committee believes that the obligation set out in Article 48(3) of the convention to deal with every question submitted to the tribunal and to state the reasons upon which the award is based confined its sanction in the annulment section of the convention."

And it then goes on to say at the bottom of that paragraph:

"Such an omission could however amount in particular situations to a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure and to a manifest excess of power."

And then on -- over the page at paragraph 37, after having gone through the issue in greater detail, it says:

"For the above reasons, the ad hoc committee affirms its jurisdiction to decide the claim of Indonesia that the tribunal seriously departed from a fundamental rule of procedure when it refused to consider other grounds for the revocation for PT Amco's investment licence."

So it had -- it establishes that it has jurisdiction to review the claim.

Now, in the event that claim was decided not to have been made out, the decision was annulled on other grounds. But again, it indicates an approach taken by the tribunal to this issue of

- 45 46 47 whether or not questions have been addressed by
- the tribunal.

 Now, there is a third case, and I'll only

direct you to two paragraphs of it before I get into the balance of the proceedings, and this is a case called the MINE case. It's called MINE v. Guinea, and it's at tab 38.

This is the most recent published annulment decision of the ICSID. And it's worth noting that Dr. Broches, the former general counsel of the World Bank whose passages I quoted to you before, presided over this annulment committee. And I'd just direct you to paragraphs 4.11 and 12, 4.11. They're at page 86.

And at paragraph 4.10 the committee says:

"An ad hoc committee retains a measure of discretion in ruling on applications for annulment. To be sure, its discretion is not unlimited and should not be exercised to the point of defeating the object and purpose of the remedy of annulment. It may however refuse to exercise its authority to annul an award where an annulment is clearly not required to remedy procedural injustice and annulment would unjustifiably erode the binding force and finality of ICSID awards.

"In the course of the proceedings MINE has advanced the argument that a series of annulments of ICSID awards might impair the effectiveness and integrity of ICSID as an international institution for settlement of disputes between States and foreign investors. The committee was accordingly urged to keep this consideration in mind in its examination of Guinea's application."

At 4.12:

"MINE's argument wrongly assumes that frequent annulments will necessarily be the result of overly strict tests applied by ad hoc committees. It overlooks the possibility that such frequent annulments may reflect neglect by arbitrators, parties

45	or counsel of requirements flowing from the
46	specificity of ICSID arbitration as defined
47	in the Convention and the arbitration

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         rules. A pure statistical approach for
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         which there is, in any event, no
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         significant basis at the present time is
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         wholly inappropriate as a measure of
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         ICSID's effectiveness."
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         Now, I direct you to that comment by the
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      committee because it might be argued that were the
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      Court to accede to the various submissions by the
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       United Mexican States in this proceeding, that
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       somehow its exercise of the corrective
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       jurisdiction of the Court would undermine the
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       effectiveness of Chapter 11. Well, the point
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       that's made by the annulment committee is that if
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       there is a form of review provided for, in that
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       case it's a form of review under the convention,
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       it's a form of review that can be exercised.
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          Now, I mentioned to --
19 THE COURT: You say --
20 MR. THOMAS: -- you, My Lord --
21 THE COURT: You say "it might be argued." As I read
       Mr. Cowper's first argument, he is arguing it.
22
23 MR. THOMAS: I -- okay. Well, I just -- on the basis
       of the International Commercial Arbitration Act I
24
25
       didn't see the argument in -- in -- I --
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          Let me put it this way, My Lord --
27 THE COURT: It is implicit.
28 MR. THOMAS: It's implicit. I don't see it explicit,
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       but I anticipate it.
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          My Lord, we referred you to a decision of the
       B.C. Supreme Court in Food Services. And I -- I
31
32
       note that that -- that is indeed cited by the
33
       respondent. And I just want to take a few minutes
34
       to talk about that case.
35 THE COURT: I wonder, would it be convenient to take
36
       the morning break now?
37 MR. THOMAS: That would be fine.
38 THE COURT: We'll take the recess.
39 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
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       adjourned for the morning recess.
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42
       (MORNING RECESS)
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       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 11:15 A.M.)
44
       (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 11:31 A.M.)
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46 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Thomas.47 MR. THOMAS: My Lord, before the break we were -- I

was just about to take you to the Food Services case. It's at tab 28 of the -- of the authorities.

Now, this was an application to enforce a -- an American arbitration association award pursuant to the International Commercial Arbitration Act. And the respondent sought to resist enforcement under the act. The Court rejected the respondent's arguments. And its principal finding is at the bottom of paragraph -- of page 228 under the heading, the bold heading, "Did the Respondent Waive its Right to Oppose Enforcement of the Award?" And it -- and it -- the Court starts by quoting Section 36 of the act, which sets out a number of grounds in which enforcement may be -- may be opposed. And then it notes that:

"In the agreement to arbitrate, the parties waived the benefit of Section 36 of the act."

And you'll see there's a precise contractual clause. It says:

"Waiver of Section 36 of the International Commercial Arbitration Act of British Columbia. The parties intend that any award entered by the arbitrators in this case shall be final and binding subject to enforcement either in Canada and/or the United States. In this regard, both parties hereby expressly waive any entitlement they have or may have to rely upon the provisions of Section 36."

And over the page, paragraph -- at page 229, paragraph 16, it is stated by the Court:

"The only possible conclusion is that the parties waived their right to oppose enforcement of the award under Section 36. And the respondent's grounds for opposing enforcement cannot be supported as they clearly fall under that waiver."

45 46 Now, My Lord, that's the principal finding of 47 the Court. I'll come back to the -- the next

reasons. But the first point is that of course under 1136 of NAFTA, the NAFTA parties have expressly not waived, if I can say it that way, their right to re -- to resist the enforcement of the award.

As you'll recall, Article 1136 permits -requires a period of 90 days following the
rendering of the award, during which time a
disputing party, not necessarily the NAFTA party,
may apply to the Court to set aside the award.

So on the -- on the actual point of law that is determined by this Court in this particular case, there's a turning on the finding that by contract the parties to this private international commercial arbitration agreed not to seek the protection of -- of the -- of the grounds that are afforded in Section 36 of the act.

Now, the Court did go on to say that in any event it would address the other arguments of the respondent.

And in this case the objection of the -- of the party resisting enforcement was the failure of the arbitrator to provide written reasons. And you see that set out at page 230 at paragraph 21 where it says that:

"Article 28(2) of the international arbitration rules requires the arbitrators to state the reasons upon which the award is based."

And it goes on to note that:

"In this matter written reasons were not issued."

The Court finds that this is not a part of the arbitral process.

Now, we of course have just taken a look at the international -- at the -- at the international level of the ICSID where the duty to state the reasons and deal with every question submitted by the parties is considered to be part of the arbitral process. So in my submission this

- is an example of what Mustill and Boyd pointed out in the text that Mr. Foy referred you to a couple of days ago where they say that to take the way in 45 46 47

which a -- one particular form of arbitration operates and to apply the reasoning to another quite different form of arbitration is to engage in analytical error. And the fact of the matter is is that at the international level there is a much greater concern in investor-State on the requirement that the award deal with every question submitted to the tribunal.

So in our respectful submission the obiter comments of this court decision do not in any way preclude Your Lordship from examining the practice in the ICSID Convention and seeing that that is in fact much more relevant and applicable to an after-Chapter-11 tribunal decision than an ordinary, private international commercial arbitration award.

It's an entirely novel question. And we submit that the idea that the Food Services case should bind the Court with respect to its consideration of this issue is not persuasive.

And I would note in this regard that reasons in a private arbitration do not necessarily serve any kind of purpose, and they certainly don't serve a public purpose, whereas reasons in a NAFTA arbitration do serve a public purpose. They serve the purpose of a NAFTA party where, if liability has been established, which is rare at international law, the State is able to determine why its actions have been found to constitute a breach of an international treaty.

Reasons also inform the citizens of a State. As you are aware, these -- these disputes are matters of significant public importance and public attention. And citizens want to know why a State may have been held internationally responsible for a given claim.

And of course the reasons are of assistance not only to the investor who brought the claim, but to future -- future investors as well. And that's the point that a Mr. Highet made at the beginning of his dissent in the Waste Management case, where he says:

"I feel obliged to set out my reasons in

45	detail because of the precedential effect
46	of this decision."
17	

Yes, it's not binding on any other party other than the parties to the dispute, but the -- the informal precedential value of these awards cannot be ignored.

Now, what were the failures in the instant case?

Mr. Foy has already directed Your Lordship to what Mexico considers to be patently unreasonable findings of fact made by the tribunal. And in our submission, these could equally be characterized as a -- the result of a series of failures by the tribunal to deal with questions presented to it by the respondent, Mexico. And in Mexico's submission, had the tribunal addressed the substantive Mexican defences -- both factual and legal, had they been accepted -- they could have changed the outcome of the case.

And this is the approach that the ICSID tribunal is -- the annulment committees are taking. It has to examine where the tribunal looked at the questions, at questions which, if accepted, could have changed the outcome of the case.

As I mentioned to you before in the Klockner case, it need only be determined whether these essential que -- arguments constituted or involved questions submitted to the tribunal and whether the tribunal dealt with them in the award, regardless of whether it undertook any, quote, study of them.

And as you saw in the Amco case, this is not only a procedural issue, it can amount to an excess of jurisdiction as well.

Now, we are -- what I propose to do, My Lord, is to group these failure to -- the failure to consider questions into four sets: the first is liability, the second is damages, the third is evidence of bad faith on the part of the claimant, and the fourth concerns a relationship between the claimant and a witness that was tendered by it who was a former federal environmental official.

Liability. You've already seen from Mr. Foy's re -- review of the award and from the documents that there's no mention in the award of

- the prior contamination of the site. And this was a matter which was addressed at length in the counter-memorial filed by the respondent, in the
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rejoinder, in the post-hearing submission, and at the hearing. In fact, Mexico opened its defence by projecting those three photographs that you have had put before you before the tribunal to illustrate the nature of the contamination of the site in 1991.

This was not done to blame Metalclad. It was -- Mexico always recognized that it was done by the previous owners of COTERIN. It was done to illustrate the basis for the local opposition to the construction of the landfill and its opening. And it was done to illustrate that the municipality, being the government which is closest to the local residents, did not share the view of the federal government. This is not unheard of in -- in feder -- in federations.

Now, I have a -- one short binder of additional materials. These are selected extracts from the record which have been provided to my friends. And I'm just going to take you through some of the evidence, My Lord.

At tab 1 is a witness statement by a -- a man who lived near the landfill, Juan Antonio Romo. And it's a short witness statement. He goes through his background, the -- his awareness that in 1993 Metalclad bought the site, and that he was concerned about the need for remediation, and he wasn't very trustful of the plans to reopen the site.

He said that they tried to convince him, in paragraph 6, that a landfill for hazardous waste was not dangerous. And he said, well, if the waste is not dangerous, why is it being brought to this place. And then he refers to the demonstration on March the 10th, 1995 where the buses came. And he -- they saw that visitors were coming to -- to look at the place.

On the next page, he believes that his family was affected personally. His daughter was born with a malformation, encephalitis I believe it is. And he says in paragraph 9 that the thing that scared him the most was that at the same time three other children were born with the same malformations. And he asked the doctor in the

- hospital if this could be a result of the landfill. And the doctor did not ask yes to my -- answer yes to my question, rather, he refused to
- 45 46 47

1 properly document the case.

Now, the evidence of Mr. Romo is illustrative of the concern that local residents had about the landfill. And the -- we have -- we sought to make this point: that whether it's based on science or not, these are legitimate concerns on the part of local residents.

We did attach evidence. And if you turn to tab 2, you'll see that this is a -- a paper that was prepared by a witness who provided written testimony to the proceeding. He was not called for cross-examination. His name was Dr. Fernando Diaz Barragan.

And Dr. Diaz Barragan attached a paper that he had prepared with some colleagues called "Genotoxic Monitoring of Workers at a Hazardous Waste Disposal Site in Mexico." If you look down at the bottom left-hand corner of the page, it says it's a paper presented at the joint United States-Mexico Conference on -- I think that's waste, transport and interactions of metals held 14-16 April 1993.

And in the middle of that -- in the three columns there, My Lord, in the middle of the page, under the heading "Materials and Methods," you'll see that it said:

"Twelve males employed at the dump site during four to eight months and seven individuals from El Huizache..."

The nearby village,

"...with similar socioeconomic and nutritional status agreed to participate as the exposed and controlled individuals respectively. Each subject completed a questionnaire regarding general health condition and drinking and smoking habits. Peripheral blood samples for all the subjects were obtained early in the morning, transported to the laboratory, and processed within 24 hours."

And if you just turn over the page, under -in the middle of the next -- in the middle column of the next page, under the heading "Discussion":

"A significant increased level of chromosomal damage was detected among the cultured lymphocytes of high-risk workers. This exposure was found to increase with exposure time."

And then on the right-hand column midway down the page:

"One of the workers showed ten times the average amount of damage found in the exposed group. Even if we exclude this individual from the analysis, the difference between groups is still significant."

And then at the bottom of the page it says:

"The results of this study help to integrate the data of an early toxicological assessment and show the relevance of analyzing several biological end points. Although the damage found could not be attributed to a particular substance, there is a clear correlation between the yield or chromosomal aberrations with the duration of exposure which demonstrates individuals were exposed to toxic substances."

Now, again, these were workers at the site in 1991. We're not attributing the health effects there to Metalclad.

What we did in adducing this kind of evidence was to again underscore that this was a -- an issue which was of -- of great concern to people, and that there wasn't just fear, that there was -- there were documents such as this which were available in the local community, in San Luis Potosi in the State, because this was a matter which was outside -- fell outside the boundaries of the municipality. It was a matter that non-governmental organizations in the State and

nationally were concerned about.
 Now, Mexico also filed two witness statements
 by a former senior official of the United States

Environmental Protection Agency, named -- her name was Marcia Williams. In fact, she was called as a witness and was cross-examined at the hearing.

And Ms. Williams had extensive experience in the problems of siting hazardous waste landfills in the United States due to the NIMBY factor, not in my backyard factor.

And her counter -- her expert reports can be found at counter-memorial annex 3 and rejoinder expert report Volume 13, and her cross-examination is in Volume 3 of the transcript. Again, lengthy reports dealing with the high-risk nature of this type of investment, it's a -- where it was discussed by her expert reports. She testified. There is no mention in the award of this part of Mexico's defence.

Now, there's no question, and Mr. Foy has taken you through the results of Metacla -- Metal -- Metalclad's due diligence when it -- it bought the site, when it entered into the option, modified the option agreement to provide for this contingency for the resolution of the municipal permit issue, et cetera.

It knew it had to do due diligence. And I turn you to -- to tab 3 which is a memorandum dated February the 12th, 1993 from Mr. Jim Faus and Mr. Michael Tuckett to Grant Kesler, and it's a proposal from Aldrett Brothers on sale of Guadalcazar landfill site. And he introduces the subject of this potential for Metalclad to buy the property for a total of \$2 million. He says:

"As we know, Mexicans love to negotiate. My guess is that this number is two to two-and-a-half times what they might ultimately take for the property."

And then in uppercase letters:

"BUT SOMETHING IS WRONG HERE. THIS IS TOO EASY!"

And so he proposes that they get their Mexico City lawyer to prepare a draft purchase agreement

- 45 46 47 that gives them due diligence. And then he says at the bottom:

"The purchase of the property should be contingent on certain things being as they have been represented."

Again, this time instead of uppercase letters, in italics:

"Just because they have a permit to operate does not mean that they will."

 So after having been alerted to the possibility of this investment, Metalclad does its due diligence. And as Mr. Foy has indicated, it made amendments to the option agreement.

Now, you'll recall, My Lord, that in the award, and it's at paragraph 45, the tribunal deals with the demonstration on March the 10th, 1995.

And Mexico -- this was a -- a -- this figured prominently in the pleadings from Metalclad. And Mexico's defence was that the demonstration was by private citizens and non-governmental organizations and their acts were not attributable to the Mexican State.

And I'm going to refer you in a few minutes to this notion of attributability at international law. But you see that at paragraph 45 of the award, there's a reference to tactics of intimidation and Metalclad's assertions that police blocked traffic. Now, again, you don't see anything in terms of what Mexico's defence was on that issue.

And if you turn to tab 4, we filed a witness statement from the priest of the parish of Guadalcazar. And the priest testifies about how he became actively involved in the opposition movement to the landfill. At -- at paragraph 11 he says:

"At the end of 1993 several people appeared at La Pedrera. It seemed as if the owners had changed and everything was indicating a new activity at the site.

Therefore, I joined some citizens of the

municipality of Guadalcazar and together we
 decided to constitute a group called Frente
 Pro Defenca de Guadalcazar."

The front -- the defence front of Guadalcazar.

"We had the support of Dr. Angelina Nunez, the founder of Pro San Luis Ecologico. This group was concerned about our problems and supported the population of Guadalcazar throughout."

This is the priest, by the way, that Mr. Neveau refers to that needs a little earthly guidance. He becomes an agitator against the -- the landfill.

At paragraph 21 he discusses the demonstration, bottom of page 4 -- 3, and he says:

"The second time I went to La Pedrera was on March the 10th, 1995. Regarding this event, I would like to state that contrary to what has been expressed by the company. the demonstration arose from the roots of the community. In other words, the city council and State officials did not have anything to do with an authentic manifestation of the will of the people. I consider that the reopening was the last straw. We were informed of the supposed inauguration of the landfill by the local newspapers of SLP. Once again, the population had been ignored and deceived. I remember that the people joined together with the only purpose of defending their health and their families. In a short time many people came together in order to try to stop the reopening.

"In my case, I do not remember seeing armed people during the manifestation. On the contrary, the only armed people that I remember were the people that were guarding the landfill."

And then he says that they have the

- demonstration. And he says that it appeared that some workers at the site were under instructions to break it up. 45 46 47

 "However, I remember that such efforts were in vein until the municipal president arrived. I understand he had not been informed of or invited to the company's celebration.

"After we noticed that we had achieved our objective of making it clear in a public way that the general population did not agree with the reopening of the site, we returned to Guadalcazar."

 This was not the only testimonial evidence that was adduced by Mexico with respect to this demonstration. And of course it's ignored.

I might add, by the way, My Lord, that Mexi -- Metalclad actually adduced a videotape of the demonstration, we -- which we reviewed. And I don't happen to have it in my possession, but I'm sure Mr. Pearce could come up with it.

There's no evidence of armed guards or police in the videotape. It's a -- a group of angry people, mainly women, engaged in a shouting match with workers at the site. We can get that tape if you'd like to see it.

Now, why is this relevant at international law?

Well, tab 20 of the ELSI case, which Mr. Foy took you through, deals with this kind of issue at international law. And I'd ask you to turn to paragraph 103.

This was a -- a case under a -- a friendship, commerce and navigation treaty between Italy and the United States. And at paragraphs 103 -- or paragraph 103 you'll see references to the treaty obligations that were imposed upon Italy and the United States by virtue of the agreement. And if I take you to paragraph 103, it says:

"Paragraph 1 of Article Roman numeral 5 provides that the nationals of each party shall receive the most constant protection and security for their persons and property and shall enjoy in this respect the full

45	protection and security required by
46	international law."
17	

 This is not identical language but it's -- it's similar language to Article 1105.

Now, the United States alleged in this case that the fact that the workers of the plant that was requisitioned by the mayor of Palermo had occupied the plant, they basically took possession of the plant, they didn't want to allow it to be shut down by the -- by the owners, that this was a violation of this -- this obligation and the obligation -- a similar obligation in a succeeding bilateral treaty between the parties.

So you see at paragraph 105 there's a -- the -- the contentions of the United States set out.

"It's the contention of the United States that once the plant had been requisitioned ELSI's employees began an occupation of the premises which continued, so far as the United States was aware, up to the reopening of the plant."

And the United States attributes an injurious consequence, the deterioration of the plant and related material and equipment, and that it impeded its trustee in bankruptcy.

At the bottom, paragraph 107, the Court says:

"That there was some occupation of the plant by the workers after the requisition is something that Italy has not sought to deny."

And the Court of Appeal of Palermo referred in passing to the circumstances of the requisitioning authority having tolerated the unlawful act of occupation of the plant by the workers.

"It appears, nevertheless, to have been a...a peaceful occupation, as may be learned from ELSI's own administrative appeal..." of -- of the "...to the prefect

45 46 47 against the requisition."

The Court -- the International Court says:

2 "It 3 oc 4 of 5 Ita 6 Pa

"It is difficult to accept that the occupation seriously harmed the interests of ELSI in view of the evidence produced by Italy that measures taken by the mayor of Palermo for the temporary management of the plant permitted the continuation and completion of work in progress in the months following the requisition."

And then it goes down:

"The Court of Palermo, however, found itself unable to establish..." any damage "...that any damage to the plant had been caused by the occupying workers."

Now, the central finding here, paragraph 108:

"The reference in Article 5 to the provision of constant protection and security cannot be construed as the giving of a warranty that property shall never in any circumstances be occupied or disturbed. The dismissal of some 800 workers could not reasonably be expected to pass without some protest."

And the Court rejects the United States' argument that its investment was denied full protection and security at international law.

So when we made this defence, because you --as you notice, there is some discussion in the award about the totality of the circumstances, and there's this reference in paragraph 45 to Metalclad asserts, and that there's been tactics of intimidation, we adduced evidence and we made argument about this because there is a basic principle and question of international law about attributing the acts of private citizens to the State in order to establish international responsibility. Of course, the award is silent on these questions.

Now, another issue going to li -- another

- question going to liability was Metalclad's knowledge of the situation as demonstrated by its own documents. And Mr. Foy has taken you through 45 46 47

that. I don't need to repeat that evidence.

But Mexico's defence on this essential question, because it went to the very finding of the tribunal that Mexico failed to -- to provide a transparent and predictable in -- investment environment, this evidence, all -- most of which was Metalclad's -- of Metalclad's own making which was admitted by Mexico, is not addressed.

And if the tribunal had been required to deal with Mexico's question here, which is Metalclad's actual knowledge significant enough to amend the option agreement, that was a question, the consideration of which could have changed the outcome of the case to apply the ICSID approach.

The next -- and the final point on -- on the question of liability is that -- concerns this whole question of domestic legal remedies which Mr. Foy has -- has already addressed. And I don't intend to -- to reprise the evidence. What I intend to do is point out the legal significance of this in Mexico's defence.

I have already indicated to you this notion of attributability. And if you would turn, My Lord, to the last -- I think it's the last tab of materials. I think it's in the secondary sources, tab 133, tab 133. This is a -- these are the draft articles of -- on State responsibility prepared by the international law commission. And the international law commission is an agency of the United Nations which assists in international law making and the study of international law.

These draft rules have been in various iterations being developed for about 50 years. It looks like they're supposed to be adopted this year by the general assembly. But what I'm about to refer you to is pretty trite. If you look at the top of the second page, Article 2, it says:

"Elements of an internationally wrongful act of a State. There is an internationally wrongful act of a State where conduct consisting of an action or omission is attributable to the State."

 And then as you go through Article 4 you'll see attribution to the State; Article 5, attribution to the State, the same in Article 6,

7, 8, et cetera.

The point is -- is that when international tribunals examine the question of international responsibility, they have to be satisfied that the acts complained of are attributable to the State.

Now, this question of attributability arose not only with respect to the demonstration, it applies with respect to Metalclad's exercise of its domestic legal remedies.

As Mr. Foy has pointed out, the -- before they took the Amparo, they should have gone to the State administrative tribunal. Having done so, that would then give the Amparo court jurisdiction under Mexican law.

Metalclad went directly to Amparo.

Now, the effect of what this tribunal has done is this: It said that the -- the refusal of the municipal permit was improper. And so implicit in that finding is that a Mexican court seized with the matter would find that the municipality acted ultra vires. Metalclad did not take that -- have that issue resolved. It went to court, and then abandoned its remedies. The tribunal steps into the place of the Mexican court and makes Mexico internationally responsible for Metalclad's failure to properly exhaust its remedies.

And we made the point in the very beginning of the post-hearing submission where we said that the choice of going to the Amparo court directly was not attributable to Mexico. The abandonment of domestic legal remedies in favour of negotiation with the municipality was not attributable to Mexico. But the effect of the determination by this tribunal is to impose international liability upon Mexico for actions taken by Metalclad. Again, the point was made at the outset of our post-hearing submission; it's not addressed in the award.

Mr. Foy has pointed out already that the award fails to deal with the Acuerdo between the municipality and -- and Metalclad which dealt with the idea that metal -- that the site could be operated as a non-hazardous industrial waste

- landfill, again, not addressed in the award. So that's my first cluster of issues, My Lord. That deals with liability.
- 45 46 47

I think what I'll do is now turn to the question of damages. And what I think I'll do is introduce the damages, because I want to talk about one case. And then it would probably be an appropriate time -- actually, one case and some State practice, and then it would be appropriate to take a -- take a break.

Again, as I understand from the materials that we've received from Metalclad to date, it's -- it is their contention that if this application is governed by the International Commercial Arbitration Act, then the Court has no jurisdiction to examine the record of the underlying procedure. And I -- I take from that they -- the contention is that you are restricted to the four corners of the award.

Now, Mr. Foy has already set out a series of arguments, and this is an additional argument from the perspective of this -- of this duty that's imposed upon the tribunal to deal with every question.

But in the damages part of my argument there is an additional ground that -- that Mexico is raising here, and that is that this award is contrary to the public policy of British Columbia.

Now, I'm going to start this presentation by saying let's just forget about all the things that I've said about the -- the unusual nature of investor-State arbitration and the NAFTA, and public rights and all that. Let's assume that this award was a private international commercial arbitration between two parties, and it's a one-off contract, and no precedential value whatsoever to the -- to the award.

I'm going to direct Your Lordship to a decision of a Court which is in one of the most arbitration-friendly, unobtrusive, laissez-faire jurisdictions in the world, and it's the Paris Court of Appeal.

As Your Lordship will know, the Paris -the -- Paris is the seat of the International
Chamber of Commerce Court of Arbitration. It's
a -- a centre of international commercial

- arbitration. And the French courts have had vast experience in reviewing international commercial arbitrations there.
- 45 46 47

1 Now, I'm going to refer you to a case which 2 was not contained in our outline. We were unaware 3 of the case's existence when we -- when we 4 completed the outline. But when -- when we found 5 the case and reviewed it, we sent a copy over to 6 my friend on February the 13th. And it's a case 7 called European Gas Turbines, and it is at tab 132 8 of the materials. 9 You don't have it? 10 MR. ALVAREZ: Haven't seen it yet. 11 MR. THOMAS: Okay. We sent it over to you on February 12 the 13th. 13 MR. ALVAREZ: I guess we'll see it. 14 MR. THOMAS: You'll see it. 15 THE COURT: Sorry, what tab again was it? 16 MR. THOMAS: 132. 17 Now, My Lord, having read the outline, you're 18 going to be aware of Mexico's view that Metalclad 19 filed a claim that was misleading and deceptive. 20 And we put this argument in the outline on the 21 grounds of deceptive action. 22 This decision is a decision of the Court of 23 Appeal, the Paris Court of Appeal, with respect to 24 an international arbitration where the damages 25 claim of the claimant was based on an -- a set of 26 expenditures. It's claimed that it made 27 expenditures that it didn't make. 28 There are two -- there were two grounds that 29 were alleged by the -- by the respondent for -- or 30 for the applicant to this particular case to have 31 it set aside. The first one involves corruption; 32 I'm not dealing with that. The second deals with 33 fraud in the arbitral proceedings. 34 And if you turn behind the long French 35 version of the case, there's a report from the 36 yearbook of commercial arbitration in English. 37 And I'd like you to take a look at page 205. It's

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22 it states:

"Second ground for a nullity. The award is contrary to international public policy as its enforcement would lead to sanctioning

English version of the report. And at paragraph

at the bottom of the page, page 205, of the

45	of fraud committed by Westman during the
46	arbitral proceedings. EGT maintains that
47	Westman committed a fraud by submitting to

the arbitral tribunal a detailed report of expenses certifying that they were incurred in order to perform its task whereas it did not bear any of these expenses. It maintained that these necessarily affected the decision of the arbitral tribunal."

Paragraph 24:

"Westman denies that it sought to mislead the arbitral tribunal, noting that its expenses report contains the following words, 'the amount of the commission for this kind of activity is speculative and is not calculated or determined on the basis of the expenses borne,' and also denies, in any case, that the alleged fraud influenced the decision of the arbitral tribunal."

Now, the arbitral tribunal or the court, the Paris Court of Appeal, reviews this. And two important points arise; the first is that it says that if an allegation of breach of public policy is made, it has the jurisdiction to review the underlying record. And in fact it actually took new evidence before the Court itself.

So it said that where the -- where the matter is before it and it involves an allegation of breach of international public policy, it has the jurisdiction to look beyond the award at the evidence itself.

And if you look at the very end of that tab, My Lord, we had a translation done by counsel that we consulted on this point at the last page. And it's an English translation of one of the paragraphs of the French part of the award that's not contained in the summary in the ICSID year -- in the ICA yearbook. And this is what the Court had to say:

"Whereas the authority acknowledged as appertaining to the arbitrator in international cases to evaluate the lawfulness of a contract by reference to

45	the rules of international public order and
46	to sanction its unlawfulness in particular
47	by declaring it to be void implied in

connection with an action to set aside based on the argument that recognition or enforcement would be incompatible with international public order..."

And he cites the section of the code of civil procedure:

"...that the control of the award carried out by the judge dealing with the action to set aside extends to all legal and factual elements of the case that might e.g. warrant the application or otherwise of the rule of international public order and, if it is so warranted, to rule on the lawfulness of the contract in light of that rule."

This -- the Paris Court of Appeal reviews the evidence it was submitted by the claimant in the arbitration below, and it concludes that:

"It would be contrary to international public policy to enforce the award in France given the evidence that was adduced by the claimant in the arbitration below with respect to its expenditures."

And it said that:

"The way in which that evidence was presented was a fraud and not a mere slight of hand or mere artfulness."

 Now, that's, as I mentioned to you, in an arbitration-friendly centre where this was an ordinary international commercial arbitration.

I'm going to layer upon that some international law to which Mexico referred in its post-hearing submission dealing with the whole question of espousal of a claim by a State.

question of espousal of a claim by a State.

And you'll recall that I mentioned to you at the outset that in the absence of investor-State arbitration, the normal course of events would be

- for the State to espouse the claim as its own at international law. So in this case it would be the United States espousing the claim of
- 45 46 47

Metalclad.

And it -- if you'll turn to paragraph 483 of Mexico's outline, you'll see a -- a quote from the United States Secretary of State, Mr. Seward. And we make the point that a State would refuse to act in espousing a claim once evidence of deception arose in the claim that they had been asked to look at. And Secretary Seward states:

"Nations cannot afford to have the intercourse which the interests of their citizens require to be kept open, subjected to the annoyances and risks which would result from the admission of fraud or duplicity into such intercourse. It has therefore become a usage, having the authority of a principle, in the correspondence between enlightened governments, in relation to the claims of citizens or subjects, that any deception practised by a claimant upon his own government in regard to a controversy with a foreign government, for the purpose of enhancing his claim, or influencing the proceedings of his government, forfeits all title of the party attempting such deception to the protection and aid of his government in the controversy in question, because an honourable government cannot consent to complicate itself in a matter in which it has itself been made or attempted to be made the victim of a fraud, for the benefit of the dishonest party."

And note the words "any deception" by an investor or any -- yeah, sorry, any -- any deception for the purpose of enhancing his claim or influencing the proceedings of his government. As I say, we made lengthy post-hearing submissions on this for reasons which will become very clear to you.

What we say with respect to damages, My Lord, is that Metalclad proffered false and deceptive evidence of the damages that it claimed to have

- 45 46 47 suffered, that the tribunal failed to perceive this fact fully, because it failed to deal with the questions that Mexico addressed to it on

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1 damages. It did walk around the edges of the 2 deception. But it failed to carry out the 3 necessary examination of the record that would 4 have led it to reject any claim for a substantial 5 monetary award with the effect that Metalclad was 6 awarded a sum of money to which it was not 7 entitled. And this is due largely to the 8 tribunal's failure to address all the questions 9 and evidence that was put before it in this 10 proceeding.

> And I'm going to suggest that this part of our submission on damages, which I will take you through after the break, is going to illustrate the wisdom of the ICSID approach to the need to deal with all questions that are submitted by a party, because in failing to address Mexico's questions, the tribunal acted unfairly in contravention of the governing rules, and it committed an injustice.

Now, I will -- we've got five minutes. I might as well just give you the -- or do you want to -- it's actually three minutes according to my watch.

24 THE COURT: It's up to you, whichever you wish to do. 25 MR. THOMAS: Okay. I'm going to leave you with an -with some thoughts over the course of the lunch break.

The deception in this case is that Metalclad repeatedly claimed that it spent \$20.5 million to acquire the land and to construct the landfill which was the subject of the NAFTA claim.

Now, you'll see that the tribunal did not accept the 20.5 million; it deducted certain expenses which it said were not attributable to the landfill. We're going to demonstrate that it did not do what it said it was doing.

But what Metalclad did was to file an expert's report which asserted that the construction cost of this landfill was \$20.5 million. It was repeatedly asked by Mexico to prepare a detailed listing of its expenditures. And I'll go into the reasons why we asked that after the break.

It refused to do that throughout the

- proceeding. Rather, it based its figure on a -- initially a single piece of paper given by their CFO to the expert who included it in his report.
- 45 46 47

And Mexico was put in the position of having to disprove this global figure of \$20.5 million.

Now, if you turn to tab 6 of the selected extracts, this is an excerpt from the expert report that Metalclad proffered in the first round of the proceeding. You'll see the title of the appraiser at the top, American Appraisal Associates. And this is the section of the report entitled "Construction Cost of La Pedrera." At paragraph 176 it says:

"The construction and investment costs of the La Pedrera project are as follows on table 3."

And if you look down, you'll see in the first section it's -- this is the investment in Confinamiento, that's really COTERIN, 1.151 million, five hundred dollars (sic), and then investment in a company called ECOPSA, \$19,323,028. It describes this: The \$1,151,500 was the purchase price for COTERIN. The balance of \$19,323,028 represents the Metalclad expenditures for the analysis of the site and the development and construction of the La Pedrera facility as it exists today. The total cost to Metalclad was almost \$20.5 million. Then paragraph 177:

"The accumulated schedule of the ECOPSA construction cost history..."

Notice this, construction cost history is shown at Figure 14, which is over the page. And when you turn that page, My Lord, you'll see Figure 14, again construction cost history. There's no ifs, buts or maybes about this. And you'll see a series of bar graphs going from 1991 to 1996. Note, in 1992 -- the highest expenditures are in the fourth quarter of 1992. And you have already heard evidence that they did not get introduced to the COTERIN investment until February of 1993. I'll come back to this later on

The next page is another heading, "Cumulative Cost History." And then paragraph 178 again very explicit, very plain:

"These costs are only the out-of-pocket expenditures by Metalclad incurred in the acquisition, permitting, construction and subsequent validation of the La Pedrera property's ability to meet or exceed all federal environmental regulations. Other indirect and intangible impacts of the La Pedrera non-startup are identified and discussed in Section 10."

And before we break, My Lord, I'll just refer you to the last page of this expert's report that was tendered by Metalclad, paragraph 223:

"Before arriving at our opinion of value of the La Pedrera going concern, we personally inspected the designated property and examined historical records of the design and construction of the designated property and studied market conditions. To develop our opinion of value, we considered the three generally accepted approaches to value, the cost approach..."

Et cetera. And then paragraph 224:

"The cost approach establishes a value based on the cost of reproducing or replacing the property less depreciation from physical deterioration and functional and economic/external obsolescence if present and measurable."

Paragraph 225:

 "In the appraisal of a development property, the cost approach which indicated a historical cost of nearly \$20.5 million (see Table 3) incurred primarily in 1993 and 1994 was limited solely to the tangible assets."

 Maybe just before we break, just one more minute, My Lord. If you turn to paragraph -- or to tab 7,

1 you'll see excerpts from Metalclad's pleadings. 2 That's the expert report I've just looked at. 3 These are the pleadings, page 29, the underlining 4 at the top: 5 6 "This \$20 million landfill in La Pedrera is 7 the only landfill built since the NAFTA." 8 9 Next page, middle paragraph, paragraph 3: 10 11 "Whereafter approval and knowledge by 12 federal and State officials, including 13 municipal officer, of claimant's physical construction of its landfill facility and 14 15 claimant's expenditure of U.S. \$20 million into the Mexican economy for the labour, 16 equipment and materials to construct the 17 landfill." 18 19 20 Next page, paragraph 11, I've underlined the 21 end of the paragraph: 22 23 "...a direct investment of U.S. \$20 million 24 while still being denied the benefit of its 25 investment." 26 27 My Lord, I think that's an appropriate point 28 to stop. We'll pick up on this after the break, 29 if I might. 30 THE COURT: All right. Yes. We'll take the luncheon 31 recess now. 32 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is adjourned until 2 p.m. 33 34 35 (NOON RECESS) (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 12:32 P.M.) 36 (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 2:02 P.M.) 37 38 39 THE COURT: Please continue, Mr. Thomas. 40 MR. THOMAS: Thank you, My Lord. Before we broke, My Lord, we were reviewing 41 42 excerpts from the experts' report in the memorial 43 where the claimant alleged that it spent 20.5 44 million for the labour, equipment and materials to

45 construct the landfill.
46 Now, My Lord, I'm going to pass up to you
47 a -- some charts which are going to expedite this

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      analysis based on record evidence. And it -- I
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      hope that this will focus the inquiry and make it
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      much more manageable and easy -- easy to follow.
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      I've given a copy to my friend.
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          When Mexico began to look at the claim, it
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      saw that -- in the Table 3 that was in the
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      experts' report, that there were expenditures
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      being claimed for 1991 and 1992 when of course
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      COTERIN had not yet appeared on the scene. And so
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       it instructed its experts -- we had two financial
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       experts dealing with valuation, Mr. Kevin Dages
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       and Dr. Mark Zmijewsky. And to spell his name for
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       the court reporter, it's Z-m-i-j-e-w-s-k-y. We
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       asked them to examine what was going on with
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       Metalclad and its investment in Mexico.
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          Metalclad is a -- a publicly traded company.
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       It trades on the NASDAQ small capitalization
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       market. And as a result it files reports with the
19
       United States Securities and Exchange Commission.
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          So Mr. Dages and Dr. Zmijewsky reviewed all
21
       of Metalclad's announcements to the market and
22
       disclosures in its SEC filings from 1991 on to
23
       about 1997.
24
          And the table which I've passed up to
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       Your Lordship is a -- simply a graphic
       representation of Metalclad's various Mexican
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       projects. And if you look at the middle of it,
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       you'll of course see a -- there's a date,
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       September 8th. That's COTERIN. It should be
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       September 9th, but that's COTERIN.
31 THE COURT: Um-hum.
32 MR. THOMAS: Of course, that's the investment that is
       the subject of this dispute.
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          At the very top you'll see in 1991 a company
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       called Eco Administracion. And I would ask you to
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       just write in beside that Santa Maria -- Santa
37
       Maria del Rio, because we refer to it as the
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       Santa -- Santa Maria del Rio project.
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          And these companies, My Lord, are the --
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       they're all -- these are all taken from record
41
       evidence.
42
          If you look at tab 8 of the materials -- I
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won't go through them in great detail, but I'll

just point out that the first report, there's an

- excerpt -- this is an organizational chart from a Metalclad document, it's called a Mexican -- "Mexico Project Status Report." And you'll see
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at -- at the page following the title page, there's a -- a series of -- of names of companies listed there that Metalclad has described on its organizational chart and what they do.

And then behind it are excerpts from various investments that they announced. And the first one is November 26, 1991. And if you turn to the second page of that announcement, about midway down the page you'll see:

"The company also announced today the completion of the acquisition of all of the outstanding shares of Environ Technologies Inc., ETI."

It goes on to say that:

"ETI owns 49 percent of the shares of Eco Administracion, a company organized to develop, construct and operate an integrated waste management facility at a site Eco has secured near San Luis Potosi in Central Mexico."

And then in the next paragraph it just notes that the shareholders of ETI include Mr. Kesler, who is the -- also the CEO of Metalclad, and Mr. Robertson. And it discloses that they're both officers and directors and shareholders of Metalclad. So they were shareholders of ETI. And ETI in turn owned 49 percent interest in Eco Administracion. And ETI was sold to Metalclad in exchange for Metalclad stock in November of 1991.

The next press release is January, February -- March 2nd, 1992. And you'll see it. It's a --

"Metalclad announces today a second joint venture to build, own and operate a state-of-the-art hazardous waste processing facility in Veracruz, Mexico."

And this is to be 120,000-tonne-per-year waste processing plant at a 200-acre site in the

- State of Veracruz.
- And then over to the next announcement, April 20th, 1992, Metalclad announced the organization
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the landfill.

1 of a third joint venture corporation in Mexico 2 known as Eliminacion to bring the number of joint 3 venture Mexican corporations to pursue its toxic 4 and hazardous waste treatment business to three. 5 And it goes on to say where they're identify --6 where they're located, San -- San Luis Potosi, 7 Veracruz and Tamaulipas, T-a-m-a-u-l-i-p-a-s, for 8 the court reporter. 9 The sites for the development of waste 10 disposal facilities have been acquired in the 11 States of San Luis Potosi and Veracruz, and a site 12 has been acquired in Tamaulipas. 13 So these carry on. There's a number of 14 announcements. And then there's -- at the end 15 there's a 1996 SEC annual report which lists in 16 some detail the company's activities. 17 If you were to turn to the page -- at the bottom it's 1523.450. 18 19 THE COURT: Um-hum. 20 MR. THOMAS: Bottom of the page, you'll see a 21 reference to ECOPSA which is on our list here. 22 And ECOPSA is active in developing additional projects in Mexico, including, 1, an additional 23 24 hazardous waste landfill and treatment facility 25 near the heart of industrial Mexico. And then 26 over the page, number 2, an industrial waste 27 treatment and disposal facility; number 3, an 28 incineration project; number 4, an aqueous waste 29 treatment facility; 5, PCB exporting; and 6, 30 BFI-Omega. And that talks about recycling. 31 And -- and it has various branches in Guadalajara, 32 Aquascalientes. San Luis Potosi, et cetera. 33 et cetera. And there's further development 34 activities underway for branches in Toluca, 35 Veracruz and one other city in Mexico. 36 Now, the evidence that emerged during the 37 course of the proceeding, My Lord, is that Metalclad took all of these other projects and its 38

U.S. overhead and lumped it in and called it the

direct cost of acquiring the land and constructing

The memorial was very explicit that the \$20.5

million was for labour, equipment and materials to

construct the landfill. In fact, what the company

- 45 46 47 did was to roll all of these other projects and its U.S. overhead into the 20.5 number, and in our submission thereby inflate the number in order to

obscure what its actual expenditures were.

And if you think back to the words of Secretary of State Seward, in our submission this was a deception which was intended to enhance the company's claim. In our submission it was positive prevarication.

There's no doubt that nowhere in the first pleading was there any reference to these other companies and nowhere in the experts' report was it disclosed that these other companies and the overhead was being included in the \$20.5 million claim.

Now, we pursued this at the hearing.

Actually, before I just proceed, if you would turn to tab 9 of our materials, this is a -- an excerpt from one of the four experts reports on damages, the financial side of damages. We had other experts who did reports on hazardous waste valuation. But this was on the damages.

And this is the rejoinder report of Mr. Dages. And you'll see that at the bottom of that page, page 8, in bold letters he says:

"Claimants have significantly altered their representations concerning the nature of their 20.5 million alleged investment in COTERIN."

And he then proceeds to list, as I have before lunch, the various references in the memorial and the expert report to how they described the 20.5 million. And then he goes and he looks at their reply declaration that was filed -- for the first time we had in the reply a statement from their chief financial officer, Mr. Dabbene. And he goes through Mr. Dabbene's reply declaration and sees that there's changes in the way in which the 20.5 million is described. It's now described as a -- an investment or a total investment, or the Mexican development costs. It's no longer the actual costs of acquiring the land and constructing the landfill. So you see a substantial change in the way in which the expert and their chief financial officer

- 45 46 47 described the monies claimed to have been expended.

 Now, if you'd just turn back to the first

page of that report, page 8, what Mexico was trying to do when it asked for a detailed listing of expenditures was to have the chief financial officer say, okay, the cost of the land was this, the cost of acquiring COTERIN was this, the cost of the engineering contract was this, the materials was this, the labour, et cetera. We wanted something that our expert could then look at and youch.

And the idea was that since there was so many investments that were being announced by Metalclad, it was appropriate for us to determine whether this investment alleged to be expropriated and what costs were actually attributable to it. We wanted a facility-specific screen of all of the costs that Metalclad said were related to that. We never got that throughout the entire proceeding.

Now, if you'll turn to tab 11 first, I'm going to take you to a few excerpts from the cross-examination of the chief financial officer and -- and the CEO. And at tab 11, line 8, we discuss this issue with Mr. Dabbene:

"Q. Now, we've looked at your declaration very carefully, Mr. Dabbene. We do not see an express statement in the declaration that Metalclad spent 20.5 million on the landfill project. Do you have a sentence in your declaration you can take us to that says Metalclad spent 20.5 million on the landfill project?

A. If I can review my statement. Please do."

And then he tries to find it and then he says:

"A. Those may not be the exact words, but I believe it's somewhere in there. I don't see those words specifically, no. No."

But he -- the answer goes on:

- "But the title of the reply is addressing the 20.5 million spent on the landfill. Q. Well, that's just the point, 45 46 47

Mr. Dabbene. We don't see, and you've just admitted, that there's no express statement in your declaration that Metalclad spent 20.5 million on the landfill project, is there? A. My review now doesn't see that specifically. Q. Right. Just to confirm, Mr. Dabbene, to the present day Metalclad has not submitted any detailed list of expenditures of the 20.5 million on the landfill project, has it? Not one consolidated list. We provided the individual details by the years in question."

And you might just highlight that, My Lord, because I'm going to come back to that later on.

"Q. Is it your contention, Mr. Dabbene, that you've provided an itemized list of all expenditures on the landfill?

A. No."

Then if you'd turn back to tab 10, Mr. Dabbene having admitted that he did not actually swear that the company spent 20.5 million, he's swearing under oath, he did not actually swear that they spent 20.5 million on the landfill as represented by the -- by the company and the experts, and he admits that they don't have an itemized list of expenditures, I take Mr. Dabbene -- at tab 10 I take him to that statement in the memorial where they claim to have expended 20.5 on labour, equipment and materials into the Mexican economy. And at line 11:

"Now, I just want to confirm that we should not understand that -- that phrase to mean that the \$20 million referred to there were just expended on the acquisition of the land and the construction of the landfill. Is that correct?

A. The 20 million does not? Can you

- repeat that, please? Yes. I just want to confirm that we should not take the meaning of paragraph 3 to be 45 46 47

1	that Metalclad spent \$20 million to acquire
2	the land and spend on land and equipment
3	and on materials specifically for the
4	landfill itself. A. I believe the 20 million that the
5 6	
	acquisition of the landfill itself was the
7	culmination of the effort that required 20
8	million in expenditures. That's my
9 10	response.
11	Q. Yes, your response. But your response, if I can put that back to you,
12	Mr. Dabbene, is that we should not
13	interpret this to mean that the 20 million
14	was spent simply on the acquisition of land
15	and the construction of the landfill,
16	correct?
17	A. That's correct."
18	A. That's conect.
19	Tab 11 sorry, tab tab 12. We've gone
20	over tab 11 already. This is re-examination
21	I'm sorry, continued re-examination:
22	Till Sorry, continued re-examination.
23	"Mr. Dabbene"
24	Wil. Dabbelle
25	This is line 8:
26	11113 13 11116 0.
-0 27	"Mr. Dabbene, I just want to wrap up this
-, 28	morning's discussion of the other Mexican
29	projects that Metalclad was engaged in."
30	projecto that Motalolaa wae engagea iii.
31	We'd gone through these other earlier
32	projects:
33	F J
34	"Just to confirm, nowhere in the memorial
35	is there a reference to the inclusion of
36	the cost of these other projects in the
37	20.5 million expenditure, correct?
38	A. I believe that's correct.
39	And nowhere in Mr. Nichols' appraisal is
40	that fact mentioned, correct?
11	Correct."
12	
13	We went to this through this with
14	Mr. Kesler, the chief executive officer of

- Metalclad, if you turn the page, turn to tab 13, the bottom of that first page, line 21:
- 45 46 47

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- 1 "Mr. Kesler, I'd just like to confirm 2 something before I go into a new area of 3 cross-examination. You're of course aware 4 that Metalclad has advanced the figure of 5 20.5 million in expenditures which were 6 incurred in connection with the COTERIN 7 project. Is that correct? A. Yes. 8 Q. And in fact the company's appraiser, 9 10 Mr. Nichols, who provided an expert report, 11 described the 20.5 million expenditures as 12 being related to the brick and mortar 13 expenses for constructing the landfill. Is 14 that correct? 15 A. No. It includes a lot more than 16 that. The 20.5 includes overhead, soft 17 costs, permitting, political relations, 18 community relations and a host of other 19 things leading up to the construction. 20 And would you confirm for the tribunal, 21 Mr. Kesler, that the 20.5 million also 22 includes expenditures which were incurred 23 by Metalclad in respect of the 3 Mexican 24 projects that we discussed this morning? 25 It does. 26 Q. It does. In fact, if we were to take 27 for example Mr. Robertson's severance in 28 September of 1993, the \$230,000 which were 29 paid to Mr. Robinson, that was included as 30 a COTERIN-related expenditure, correct? 31 Correct." 32 33 I'll just stop parenthetically, My Lord.
 - COTERIN is acquired.

 His severance package was approved on the date of the board meeting that approved the COTERIN acquisition. And Mr. Robertson's severance payment -- he had a gross settlement of \$230,000 -- is included as a COTERIN-related expenditure in this description of the direct cost

Mr. Robertson was an officer and director of

the company who disagreed with the management of

the company and left in the summer of 1993 before

of buying the land and acquiring the landfill.

And Mr. Kesler says -- and this is a very important statement, the next statement: 47

"Well, it wasn't included as a
COTERIN-related expense; it's a part of the
20.5 million, as is every other salary and
overhead expenditure that we made during
the entire period of time leading up to the
construction of the project."

So he's just told us that all of their salary and overhead expenditure has also been included in that sum.

"Q. And, for example, cash payments to Lucia Ratner would also be included in that figure as well, correct?

A. It would for the same reason."

Now, I'll go ahead and highlight. Lucia Ratner is the wife of a federal environmental official at the time. And we'll go into her relationship and his relationship with Metalclad

later on.

Now, My Lord, if you turn to tab 14, I'd ask you to actually take out tab 14 because it will assist you in following what I do next.

You'll recall that Mr. Dabbene testified that he had provided some information relating to expenditures in particular years.

What Mr. Dabbene did was he attached to his witness statement in Exhibit 15 a set of handwritten -- photocopies of handwritten ledgers taken from Metalclad's books in 1993 and 1994.

Now, Mr. Dabbene didn't join the company until 1996, but he went back and he took some ledgers, and he provided them as evidence of expenditures on the COTERIN landfill. No receipts, proof of payment, accounts or documents of the like were ever filed by Metalclad in this proceeding.

So we had these ledgers that were given to us. They were handwritten ledgers, and they're incomplete. They only deal with certain classes of expenditures.

And so what Mr. Dages did was to take the handwritten ledgers and to put them into a typed

- format. And you'll see it's across the top, "Payments Made by Metalclad for Accounting, Consulting and Legal Services, 1993/1994." And
- 45 46 47

1 then he has a reference number, the date, the 2 payee. And then he has three columns: accounting, 3 consulting or legal. 4 Now, we took Mr. Dabbene through some of 5 these expenditures. And if you'll turn to tab 15, 6 we'll start off with the first one -- question, at 7 line 3: 8 9 "You're not suggesting, are you, that it's 10 appropriate to take, for example, all of 11 Metalclad's expenses associated with the 12 Santa Maria del Rio incinerator and 13 allocate them to COTERIN, are you? 14 A. Yes. 15 Q. You're suggesting that? 16 Yes." 17 18 And he goes on to say that this is part of 19 the investment in the landfill. 20 So what he's done is he's taking expenses 21 relating to Eco Administracion back in 1991, '92 22 and '93 and rolling them into the direct cost of 23 constructing the landfill as it was represented 24 originally. 25 I should note Mr. Dabbene has tried -- has 26 changed the characterization at this point. 27 Now, if you turn the page to 129 on the 28 right-hand side of the next page, we say at line 29 7: 30 31 "All right. Well, Mr. Dabbene, let's go 32 back to our Exhibit 20, which is Mr. Dages' 33 transcription of the handwritten ledgers that you attached to your witness 34 35 statement. 36 Okay. 37 I want to turn to legal expenses, first of 38 all. Could you turn to Items 69, 70 and 71 39 on the list?"

And, My Lord, those are on the second page,

69 to 71. And I ask him whether he sees them.

"Yes."

40 41

42

43 44 45 46 Question -- and they're respectively 47 D. Neveau, Electrometrics, a payment of \$60,000;

```
G. Kesler, $60,000; Ron Robertson, $60,000.
1
2
         Now, at line 22 of the cross-examination:
3
4
         "I'm quite prepared to take you to the SEC
5
         filing, Mr. Dabbene, that shows that
6
         these..." permits were issued -- or
7
          "...these payments were made for the
8
         issuance of a construction permit for the
         Santa Maria del Rio project. Would you
9
10
          like me to take you to that?
11
          A. No. I'll accept it.
12
          Will you accept that?
13
          So you consider that the payment of these
14
          bonuses to these three Metalclad directors
15
          and officers for the issuance of federal
16
          permits for a separate project is a
17
          COTERIN-related expense?
18
          Yes.
19
          By the way, when we look at Mr. Neveau's
20
          listing at number 69, it says
21
          'Electrometrics' behind that. Do you see
22
          that?
23
          Yes.
24
          Do you know what that project was all
25
          about?
          I believe it was the name of his consulting
26
27
          firm that he was employed by.
28
          All right."
29
30
          Then over the page, My Lord, to line 2:
31
32
          "Okay. So if I look at Item 278..."
33
34
          So if we turn over to 278 here, this is
35
       now -- you might note the date. It's October
36
       15th, 1993. So this is -- it's important to keep
37
       in mind these are all 1993 expenses.
38
39
           "Q. Okay. So if I look at Item 278 --
40
          let's switch over to Item 278 -- I see a
          payment of $50,000 on October 15th, 1993 to
41
42
          Electrometrics Research Inc. That would be
43
          Mr. Neveau's company, do you think?
44
          A. I think it could be.
```

- 45 46 47
- Q. All right. I see the same day the next payment is to Mr. Kesler for \$50,000. Do you see that?

1	A. Yes.
2	These are both listed all listed as
3	legal expenses, Mr. Dabbene. Is that
4	right?
5	A. On your sheet here, that's correct.
6	Q. Well, they're taken from your
7	handwritten ledgers.
8	A. I'll accept that as well.
9	Q. Now, would you turn to Item 87? Is it
10	your practice to allocate board member fees
11	to legal expenses, \$43,000?"
12	
13	He says that his practice is to present them
14	on a different chart of accounts, his own practice
15	is.
16	Then we go through further payments to
17	Mr. Kesler, Mr. Neveau and Mr. Robertson.
18	And then in the middle of page 132 there,
19	My Lord, at line 12, you'll see another aspect of
20	the cross-examination.
21	
22	"If you turn to Item 126, I see a payment
23	on May 17th, 1993 to Lucia Ratner Diaz
24	Gonzales. Do you see that?
25	A. Yes.
26	And that is for \$10,000?
27	A. Correct.
28	Is Ms. Ratner a lawyer?
29	A. I don't know. It's before my time.
30	Do you know who she is?
31	It's before my time. There's probably
32	several names here I don't know."
33	
34	Well, My Lord, I'll instruct you that that's
35	the wife of the federal environmental official.
36	Then over the page we review the payment of
37	\$207,000, again under the legal expenses, to
38	Mr. Robertson, and point out that he's been he
39	had left the company prior to the acquisition of
40	COTERIN. Line 14:
41	
42	"Would you turn to Item Number 254,
43	Mr. Dabbene? And that's September the
44	30th, 1993, consulting expense for CATSA,

- \$36,667. CATSA was a separate company, was it not?

 A. By that date, I believe so. 45 46 47

1 2	A. [sic] Yes. Turn over the page to Item 289. Do you see that?
3	Yes."
4	
5 6	You go to 289.
7	"Town: Douglas Ostabar 20th 4002
8	"Terry Douglas, October 26th, 1993,
	\$10,000. Mr. Douglas was one of the
9	original shareholders in Environ
10	Technologies Inc., was he not?
11	A. I believe that's correct.
12	Then 292, another wire to CATSA for
13	47,500. Do you see that?
14	Yes.
15	Again, that's a separate business from
16	COTERIN, correct?
17	A. At that time it's a separate legal
18	entity, if that's the question.
19	And would you go to Items 320 and 321?
20	November 29th, 1993 we have another legal
21	expense to Mr. Grant Kesler for \$100,000.
22	And below him, Dan, question mark,
23	\$100,000. Do you see that?
24	A. Yes.
25	Neither Mr. Kesler nor Mr. Neveau were
26	providing legal services to the company,
27	were they?
28	A. I assume not. I don't know.
29	Then Item 325, wire to Rodarte and
30	de la Fuente."
31	A. II. 0 405
32	At line 3 on page 135:
33	WA
34	"Mr. de la Fuente was a Mexican
35	shareholder who sold his shares to"
36	Metal "Eco-Metalclad in 1992, was he
37	not?
38	I don't recall a list. I wasn't there.
39	All right. I'll instruct you that he had
40	shares in Eco Administracion, Eliminacion
41	and Descontaminadora, and that in November
42	of 1992 he sold those shares to Metalclad,
43	to Eco-Metalclad Corporation.
44	A. Okay. I'll accept that.

- Q. And none of those projects had
 anything to do with COTERIN, did they?
 A. What were the dates?
 - Charest Reporting Inc. (604) 669-6449

1 2 3	Q. He sold the shares in November 1992. And I'm asking you whether any of the three projects which we went through already had
4	anything to do with COTERIN.
5	A. Perhaps.
6	Q. All right. The name 'COTERIN' in 1992
7	wasn't out there.
8	A. Correct."
9	
10	And then it should be question.
11	
12	"In fact, Metalclad's evidence in this
13	proceeding is that it was not introduced to
14	the COTERIN opportunity until February of
15	1993, correct?
16	A. That's correct.
17	Are you aware of Mr. Neveau's educational
18	qualifications?
19	Not specifically, no.
20	Is he a lawyer?
21	I don't believe so."
22	
23	Well, the record evidence is he's not a
24	lawyer.
25	Now, if you turn to tab 16, My Lord, after we
26	complete that cross-examination, Mr. Civiletti,
27	who is Metalclad's party-nominated arbitrator,
28	says at line 7:
29	
30	"Arbitrator Civiletti: I have one
31	question, Mr. President."
32	T1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
33	This is to Mr. Dabbene.
34	
35	"Your answer about there being detailed
36	records available to prior auditors when
37	the auditors were outside auditors were
38	doing more and more work for the company in
39	those early years in response to the
10	president's question does not change your
11	testimony that the 20.5 million summarized
12	in the schedule that you have referred to
13	includes not only the landfill project but
14	all other, or 3 or 4 other, projects of

Metalclad in which they invested in various ways and expended monies in various ways for the establishment of, in effect,

1 Metalclad business in Mexico. Isn't that 2 true?

The Witness: That's true."

Now, My Lord, if you would turn to the second table in the charts that I've provided to you, the -- this is a -- this is a -- an analysis of the interest rate calculation by the -- by our expert. We had to figure out what precisely the tribunal did.

The tribunal determined -- and I'll take you to -- to the damages part of the award in more detail. But he -- it determined that the -- the date of the expropriation was the den -- the date of the denial of a municipal permit. It didn't specify December the 5th, 1995, but that was the date it was denied, at least the first time. So it's not very precise about when it is, but -- it could be the permit denial in '96, but it's -- we take it as '95, December '95. And then they awarded pre-award interest from that up to the -- October -- up to October the 15th of the year 2000.

So our expert simply backed out the interest. And you'll see -- about the seventh or eighth line down you'll see:

"Final arbitration award, \$16,685,000."

30 THE COURT: Um-hum.

MR. THOMAS: And then he's backed out the interest. And he says that the implied interest is \$4,119,085.

So we -- by our calculation the implied original award is, up there on the top right, twelve million, six hundred and eighty-five -- six hundred and sixty-five thousand, nine hundred and fifteen dollars.

Now, if I -- I would ask you, My Lord, if you would get your copy of the award, because I'd like to just reprise what the -- what the tribunal said about what it was doing in the damages calculation.

And if you'd turn to paragraph 122, you'll

see that the -- the tribunal agrees with the parties that fair market value is best arrived at in this case by reference to Metalclad's actual

investment in the project. So there had been some argument about whether it should use a discounted cash flow analysis because Metalclad claimed \$90 million in damages and lost profits, et cetera, plus loss of market capitalization. But the tribunal decides that it should be Metalclad's actual investment in the project.

And then if you turn the page, at page 123 -- or paragraph 123, it says:

 "Metalclad asserts that it invested \$20.5 million in the landfill project basing its value on its United States federal income tax returns and auditor's work papers of capitalized cost for the landfill reflected in a table marked 'Schedule A' and produced by Metalclad as Response 7AA in the course of document discovery."

And, My Lord, we've included that in this chart here. It's right behind the implied interest rate calculation. It's a -- you'll want to look at the back of it here because it fits with the -- our analysis of the tribunal's calculation.

So this is the -- this Table 7AA is quite similar to the Table 3 that was put in the Triple A report that I started off by referring you to. Some of the numbers don't quite match, but it comes out to the same total, twenty point -- 20,474,528.

Now, if you look at paragraph 124, they record that Mexico challenges the correctness of these calculations on several grounds, one of which is the lack of supporting documentation for each expense item claimed. You'll see later on that there were more -- many more grounds, but that's what they decide.

And they decide that the tax filings of Metalclad together with the independent audit documents supporting them are to be accorded substantial evidential weight.

Then they go on to say in 125:

45	"The tribunal agrees, however, with
46	Mexico's position that costs incurred prior
47	to the year in which Metalclad purchased

1 COTERIN are too far removed from the investment."

So the tribunal will reduce the award by the amount of the costs claimed for 1991/92. So they got that part.

One -- paragraph 126, then they talk about subsequent costs. And they talk that -- about the fact that Metalclad had bundled all these other investments in there as the cost -- the direct cost of the landfill. And at the bottom of that paragraph it says, the third line up:

"The tribunal does not consider it appropriate to apply the concept of bundling in the present case. The tribunal has reduced accordingly the sum payable by the government of Mexico."

So it appears to have disaggregated these other projects.

And then paragraph 127 on remediation, they point out that since legal title of the landfill site rests with COTERIN, when -- if a payment is made under this award, it's going to come to an end, and therefore it has to relinquish that. And then it says:

"The fact that the site may require remediation has been borne in mind by the tribunal and allowance has been made for this in the calculation of the sum payable by the government of Mexico."

Now, you'll note when they go -- when they go through their damages calculation they talk about making allowance for removing pre-COTERIN activities, bun -- debundling and remediation. But they don't specify, in remediation debundling, what they've taken out.

And the problem is this, My Lord -- I'm going to take you through this. And it's -- it's illustrated very graphically in Table 3.

The starting point is the \$20,474,528; that's

- the sum that Metalclad claimed. And then
- according to paragraph 125 we are to subtract the 1991/1992 costs. So that takes off \$4,861,000.
- 45 46 47

And that yield -- yields a subtotal of \$15,613,528. Then they tell us that we are to subtract remediation as per paragraph 127.

And if you'll turn to tab 17 of the materials I've provided you, the expert for Metalclad filed this Table 4. And if you look down to the third line, you'll see that they -- they have \$1 million per year for 3 years for the remediation expense. And over the page, the expert indicates that the projected remediation expense is estimated by Metalclad, and it's expected to be advanced by Metalclad and ultimately returned to it by way of an offset of royalty payments to the original owners of the site. But he was given that figure of \$3 million for the cost of remediation by Metalclad.

Now, here's the problem: If we take off \$3 million, we get to a subtotal of \$12,613,528, but the fully debundled figure is \$12,565,915, and the difference between taking out 1991 and 1992 and remediation, and their fully debundled figure is only \$47,613.

Now, we know that the tribunal said that it did not consider bundling to be appropriate to apply in this case and it's reduced the sum payable accordingly. But it's allocated only \$47,000 for all of Metalclad's non-COTERIN, Mexico expenses and its U.S. corporate overhead for 1993 to 1996.

Now, you'll note when I took you through the cross-examination of Mr. Dabbene I was focusing on exhibits relating to expenditures made in 1993, because the tribunal said they've taken out '91 and '92. Well, Mexico challenged the idea that they should be able to pay \$180,000 to 3 directors for the issuance of a federal permit to another project and claim that as a COTERIN expense.

If we take \$180,000 off, we're below their fully debundled award by \$132,387.

And you'll recall that I mentioned that Mr. Robertson was paid that \$207,000 to leave that -- when he left the company before they acquired the -- COTERIN. If we take out the \$207,000, we already have a deficit of 339,000 --

- 45 46 47 it's 387,000 (sic). And that's just with two inappropriate items that were included as evidence of expenditures on this project.

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Now, if you tur -- skip over Table 3A, 2 because I'll come back to that, and 3B. But just 3 note, My Lord, that Table 4 is a -- an analysis of 4 what we did with Mr. Dabbene.

> We challenged over 85 percent of the accounting, consulting and legal expenses that he had in that -- in that one slice that we were given access to in that -- in those handwritten ledgers that related to 1993/94. Over 85 percent of those were challenged as being expenses that had nothing to do with COTERIN, keeping in mind that the premise that we started from, which was that this 20.5 million was for the direct cost of buying the land, buying the materials and paying for the labour and the engineering.

I -- I should point out one other thing. The tribunal finds that the date of expropriation is -- if it is December of 1995, Metalclad has also of course included in its Table 3, 1996 expenditures, and there's 1.259 million for 1996. But that's not our central concern here.

Our central concern here is the complete disconnect between what the tribunal said it was doing and what the record evidence before it, Metalclad's record evidence, for example, of remediation costs, was.

Now --

28 THE COURT: But you don't know that that's the figure that the tribunal took.

30 MR. THOMAS: The -- there's two figures on the record: \$3 million, and Metalclad had an advertisement that it published in January of 1994 saying that it had \$5 million available to remediate the site. That's the only record evidence.

> Now, they don't tell us because -- as I pointed out to you, when you go through the paragraphs, when it comes to remediation and debundling, they don't tell you what they took out.

- 41 THE COURT: And -- and they used the phrase "an 42 allowance."
- 43 MR. THOMAS: Well, that's what the record evidence 44 was.

- 45 THE COURT: Um-hum.
 46 MR. THOMAS: Now, it appears that they've subscribed
 47 to Mexico's defence that there had to be -- I

mean, they say in paragraph 122 "actual expenditures on La Pedrera." So they appear to have accepted Mexico's defence that there had to be some kind of project-specific screen applied to find the damages in terms of actual expenditures.

And so one can say, well, it's obvious that they've rejected Mr. Dabbene's testimony that they should be able to claim all these other expenditures as green field project development expenses.

But I'm going to show you why we don't believe that they acted in accordance with the governing rules of the arbitration here in terms of addressing questions that were put to them.

If you turn to Table A, or 3A, again we -we take out '91/'92, we take out remediation, we
get to 12.6. Our expert reviewed their SEC
fillings. And he found that for the years 1994/'95
they lumped all of their expenditures into Mexican
landfill development. In '93 it was a separate
line item in the final statements. And in '96
it's a separate line item. But in '93 and '94
everything's lumped into that.

Now, what happened was that in 1996 Metalclad and its auditors went back and restated the landfill expenses.

And if you look at the -- the number here on -- under the -- on this table, you'll see subtract the expenditures from May 1993 to December 1996 that were reclassified out of Mexican landfill, which -- which expenditures Mr. Dabbene admitted were included in the 20.5 million claimed investment. So for the financial year ending December -- December 31st, 1996, going back 3 years, they reclassified \$11,323,051 out of the Mexican landfill business.

Now, if you take out that, and I'll take you to Mr. Dabbene's admission, the resulting award is one million, two hundred and ninety thousand, four hundred and forty-seven dol -- four hundred and seventy-seven dollars. And that's from May '93 on. That leaves out first quarter 1993. And if you look at their own evidence for first quarter '93, they expended \$1.338 million.

Now, if you'll turn to tab 18, this is an excerpt from Mr. Dages' rejoinder report. And it's entitled "My Choice of the 1996 10K Disclosed

Balance." Keep in mind we -- we're working from
their aggregate -- their consolidated U.S.
financial statements. We don't have anything
that's project-specific given to us. So he says:

"The Metalclad December 1996 10K footnote language concerning the accounting policies pertaining to and the actual level of Metalclad's Mexican landfill investment is fairly complete and accurate as well as consistent for all years from 1994 to 1996."

And then he tooks at -- looks at note A.

"During..." 19 "...fiscal '94 the company acquired COTERIN which owns a landfill site. Capitalized cost consist of acquisition, development and construction costs, including engineering, consulting, environmental studies, permitting and legal costs associated with the landfill."

And then he says in note B:

"Included in property, plant and equipment at December 31st, 1996 is approximately \$3,875,000 representing the company's investment in its hazardous waste treatment facility in Mexico. Additionally, the company has recorded goodwill of approximately \$697,000 associated with this facility."

And then you look at -- underneath there where he has property, plant and equipment, hazardous waste treatment facilities.

Now, notice the word "facilities," because Mr. Dages has something to say about that.

And if you look at paragraph 32 of Mr. Dages' report, he says:

"Most importantly, by virtue of its separate line item identification, the..."

45	3.8 hundred "\$3,875,641, hazardous waste
46	treatment facility's balance as of December
47	31st, 1996 appears to have had some

facility-specific screen applied. Therefore, the amount presumably represents expenditures reasonably attributable to the announced 1996 Metalclad waste treatment facilities in..." progress "...in process: COTERIN, Santa Maria del Rio, Veracruz, Tamaulipas and two other additional facilities, one of which was subsequently identified as Aguascalientes.

"However, adopting such a number remains a fallback position at best for three reasons: first..."

The exact terminology is in the plural. He's talking about facilities.

"Second, claimant has not provided the detailed expenditures or support underlying the 10K balance of 3.8 million. In our prior report we note this, and we subtract out \$650,000 as the estimate of the portion of the 3.875 million attributable to disclosed land acquisitions at Santa Maria del Rio and Veracruz."

And then he talks about the auditor's opinions relating to Metalclad's consolidated financial statements taken as a whole, not to any elements. And the COTERIN facility would be an element.

And then at paragraph 36 Mr. Dages makes the point:

"The difference between claimant's 20.5 million alleged investment and my fallback, COTERIN-specific estimate is simple. It's not, however, pre-development costs, development costs, pre-acquisition development costs, or even what was capitalized versus what was expensed. We simply differ..." with re "...on specificity with regard to COTERIN.

"Claimant effectively suggests that

45	the respondent and the tribunal accept
46	virtually every 1991 to 1994 Metalclad
47	expenditure outside of the strictly

insulation business expenses as part of its alleged COTERIN investment. I suggest that the starting point must be expenditures reasonably attributable based upon unambiguous documentary evidence to the COTERIN project, the subject of the arbitration."

And then he points out that their own 10Ks and press releases are showing that during the peak COTERIN investment years on their chart, '92 to '94, they disclose four, five and ten Mexican projects respectively.

And then he points out how they change their allocation, the statement of the expenses, in paragraphs 38 and 39. And he points out that the difference in the restatement at the end of 1993 -- '96 is dramatic. At paragraph 40 he says:

"The difference is dramatic. Exhibit 5 compares the relevant line items from Metalclad's May 1996 and December 1996 10Ks. The differences attributable to the reclassification for the years ending May '94 to May '96 alone totalled \$9.4 million."

And if you look at the back of that tab, My Lord, at tab 18 there, the same tab, we include Exhibit 5 from Mr. Dages' report where he does the comparison of the lumped-in version of the expenses, which is in the upper part of the exhibit, and the restated expenses. And he points out that to the end of May '9 -- '96 they've reclassified 9.382904 out of the landfill category.

Now, if you took a -- take a look at tab 19 at line 16, the question to Mr. Dabbene:

"Did you bring the reclassification of those expenses to the tribunal's attention?

44 No.

- Are those 11 -- A. Did not change what they were there for. 45 46 47

Q. Are the 20 million part of the -- are the 11 million part of the 20.5 million? A. Yes."

Now, I'm not going to go into great detail about this, but Mr. Dages' second report spends pages analyzing Mr. Dabbene's declaration, because Mr. Dabbene doesn't attach his 1993 10K which shows that landfill's broken out. He only attaches the 1994 10K which is photocopied twice and represented as a 1993 10K and a 1994 10K, but they're different formats to the photocopy.

And he -- and he doesn't include the 1996 10K, which supports Mexico's position that you need to have some kind of project-specific screen applied. In other words, their own auditors in 1996 have -- and -- and Metalclad, have restated what should be allocable to COTERIN and the other facilities. But Mr. Dabbene's witness statement doesn't include any evidence to show that that change in classification was taking place.

So if you take out the 11 million, roughly \$11 million, you get to a resulting award, if you're using the record evidence for remediation, of \$1,290,477. And that, My Lord, is before we take into consideration first quarter 1993, because that's the -- that's the gap between what was clearly taken out by the tribunal and the May 1993 onwards expenses.

And if we just take half of what they say they spent in first quarter 1993 and take out \$669,296 we get down to \$621,181.

Now, we put this, all of this, in front of the tribunal, but there was an entirely different set of evidence that was put before the tribunal which led to an even lower number. If you look at page -- at -- at tab 20, this is a letter that was sent by the tribunal to the parties during the middle of the arbitration. And they wanted our closing submissions to be directed to certain issues. I've just included the last page where they ask some questions about valuation, and it's at -- it's their question numbered 9. It says:

"In relation to NAFTA 1110 does the
evidence support all" of the "all the
methods of determining market value

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1 referred to by the experts, e.g..." 2 3 And then if you drop down and look at number 4 2: 5 6 "...cost less depreciation." 7 8 Cost less depreciation is of cour -- is a --9 one of the --10 May I have my NAFTA? 11 -- one of the methods of valuing fair market 12 value under the NAFTA. If you look at Article 13 1110, paragraph 2, it's saying: 14 15 "Compensation shall be equivalent to the fair market value of the expropriated 16 17 investment immediately before the 18 expropriation took place." 19 20 And then the last sentence: 21 22 "Valuation criteria shall include 23 going-concern value, asset value, including 24 declared tax value of tangible property." 25 26 So the tribunal was quite properly asking 27 about costs less depreciation. And we were pleased to deal with that, because we had 28 29 requested repeatedly that Metalclad provide tax 30 returns of its Mexican subsidiaries. We had all 31 of these different ventures that were being 32 announced, and we wanted to see the tax returns.

And if you turn to tab 21, you have a table. And behind it in quite small print, but it's there just to provide you the evidence -- behind it are the Mexican tax returns for COTERIN, which owned the landfill, and ECOPSA, which was going to run the landfill.

We didn't get very far. But at -- finally the

returns were given to us.

tribunal issued an order and a few of the tax

And you'll recall, My Lord, that ECOPSA was formerly Eco Administracion. It was renamed in 1994. In May of 1994 in a reorganization

Metalclad turned Eco Administracion into ECOPSA.
 Now, Mr. Dages did a -- an exchange rate
 calculation, which is there. We put this before

the tribunal in closing. And you'll see that the declared asset value of COTERIN for December 31st, 1996, as declared to the Mexican tax authorities on that first page, is \$136,000, it's \$136,339.

And then if you look at ECOPSA, its declared tax value is \$3,295,469. And if you look up to that line three to four lines up, other fixed assets and deferred charges, there's a large chunk of the 3 million -- the 3.2 million, 1.9 -- actually, \$1,954,343. That's -- 59.3 percent of the total of the declared asset value of ECOPSA is other fixed assets and deferred charges.

Now, if you'll turn to tab 22, I'll take you to this part of the argument with the tribunal. Line 9 it starts at, on the first page, page 168.

"If you turn to Exhibit 7, you will see tax returns filed by Mr. Dabbene and Metalclad for December 1996 for COTERIN which is, of course, the company that owns the landfill and ECOPSA, which was supposed to be operating it. The name of the tax return is in a bar code in the upper right corner."

We identify that. And then we identify tab 8, which is this table which I've just shown you from Mr. Dages, where he took the tax returns and put them into a legible format. And I indicate what the values are according to their own tax returns. So Mr. Lau -- President Lauterpacht is off mic, then he comes back and he says:

"Now, just so I can get my notes straight, we've passed comparative sales and now we're on to the second situation and have been for some time, right? Yes.

In fact that's correct, Mr. President. In fact there are two parts to the second

fact there are two parts to the second one. We've dealt with the asset value. That was the \$20.5 million figure that was represented in the memorial in the Triple A report.

- Yes.
- And we dismissed that.
- 45 46 47 We've now moved to the declared tax value

1	of tangible property or other criteria
2	which is the express language of Article
3	1110. We've referred to the tax return
4	filed by the two Mexican subsidiaries.
5	Mr. Dages, by the way, would not let me
6	complete this discussion of the tax return
7	without noting that there is almost \$2
8	million of other fixed assets and deferred
9	charges. And he would not be prepared to
10	let this go as un as necessarily in any
11	way relating to the landfill. And the
12	reason of course is that we know ECOPSA
13	owns a piece of land at Santa Maria del Rio
14	that was originally purchased in 1991 for
15	the land for the incinerator that
16	Metalclad was going to build there. So we
17	were not prepared to accept that that
18	should be rolled into ECOPSA, and
19	considered to be part of the declared asset
20	value of ECOPSA.
21	President Lauterpacht: Yes, I see that,
22	1.954.
23	Mr. Thomas: Yes. Mr. Dages said he would
24	not let that go without vouching.
25	President Lauterpacht: That is the case of
26	bunching of the expenses involved
27	elsewhere. Is that right?
28	Who knows. This is the company that was
29	set up in March of 1994. You may recall in
30	the facts this is the one, this is Eco
31	Administracion which was supposed to
32	operate the incinerator at Santa Maria del
33	Rio. You'll recall I went into this in
34	some detail on Friday with Mr. Kesler. In
35	March of 1994"
36	
37	Actually, that was misspoken. It was a it
38	was May.
39	
40	"it becomes Ecosistemas del Potosi. So
41	who knows what's loaded into this in terms
42	of asset value.
43	President Lauterpacht: Okay."
11	•

45 46 47 Then Mr. Civiletti says:

"Well, do you contend that the cost

1	approach is not very helpful?
2	Well, sir, it's a lot closer to what our
3	expert believes to be the figures than the
4	20.5 or the market capitalization or the
5	DCF.
6	Arbitrator Civiletti: So depending on how
7	you calculate this and how you calculate
8	the remediation liability, it might be a
9	negative figure.
10	It's quite possible, sir.
11	Is that one of your contentions?
12	We don't have the detail.
13	The frustration here on the part it
14	comes from out of the expert's report is
15	the complete lack of detail notwithstanding
16	repeated requests. It's not for us to
17	prove up what the investment of what
18	had been expended. We have no idea and
19	we're not prepared to assume that what has
20	been spent has been spent in relation to
21	this investment."
22	
23	And then Mr. Civiletti says:
24	•
25	"Well, do you do contend that whatever
26	it is"
27	
28	If you flip over the page:
29	
30	"only those factors of cost or expenses
31	that are directly attributable to
32	La Pedrera are appropriate as
33	considerations of potential damages?
34	That's correct."
35	
36	So here we have the one of the arbitrators
37	himself saying that if you take the tax returns
38	and add the and add the remediation liability,
39	it might be a negative value. And of course we
40	we argued this, and we argued it in our
41	post-hearing submission.
42	There's nothing in the award that deals with
43	this issue, which is which is clearly seen by
44	the arbitrator as being one of the ways to value

- 45 46 47 this investment. And the NAFTA says you're -- that's one of the criteria you look at, is that -- is the declared tax -- the declared asset value in

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the tax returns.
2 THE COURT: Mr. Thomas, I think we'll take the
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      afternoon break.
4 MR. THOMAS: Okay.
5 THE COURT: I might be a -- a minute or two longer
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      than the 10 minutes. I have to talk to a couple
7
      of people during the break.
8 MR. THOMAS: Thank you.
   THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
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       adjourned for the afternoon recess.
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       (AFTERNOON RECESS)
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       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 3:10 P.M.)
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       (PROCEEDINGS RESUMED AT 3:27 P.M.)
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16 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Thomas.
17 MR. THOMAS: My Lord, thank you.
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          My Lord, I -- I finished off the discussion
19
       of the declared tax values with the point that the
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       tribunal did not address this question in the
21
       award.
          I -- I pointed out to you earlier that --
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23
       that if this act, if this application is governed
       by the International Commercial Arbitration Act,
24
25
       then the public policy ground in -- in Section 34
26
       is available to the Court.
27
          We -- I'd like to direct you to the excerpts
28
       on public policy in the analytical commentary.
29
       You recall that Mr. Foy mentioned to you that the
30
       act allows the Court to -- to look to the
31
       analytical commentary of UNCITRAL. And at tab 91
32
       there are two paragraphs that are relevant,
33
       actually three paragraphs. It's the secondary
34
       sources binder.
35 THE COURT: That's what I had first, yes, and looked
36
37 MR. THOMAS: Yes, secondary sources binder, tab 91.
       And if you'd turn to page 30 --
39 THE COURT: Sorry, mine --
40 MR. THOMAS: Yeah, tab 91 of the secondary sources.
41 THE COURT: My secondary sources starts at tab 96.
42 MR. THOMAS: Sorry, tab 9 -- no, it's tab 91.
43
          Oh, sorry, there's two of them. Just a
44
       moment, please.
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- 45 THE COURT: Oh, there's -- tab 91 in the statutes and
- 46 treaties. 47 MR. THOMAS: Yes, sorry, sorry.

At page 36, please. And, yes, at the bottom of -- of page 36, paragraph 296:

"In discussing the term 'public policy' it was understood that it was not equivalent to the political stance or international policies of a State but comprised the fundamental notions and principles of justice. It was noted, however, that in some common law jurisdictions the term be interpreted as not covering notions of procedural justice while in legal systems of the civil law tradition inspired by the French concept of order publique, principles of procedural justice were regarded as being included.

"It was observed that the divergence of interpretation might have contributed to a concern expressed earlier that paragraph 2 did not cover all serious instances of procedural injustice."

And then paragraph 297:

"The commission, after deliberation, was agreed that the provisions should be retained, subject to the..." dele "...deletion of the words or any decision contained therein which were superfluous. It was understood that the term 'public policy,' which was used in the 1958 New York Convention and many other treaties, covered fundamental principles of law and justice in substantive as well as procedural respects. Thus, instances such as corruption, bribery or fraud in similar serious cases would constitute a ground for setting aside. It was noted in that connection that the wording 'the award is in conflict with the public policy of the State' was not to be interpreted as excluding instances or events relating to the manner in which an award is arrived at."

45 46 And then over at paragraph 303 on the other 47 page:

"It was understood that an award might be set aside on any of the grounds listed in paragraph 2 irrespective of whether such ground had materially affected the award."

I'm going to submit to you, My Lord, that this commentary by the United Nations commission shows a -- somewhat of a change of attitude with respect to public policy in that it does not require a materiality requirement as the New York Convention hitherto understood required. And of course this is a guidance that is open to this Court.

Now, what should the tribunal have done with the damages situation? Again, we have to keep in mind that this is investor-State arbitration as opposed to the espousal of the claim by the investor-State. There is an extensive body of public international law that says that where States advance a claim, they're under the duty of utmost good faith when they make the claim.

And in Mexico's submission, a State that was mindful of its obligation to advance a claim in the utmost good faith would not take the investor's U.S. corporate overhead and these other projects and describe them as a \$20.5 million expenditure for the direct cost of acquiring the land and building the landfill.

Of course there's no filtering or screening of the claim by the United States in this instance. So the first question in our submission is what should the tribunal have done when it was presented with this issue of deception? And we believe that there were a variety of responses.

The first is it could have held that due to Metalclad's attempt to enhance its claim, to use the words of Secretary of State Seward, the deception in the claim rendered the claim inadmissible.

In Mexico's submission what happened here was very similar to what happened in the European Gas Turbines case where the tribunal accepted a set of expenditures which were proven to be unreliable.

- 45 46 47 And this is of fundamentally -- fundamental importance for the NAFTA parties. It cannot be right and proper for a claimant to be able to step

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into this extraordinary right which has been given to it by this treaty and misrepresent its damages. And it cannot be right to be rewarded by having the tribunal use the misrepresented sum as the point of departure for the subtraction exercise that it engaged in. And since the tribunal neglected its duty, it's -- Mexico looks 8 to the Court to exercise its corrective function.

> Now, the second approach that the tribunal could have taken was that it could have decided, well, the claim is still admissible. But it then should have subjected the damages alleged with heightened skepticism. It should have considered how the very, very low declared tax value of these two companies remained in stark disparity with great discrepancy between those numbers and the numbers that the tribunal arrived at.

And in our submission after it dawned on Arbitrator Civiletti that these other companies had been rolled into the number that had been misrepresented to the tribunal, it had a duty to examine this other record evidence. And this record evidence was not difficult to review. It was all set out in great detail by Mr. Dages' initial report filed with the counter-memorial, and his second report filed with the rejoinder.

The tribunal says that it relies upon the auditors' work payments. Well, the auditors were the ones who came back with the restatement of the expenses in 1996. And Metalclad itself filed the tax return for the Mexican tax authorities with respect to COTERIN and ECOPSA.

So in our submission the misrepresentation of the \$20.5 million figure led to a damages award which was the -- the tribunal states was supposed to be the actual expenditures on the landfill, and it did not deal with that in accordance with the record evidence which was before it which clearly gave rise to serious doubt of how you could have the -- such a disparity between these numbers.

At chart -- at Table 5, My Lord, I've just summarized five questions that we consider to be essential damages questions that could have been addressed or should have been addressed: the

effect of the misrepresentations, not only on the damages but on the credibility of the claim as a whole, and I'll be getting into this later on; the

significant discrepancy between the negative award, the -- the mis -- the reclassification of expenses; the extent to which non-COTERIN Mexican expenditures should have been debundled; payments to the Mexican government official's wife, et cetera. So these set out in very summary form what the tribunal should have been looking at in light of the evidence that was put before it.

And we submit that this damages award has to be set aside for four reasons. It was advanced in a deceptive fashion, and that cannot be consistent with the public policy of British Columbia.

In our submission it offends the most basic notions of morality and justice in British Columbia, to hold out through your expert that this is your construction cost, and to -- and to allege that in your pleadings which have been reviewed by counsel, reviewed by the CEO of the company.

It should be set aside because the tribunal failed to deal with the declared asset value of COTERIN. It should be set aside because of restatement. And there is authority in Canada that it is contrary to public policy to require the payment of an award that includes the reimbursement of bribes. And there is a decision of the Quebec Court of Appeal, I won't bother to take it to you there (sic). It's a very short decision, it's at tab 67. And it's the Transport de Cargaison case which said -- where the Quebec Court of Appeal said that if a -- an award includes repayment for bribes, it is contrary to the public policy of Quebec.

Now, My Lord, I started off the damages analysis by referring you to the ICSID cases that deal with annulment and the whole issue of establishing a question and the tribunal's obligation to deal with the question.

And in my submission what I've just taken you through with respect to, for example, the -- the tax returns illustrates the wisdom of the ICSID rule. It demonstrates why, as Dr. Broches calls it, it's a fundamental procedural protection of the parties against arbitrary decisions.

And it illustrates Dr. Broches' comment which I gave to you before, which is that he said you cannot pick and choose, the tribunal cannot pick

and choose and decide the que -- the -- the issues as if other questions had not been raised. These were raised.

Now, there's a decision of the ICSID which I -- again, I averted to before, but I just want to take you back to it. It's the MINE decision. It's at tab 38 of the cases, Volume 2, tab 38. And if you'd turn to tab -- or -- or paragraph 6.99 in the annulment decision, you'll see:

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"The committee will first mention..."

At 6.99, page 107, it said -- the paragraph begins:

 "The committee will first mention two instances in which the tribunal failed to deal with questions raised by Guinea, the answer to which might have affected the tribunal's conclusion. Failure to address these questions constituted a failure to state the reasons on which that conclusion was based."

And then if you drop down to 6.101:

"If Guinea's argument..."

And no need to go into the argument.

 "...had been accepted, it would have meant a radical reduction of the damages claim."

 And then going on further down that paragraph:

 "They raise, therefore, important issues. The tribunal either failed to consider them or did consider them but thought that Guinea's arguments should be rejected. But that did not free the tribunal from its duty to give reasons for its rejection as an indispensable component of the statement of reasons on which its conclusion was

 based."

45 46 47 And for that reason, the damages part of the

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MINE award was set aside by the annulment committee.

And in our submission that's precisely what we're talking about in this case. We have two compelling areas of evidence that have been reviewed in detail by the experts and addressed in submissions, and the award simply -- it's as if they never were raised.

Now, I'd just -- I've been told by my colleagues -- I haven't had a chance to read it, but I'm told that Metalclad has argued -- well, there's a provision of the ICSID arbitration rules that allows you to go back to the tribunal if it hasn't stated a -- reasons on a particular issue. We -- we are well aware of that. We looked at it carefully. But we also looked at what the ICSID annulment committees had to say about that.

And the -- the best statement of this is in the Amco v. Indonesia case we went over this morning. You need not turn to it, but I'll just read you (sic). It's paragraph 35, and it says:

"In the present case Indonesia alleges that the tribunal had disregarded facts and arguments which, had they been considered, could have obliged the tribunal to abandon the very bases of its award. If the tribunal had accepted as valid any of the arguments invoked in the application for annulment, their insertion in the award would have contradicted what had hitherto been the main lines of reasoning of the award. Thus, the tribunal would have been obliged to modify the rationale of the award. However, the full or partial annihilation of the reasoning and the conclusion of the award is the very task which the convention allots to an ad hoc committee created pursuant to the annulment provision.

"It follows that the remedy provided by Article 49.2 would be inadequate to cope with the allegations set out in the application before the present committee.

45	Further, in line with the international law
46	rule that a claimant does not need to
47	exhaust inadequate remedies before

resorting to remedies believed to be more efficient, Indonesia could have recourse to the annulment process. And for the above reasons, the committee reaffirms its jurisdiction."

So we looked at all of these issues, not just the issues of damages, but the issues that Mr. Foy raised where record evidence provided of -- of Metalclad's own documents which went directly against what the tribunal ended up doing. And we decided that it did not make sense to go back to the tribunal because it should be dealt with by a Court as a whole when looking at what this tribunal did.

Now, I'll speak a little bit about the other issues relating to bad faith.

You -- I should -- you'll -- you'll not be surprised, My Lord, by the fact that there's no discovery within the meaning -- as we understand it, at this type of international proceeding. And therefore the respondent is reliant upon the good faith of the claimant to provide documents requested of it. And I've already told you about the international law relating to States reviewing claims that they are about to espouse.

Now, we argued very forcefully in our post-hearing submission that the international law duties that appertain to a State should apply to the investor who is allowed to step into the steps (sic) of the State because this is such an extraordinary right to prosecute a claim. And it's in our post-hearing submission at pages 84 to 95. So we spent 11 pages of the post-hearing submission dealing with this issue.

We have identified in our outline of materials two what we call material deceptions in the pleadings. And we think that they're of fundamental importance because they related to the truth of the pleadings and the testimony provided by Metalclad. They related to the company's knowledge of a municipal permit issue. And they related to the damages issues that we just discussed.

Now, you'll recall that Mr. Foy had taken you to a passage of the memorial where Metalclad alleged that not until December 1995, December

1995, did any State or federal official -- I'm sorry, any State or local official allege that such a permit was or is needed. That's at paragraph 17 of the memorial.

Well, Mr. Foy took you to two letters from federal officials in November of 1994 which informed Metalclad of the federal view that they should apply for the municipal permit. And Metalclad was forced to admit in its reply that it was a matter of corporate record that in fact the municipality had previously denied the -- the application for the permit when it was applied for in 1991.

Now, if you look at tab 40 -- 24 of our selected evidence, you'll see a conclusion from an expert report, a different expert. This time it was a legal expert that had opined about the alleged opacity of Mexican law. And look at conclu -- the last conclusion under paragraph 5, the last paragraph:

22 "It is not clear that a municipal
23 construction permit was required for the
24 La Pedrera landfill. But given these
25 facts, we opine that if it was required, it
26 was reasonable and even highly likely that
27 Metalclad, diligently acting in good faith.

Metalclad, diligently acting in good faith, would have been unaware of this requirement."

Now, My Lord, I'm asking you, take the amended option agreement which specifically addresses the municipal permit issue and put that against an expert report that's filed with this tribunal that it was reasonable and even highly likely that diligently acting in good faith Metalclad would have been unaware of this requirement.

We think it's contrary to public policy in B.C. to allow a claimant to -- to make that kind of pleading, and -- and bring in an expert -- this is the second expert report that did it -- bring in an expert that makes a demonstrably false representation as a conclusion, when you know in

- 45 46 47 the concrete evidence, which is not supplied with the memorial, the -- the amended option agreement, that this is not Metalclad's actual knowledge at

the time that they acquire the investment.

Now, the memorial implied -- My Lord, you -- you'll recall that I -- in cross-examination the witness has admitted that nowhere in the memorial had there been any reference to the three other projects, ECOPSA, Descontaminadora and -- and Contaminantes. There was no reference to those, and there was no indication in the memorial that they were rolling in the costs for those.

And in the memorial at paragraph 13 the memo -- memorial states that Mexican -- Metalclad officers first met Mexican -- met federal officials at a conference in New York City in October of 1992.

Now, keep in mind Metalclad's issued a press release in November of '91 relating back to their -- the investment in Eco Administracion by Mr. Kesler and his colleagues in August of '91. And look at the -- and the last sentence of the paragraph states:

"Metalclad officers had studied the hazardous waste needs in Mexico with a view toward..." enter "...toward entering the market under appropriate conditions."

Well, the fact of the matter is they were already in Mexico. It wasn't studying the hazardous waste needs from the view to making the investments; it was already there.

And if you look at tab 26 of the selected extracts, this is an excerpt from Mr. Kesler's first witness statement where he testifies:

"Our interest in Mexico began in the fall of 1991. For the remainder of that year, and..." for 19 "...and 1992, we worked on a project with some executives at Ford, Bacon & Davis who wanted to build a hazardous waste incinerator in San Luis Potosi."

Well, that was his project. It wasn't their project. It was his project. And the implication of his testimony is that it's somebody else who's

- wanting to make the investment in Mexico. Well, this is the company that he and other Metalclad investor -- or Metalclad officers are shareholders
- 45 46 47

1 in that they end up selling to Metalclad.

And we say this was calculated to deceive because, number 1, by presenting the claim as if COTERIN was their first investment in Mexico, they pled that they were unaware of the municipal permit that was sprung on them two years after they made the investment.

But, as Mr. Foy has shown you with the selected extracts of evidence, the first investment that they made in the very same State of San Luis Potosi, we had evidence of two construct -- municipal construction authorizations given by other municipalities in the same State.

So if your first investment has got municipal permits, how can you plead that you're taken by surprise in your fourth investment?

This was done to lay the foundation for the claim that together with this expert's report that they didn't know about the municipal permit, that they were taken by surprise by this untransparent legal system.

Now, the second reason they did this was of course for the damages, to roll in all these other damages.

And the third reason, My Lord, is that we submit that it was done to obscure a relationship between Metalclad and a federal official who filed two witness statements on their behalf and then refused to attend to the tribunal for cross-examination.

We posed a series of questions to the tribunal in our closing about good faith. And at tab 28 you'll see submissions made there. And we actually stated:

"I do wish to conclude the legal submissions with a set of questions..."

This is at line 10:

"...if I may, because this is a matter of considerable importance to the respondent, and it is the question of the way in which the claim has been presented. Is there a

duty of candour? Did they have a duty to fairly disclose the facts surrounding the investment?"

We objected to their vexatious pleadings.

We objected to the way in which they stated the evidence. They misstated the evidence. Two significant pieces of evidence were misstated. We identify that for the tribunal.

We said they're of enormous importance to the respondent, and we'd be grateful if the tribunal would consider these in the course of making its award. Of course the award says nothing. Why is it so important? Because it's open season on the NAFTA parties if this type of behaviour is allowed to be tolerated.

We have no discovery. We're in an ad hoc tribunal, and we rely upon the good faith of a claimant. And you cannot allow claimants to misrepresent their damages, misrepresent their actual knowledge of these types of issues. It goes centrally to the issues that the tribunal was supposed to pass on.

At least if they complied with Article 53 we would know what the tribunal thinks about these questions. Perhaps the tribunal thinks it's okay; they awarded them \$12.6 million. We need to know for future claimants. These awards are of very great public significance to the NAFTA parties.

Now, the last issue, My Lord -- we're taking a -- I can do this last issue in about 20 minutes if you're -- 15 minutes or 20 minutes, and that would allow Mr. Foy to begin anew tomorrow.

31 THE COURT: Yes. Go ahead.

32 MR. THOMAS: Would you -- okay.

The last issue which was raised and addressed to the tribunal concerned this affiliation between Metalclad and a witness that it tendered.

You heard Mr. Foy refer to Mr. Rodarte Ramon. And Mr. Rodarte Ramon was the local federal environmental official in San Luis Potosi in 1991. You may recall these comments about the municipality's objecting to his arrogance.

Mr. Rodarte filed a witness statement, and it's at tab 29. And in the very last para -- it's the second-to-last paragraph, at the last page of his witness statement, he says:

45
46 "After leaving my employment as technical director of the environmental border plan,

I was hired by a subsidiary of Metalclad
 for which I worked since September of 1993
 in the capacity of external environmental
 consultant."

So he's saying in this statement that he started working for Metalclad in September '93.

And if you go to the previous page, the first full paragraph, there is a contention here in this case, a lot of disputed facts about a -- a meeting between the governor of the State with Metalclad. And if you look at that paragraph, in the -- in June of 1993, second -- second sentence:

"SEDESOL sent me to the meeting with Metalclad and Governor Sanchez Unzeuta, at which time Sanchez Unzeuta expressed his support and issued to Metalclad, quote, intention letter."

 Now, if you'll turn to tab 31, you'll see a press release issued by Metalclad on June 16th, 1993. And Mr. Rodarte Ramon has just testified that he joined Metalclad in September of '93. And one of Metalclad's many Mexican corporations is a company called CATSA. And it says:

"Metalclad..."

Et cetera,

"...has announced the recent opening of an environmental management consulting group. The consulting group, CATSA, will be a wholly owned subsidiary of Eco Metalclad and will be headquartered in Mexico City with a branch in San Lois Potosi.

Dr. Humberto C. Rodarte has been appointed the director general of CATSA."

So Dr. Rodarte is -- has been appointed the director general of CATSA on June 16th, 1993.

Now, he's testified in his first statement he actually joined Metalclad in September. And he

- testifies of course that he's been sent by the federal government to this meeting in June with the governor. 45 46 47

 Now, we became aware of this, of course, and we -- we -- we made the point in our counter-memorial that Mr. Rodarte's testimony about the meeting with the governor is not very credible because he's obviously in a conflict of interest. He apparently was still working for the government, but he'd just been announced as the director general of Metalclad's consulting firm.

Now, when we made that we had no idea what Mr. Rodarte actually was up to. And if you turn to tab 31, first of all you'll see his second witness statement. And you'll see that he's now amended in -- a clarification of dates of work. And he says in paragraph 3:

"I worked for Metalclad from June of 1993 to March of 1996."

So now he's making it clear that he was wrong to say that he was there starting in September.

And he then goes on to say he's fully aware of the law and policy of the government of Mexico precluding employees from working for private companies. And he declares that:

"At no time did I violate this..." law or policy -- or "...this policy or law."

In fact he goes on to the very end. And there had been a dispute in -- in the previous round of pleadings about Metalclad and its lawyers and counter- -- allegations and counter-allegations. And at paragraph 39 he gives character evidence about Mr. Kesler. He says:

"Unfortunately, seeking and offering bribes is too common in Mexico, especially in State and local politics and business. But this is simply out of line with everything that I know about Mr. Kesler and the people I worked..." at "...worked with at Metalclad."

Now, after he filed this witness statement,

- if you'll turn to para -- to tab 32, Mexico discovered that his wife was made a shareholder of the first investment in Mexico in August of 1991
- 45 46 47

when he was the local environmental representative for the federal government. So she was made --and it was a very closely held company. There were five -- there were four original Mexico --Mexicans, and she was added as a fifth subscribing shareholder. And then there was this company, ETI, with four American shareholders. And ETI held 49 percent. The Mexicans held 51 percent of Eco Administracion, and she was made a shareholder of 400 shares of the company. Later on of course ETI becomes part of Metalclad.

And in February of 1993 Mrs. Rodarte enters into a stock exchange agreement with Mr. Kesler on behalf of Eco Metalclad. You see the recital where she says that she's a Mexican nationale (inflection) married with Mr. Huberto -- that's a typo -- Rodarte. She identifies her address. And she's the sole and legal owner of 400 shares of series A capital stock of Eco Administracion.

This is a very unusual agreement, because she agrees to exchange her shares in Eco for shares in Metalclad. And she becomes entitled to the issuance of shares in the payment of cash when federal environmental permits are issued to Metalclad's various Mexican investments.

And it's a particularly strange agreement because she's not just entitled to the -- the payments for the permits issued to Eco; she's issued to -- she's entitled to payments of cash and shares for permits issued to other projects that she's not even a shareholder in in the first place.

And it's not just the listed ones, it's also corporations mentioned in statement 3. We don't know what statement 3 is. We've never been able to get our hands on the document.

And if you take -- take a look at page 7 of that agreement, My Lord, you'll see that she becomes entitled to a payment of 30,000 shares of Metalclad stock on the date of a final permit for construction of plant number 1 for Eco Administracion. You see that in paragraph A.

So she signs this agreement. Mr. Kesler signs the agreement. And lo and behold, about one

- 45 46 47
- or two days later, a federal permit is issued there. That's the one that also triggered the bonus payments to the Metalclad officers. And she

1 gets 30,000 shares, which our expert at the time 2 calculated to be worth about \$150,000 U.S.

> And then, as you've seen in the -- in the cross-examination of Mr. Dabbene, you saw a reference to payments in the legal expenses ledger.

7 THE COURT: Um-hum.

MR. THOMAS: Tab 34 -- sorry, 35 is a letter signed by Mr. Kesler to their Mexico City lawyer. And he 10 says that:

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> "With respect to the agreements to exchange stock in Eco Administracion, it's my suggestion we advance \$10,000 in the case of Lucia and 20,000 in the case of Jose de Jesus de la Torre so that a certain amount of cash is paid along with the delivery of the shares in Metalclad Corporation."

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By the way, we were never able to establish who Jose -- Jose de Jesus de la Torre is.

The fellow who organized these companies in the beginning gave a witness statement. He said I've never heard of this fellow. I don't know how he would be in a position to convey shares to Eco-Metalclad. But we've never been able to track that down.

Now, the secretary of environment, Julia Carabias, filed a very short statement in the rejoinder where she said I've been made a -- made aware of these -- these documents. And it appears that -- that Mr. Rodarte Ramon has committed various irregularities or irregularities committed by Metalclad in conjunction with Mr. Rodarte Ramon. And it said that she -- it caused her to be concerned as they severely affect the credibility of the company, and that they would be carrying out a detailed investigation.

The witness statement of Mr. Hermosillo is at tab 37. Mr. Hermosillo is one of the original shareholders of Eco Administracion and the subsequent two companies. He was forced out in a shareholders dispute with Metalclad in 1992/93.

- 45 46 47 And Mr. Hermosillo, in his witness statement at paragraph 10, he goes through these -- organization of these various companies. And at

paragraph 10 he says:

2 3 "I've b 4 a seri 5 not a

"I've been asked to identify Lucia Ratner, a series A shareholder in Eco, who..." is not a member of the "...who was not a member of the Mexican group and who advised whether Grant S. Kesler knew of her identity when Eco was incorporated."

This is paragraph 10:

"Lucia Ratner is the wife of Humberto Rodarte Ramon. Mr. Rodarte Ramon was a subdelegate of SEDUE in San Luis Potosi at the time that Eco was incorporated. Grant S. Kesler knew Lucia Ratner was his wife and approved of the issuance of 400 series A shares to her."

Mr. Hermosillo was identified by Metalclad as a witness whom they wished to cross-examine. And he came to Washington. And midway through the first week of the hearing he was excused from testimony. And that's at tab -- I don't need to go through it. At tab 38 you'll see the exchange between Mr. Pearce and the president of the tribunal, and the president confirming that Mr. Hermosillo, among others, has been allowed to

Then Mr. Kesler took the stand, and at tab 39, middle of the page, line 11:

"Is it your testimony that you had not known of Mr. Rodarte in August of 1991 when his wife was made a shareholder of Eco Administracion?

A. I did not know him in August 1991, nor did I know Lucia Ratner.

Q. Now, you're aware, Mr. Kesler, that Mr. Hermosillo has testified in his witness statement that he -- or that you were fully aware that Ms. Ratner was the wife of a local SEDUE environmental official.

- 45 46 47 correct?
 A. I know he testified to that. It's not correct.

1 Q. You're aware that Mr. Hermosillo was 2 in Washington yesterday available to be 3 cross-examined? 4 A. Yes." 5 6 Then later on the relationship is reviewed. 7 And I'd ask you to turn to page 109 of the 8 transcript. And at about line 8, Mr. Kesler has 9 testified in writing that he arranged a duty 10 for -- a dinner for Ms. -- Mr. Rodarte and 11 Ms. Ratner in April of '93. 12 13 "A. I indicate that's where I first met 14 her, was when we hosted a dinner for 15 Humberto and his wife and his children." 16 17 And then we go on, and we say: 18 19 "Well, how did that come to be arranged? 20 A. I believe they were in Orange County 21 to visit -- to attend Disneyland, if I'm not mistaken. We made some contact, and I 22 said let me take you to dinner. 23 24 Q. At this point you knew that Mr. Rodarte was working for the federal 25 government because he testifies that 26 27 sometime in early 1993 he introduced 28 Metalclad to the COTERIN opportunity, 29 correct? 30 A. Yes. 31 Now, Mr. Kesler, when you had dinner with 32 him in April of 1993, did the penny drop 33 that this Lucia Ratner, who was married to 34 this individual who had introduced 35 Metalclad to the COTERIN opportunity, was 36 the same Lucia Ratner who had been one of 37 the original shareholders in Eco 38 Administracion? 39 I have no recollection of it. I don't 40 remember even thinking about that or 41 thinking that. When did you realize that? 42 43 A. Realize what? 44 When did you realize that one of the

original shareholders in Eco Administracion was the wife of a local environmental official?

A. Okay. At the time we made that stock exchange agreement..." He's now referring to February of 1993. "...she was not the wife of a local environmental official. No. At that time she's the wife to the special advisor to the president of INE. A. That's correct. Q. Right? A. And we would have been aware of it at the time."

So at the time that he enters into the stock exchange agreement which provides for the payment of cash and shares to Mrs. Ratner, he's aware that Mr. Rodarte Ramon is a special advisor to the president of federal permitting authority.

We discovered some more about Mr. Rodarte. At tab 41 -- he left Metalclad's employment in 1996. And there's a -- an agreement whereby he wraps up his affairs with Metalclad. And if you look at the second page at tab 40 you'll see recital F. The parties are doing recitals. And he says that he acted as intermediary on behalf of the sellers in the sale of the shares of the capital stock of COTERIN, which is also a subsidiary of Metalclad, without the sellers having paid him the commission he agreed with them.

Obviously, we identified Mr. Rodarte Ramon, because he made some fundamental testimony with respect to assurances given to Metalclad. He's, for example, the witness who testifies that in November of 1994 Metalclad is told to humour the -- the locals and apply for the permit, it's going to be forthcoming.

We wanted to cross-examine Mr. Rodarte, and Mr. Rodarte declined to attend the hearing. So we were deprived of that opportunity.

So we have a situation where his wife receives 30,000 shares of Metalclad stock. And we were able to find two -- a letter and, it appears,

- another payment of \$10,000 each. And of course this is the -- the cash payments are rolled into the damages that are being asked of Mexico to
- 45 46 47

1 reimburse.

Now, what is the relevance of all this? Well, there's -- first of all, there's the public policy issue. But also just on the merits of the case, I want to read you just a couple of paragraphs, and then I'll complete for today. Sorry, two -- two more things, I'll -- from the witness statement of Mr. Altamirano.

Keep in mind Mr. Altamirano was the -- a federal witness -- federal official who issued the permit, the two permits for COTERIN. And his testimony -- remember, he's not called as a witness. His testimony is this, paragraph 26:

"I remember that to my great surprise in September 1993 Mr. Humberto Rodarte Ramon quit at SEDUE and became a corporate representative for Metalclad. I do not recall his official title, but my impression was that he was in charge of facilitating and accelerating the granting of permits for the La Pedrera project. Once he joined Metalclad, he facilitated the communications and translation during our discussions."

And then he goes on to say:

"I also remember that Mr. Rodarte Ramon gave the impression that he believed that they would prevail over the State and municipal concerns. He thought the influence of the federal government could tilt the decision in favour of the project."

Mr. Altamirano says:

"However, I was always careful in my position as general director to ensure that powers conferred on the federal authority to grant permits were fully exercised but never invading the local government's sphere of jurisdiction."

45 46 Now, Mr. Altamirano's statement was filed in 47 our counter-memorial before Mexico became aware of

the true nature of Mr. Rodarte's relationship both with Metalclad through his wife and with COTERIN through his commission.

Well, it's obvious that Mr. Rodarte Ramon is going to say that the federal government is going to be able to force this thing through; he's going to collect \$100,000 from the vendors, and he's also got this relationship with Metalclad. He's a consultant as well by the time he actually comes out in the open about it.

And Metal -- then the award says that Met -- it -- it accepts Metalclad's claim that it relied on good faith on federal assurances. And in paragraphs 80, 85, 87 and 88 it speaks of the assurances. And then it finds at paragraph 99:

"The totality of these circumstances demonstrate a lack of orderly process and timely disposition in relation to an investor of a party acting in the expectation that it would be treated fairly

and justly in accordance with the NAFTA."

And then it says at 107:

"These measures..."

These are the denial of the permit and the municipality's court action.

"...taken together with the representations of the Mexican federal government on which Metalclad relied amount to an indirect expropriation."

Well, we say there was no good faith reliance on assurances coming from this man. And I want to point out that on this part of the case there were no contemporaneous documents that supported Metalclad's contention about the assurances. This was a testimonial part of the case.

So we submit that it was another question that should have been addressed by the tribunal. It will be helpful for us to know for future cases

- 45 46 47 that if a -- an official who ends up giving evidence on behalf of a claimant and is in an improper relationship with the claimant is to be

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2
      important fact for the NAFTA parties to know.
3
          Well, My Lord, I said I'd take 20 minutes. I
      think that's a good place to stop for today.
5 THE COURT: Are you finished or are you --
6 MR. THOMAS: I'm pretty well finished, yeah.
7 THE COURT: I mean, I'm quite happy to have you
      complete if you wish.
8
9 MR. FOY: Check your notes and finish tomorrow.
10 MR. THOMAS: I'd like to check my notes. I may have
       a -- a very short 5, 10 minutes tomorrow.
12 THE COURT: Okay, that's fine. Whatever your
13
       preference is.
14
          If I could address timing then before we
15
       adjourn for the day, where do we sit in terms of
16
       the timing?
17 MR. FOY: Mr. Thomas will check his notes and, as he
18
       mentioned, finish. And then I will take you back
19
       to the final issues. And we'll be, I estimate, at
20
       least an hour.
21 THE COURT: Has there been any discussion as to the
22
       order of --
23 MR. COWPER: Yes. I think just --
24 THE COURT: -- of the other presenters, because the --
25
       the normal rule when there's parties to action is
26
       that all the parties that are -- are in support of
27
       a particular position go first, and then we hear
28
       the contrary parties. And I -- I read Canada's
29
       submission, and I know it sides with Mexico.
30 MR. COWPER: Yes. I think we have agreement on that
31
       and -- with a minor variation. It -- I think -- I
32
       actually think we addressed this earlier, but I
33
       think we'd agreed that Canada and Quebec would go
34
       after Mexico.
35
          The one variation on that is Mr. Giles asked
36
       my agreement to have him lifted from tomorrow so
       that he could do it on Monday on the basis he'd be
37
38
       less than a hour and -- even if he had to
39
       interrupt me. And I said that was fine just to
40
       accommodate his calendar. So I understand
41
       Mr. de Pencier's ready to go tomorrow. So if my
42
       friend is an hour in the morning or an
43
       hour-and-a-half, and Mr. de Pencier says he'll be
44
       two hours or less, then we're -- we will be in
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given weight as an ordinary witness, that's an

- shape for Monday.

 Now, I have two requests of Your Lordship.

 That may mean that there's time tomorrow for us to 45 46 47

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1
      start, and I'm quite happy to do that. I don't
2
      want to do it if it's late Friday afternoon and
3
      you're -- and -- and it's not the right time to
4
      start.
5
         I do have a second question, which is we --
6
      we will have our document ready. We have all of
7
      the binders of authorities and extracts in place.
8
      all of the tab references take some time to go.
9
      So it may not be possible to get a -- a -- an
10
       argument with all the tab references in, but I can
11
       get that for you tomorrow if you wish.
12
          So if you can give me a -- some direction on
13
       that, I'm -- I'm happy to -- to go over till
14
       Monday and start after -- after Mr. Giles goes or
15
       to give you what remains of tomorrow afternoon.
16
       I'm completely in your hands, although I -- I'd
17
       like to know now rather than tomorrow.
18 THE COURT: Part -- part of the reason that I'm making
19
       the inquiry is that I have another matter at
       9 o'clock tomorrow morning that's scheduled for an
20
21
       hour. And at the conclusion of the break,
22
       Mr. Registrar said that they had contacted the
       registry saying that they would probably need more
23
24
       than an hour, and could they attend at 4 o'clock
25
       tomorrow afternoon for I think he said 20 minutes.
       half an hour. It happens to be --
26
27 MR. COWPER: Well --
28 THE COURT: -- one of your partners.
29 MR. COWPER: -- I suggest, just to seize him of
       that -- one of my partners is doing that to me?
30
31 THE COURT: Yes.
32 MR. COWPER: Yeah, well, that's what they're like on a
33
       good day.
          Well, I -- my suggestion then is that we -- I
34
35
       won't do anything tomorrow. I will hand up
36
       Your Lordship the untabbed reference, if you'd
37
       like it.
38 THE COURT: I would like that for the weekend.
39 MR. COWPER: And so you can have that.
40
          And otherwise I think it sounds as if we're
41
       going to probably enable you to hear the other
       matter sometime in the afternoon if the schedule
42
43
       is right. Mr. de Pencier says yes. So I think
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you'll have a substantial part of the afternoon

- for the other matter.
 for the other matter.
 THE COURT: But having -- having gone down that
 route --

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MR. COWPER: Yes.
   THE COURT: -- I don't want us to lose time tomorrow
3
      which we'll need next week, in other words, we
       won't finish next week because we're --
4
5 MR. COWPER: Oh, I -- I have -- we will finish.
6 THE COURT: We will finish.
7 MR. COWPER: I -- I will finish, absolutely. No.
      No. I -- I will finish.
8
9 THE COURT: Yes, Mr. Foy?
10 MR. FOY: I just had -- I would too -- too -- I have
11
       received some draft arguments, and I too would
12
       appreciate receiving the argument that is intended
13
       to be filed as soon as possible.
14 MR. COWPER: Well, I've told my friend, I gave him
       what I -- I undertook to give him last night. I
15
16
       actually, I gather, pushed the wrong button so
17
       there was one -- at 1 o'clock in the morning I
18
       gave him 5 instead of 6 chapters, but with the --
19
       with the exception of the introduction and the
20
       final submission on the scope of relief, my friend
21
       has my argument. So I -- I -- he's got it.
22 MR. FOY: That's of assistance, My Lord.
23 MR. COWPER: And he'll get it -- he'll get it in a
24
       fancier form, but I'll give it to everybody in
25
       a -- in a bound form tomorrow.
26 THE COURT: Do I take it, Mr. Cowper, just if I could
       ask you this directly, given that you don't think
27
28
       that we have a time concern for next week, I --
29
       I -- I'm inferring or reading between the lines
30
       what you're saying is that you would prefer to
31
       wait until Monday morning to start your
32
       submissions.
33 MR. COWPER: I'm actually really eager to start, but
34
       Monday morning is fine. And the one thing that
35
       happens with Monday is that I'm -- I'm probably
36
       able to -- to get a faster start. But I'm -- I'm
       actually -- I'd actually rather start tomorrow
37
38
       afternoon, but I think the right thing to do, both
39
       in terms of getting us done and having
40
       Your Lordship fresh, if you -- if you have even --
41
       a better hour spent flipping through our argument
42
       would probably be better spent, even if it was
43
       tomorrow, rather than me starting for an hour
44
       tomorrow. But I'm -- I'm -- as I say, I'm quite
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- happy to start tomorrow afternoon and eager and
 willing to go, but I THE COURT: Well, I just wish to do whatever is the

Discussion re scheduling

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most efficient.
2 MR. COWPER: I -- I think --
3 THE COURT: I don't want to unnecessarily lose time.
4 MR. COWPER: Right. I don't think we'll be in any
5
      difficulty with time.
6 THE COURT: Very well then.
         When I have the other matter come before me
7
      tomorrow, I'll canvass with them returning at
8
      maybe 3 o'clock or something like that.
9
10 MR. COWPER: Fine, My Lord.
11 THE COURT: Thank you, counsel.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Order in chambers. Chambers is
      adjourned until the 23rd of February at 10 a.m.
13
14
15
       (PROCEEDINGS ADJOURNED AT 4:25 P.M.)
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      Charest Reporting Inc.
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      Certified Realtime Court Reporters
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      Vancouver, British Columbia
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