

not only with Tricia, but then with Pat, and then Lynda Robb and Julie, and I guess one or two others. He looked like he was having a good time and did a superb job of it.

After the bridal couple left, the P and Mrs. Nixon went upstairs and he called me up. He and Pat, Julie and Bebe, were in the West Hall, talking the whole thing over, and the P asked me for a rundown on how it had all gone. I gave him a very enthusiastic report. The P was in great spirits.

Julie wanted to watch the thing on TV, and the P said if you do, I'm going to have to leave, but we persuaded him to look at it on TV, on the NBC special which came on right at that time. He saw himself going down that aisle and made the comment that, well at least I'm standing pretty straight. Obviously the ladies in the family had been nagging him about standing up straight, and he was pleased to see himself looking pretty good. The TV was great and he realized it, so it was a good thing he did watch it, and I think that bucked him up, too. All in all, the whole thing was a sensational day.

### **Sunday, June 13, 1971**

The P spent most of the day at the EOB with Bebe, while Mrs. Nixon helped Julie pack for her departure to join David, after a reception for the Nixon and Ryan families in the morning at the Residence as a follow-up to the wedding. The family then took Julie to the airport and returned to the house for dinner.

The big deal today was a break in *The New York Times* of the reprinting of the 40-volume Vietnam Papers, that covered the whole McNamara operation. Haig called to tell me about it before I had seen the *Times*. Apparently we didn't know that the papers had been taken out and *The New York Times* has all of them except one volume of the 40. It really blasts McNamara and Kennedy and Johnson. He (*Haig*) feels that it will cause terrible problems with the South Vietnamese government. The point is that it's criminally traitorous that the documents got to *The New York Times*, and even more so that the *Times* is printing them. The *Times* says they plan to print the whole series of articles. The key now is for us to keep out of it and let the people that are affected cut each other up on it.

These were of course the "Pentagon Papers," the 7,000-page study of American involvement in Southeast Asia from World War II to 1968 which had been commissioned by Robert McNamara while he was Secretary of Defense. It was the largest leak of classified documents in American history.

### **Monday, June 14, 1971**

The day started up with some more follow-up on the *New York Times* story, which was discussed at the staff meeting. When the P called me in, he raised the point, too, that there's cause in this for everyone to be concerned, especially regarding foreign policy. As to staff leakage, etc., the P is especially concerned about Henry's staff. He thinks that we should get the story out on . . . at Brookings, who is the suspected villain.

The first suspect for the leakage was a former Defense Department employee who was then a Fellow at the Brookings Institution.

Just smoke Brookings out, using names, and demand that charges be brought. He also wanted me to talk to Haig about the staff situation, particularly with concern to the P's papers and how we're taking care of them.

### **Tuesday, June 15, 1971**

The big thing today was still the *New York Times* story follow-up, as they go on running it and the whole thing builds substantively. Mitchell went ahead last night with his request of them to cease publication; they refused. So today he went for an injunction, got a temporary restraining order, and probably will be able to get an injunction. After meeting with the P this afternoon, decided to file criminal charges. So we're pretty much in the soup on the whole thing now. The real problem is to try to establish clearly that the Administration's interest here is in the violation of Top Secret classifications rather than in the release of this particular material. The problem otherwise is that we're going to be tied into it and get blamed for the same kind of deception that was practiced by the Johnson Administration.

The P dictated a memo to me this morning, issuing orders

that there is to be no contact and no interviews by any member of the White House staff with *The New York Times* unless there is express permission from the P, which he does not intend to grant. I called all the key staff members and covered them on this, and interestingly enough, they all agreed that it was the right idea. He also felt that we should launch an attack on the *Times*; that it was a reckless disclosure of secrets and shocking breach of security. The other point that he wanted us to emphasize was that this is a family quarrel of another Administration, that they're washing their dirty linen in public and that we aren't going to get into it, but we do believe in the security of secret documents and we'll have to enforce that.

### **Wednesday, June 16, 1971**

*New York Times* reaction again dominated the day today, starting with the staff meeting, where we got into a discussion in the 8:00 meeting, with Shultz making the point that there are three main issues: the question of whether this should have been classified or declassified to begin with; the point that Top Secret material is published every day and the question of why this is any different from others; and the concern about how devious Defense and Foreign Affairs intelligence are. They're always playing a cat-and-mouse game, never a straight statement.

There's a real problem here of Johnson's pure deceit, for instance at his press conference where he said he was not doing exactly what he was doing. Another idea was that we should declassify all the material that can be declassified and announce now that we're going to do so. Do enough of a release so that we can't be accused of suppression. That, though, creates the problem of declassifying other documents or releasing them to the Senate on the basis of their being leaked or on any other basis.

The P got into this, on and off all during the day, wanted to be sure that we're making an all-out effort on editorials.

He feels that we do have to make the issue that the press is massively endangering our security, paint them as lawbreakers, disloyal, etc. That there's no question of right to know or how we got into Vietnam, but we must maintain the integrity of government.

As we were talking at midday today, he heard some kids

shouting out on the South Lawn and realized the 1,000 Rural Electrification Administration youth group were gathering to be addressed by Cliff Hardin and then taken on a White House tour. After pondering the whole thing, on and off for a while, he decided that he should go out and greet them, which he then did on a completely spontaneous and unannounced basis, and it was a big success. Now he feels he wants to do more of that kind of thing, which indeed he should.

#### **Thursday, June 17, 1971**

*New York Times* is still the major item of the day. P spent considerable time at a number of sessions with Colson, Ziegler, E, K, and various combinations of them, going over points to be made. Particularly anxious to get across that this is no skin off of our hide, this involves the Kennedy-Johnson Administrations; there are no documents from this Administration.

He asked me to tell E that he wasn't sure Mitchell should delay the grand jury. He thinks that we have to play boldly and not be afraid of the risks. Mitchell delayed it anyway; in fact, he already had when the P was talking to me.

He made the point that things were the same way in the Hiss case, that everybody will get a little jittery and want to start pulling back, but we want to fight it. This involves security.

P worked on the ideas of what he ought to say at Rochester tomorrow. His point is to speak to the policy of this Administration regarding security. We've got to enforce a law that is passed by Congress. He then mentioned to K, E, and me, that he's thinking in very big terms on this and that he may argue the case before the Supreme Court himself, to indicate the importance of it. He wants to use the line that the *Times* now says that stolen goods are fit to print. Also, he ordered Henry to get the Lodge files on the murder of Diem. Part of which is covered in the files that the *Times* has, but part of it isn't, and he thinks that we should get some of those in our possession. Apparently Lodge has the only files at this point.

#### **Friday, June 18, 1971**

Again today *The New York Times* papers is the big story.

We pretty much agreed, although Henry K was in violent

disagreement, that LBJ should go on to defend the Presidency. But then learned late this evening that Johnson had completely collapsed, was in a state of being totally unstrung, feels that the country is lost, that the P can't rule and that they're out to destroy him, etc. So that ended any participation by him.

The whole thing kept going back and forth in phone calls. E set up a meeting of the group in Washington to work on final recommendations, etc. As of late this evening, the matter was still pending consideration by the courts. There was something of a flap on the point raised by *The New York Times* that the question was now moot because *The Washington Post* had the materials, so we went into the DC court asking for an injunction against the *Post*, which was not granted and we moved immediately to the Court of Appeals. The question of whether to go into the DC court was raised by John Mitchell, calling E while we were in Rochester. John and I agreed we should go, as did Mitchell, so that was the way that was set.

First thing this morning, the P met with President (*Leopold*) Senghor of Senegal. That was supposed to be a half-hour meeting before we left for Rochester; unfortunately Senghor wasn't told that, and didn't get to the point of anything that he had planned to discuss until the meeting had been going about forty-five minutes. Also, he speaks only French, so translation was required. This, needless to say, didn't get the P off to too good a start for the day. Rochester itself went pretty well. The crowds weren't as big as we had hoped for, but then the demonstrations weren't as bad as we were afraid that they might be, either.

### **Saturday, June 19, 1971**

At Key Biscayne. The P had me over this morning for three or four hours at the Residence; he had the door open to his study so it was extremely hot. He had his bathing suit on and a sport shirt and was smoking a cigar; I had on my coat and tie. He had called me about 8:30 in the morning, talked for a few moments on the phone, and then told me to come over. I hadn't even gotten up yet, so ended up never having any breakfast. He got into a critique on the Rochester trip, feeling that we had missed some things on the motorcade operation, etc., and he had some ideas on kinds of things that he could do in these towns when we're on the road that would make

the trips more effective. Another idea that concerned him was the stock market drop, for which he was having trouble figuring the reason.

### **Sunday, June 20, 1971**

At Key Biscayne. The P was on the phone for a long time this morning, caught me over at the hotel at breakfast, then frequently on various ideas during the day as they came up, all regarding *The New York Times* case. He explained to me that in order to understand this whole thing, we have to understand the Hiss case. That they're very similar, although none of us really realizes it. In that case, too, the papers themselves didn't make any difference. They were old and outdated and unimportant; the key thing was that we got across the point that Hiss was a spy, a liar, and a Communist.

The question on this one is basically the same thing. These papers are not what are important in themselves, what is important is that someone stole them and that the *Times* printed them. He feels strongly that we've got to get Ellsberg nailed hard on the basis of being guilty of stealing the papers. That's the only way we're going to make the case of the press having done something bad and violated the law in publishing stolen documents.

We now knew that the papers had been leaked by Daniel Ellsberg, a former Pentagon aide who subsequently worked at the Rand Corporation.

### **Monday, June 21, 1971**

Still in Key Biscayne. The P went over to the Teamsters this morning on short notice, although we had tentatively worked out a plan for doing it over the last few days. He went into their executive board and constitutional committee meeting and met privately with Fitzsimmons for a few minutes beforehand. The whole thing was very cordial. He talked primarily on foreign policy, gave them a good buildup, emphasized that he was the first President since FDR to visit the Teamsters, and got a big hand for that, as he did when he said that he knew that he could always count on them for solid backing on matters of foreign policy and anything that affected the

security of the nation. It was a good session and well worth taking the time.

### **Tuesday, June 22, 1971**

The big problem currently today was the round of Senate resolutions launched by a Cook-Stevens amendment to require an end of the war in nine months. This got all hung up in a lot of parliamentary maneuvering, amendments, etc. The net result was that Cook-Stevens was amended by Stennis to put in a relatively favorable amendment for us, and then it passed on that basis. But then Mansfield offered his resolution as a substitute for it and Mansfield passed 57-42, which is a pretty strong vote and solidly against us. So we've now taken our basic defeat in the Senate on the antiwar deal.

This worried the P some, and worried Henry a great deal more. He got very cranked up about it because he really feels that this is the collapse of the country and it will mean not much chance for his negotiation in Paris this weekend, which is especially galling to him. It is contradictory on its face, because setting a deadline is totally inconsistent with a cease-fire negotiation and release of POW's. So the enemy's incentive to negotiate would be eliminated.

The *New York Times* papers question goes on. The P now wants to have Huston set up a small team under E to start rifling through all the secret documents and especially the Cuban missile crisis, etc., as well as Vietnam. And then get some newspapers to demand that it come out and also get a congressman to do so.

He got to talking on the general subject and made the point that he had a call from the *Chicago Tribune* and that they're demanding that we release and declassify World War II and Korea documents, also the Bay of Pigs and the Cuban confrontation. The P is ordering that this be done; everything that's not involved in current security.

### **Wednesday, June 23, 1971**

The P had breakfast with Mansfield this morning and apparently he relayed to him two points. First, they went into the question of the release of the Pentagon Papers, and the P worked out a deal whereby we will turn the Papers over to Mansfield and Albert and they can figure out how to handle them. This puts the heat completely on them. It fits in with

E's strategy on the basis that they will then have to hold hearings, etc., to follow up on this, which will be an enormous problem for the Democrats to figure out how to cope with.

The P then, after leading Mansfield on, and finishing that up, indirectly led him into the question of the Mansfield amendment yesterday calling for a date certain to end the war in nine months, and the P gave him a basic ultimatum regarding the harm that the Senate did. He rather happily described this to K and me and E, who was there for it, in his office. He made the point that we are in the middle of negotiations that started May 31 and we'll know within a month whether the Senate action has ruined those negotiations. If so, the P will have to go on to the people and explain that the reason for the collapse was the action of the Senate and that Mansfield will have to take that blame. He made the point to us that if we do get to the point where we have to withdraw because the negotiations failed, he will do it with a total bombing of the North to eliminate their capability of attacking, so in order to get out, we escalate to accelerate our withdrawal.

Henry was in and out several times in the morning, as he was getting ready to leave for London for his cover-up to his move on to Paris this weekend for the negotiations. The P made the point to him that he's got to get it settled, that from here on everything is based on the domestic political outlook and he's got to realize that. He makes the point, too, that with the Mansfield resolution, now maybe we have the excuse for flushing the whole deal. We had to make that decision last year, either to stand up or to flush and we made the decision to stand up, feeling that we'd never have the chance to decide it again. But now we probably do have that chance, because of the Senate resolution, and if the negotiations fail, that may be exactly what we will do.

On the release of the material, he made the point we won't compromise codes and sources, but we are going to release other materials, and he wants to have the *Tribune* start demanding papers.

Regarding the declassification of other papers, he's determined to do everything we can to our advantage, on the assumption that we have only a year to do it, for sure. He wants to move into World War II, Korea, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the Bay of Pigs, and the murder of Trujillo. He wants me to



set it up to give someone free rein in these files and put a full team on it that's absolutely trustworthy and get it all done within this next year. Also, now that we have our man in the IRS, he wants to pull the Clark Clifford file and also all the top supporters of the doves, the full list with a full field audit, and see what we can make of it on analysis.

**Thursday, June 24, 1971**

We took off at midday for the trip to Indiana, where the P did the dedication ceremony for the plaque, or historical marker, commemorating his mother's home: He gave an excellent little talk in the courthouse square, and the whole thing came off extremely well as a bit of rural Americana. There was a big crowd, very enthusiastic, heartland-type people. The principal of the school was the emcee, the little girl who was the chairman of the Junior Historical Society introduced the P, and at the end the band played "God Bless America" while everybody sang together. Then the P followed through on his plan to drive from there to Indianapolis, rather than taking the helicopter back. We had given no advance notice and our subterfuge worked well. We had only the press pool with us.

I rode in the car with the P. Unfortunately, it was hot as the dickens and, with the glass top and sides of his car, it got hotter and hotter inside. We kept looking for opportunities to stop on the unannounced route, and finally found one in the form of a little local newspaper office, where they had heard on the police radio ahead of time that we were driving in and had whipped up a sign on wrapping paper saying welcome Mr. President and Max. This referred to Max Friedersdorf of our staff, who was born in Jennings County and was a friend of the editor of the paper. The P stopped there and chatted with the newspaper staff for a little while. Then we drove on and saw a bunch of old ladies standing on the road, stopped to talk to them, and discovered they were from an old folks' home. There were quite a few people along the way, as the word got out by radio that we were coming. Overall, I think that it was well worthwhile doing it. But both the P and I were dripping wet and really hot by the time we got to the hotel in Indianapolis. Fortunately there was time to take a shower and get cleaned up. The Hovde dinner came out fine.

On to Chicago. Mayor Daley met us at Meigs Field and

you any good to come and talk to me, because I'll be tougher than he is. That's the way it's going to be.

Then he just got up and walked out, that was the end of the meeting. It was pretty impressive, for all of them. I walked out right after he did. They seemed to be very much impressed, so I think it had its effect.

**Wednesday, June 30, 1971**

We had the Court decision (*on the Pentagon Papers case*) this afternoon, and that pretty much dominated the developments. The Court went 6 to 3 against us. After the NSC meeting this afternoon, the P had Laird and Mitchell into his office and called K and me in for a discussion on the Court decision and how we should handle the reaction. Laird took the view that he should supply copies of all of the Pentagon Papers to the press because they have agreed to delete the sensitive sections. Henry argued very strongly that we have to maintain the principle of the security of government, and that we should not give the papers out.

There's a general agreement that there is very definitely a conspiracy here, on these papers, and Laird alluded to some intelligence they had that he didn't get into detail on.