

DIRECTORATE FOR RESEARCH

S-26553/DB-2C



Date 5 November 1982

Response to Request for Intelligence

For CDR R. P. Zwart, OASD/ISA/NESA

Subject Afghan Resistance (U)

1. (U) The following is provided in response to your request
of 25 October 1982

3.

ASSESSMENT OF INSURGENT EQUIPMENT

- All six major resistance groups appear to have adequate supplies of modern assault weapons and ammunition but still lack the heavier weaponry needed to turn the military situation in their favor. Smaller groups in isolated provinces, however, are still affected by shortages of small arms and ammunition.

- While Soviets can and do temporarily disrupt the two-way flow of men and supplies through major mountain passes, we do not believe the Soviets can permanently seal off Afghanistan from the rest of the world. The rugged terrain, limited manpower thus far available to Soviet/Afghan commanders, hostility of the local populace and the resourcefulness of the resistance argue against a successful effort to permanently close the passes.

4. INSURGENT EQUIPMENT DEFICIENCIES

- Major military equipment deficiencies among resistance forces include more and better surface-to-air missiles and anti-aircraft guns, heavy machine guns, antitank missiles, antitank mines, man-pack mortars and tactical radio equipment.

5. SOVIET REACTION TO PROPERLY EQUIPPED RESISTANCE

- Soviets to alter ground support tactics. These include:

- Bombing raids conducted from higher altitudes.
- Gunships operating in consonance with other gunships or high performance aircraft in order to provide escort protection.

- Use of countermeasures such as heat flares being fired from helicopters to mislead heat-seeking missiles.

6. RESOLVE OF THE RESISTANCE FORCES

[the resistance forces could continue the insurgency for the foreseeable future at its present level against current Soviet forces. We believe the Soviets would have to double their strength to break the current stalemate. A 50,000 man increase in Soviet personnel in Afghanistan would not significantly alter the current situation. However, if a 50,000 man increment were to be concentrated in one area, it could be temporarily pacified. But when they move on to another problem area, the insurgents would probably reassert control.]

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