

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

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PAGE 01 LIMA 00711 01 OF 08 211801Z  
ACTION SCT-02

RELEASED IN PART  
B1, 1.5(D)

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-05
	NSCE-00	ARA-00	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00	L-02	AMAD-01
	TRSE-00	PM-05	PA-02	CCO-00	INRE-00	CA-02	FAA-00
	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	FAIM-01	DS-01
	DSE-00	ZOVD-00	/028 W				

-----111714 211802Z /38

P 211708Z JAN 87  
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6765  
 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
 AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
 AMEMBASSY QUITO  
 MEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
 AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA  
 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM  
 USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM  
 DEAHQS WASHDC  
 DIA WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 08 LIMA 00711

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS  
 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD  
 DEA FOR OF, PS, OF, OI  
 DIA FOR AT-5/OS-1D/DB/6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SNAR, EAID, PE  
 SUBJECT: EMBASSY VISIT TO AYACUCHO

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

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2. SUMMARY: AN EMBASSY VISIT TO AYACUCHO PROVIDED  
 ADDITIONAL INFORMATION ABOUT ACTIVITIES IN THE SOUTH-

n/a

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UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
 REVIEW AUTHORITY: SAM A. MOSKOWITZ  
 DATE/CASE ID: 27 JUL 2001 200003845

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n/a

CENTRAL EMERGENCY ZONE, INCLUDING COUNTERTERRORIST OPERATIONS, HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES, AND NARCOTICS. SECURITY IN AYACUCHO CITY HAS IMPROVED GREATLY. SENDERO HAS SHIFTED MUCH ACTIVITY TOWARD THE JUNGLE OF LA MAR (NORTH) AND EASTWARD. SENDERO UNITS MAY BE SMALLER NOW; SL VIOLENCE IS MORE SELECTIVE, ASSASSINATING DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM PERSONNEL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES. SL KILLED AT LEAST 250 PERSONS IN 1986. SECURITY FORCES ARE LOCATED IN SMALL BASES THROUGHOUT THE ZONE. GOP COUNTER-TERRORISM DOCTRINE IS NOT CARRIED OUT WELL IN PRACTICE. MILITARY-CIVILIAN RELATIONS AT LOCAL LEVEL ARE A PROBLEM, BUT THERE ARE SOME SUCCESS STORIES. TERRAIN, COMMUNICATIONS, AND, ABOVE ALL, INTELLIGENCE REMAIN FORMIDABLE OBSTACLES. DESPITE HITS TAKEN BY SL, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO END IN SIGHT TO TERRORISM OR THE MILITARY ROLE IN AYACUCHO. THERE HAS BEEN SUBSTANTIAL MIGRATION FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE. GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS DROPPED IN 1985 BUT STILL REMAINED AT SIGNIFICANT LEVELS THROUGH 1986. AYACUCHO HAD ABOUT 35 REPORTED UNRESOLVED DISAPPEARANCES IN 1986 AND AT LEAST SEVEN SUMMARY EXECUTIONS. CRITICS CLAIM THE DISPARITY IN MILITARY-SENDERO CASUALTY REPORTS (ABOUT 20 TO ONE) POINT TO GOP PRACTICE OF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS. POLICE CLAIM ARMY MISTREATMENT OF DETAINEES. GOP DEVELOPMENT EFFORTS HAVE INCREASED FIVE-FOLD BUT CONFRONT SEVERE CHALLENGE BY TERRORISTS AS WELL AS TERRAIN AND CLIMATE. POLITICAL PARTIES ARE NOT WELL DEVELOPED. COCA GROWING AND PROCESSING ARE ON THE RISE IN LA MAR, BUT POLICE STATE COUNTERTERRORIST DUTIES TAKE PRECEDENCE OVER ANTI-NARCOTICS EFFORTS. END SUMMARY.

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3. THE BIRTHPLACE OF THE SENDERO LUMINOSO (SL) TERRORISTS, PERU'S REMOTE AYACUCHO DEPARTMENT REMAINS A SOURCE OF INTEREST ABOUT TERRORISM, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND, MORE RECENTLY, NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING. POLOFF VISITED AYACUCHO CITY DECEMBER 17-19 AS PART OF OUR EFFORTS TO INCREASE DIRECT EMBASSY KNOWLEDGE ABOUT REGIONS MOST AFFECTED BY TERRORISM. VISIT INCLUDED MEETINGS WITH POLICE OFFICIALS (POLICE PROVIDED BODYGUARDS AND VEHICLE FOR VISIT);

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[REDACTED]

STAFF MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTE; AND SEVERAL LOCAL AND VISITING JOURNALISTS. OTHER ACTIVITIES INCLUDED VISIT TO DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS ON THE OUTSKIRTS OF THE CITY AND A FUNERAL MASS FOR A GOP AGRONOMIST ASSASSINATED BY SL. ATTEMPTS TO MEET WITH THE MILITARY, THE ARCHBISHOP, AND THE RELATIVES OF THE DISAPPEARED GROUP WERE UNSUCCESSFUL. (NOTE: PLEASE PROTECT ALL SOURCES).

4. TERRORISM IN AYACUCHO: CHANGES IN TACTICS AND AREAS. CONTACTS UNANIMOUSLY AGREED THAT SL URBAN OPERATIONS HAD DECLINED ENORMOUSLY SINCE 1982-84. POLICE AND CIVILIAN OFFICIALS CREDITED CHANGE TO ARMED FORCES POST-DECEMBER 1982 PRESENCE, FOLLOWED BY MAJOR 1983-85 ARMED FORCES COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS THROUGHOUT THE AYACUCHO EMERGENCY ZONE, DURING WHICH HUNDREDS OF TERRORISTS (AND ALLEGEDLY LARGE NUMBERS OF INNOCENT CIVILIANS) DIED. POLICE BELIEVED, HOWEVER, THAT SL RETAINED A LARGER URBAN PRESENCE -- PROBABLY GEARED TOWARD INTELLIGENCE WORK -- THAN ITS REDUCED URBAN OPERATIONS WOULD INDICATE. THEY WERE PARTICULARLY SUSPICIOUS OF THE STUDENTS AT HUMANGA UNIVERSITY AND INHABITANTS OF THE AYACUCHO SLUMS.

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ACTION SCT-02

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-05
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	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	FAIM-01	DS-01
	DSE-00	ZOVD-00	/028 W				

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P 211708Z JAN 87  
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA

n/a

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TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6766  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
AMEMBASSY PANAMA  
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM  
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM  
DEAHQS WASHDC  
DIA WASHDC

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TERREP

PANAMA FOR DS  
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD  
DEA FOR OF, PS, OF, OI  
DIA FOR AT-5/OS-1D/DB/6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SNAR, EAID, PE  
SUBJECT: EMBASSY VISIT TO AYACUCHO

5. SL'S RURAL PRESENCE HAD CHANGED SINCE 1984.  
ACCORDING TO DEVELOPMENT OFFICIALS AND JOURNALISTS WHO

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HAVE TRAVELED IN THE COUNTRYSIDE, SL HAS SHIFTED IN A  
GENERALLY EASTWARD DIRECTION. FORMER SL STRONGHOLDS  
IN CANGALLO AND WESTERN VICTOR FAJARDO PROVINCES ARE  
QUIETER, AS IS HUAMANGA PROVINCE. SL IS STILL PRESENT  
IN THOSE AREAS, HOWEVER. ALL MAJOR ROADS ARE SUBJECT  
TO SPORADIC SL ROADBLOCKS. TERRORISTS REMAIN VERY  
ACTIVE IN VILCASHUAMAN PROVINCE, ONE OF THEIR ORIGINAL  
REDOUBTS; IT WAS AN ARMY PATROL IN THIS AREA WHICH  
CARRIED OUT THE OCTOBER POMATAMBO AND PARCCO EXECUTIONS.  
SL IS ALSO PRESENT IN THE MOUNTAINOUS AREAS IN THE FAR  
NORTH OF AYACUCHO DEPARTMENT "ALTOS DE HUANTA"). THE  
AREA OF GREATEST SL ACTIVITY IS THE JUNGLE AREA OF  
LA MAR PROVINCE AND NEIGHBORING AREAS IN APURIMAC  
DEPARTMENT. AYACUCHO POPULATION PATTERNS HAVE SHIFTED  
ALSO. TOTAL DEPARTMENT POPULATION DECREASED FROM

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503,000 IN 1981 TO AN ESTIMATED 450,000 IN 1986. AYACUCHO CITY HAS GROWN FROM 75,000 TO ABOUT 110,000. LIMA, HUANCAYO, AND ICA HAVE RECEIVED A TOTAL OF ABOUT 50,000 MIGRANTS. RURAL POPULATION HAS DECLINED DRAMATICALLY; IN MANY AREAS, FARMERS HAVE ABANDONED ISOLATED HUTS TO LIVE IN NEARBY TOWNS.

6. CONTACTS AGREED THAT LOSSES CAUSED BY AGGRESSIVE ARMED FORCES PATROLLING WERE PRIMARILY RESPONSIBLE FOR SL'S CHANGE. IN ADDITION, THEY SAID, THE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF VIOLENCE ON CAMPESINOS -- IN LIVES, CROPS, AND FORCED MIGRATION -- HAD COST SL GRASS ROOTS SUPPORT, LEAVING SL MEMBERS EXPOSED. CAUGHT BETWEEN THE ARMED FORCES AND SL, MANY CAMPESINOS SOUGHT TO AVOID TAKING SIDES. CONTACTS SPECULATED THAT SL'S NEW GEOGRAPHICAL FOCUS MIGHT ALSO OBEY A DESIRE TO OPEN NEW FRONTS, KEEPING THE ARMED FORCES BOGGED DOWN IN AYACUCHO WHILE SL MOVED NORTH (JUNIN), SOUTHEAST (APURIMAC, CUZCO, AND PUNO), AND TO LIMA. NOTING SL'S FASCINATION WITH THE

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CHINESE COMMUNISTS, THEY SUGGESTED SL CHANGES MIGHT BE ITS OWN VERSION OF THE "LONG MARCH." THE POLICE NOTED RECENT INTELLIGENCE THAT SL HAD DISPERSED ITS LEADERSHIP TO VARIOUS CITIES BUT PLANNED TO EXPAND OPERATIONS IN AYACUCHO IN 1987.

7. SENDERO -- CHANGES IN TACTICS:

[REDACTED] SL'S MAOIST DOCTRINE HAD LED IT TO SEEK LIBERATED ZONES. ITS ATTEMPTS TO DO SO IN 1982-83 HAD COLLAPSED UNDER MILITARY PRESSURE IN 1983-84, AND SL HAD HAD TO REVERT TO GUERRILLA ACTIONS WITH SMALL, MOBILE UNITS. CONTACTS AGREED SL GENERALLY AVOIDED CONTACT NOW WITH LARGE UNITS OF THE ARMED FORCES, PREFERRING TO ATTACK SMALL POLICE POSTS AND TO AMBUSH THE OCCASIONAL ARMY PATROL (NATIONWIDE, ARMED FORCES SUFFERED ONLY 23 KILLED IN 1986 BY TERRORISTS VERSUS 84 POLICE). SL APPEARED FAR MORE SELECTIVE NOW, SETTling FOR QUALITY INSTEAD OF QUANTITY. PREFERRED TARGETS NOW INCLUDED CIVILIAN OFFICIALS, PARTICULARLY THOSE ASSOCIATED WITH CORFA. AT RANDOM ROADBLOCKS, TERRORISTS ASSIDUOUSLY CHECK IDENTITY PAPERS, IN ADDITION TO COLLECTING "WAR TAXES." PERSONS IDENTIFIED AS LINKED TO THE GOP FREQUENTLY ARE EXECUTED.

8. COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS: INTERLOCUTORS OFFERED

n/a

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A NUMBER OF OBSERVATIONS ON GOP MILITARY/POLICE OPERATIONS AGAINST SL. ACCORDING TO JOURNALISTS, GOP HAD THE FOLLOWING FORCES IN THE EMERGENCY ZONE: 2,000 PLUS SOLDIERS; 600 MARINES; 1,200 GUARDIA CIVIL POLICE; 300 INVESTIGATIVE POLICE (PIP); AND 100 GUARDIA REPUBLICANA, FOR A TOTAL OF ABOUT 4,200 MEN (NOT INCLUDED, APPARENTLY, IS A SMALL NUMBER OF AIR FORCE PERSONNEL AT THE AYACUCHO AIRPORT). (COMMENT: DAO ESTIMATES 4,500 ARMY AND MARINES; SEE PARA 9. END COMMENT.) THE NUMBER OF GUARDIA CIVIL POLICE

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ACTION SCT-02

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-05
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	DSE-00	ZOVD-00	/028 W				

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P 211708Z JAN 87  
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6767  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
AMEMBASSY PANAMA  
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM  
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM  
DEAHQS WASHDC  
DIA WASHDC

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TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS  
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD  
DEA FOR OF, PS, OF, OI  
DIA FOR AT-5/OS-1D/DB/6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SNAR, EAID, PE  
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REPORTEDLY WAS DECLINING AS THE GOP BEEFED UP ITS  
STRENGTH IN PUNO AND CUZCO DEPARTMENTS. ALL MILITARY

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
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AND POLICE FORCES WERE UNDER THE ORDERS OF THE HEAD OF  
THE AYACUCHO POLITICAL/MILITARY COMMAND, GENERAL JUAN GIL  
JARA (NOTE: REPLACED JANUARY 1 BY GENERAL JORGE  
SANCHEZ MANRIQUE.)

9. THE BULK OF THE NAVY FORCES WERE ASSIGNED TO THE  
JUNGLE AREAS OF LA MAR PROVINCE; THE ARMY HAD THE REST  
OF THE EMERGENCY ZONE, DISPERSING ITS FORCES IN  
APPROXIMATELY 50 COUNTER-GUERILLA BASES (BCG). EACH  
BASE H THREE OFFICERS AND ABOUT 50 MEN AND WAS RESPON-  
SIBLE FOR A SPECIFIED AREA; THE BASE WAS ALWAYS LOCATED  
IN AN IMPORTANT VILLAGE OR PROVINCE CAPITAL. ONE  
OFFICER AND 25 SOLDIERS WOULD PATROL WHILE THE REMAINDER  
RESTED AND GUARDED THE BASE.

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10. ADDITIONAL BASE SECURITY WAS PROVIDED BY PEASANT  
SELF-DEFENSE FORCES, KNOWN AS "RONDAS" OR  
"MONTONERAS," ALMOST ALWAYS CREATED BY THE ARMY. RONDA  
MEMBERS USUALLY WERE ARMED WITH CLUBS AND SPEARS, BUT  
SOMETIMES HAD SHOTGUNS. THEY WERE SOMETIMES USED AS  
GUIDES BY ARMY PATROLS. INTERLOCUTORS WHO HAD HAD  
CONTACT WITH THE RONDAS, INCLUDING THE DEVELOPMENT  
WORKERS AND JOURNALISTS, SAID THAT ALTHOUGH THE ARMY  
MADE SERVICE IN THE RONDAS OBLIGATORY, IT GENERALLY WAS  
ACCEPTED BY CAMPESINOS AS A NECESSARY EVIL.

11. CONTACTS AGREED THAT THE MILITARY'S RELATIONS WITH  
THE CIVILIANS IN THE COUNTRYSIDE WERE UNEVEN AT BEST.  
RACIAL AND CULTURAL DIFFERENCES WERE STRONG BETWEEN  
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OFFICERS AND CAMPESINOS. ARMY OFFICERS WERE TRAINED TO DEMAND OBEDIENCE; MANY CAMPESINOS HAD A STRONG SUSPICION OF OUTSIDE AUTHORITY. SOLDIERS FROM THE AREA WERE NEVER USED IN AYACUCHO FOR FEAR OF SL INFILTRATION AND RELUCTANCE TO GET TOUGH WITH THE LOCAL POPULATION.

12. IN AT LEAST THREE CASES, HOWEVER, BCG COMMANDERS HAD HAD OUTSTANDING SUCCESS IN WINNING COMMUNITY SUPPORT FOR COUNTER-TERRORIST OPERATIONS. BCG COMMANDERS IN THE TOWNS OF SACHABAMBA, TOTOS, AND ACOS VINCHOS HAD LOBBIED SUCCESSFULLY FOR ROADS, SCHOOLS, AND HEALTH POSTS. COMMANDERS HAD KEPT THEIR TROOPS IN LINE; IN TWO CASES, THEY SPOKE QUECHUA, THE INDIAN LANGUAGE SPOKEN BY WELL OVER HALF THE POPULATION. IN ACOS VINCHOS, ACCORDING TO A JOURNALIST WHO WAS A FREQUENT VISITOR, THE TOWNSPEOPLE RESPONDED EVENTUALLY BY IDENTIFYING SL MEMBERS (WHOM THE ARMY ALLEGEDLY ELIMINATED AFTERWARDS).

13. DESPITE SCATTERED SUCCESS STORIES, THE MILITARY STILL FACED SIGNIFICANT PROBLEMS. AYACUCHO'S BROKEN TOPOGRAPHY, A SERIES OF STEEP VALLEYS PUNCTUATED BY HIGH PLATEAUS OR JUNGLE, LIMITED THE TERRAIN THAT A BCG COULD PATROL. PATROLLING HAD DROPPED SHARPLY IN LATE 1985, FOLLOWING THE ACCOMARCA MASSACRE, BUT HAD INCREASED SINCE THEN (BUT NOT TO THE PRE-ACCOMARCA LEVELS). COMMUNICATIONS WERE NONEXISTENT IN MANY PLACES, AND HELICOPTER MOBILITY WAS ALMOST ZERO. BCG'S WERE ROTATED PERIODICALLY, ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE RONDAS COULD PROTECT THEMSELVES, BUT SL REMAINED SUPERIOR TO THE RONDAS AND, IN SOME CASES, HAD KILLED "DISLOYAL" RONDEROS ONCE THE ARMY HAD LEFT.

14. IDENTIFICATION OF THE ENEMY AND INTELLIGENCE REMAINED KEY PROBLEMS AS WELL. SL UNITS WERE SMALL AND MINGLED WITH THE POPULATION. IT WAS DIFFICULT TO MEASURE HOW MUCH POPULAR SUPPORT WAS COERCED AND HOW MUCH WAS GENUINE. THE ARMY NEEDED INFORMANTS TO

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ACTION SCT-02

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-05
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	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	FAIM-01	DS-01
	DSE-00	ZOVD-00	/028 W				

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P 211708Z JAN 87  
 FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
 TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6768  
 INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
 AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
 AMEMBASSY QUITO  
 AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
 AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
 AMEMBASSY PANAMA  
 USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM  
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 DEAHQS WASHDC  
 DIA WASHDC

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TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS  
 USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD  
 DEA FOR OF, PS, OF, OI  
 DIA FOR AT-5/OS-1D/DB/6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
 TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SNAR, EAID, PE  
 SUBJECT: EMBASSY VISIT TO AYACUCHO

IDENTIFY SENDERISTAS BUT USUALLY TRIED TO OBTAIN  
 INFORMATION THROUGH THREATS RATHER THAN PERSUASION.

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WHEN IT HAPPENED UPON PROBABLE SL MEMBERS, THE ARMY  
 GENERALLY WOULD EXECUTE THEM AFTER EXTRACTING INFORMATION,

n/a

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ACCORDING TO POLICE AND CIVILIAN CONTACTS. THERE WAS NO EFFORT TO ENCOURAGE SL MEMBERS TO TURN THEMSELVES IN. 15. HUMAN RIGHTS: CONTACTS SAID SL NO LONGER APPEARED TO ENCOURAGE BLOODY INTERCOMMUNAL VIOLENCE. MORE SELECTIVE, SL STILL PROBABLY ACCOUNTED FOR 200 PLUS CIVILIAN DEATHS AND 50 PLUS MILITARY/POLICE DEATHS IN AYACUCHO IN 1986. ALL CONTACTS AGREED THAT GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS HAD DROPPED SINCE 1983-84 BUT STILL REMAINED AT SIGNIFICANT LEVELS. THE AYACUCHO EMERGENCY ZONE ACCOUNTS FOR ABOUT 90 PERCENT OF THE 1,100 REPORTED DISAPPEARANCES ON AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL'S LIST. DISAPPEARANCES HAD DECLINED FROM ABOUT 500 PER YEAR (IN 1983 AND 1984) TO ABOUT 100 PER YEAR IN 1985 AND 1986.

[REDACTED]

B1, 1.5(D)

SEVERAL TIMES THAT MANY WERE REPORTED DISAPPEARED, BUT EVENTUALLY WERE TURNED OVER BY THE ARMY TO THE POLICE FOR INVESTIGATION AND, IN MOST CASES, THEREUPON FREED FOR LACK OF EVIDENCE. MOST OF THE DISAPPEARED IN 1986 AND PREVIOUS YEARS PROBABLY WERE SENDERO MEMBERS [REDACTED] AND NOT THE PRODUCT OF INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE. [REDACTED] NOTED FRUSTRATION WITH THE INABILITY OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM IN AYACUCHO TO ADDRESS THE MILITARY ROLE IN DISAPPEARANCES. JUDGES WHO TOOK HABEAS CORPUS ORDERS TO THE MILITARY BASE, SEEKING TO CHECK MILITARY DETENTION CENTERS, WERE NEVER ALLOWED TO ENTER.

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16. [REDACTED] DENIED THAT CHIEF ATTORNEY (FISCAL DE LA NACION) CESAR ELEJALDE HAD EXERTED PRESSURE TO COVER UP

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ABUSES IN HUMAN RIGHTS CASES (AS HAS BEEN ALLEGED); HUMAN RIGHTS ACTIVISTS [REDACTED] ARGUED OTHERWISE, NOTING VIRTUAL ABSENCE OF ANY TRIALS FOR THE PRE-1985 DISAPPEARANCES, AS WELL AS LACK OF ANY INVESTIGATION OF THE ALLEGED 1985 UMARU/BELLAVISTA MASSACRE.

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[REDACTED] DISAPPEARANCES HAD INDEED DROPPED IN 1985 AND EARLY 1986, BUT HAD PICKED UP AGAIN IN NOVEMBER WHEN PRESUMED SOLDIERS HAD "KIDNAPPED" 50 PERSONS, OF WHICH ONLY 30 HAD REAPPEARED AS OF DECEMBER.

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[REDACTED] ABOUT 50 UNIVERSITY PROFESSORS AND STUDENTS HAD DISAPPEARED

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n/a

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DURING 1986. ALTHOUGH THE GREAT MAJORITY LATER TURNED UP IN POLICE CUSTODY, ONE PROFESSOR (LUIS RIVERA ARAGON) HAD NOT BEEN SEEN SINCE MAY. SEVERAL OF THE STUDENTS CLAIMED TO HAVE BEEN BEATEN DURING ARMY CUSTODY, HE SAID.

17. ACCORDING TO POLICE OFFICIALS, THE ARMY ROUTINELY CARRIED OUT DETENTIONS IN AYACUCHO CITY AND ELSEWHERE. THEY USUALLY OCCURRED AT NIGHT, SUPPOSEDLY TO REDUCE THE NUMBER OF POSSIBLE WITNESSES, AND TO STRIKE A PSYCHOLOGICAL BLOW AT THE DETAINEE AND HIS FAMILY. THOSE DETAINEED WERE HELD INITIALLY BY THE ARMY -- NOT THE INVESTIGATIVE POLICE. A TERRORIST WHO CONFESSED OR WHO WAS CAUGHT WITH COMPROMISING EVIDENCE GENERALLY WAS EXECUTED, THEY SAID. THOSE WHO APPEARED POSSIBLY INNOCENT WERE TURNED OVER TO THE INVESTIGATIVE POLICE. MANY OF THESE SUSPECTS HAD BEEN BEATEN AND WERE TURNED OVER TO POLICE IN POOR SHAPE; IN ORDER TO PROTECT THEMSELVES FROM SUBSEQUENT ACCUSATIONS OF POLICE BRUTALITY, THE POLICE ALWAYS HAD A DOCTOR (MEDICO LEGISTA) EXAMINE SUSPECTS.

18. [ ] CONFIRMED THAT BEATINGS WERE COMMON, BUT CLAIMED THAT POLICE CARRIED THEM OUT AS WELL, ALTHOUGH NOT AS SEVERELY AS THE MILITARY. (A DIFFERENT POLICE OFFICER TOLD POLOFF IN JANUARY 1986 IN AYACUCHO THAT

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ACTION SCT-02

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-05
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	TRSE-00	PM-05	PA-02	CCO-00	INRE-00	CA-02	FAA-00
	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	FAIM-01	DS-01
	DSE-00	ZOVD-00	/028 W				

-----112123 211808Z /38

P 211708Z JAN 87  
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6769  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
AMEMBASSY PANAMA

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USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM  
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM  
DEAHQS WASHDC  
DIA WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 05 OF 08 LIMA 00711

TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS  
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD  
DEA FOR OF, PS, OF, OI  
DIA FOR AT-5/OS-1D/DB/6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SNAR, EAID, PE  
SUBJECT: EMBASSY VISIT TO AYACUCHO

POLICE ORIGINALLY HAD BEEN PRESENT IN MILITARY INTER-  
ROGATIONS OF TERRORISM SUSPECTS, BUT COULD NOT STOMACH

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THEIR METHODS; "WE USE THE THIRD DEGREE, BUT THEY USE THE  
FIFTH DEGREE -- AFTERWARDS THERE IS NOTHING LEFT.")

[REDACTED] A COLONEL IN THE GUARDIA REPUBLICANA POLICE  
HAD BRAGGED [REDACTED] OF A CASE IN WHICH HE HAD TAKEN A  
SUSPECT OUT OF THE CITY, ORDERED HIM TO DIG HIS GRAVE,  
AND THREATENED TO KILL HIM (THE COLONEL CLAIMED HE WOULD  
NOT HAVE CARRIED OUT THE THREAT). THE SUSPECT FINALLY  
CONFESSED AND WAS RETURNED TO JAIL. [REDACTED] NEVERTHE-  
LESS, INDICATED SOME SYMPATHY FOR THE POLICE'S NEED FOR  
INFORMATION FROM TERRORISTS.

B1, 1.5(D)

19. SEVERAL PERSONS -- [REDACTED] --  
BELIEVED THAT GOVERNMENT SUMMARY EXECUTIONS IN THE  
COUNTRYSIDE MIGHT HAVE DROPPED IN EARLY 1986, BUT  
POSSIBLY HAD RISEN IN LATE 1986. LITTLE INFORMATION WAS  
AVAILABLE. MUCH OF THE DEPARTMENT WAS INACCESSIBLE, AND  
TRAVEL WAS DANGEROUS. THE ARMY HAD RESTRICTED JOURNAL-  
ISTS' MOVEMENT IN SEVERAL AREAS OF CONFLICT, OSTENSIBLY  
FOR THEIR OWN SAFETY. [REDACTED] ARMY COMMUNIQES  
PLACED JULY 1985 - DECEMBER 1986 DEATH TOLL AT 553  
PRESUMED TERRORISTS, 253 CIVILIANS KILLED BY BOTH  
SIDES (I.E., ACCOMARCA VICTIMS), AND 19 SECURITY FORCES  
MEMBERS. THEY BELIEVED THE IMBALANCE BETWEEN SL AND

B1, 1.5(D)

B1, 1.5(D)

B1, 1.5(D)

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n/a

ARMY CASUALTIES REFLECTED IN OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE -- OVER 20 TO ONE -- INDICATED A PRACTICE OF SUMMARY EXECUTIONS. THEY POINTED TO OCTOBER KILLINGS AT POMATAMBO AND PARCCO, WHICH ORIGINALLY WERE CLAIMED IN ARMY COMMUNIQUE AS FIREFIGHTS, AND ONLY AFTER MEDIA INVESTIGATIONS WERE ADMITTED TO HAVE BEEN SUMMARY EXECUTIONS.

B1, 1.5(D)

21. REPORTERS SAID POMATAMBO VILLAGERS CLAIMED THE ARMY PATROL HAD A LIST OF SUSPECTED TERRORISTS, INCLUDING THE SEVEN VICTIMS. THEY SPECULATED AN INFORMER PROVIDED THE NAMES, AND AGREED THAT THOSE EXECUTED POSSIBLY WERE SENDERISTAS -- THIS WAS ONE OF SL'S OLDEST OPERATING AREAS. THE PARCCO KILLINGS APPEARED TO BE MOTIVATED BY ECONOMIC GAIN. ONE OF THOSE KILLED WAS THE CHURCH ADMINISTRATOR, AND VILLAGERS CLAIMED THE CHURCH'S CHALICE WAS TAKEN BY THE PATROL. TWO OF THE DEAD WERE OVER 80, AND TWO WERE CHILDREN (12) AND (4), UNLIKELY SL COMBATANTS. ARMY DAO CONTACT PROVIDED A DIFFERENT VERSION. HE SAID THAT SL CANGALLO UNIT LEADER WAS CAPTURED ATTEMPTING TO ESCAPE FROM A MEETING. PERSONNEL PRESENT WERE SUBSEQUENTLY CONSIDERED GUILTY BY ASSOCIATION AND EXECUTED. (LATTER VERSION DOES NOT COVER PARCCO.)

22. OBSERVERS SAID PROSPECTS FOR IMPROVEMENT OF

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GOVERNMENT HUMAN RIGHTS PERFORMANCE WERE DIM SINCE, IN THEIR VIEW, PRESIDENT GARCIA WAS UNINTERESTED IN RISKING HIS GOOD RELATIONS WITH THE ARMED FORCES.

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ACTION SCT-02

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-05
	NSCE-00	ARA-00	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00	L-02	AMAD-01
	TRSE-00	PM-05	PA-02	CCO-00	INRE-00	CA-02	FAA-00
	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	FAIM-01	DS-01
	DSE-00	ZOVD-00	/028 W				

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P 211708Z JAN 87  
FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6770  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
AMEMBASSY PANAMA  
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM  
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM  
DEA HQS WASHDC  
DIA WASHDC

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TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS  
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD  
DEA FOR OF, PS, OF, OI  
DIA FOR AT-5/OS-1D/DB/6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SNAR, EAID, PE  
SUBJECT: EMBASSY VISIT TO AYACUCHO

UNLIKE IN PUNO, THE CHURCH APPEARS TO HAVE PLAYED ALMOST NO ROLE IN AYACUCHO, DUE TO THE STRONG CONSERVATIVE VIEWS

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OF ARCHBISHOP RICHTER PRADA (HIS BROTHER WAS A PROMINENT ARMY GENERAL). AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, NONE OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES, INCLUDING THE IU, WAS CONSISTENTLY INTERESTED IN HUMAN RIGHTS. USE OF THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM WAS STYMIED BY THE MILITARY'S STATE OF EMERGENCY POWERS.

23. POLITICAL PARTIES -- THE IU: [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE LEFT TRADITIONALLY HAD BEEN STRONG IN AYACUCHO, PARTICULARLY IN AYACUCHO CITY. IT WAS WELL REPRESENTED IN THE UNIVERSITY, UNLIKE APRA, AND HAD BETTER EDUCATED CADRE. [REDACTED]

B1, 1.5(D)  
B1, 1.5(D)

[REDACTED] THE GOP-APPOINTED PREFECT WAS A CARPENTER, AND THE APRA MAYORAL CANDIDATE WAS A CHAUFFEUR). THE IU HAD BEEN AFFECTED BY THE INSURGENCY, LOSING SOME MEMBERS TO SL AND TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS. HE [REDACTED]

B1, 1.5(D)

[REDACTED] CLAIMED, AS DO MOST IU LEADERS, THAT SL WAS ITS ENEMY, ALTHOUGH SL HAS YET TO TARGET THE IU IN AYACUCHO.

B1, 1.5(D)  
B1, 1.5(D)

24. [REDACTED] REJECTED SL'S USE OF TERRORISM AND ITS "IDEOLOGICAL DOGMATISM" THAT EXCLUDED THE TRADITIONAL LEFT. IN CONTROL OF THE MAYORALTY AFTER JANUARY 1, THE IU WOULD SPEAK OUT AGAINST SL AS WELL AS GOP HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES. (MAYOR IS FERMIN AZPARRENT OF THE PRO-SOVIET COMMUNIST PARTY, PCP-U). IT WOULD SEEK MORE MEDIA ATTENTION AND MORE RESOURCES FOR THE PROVINCE. A TOP PRIORITY IS TO PRESS FOR A LIFTING OF THE STATE OF EMERGENCY AND A RESURGENCE OF CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE AREA. [REDACTED] UNDERScored THE IMPORTANCE OF THE LATTER; THE PRICE OF THE MILITARY'S ROLE IN AYACUCHO WAS THE SUFFOCATION OF CIVILIAN AUTHORITY AND THE LACK OF A POLITICAL CHALLENGE TO SL THAT WOULD COMPLEMENT THE MILITARY CHALLENGE.

B1, 1.5(D)

25. POLITICAL PARTIES -- APRA: CORFA PRESIDENT CAPPELLETTI WAS UPBEAT ABOUT HIS PARTY'S PROSPECTS.

B1, 1.5(D)

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THE IU WAS LOSING ITS TRADITIONAL APPEAL; GARCIA HAD SWEEPED THE DEPARTMENT IN 1985, AND APRA HAD INCREASED ITS VOTE DURING THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS, NARROWLY LOSING

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TO THE IU. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THERE WERE INTERNAL PROBLEMS (CONTROL OVER THE AYACUCHO PARTY IS DISPUTED BETWEEN CAPPELLETTI AND CONGRESSMAN ALBERTO VALENCIA). POINTING TO THE FIVE-FOLD INCREASE IN 1986 OF DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES FOR AYACUCHO, HE ARGUED THAT THE GOP, AND APRA, WERE OFFERING THE CAMPESINO AN ALTERNATIVE TO SL. TOTAL AID AND CREDITS ROSE FROM INTIS 296 MILLION (\$21.1 MILLION AT OFFICIAL 13.94 RATE) IN 1985 TO INTIS 1,295 MILLION (\$92.9 MILLION) IN 1986. CAPPELLETTI ADMITTED, HOWEVER, THAT BUREAUCRATIC REQUIREMENTS WOULD KEEP HIM FROM SPENDING THE ENTIRE AMOUNT ALLOCATED FOR 1986. BOTH HE AND IBARRA EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR USAID'S SUPPORT OF LOCAL PROJECTS (THROUGH LOCAL CURRENCY GENERATED BY PL 480; TOTAL ABOUT \$8 MILLION) BUT WERE CONCERNED THAT USAID SUPPORT WAS COMING TO AN END. (COMMENT: USAID WOULD BE PLEASED TO CONTINUE TO SUPPORT GOP ACTIVITIES OF THIS TYPE. END COMMENT.)

26. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: HECTOR IBARRA OF INADE WAS MORE CAUTIOUS ABOUT DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS. ALREADY HARMED BY THE 1970'S AGRARIAN REFORM, AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION HAD DROPPED CONSIDERABLY IN 1982-83 AS SL EXPANDED. THERE WAS DROUGHT IN 1984. ONLY IN 1986 HAD THE REGION BEGUN TO REACH PRE-1982 PRODUCTION LEVELS. EVEN SO, MANY STAPLES, SUCH AS CORN OR POTATO SEED, HAD TO BE IMPORTED FROM JUNIN (TO THE NORTH) OR APURIMAC (TO THE EAST), AND INADE HAD HAD TROUBLE IN GETTING PRODUCTION LOANS REPAID. CATTLE RAISING HAD DROPPED SEVERELY AND HAD NOT RECOVERED. FARMERS WERE WORRIED ABOUT 1987 SINCE THE WINTER RAINS WERE LATE. LACK OF IRRIGATION WAS AN IMPORTANT FACTOR IN AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION. IBARRA COMPLAINED THAT THE LION'S SHARE OF

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ACTION SCT-02

INFO	LOG-00	ADS-00	AID-00	INR-05	SS-00	CIAE-00	EB-05
	NSCE-00	ARA-00	NSAE-00	COME-00	SSO-00	L-02	AMAD-01
	TRSE-00	PM-05	PA-02	CCO-00	INRE-00	CA-02	FAA-00
	USSS-00	USIE-00	JUSE-00	FBIE-00	OC-02	FAIM-01	DS-01
	DSE-00	ZOVD-00	/028 W				

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P 211708Z JAN 87

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n/a

FM AMEMBASSY LIMA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 6771  
INFO AMEMBASSY BOGOTA  
AMEMBASSY LA PAZ  
AMEMBASSY QUITO  
AMEMBASSY SANTIAGO  
AMEMBASSY CARACAS  
AMEMBASSY PANAMA  
USAFSO HOWARD AFB PM  
USCINCSO QUARRY HTS PM  
DEA HQ WASHDC  
DIA WASHDC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ L SECTION 07 OF 08 LIMA 00711


TERREP

PANAMA FOR ADS  
USCINCSO ALSO FOR POLAD  
DEA FOR OF, PS, OF, OI  
DIA FOR AT-5/OS-1D/DB/6D2/JSI-4B/DB-3C1

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR  
TAGS: PTER, PGOV, PHUM, PINS, SNAR, EAID, PE  
SUBJECT: EMBASSY VISIT TO AYACUCHO

DEVELOPMENT RESOURCES WENT TO SHOWCASE PROJECTS THAT  
SOMETIMES WERE ILL-CONSIDERED.  
CONFIDENTIAL

B1, 1.5(D)



SL TARGETED

CORFA BUT NOT INADE PROJECTS AND PERSONNEL. THE REASONS, HE BELIEVED, WERE CORFA'S HIGHER PROFILE AND IDENTIFICATION WITH APRA, AND INADE'S CONCENTRATION ON SMALL PROJECTS IN CLOSE COORDINATION WITH COMMUNITIES. SL HAD STOPPED ONE INADE STAFFER IN APURIMAC BUT HAD NOT HARMED HIM.

27. NARCOTICS: SINCE THE EARLY 1980'S, COCA CULTIVATION HAS FLOURISHED IN THE SAN FRANCISCO AREA IN LA MAR PROVINCE. POLICE SAID COCA LEAVES WERE PROCESSED IN

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LOCAL LABORATORIES, AND THE PASTE EITHER FLOWN TO LIMA OR TAKEN BY TRUCK. NO CIVILIAN OR MILITARY AUTHORITY TRIED TO CONTROL TRAFFICKING -- ALL POLICE RESOURCES WERE DIRECTED AGAINST TERRORISM. STATISTICS ON PRODUCTION AND OUTFLOW OF COCA WERE UNAVAILABLE. POLICE AND CIVILIAN OBSERVERS, HOWEVER, POINTED TO NOTICEABLE PRESENCE AND WEALTH OF SMALL LA MAR LANDHOLDERS, AND OF THE AYACUCHO MERCHANTS WHO SUPPLIED THEM. POLICE SAID THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF ANY NARCO-TERRORIST TIES. INDEED, THEY NOTED THAT CAMPESESINOS IN THE LA MAR AREA HAD THE BEST RONDAS IN THE DEPARTMENT AND FREQUENTLY FOUGHT SL. (DEA COMMENT: OUR INTELLIGENCE CONFIRMS THIS INFORMATION. THERE ARE INDICATIONS THAT COCA GROWING IN NORTHERN AYACUCHO IS SPREADING TO NEIGHBORING PARTS OF JUNIN AND APURIMAC DEPARTMENTS. COCA LEAF PRODUCTION IN ALL THREE ZONES IS VIRTUALLY UNCONTROLLED. DRUG POLICE HAVE A VERY DIFFICULT TIME SECURING INFORMATION THERE. OPERATIONS IN THE EMERGENCY ZONE ARE ALMOST IMPOSSIBLE. END COMMENT.)

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28. COMMENT: WITHIN THE CONSTRAINTS OF AN OCCUPIED CITY--THE MILITARY AND POLICE PRESENCE IS HUGE--DAILY LIFE APPEARS RELATIVELY NORMAL. THERE WAS NO APPARENT TENSION OR FEAR EVIDENT IN PERSONS ON THE STREET. DESPITE AYACUCHO'S SMALL SIZE, THERE IS A STRIKING LACK OF COMMUNICATION AMONG POLITICAL AND SOCIAL LEADERS, PARTICULARLY BETWEEN NON-OFFICIAL CIVILIANS (SUCH AS THE UNIVERSITY) AND THE MILITARY COMMAND. THE MILITARY HAS A FIRM GRIP ON GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES, AND EVEN THE POLICE CHAFE UNDER THEIR CONTROL. DESPITE THE DROP IN TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN AYACUCHO CITY AND SOME OF THE COUNTRYSIDE, THERE APPEARS TO BE NO END IN SIGHT TO TERRORISM OR THE CURRENT MILITARY ROLE IN THE REGION. PART OF THE SOLUTION COULD BE TO ARM CERTAIN RONDAS, BUT THE MILITARY IS LEERY ABOUT ARMING UNTRUSTWORTHY CIVILIANS.

29. TO ITS CREDIT, THE GOP HAS INCREASED ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE EMERGENCY ZONE AS PART OF ITS MUCH-TOUTED FOUR PART COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY (MILITARY, ECONOMIC, POLITICAL, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL). COORDINATION PROBLEMS EXIST, SUCH AS THE LACK OF SUFFICIENT PROTECTION FOR ECONOMIC PROJECTS AND WORKERS. THE GOP HAS

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