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GOING TELEGRAM Department of State

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26616
DEF 12 INDIA
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FOR OC/T USE ONLY

ACTION: AmEmbassy NEW DELHI

INFO: AmEmbassy LONDON
AmConsul BOMBAY
AmEmbassy RAWALPINDI

Def 12 India

7/28/66

STATE 26616
LIMDIS

REF: New Delhi's 3056, May 10; Deptel 2296, May 24
dealing with

1. An unclassified paper ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ Cost Factors in Nuclear Weapons Development. ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ is being pouched to addressee posts under cover of an airgram referenced to this telegram. This study is an initial effort only; Washington agencies are continuing to collate and process available info.

2. We hope that discreet dissemination of data such as contained in study under reference can reinforce support within India for the GOI's no-bomb policy. At the same time, however, we are concerned at possibility of adverse repercussions within India should their use lead to a situation in which significant opinion-leading elements of the Indian public became persuaded that the U.S. Government was engaged in a QUOTE hard-sell UNQUOTE publicity campaign against bomb. In this connection, KAYSEN and LONG told

Hand by: A/INC:CSCoon:js 7/28/66

Telegraphic transmission and classification approved by: G - U, Alexis Johnson

A-Amb. Handley
I - Mr. Trevithick
A/INC-Miss Laise
DD/ISA - Col Haynes
AEC - Mr. Salzman (subs)
DOD/DIA-Col. Waddington (subs)
ACDA-Dr. Scoville/Rochlin
ACDA-Mr. de Palma
S/P-Mr. Gathright
G/PM-Mr. George
S/S-Mr. Walsh
AEC-Mr. Blumenthal (thru SCIS subs)
INR/RCT-Mr. Monaghan (Tait)
USIA-Mr. Hanson (subs)
INR/RNA-Mrs. Tait (draft)

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us that when they and other private US scientists (AAAS Arms Control Group) discussed subject with Sarabhai and other Indian leaders in Delhi in early June, Indians drew sharp distinction between independent Indian decision refrain from nuclear weapons program and a decision reached under U.S. pressure. In wake of devaluation Indian ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ sensitivity to real or imagined US pressure has only increased.

3. We would appreciate Embassy comment on this point and on tactics for using information such as that contained in the ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ paper. In this connection we would particularly welcome your assessment of relative merits of following three approaches now being considered by interested Washington agencies: (a) pass data on ~~XXX~~ private, non-attributable basis to carefully selected Indian leaders considered trustworthy and basically opposed to India going nuclear; (b) encourage, without public display USG interest, replay in India of data and related info that may appear or be caused to appear in reputable third country (eg West Europe or Japan) publications; (c) encouraging reputable private US scholars and authorities to publish articles which could be replayed for Indian audiences.

4. Also appreciate receiving report on the uses Embassy may have made of the classified data conveyed in Deptel 2296 of May 24, and the results or reactions, if any.

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5. Pending your response to this message and our reaction thereto we suggest that you not pass study being sent you to any Indian, official or otherwise, in its present form. You may, however, draw on appropriate sections of it for oral discussions that may arise on nuclear question.

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END

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