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Edited by Gregory
F. Domber 1
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On April 5 Poland celebrates the twelfth anniversary of the signing
of the Round Table Agreements -- a landmark power-sharing agreement negotiated
by representatives of the Communist Polish government, leaders of the long-outlawed
union Solidarity, and leaders of the Catholic Church that allowed for the
first free elections in Eastern Europe in nearly 50 years. To mark
the anniversary, the National Security Archive is publishing a new electronic
briefing book, featuring recently declassified Department of State documents
detailing the U.S. embassy’s analysis of and participation in events during
Poland’s revolution.
The year 1989 began with a contentious Polish
United Workers’ Party (PZPR) Plenum in January that led directly to the
Round Table Negotiations from February 6 to April 5. Later, on June
4 and 18, Solidarity candidates won landslide victories in elections to
the Sejm (the lower house of the Polish Parliament) and the Senate.
These elections were followed by a presidential crisis, then a presidential
visit by George Bush on July 10-11. In a year of surprises, the Solidarity
leadership would pull off their most daring coup when in mid-August they
orchestrated a Solidarity-led coalition in the Sejm, electing Tadeusz Mazowiecki
-- a leading member of Solidarity -- as prime minister and forming Poland’s
and the Eastern Bloc’s first non-Communist government since World War II.
Ultimately, Poland would be overshadowed by events in Budapest, Prague,
and Berlin; however, it was the Poles that led the way for Eastern Europe’s
revolutions of 1989.
From the American perspective, President George
Bush has characterized American policy toward Eastern Europe during 1989
as that of a “responsible catalyst.”2
Presumably this meant that the U.S. worked to support Solidarity in its
drive to become part of the Polish government, while pushing the Communists
to give up their monopoly on power. This characterization seems correct
for the first half of the year. However, shortly before the first
round of elections on June 4, the U.S. switched gears from pushing for
change to restricting the pace of that change. Concerned that a radicalizing
public and an increasingly anxious Communist Party could plunge an unstable
Poland into chaos, Washington metamorphosed from a “responsible catalyst”
to a “reluctant inhibitor.” Thus during the crisis months of mid-1989,
as Solidarity jousted with the PZPR for control of the office of president
and then prime minister, Washington aired on the side of caution, working
to restrict Solidarity’s push for power and attempting to insure that the
Communists were not left behind. When Solidarity made their final
push for prime minister, the American’s were reluctant to take such a drastic
step. However, by that point in time there was little the U.S. could
do as Solidarity took its destiny into its own hands.
Contemporary observers, as well as scholars, have
tended to be critical of the Bush administration’s first six months in
office, during which most foreign policy decisions were put on hold until
a comprehensive policy review was completed.3
Outside of President Bush’s April 17 speech in Hamtramck, which pledged
to make the process of self-determination in Eastern Europe the central
test of Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking,” as well as to give economic
aid and moral support for the reforms occurring in Eastern Europe, America
took no new or striking policy initiatives -- prompting U.S. Ambassador
to Moscow Jack Matlock and Anatoly Chernaev, Gorbachev’s chief foreign
policy aide, to entitle the chapters in their memoirs on the first half
of 1989 “Washington Fumbles” and “The Lost Year,” respectively.4
In contrast to this perspective, the U.S. Ambassador to Poland during 1989,
John R. Davis, Jr., jokingly admits that he enjoyed the extra freedom of
movement a lack of interest from Washington afforded him.5
However, this greater freedom did not translate into any new or proactive
policy on the ground in Poland, either.
What the recently declassified cables below
show is that during the first half of the year no radical policy changes
were made in large measure because the Poles and Solidarity were making
significant progress on their own toward fulfilling American goals. Since
the declaration of martial law in December 1981, the United States had
three simple and publicly acknowledged goals: to obtain the lifting
of martial law, to gain the release of all political prisoners, and to
realize the resumption of an open dialogue between the Communist government,
Solidarity, and the Catholic Church. Martial law was lifted rather
quickly. But throughout the 1980’s the U.S. government worked both
publicly and covertly to fund, equip, and morally support Solidarity to
insure its continuing viability as a dissident voice. The Reagan
administration also utilized economic sanctions and leverage over international
lending institutions as both carrot and stick to pressure the Polish government
toward negotiations and compromise. In mid-1986, the Polish government
passed a resolution calling for the release of the last political prisoners
in a mass amnesty, fulfilling the U.S.’s second goal. Following miners’
strikes in the summer of 1988, Lech Walesa and Interior Minister Czeslaw
Kiszczak met secretly throughout the fall and winter of 1988 opening a
Solidarity-government dialogue. During a heated PZPR Plenum in January
1989, the Communist Party finally acquiesced to the last prerequisite for
further dialogue—the willingness to discuss the re-legalization of Solidarity.
Most importantly, beginning on February 6, 1989, representatives of the
Communist coalition,6 the Catholic Church,
and Solidarity sat down around a donut-shaped, round table to negotiate
Poland’s future. In the minds of American policy-makers in both Washington
and Warsaw,7 events were progressing better
than could be expected. For the first six months of 1989, there was
no need for the U.S. to change directions or push harder on the ground
in Poland.
This is not to say that the embassy staff was
sitting on their hands; on the contrary, they were sending some absolutely
spectacular bits of reporting back to Foggy Bottom, keeping Washington
extremely well informed. Throughout the Reagan years, in spite of
political roadblocks set by the Communists, John Davis and his staff worked
to maintain contact and at least limited discussion with his Communist
counterparts, so that by 1989 he had a healthy working relationship with
the PZPR.8 More importantly, the American
embassy worked to create and nurture intimate ties with the Solidarity
leadership. Throughout his tenure in Warsaw, Ambassador Davis held
frequent informal gatherings—evenings ostensibly spent socializing, watching
recent American movies, and eating large batches of beef stroganoff or
lasagna in the ambassador’s residence—allowing members of Solidarity to
meet with each other and to talk with the ambassador. By 1989 Ambassador
Davis had assumed the role of a close confidant and advisor to Solidarity’s
leadership, allowing the dissidents to act as they saw fit but nonetheless
offering his support and input on the most important issues when it was
requested.9 More importantly, the embassy’s
relationship with Solidarity’s inner circle gave American diplomats an
unusually deep understanding of the situation.
This depth of understanding is evident in most
of the cables from the first half of 1989, but it is perhaps best exemplified
by Davis’s analysis following the signing of the Round Table Agreements.
The embassy understood what the Round Table agreements and impending free
elections meant: an overwhelming victory for Solidarity. As
Davis wrote on April 19 after returning from a 10-day trip to the U.S.,
“[The Communist authorities] are more likely to meet total defeat and great
embarrassment.” Surveying the mood of the PZPR, the public, and Solidarity,
Davis sent back word to Washington that Solidarity would win, and win big.
While few others were openly predicting a “Solidarity sweep in the Senate,”
Davis clearly saw that June 4 would be nothing but an outright victory
for Solidarity. (Document No. 1)
In retrospect, the U.S. embassy’s analysis of events in this instance,
as in many others, was first rate and dead on.
In the two months between the signing of the
Round Table Agreement and the first round of elections, American satisfaction
was replaced with concern. On the eve of the first round of elections,
Solidarity’s impending electoral victory was no longer a cause for celebration—it
became a threat to the stability of the Round Table framework. Until
this point, Washington and the embassy assumed that the elections would
lead to a situation in which Solidarity and the Communists would lead jointly
over the next six years with Solidarity gaining a full voice in the government
only after subsequent elections—a slow transition toward political liberalization.10
In a June 2 cable, Ambassador Davis predicted a “nearly-total Solidarity
victory” with the Party only winning 2 or 3 Senate seats. For the
first time since the Agreements were signed, Davis even wrote about a possible
“rejection of the National List.”11
In the embassy’s analysis this type of complete victory for Solidarity
was not a positive development; instead, it “threaten[ed] a sharp defensive
reaction from the regime.” A Solidarity victory was now a “specter of utter
catastrophe” in which the reform wing of the communist Party could be humiliated
and lose its hold on power within the Party, plunging Poland into uncertainty,
a military coup d’etat, or even civil war. (Document
No. 2)
By the evening of June 5, even the Party had
acknowledged their overwhelming defeat. Solidarity had won 160 out
of 161 Sejm seats it was eligible for, as well as, 92 seats in the Senate.
More surprisingly, only 2 of a possible 35 Party candidates on the National
List received the necessary 50% of votes to be elected to the Sejm.
The specter of utter catastrophe still loomed large on the horizon, and
the American embassy quickly became concerned that a crisis might ensue
over the election of the new Polish president. According to American
calculations the Communist coalition would have only a two-vote majority
in the National Assembly. With expected defections by at least 10
Communist or Communist-coalition deputies, this gave Solidarity a majority.
So, "the assumed election of Wojciech Jaruzelski as president will be re-examined
by many" and that "if Jaruzelski is still to be elected president, it will
only be with Solidarity acquiescence if not more active support."
Because the election of Jaruzelski as president was an unwritten assumption
of the Round Table Agreements, the embassy, Washington, and many Solidarity
activists correctly felt that if Solidarity reneged on this part of the
deal, the whole framework of the agreement might fall apart. Amid
other signs of possible radicalization in the public sphere—Davis was particularly
concerned with the low voter turn out and the public’s decision to disregard
Lech Walesa’s pleas to accept the National List—it now became imperative
to insure that General Jaruzelski be elected president. In a stunning
shift of policy, the Americans were now campaigning for the Communist incumbent.
(Document No. 3)
In the next round of elections two weeks later,
Solidarity candidates won the only Sejm seat they had not yet taken and
7 of the last 8 remaining seats in the Senate they were allowed to compete
for, only strengthening the specter of a presidential crisis. Publicly,
tension continued to rise with demonstrations occurring in Krakow calling
for Jaruzelski to resign from the government. Privately, members
of the PZPR leadership began to pressure American diplomats by stating
that if Jaruzelski was not elected president it would effect the upcoming
visit of President Bush. Still other communist officials made it
clear that "military and militia officers indicated that they would feel
personally threatened if Jaruzelski were not president and would move to
overturn the Round-Table and election results."12
In direct communications between the PZPR and the Church, Kiszczak said
that if Jaruzelski "was not elected president then we would be facing a
further destabilization and the whole process of political transformation
would have to end. No other president would be [listened to] in the
security forces and in the army."13
In this increasingly tense situation, Ambassador
Davis met over dinner on June 22 with "some leading Solidarity legislators,
who had better remain nameless."14 According
to a secret cable sent the following day most Solidarity leaders felt that
"if Jaruzelski is not elected president, there is a genuine danger of civil
war ending . . . with a reluctant but brutal Soviet intervention."
However, most Solidarity leaders had also pledged publicly not to vote
for Jaruzelski, so they found themselves in a jam and came to Ambassador
Davis looking for advice. In a rather stunning example of the type
of close, advisory position the ambassador had earned within Solidarity,
Davis jotted a few numbers on the back of an embassy matchbook to explain
the “arcane western political practice known as head-counting” whereby
a large number of Solidarity delegates might not attend the election session.
The Solidarity delegates in attendance could then abstain from voting because
the Party delegates would have such an overwhelming majority. (Document
No. 4) The U.S. embassy had moved beyond a policy of concern
toward the situation and was now actively advising Solidarity on how to
elect General Jaruzelski.
By the end of June with President Bush’s visit
rapidly approaching, the newly elected government had not yet settled the
presidential crisis. In fact, General Jaruzelski began to show signs
that he was not willing to run for election, further endangering the precarious
balance. As Davis noted in his June 23 Cable:
the General is determined that he will not
‘creep’ into the presidency. He is understandably reluctant to face
another public humiliation after the defeat of Party reformers on the National
List in round one of the elections. Consequently, Jaruzelski is doing
his own head-counting and, if the numbers don’t come out right, might well
decline the nomination.15
Privately, Jaruzelski voiced his reluctance to run for president during
the 13th Plenum of the PZPR Central Committee on June 30,16
confirming Davis’s fears.
On the evening of July 9, President Bush landed
in Warsaw for a two-day visit which included private meetings with General
Jaruzelski and Lech Walesa, a reception at the Ambassador’s residence,
and the historic opportunity to speak before the Polish parliament.
In the words of the embassy, President Bush would “find himself in the
center of the world’s most pro-American country,” nearly guaranteeing that
Washington’s goal of utilizing the trip to show moral support for the reform
process in Poland would be a success. On a less positive note, Davis
also notes the Poles’ “hopes [for economic assistance that are] certain
to exceed our capacity to deliver.” (Document No. 5)17
In the private conversation between Bush and Jaruzelski at Belwedere Palace
on the morning of July 10, however, a main purpose of his trip seems to
have been to push General Jaruzelski to run for president. As President
Bush recalls:
Jaruzelski opened his heart and asked me what
role I thought he should now play. He told me of his reluctance to
run for president and his desire to avoid a political tug-of-war that Poland
did not need. I told him his refusal to run might inadvertently lead
to serious instability and I urged him to reconsider. It was ironic:
Here was an American president trying to persuade a senior Communist leader
to run for office.18
According to others present during the meeting, President Bush may have
overstated the degree to which Jaruzelski “opened up his heart,” and the
actual affects this conversation had on Jaruzelski’s thoughts are a matter
of interpretation.19 But, with these
recently declassified documents, Bush’s motivation for pushing a senior
Communist leader to run for office becomes clear -- Jaruzelski was an absolutely
necessary part of any new government if Poland were to remain stable.
Similarly, when in public with General Jaruzelski, Bush’s body language
was very open and positive towards Jaruzelski. Some observers have
commented that Bush seemed more comfortable with Jaruzelski than he did
with Walesa. In light of the fact that the U.S. embassy had been
reporting for months on the increasing radicalization of the Polish public
and the fear and concern anti-Jaruzelski demonstrations caused amongst
Party members, it was completely consistent for President Bush to demonstrate
America’s support for Jaruzelski -- anything less would have only increased
criticism and upped the tension. A week after President Bush departed
Poland for Hungary, General Jaruzelski became President Jaruzelski, narrowly
winning victory in the National Assembly by one vote.
Unfortunately, before President Jaruzelski
was even elected, Poland was already in another crisis situation, this
time surrounding the question of a prime minister and the creation of a
government. From the beginning, the U.S. embassy had assumed that
the PZPR and its coalition partners would utilize their mandated majority
to create a communist coalition government. On July 3 in the midst
of the presidential crisis, Adam Michnik, a leading Solidarity intellectual,
proposed an agreement that would allow the PZPR to retain the presidency
while a member of Solidarity would become prime minister.20
The Communists countered this offer with their own compromise to create
a “grand coalition” in which PZPR delegates would maintain control over
key power ministries such as the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Ministry
of Defense, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In return, Solidarity
delegates would receive key positions in economic and social ministries,
as well as a deputy prime minister position.
At the beginning of August, however, Walesa
openly rejected the idea of a “grand coalition” government, and Bronislaw
Geremek (another leading Solidarity figure) stated that the Solidarity
delegates would not support Czeslaw Kiszczak for prime minister.
Moreover, Lech Walesa and Solidarity leaders began to court members of
the Communist Party’s coalition partners to join a Solidarity-led coalition.
Although a few U.S. cables had mentioned the possibility of members of
the Communist coalition -- particularly the SD and ZSL -- breaking ranks
with the PZPR and voting with Solidarity,21
the reality of the situation seems to have taken Ambassador Davis by surprise.
As he recalls:
What I didn’t predict, what I couldn’t predict
was that the two satellite parties would be willing to break away and form
a government with Solidarity. ... It was an item of doctrine
with [the Solidarity leadership] that these were contemptible satellites
that had no independent views of any kind and should never be treated as
anything separate from the Party itself. That was the general view
that prevailed for many, many years. And it misled us in the end,
because [the ZSL and SD] turned out to have their own interests.
Walesa and some of his people saw this and knew how to exploit it...
It was a brilliant political maneuver.22
Walesa’s coup was effective, and by August 7 Walesa’s work had paralyzed
General Kiszczak’s efforts to create a government.
Four days later on August 11, Davis met with
Kiszczak as the crisis came near a breaking point. According to the
cable, Kiszczak “explained that Solidarity’s latest proposal that it take
over the government in coalition with the Peasant party and Democratic
Party ... was unacceptable to the senior officers of the army and police
and to the Czechs, East Germans, and Soviets.” The interior minister
continued, explaining that a Solidarity coalition was “regarded as breaking
the deal made at the Round Table” -- something the U.S. had attempted to
keep alive and viable at all costs. Kiszczak even alluded to the
recent events in Tiananmen Square, but he was not worried about a Soviet
military intervention, only the drastic effects Soviet economic measures
could have in Poland. Later in the meeting, Ambassador Davis strongly defended
the U.S. against charges that the West was behind Solidarity’s push to
take control of the government; however, he seems to have taken Kiszczak’s
warning about the crisis very seriously. As the cable concluded:
The clear message conveyed was that a Solidarity
government is not acceptable at this time although they are more than welcome
to take over a number of ministries. There was also the very thinly-veiled
appeal to the U.S. to restrain the opposition’s thrust for power, something
which is probably beyond our capacity now even if we chose to try.
I fear that food shortages and price increases here have taken the situation
right to the brink and it will take all the efforts of cooler heads of
both sides to avoid a crisis with unpredictable consequences.
(Document No. 6)
America could no longer act as the “inhibitor,” and this worried the embassy.
As events continued on their own momentum,
the embassy continued to report back to Washington but received no guidance
other than “to keep all lines of communication open” between Solidarity
and the PZPR. (Document No. 7) However,
Washington did take Kiszczak’s warnings23
seriously, and requested analysis from the U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet
Union, Jack Matlock, regarding the probable Soviet reaction to a Solidarity-led
government in Poland. Matlock’s response was really quite remarkable.
As the cable concluded:
The Soviet response to the Polish political
crisis has thus far been restrained, and barring a major misstep by Solidarity
is likely to remain so. In keeping with Soviet “new thinking” in
foreign policy, a strong reaction to Polish events does not seem to be
appropriate. ...in the final analysis, although Solidarity may be a bitter
pill to swallow, our best guess is that the Soviets will do so, if it comes
to that, after much gagging and gulping. Their essential interests
in Poland will be satisfied by any regime, Solidarity-led or not, that
can promote domestic stability and avoid anti-Soviet outbursts.(Document
No. 8)
By Matlock’s analysis, Mikhail Gorbachev’s “new thinking” had superceded
“fraternal assistance.” He now believed that the Soviets were willing
to accept a non-Communist government in Eastern Europe, so long as that
government was not anti-Soviet. Fortunately, Lech Walesa and Solidarity
had played their cards perfectly up to this point to sooth Soviet fears
by publicly stating that they would not leave the Warsaw Pact, and by recognizing
the importance of a continued, positive Polish-Soviet relationship.
Most importantly, in this August 16, 1989 cable, the embassy in Moscow
realized that the Soviet’s trump card in Eastern Europe -- military intervention
-- would no longer be used. Matlock understood that the Brezhnev
Doctrine was dead, and the Cold War would not last much longer.
With reassurances from Moscow that the situation
was not as dire as Kiszczak had made it out to be, the embassy in Warsaw
took no new action. They continued to worry about the outcome; however,
it is clear that the Solidarity leadership was now exclusively in control
of its own destiny and was no longer turning towards their friends in the
American embassy for advice. By August 19 an agreement had been reached
for a Solidarity prime minister to create a coalition government with ministers
from Solidarity, the SD, the ZSL, and the PZPR.24
(Document No. 9) The crisis officially
ended on August 24 when Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a long-time Solidarity leader,
was confirmed by the Sejm as prime minister and charged to create a government.
With that, Poland peacefully ended nearly a half-century of Communist rule.
In terms of American policy, Ambassador Davis
had successfully fulfilled the political tasks assigned to him and he requested
new orders. (Document No. 10a) Deputy Secretary
of State Lawrence Eagleberger responded, “Your next task is to promote
and ensure the realization of economic prosperity in Poland, to include
stable growth, full employment, low inflation, high productivity and a
Mercedes (or equivalent) in every garage.” (Document
No. 10b) Although Eagleberger’s comments do not lack sarcasm,
they are indicative of a fundamental change in American policy. For
the entirety of the Cold War, the U.S. sought to promote free elections
in Eastern Europe and see a popularly elected, democratic government take
control. Poland succeeded first, and a major—if not the major—prerequisite
condition of the Cold War in Europe ceased to exist. American policy
was no longer to end Soviet domination and Communist control of Poland,
but to take the next step to promote its economic growth and reintroduce
Poland into Europe. On August 24, the Cold War ended in Poland --
the rest of Eastern Europe would not be far off.
Note: The following documents are in PDF format.
You will need to download and install the free Adobe
Acrobat Reader to view.
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Document
1
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Election ’89: The Year of Solidarity,”
April 19, 1989. |
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Document
2
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Election ’89: Solidarity’s Coming Victory:
Big or Too Big?,” June 2, 1989. |
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Document
3
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, "Election '89: Solidarity's Victory
Raises Questions," June 6, 1989. |
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Document
4
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “How to Elect Jaruzelski without Voting
for Him, and Will He Run?,” June 23, 1989. |
 |
Document
5
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Poland Looks to President Bush,” June
27, 1989. |
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Document
6
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Conversation with General Kiszczak,”
August 11, 1989. |
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Document
7
Cable from Secstate to Warsaw, “Solidarity-Government Dialogue,” August
12, 1989. |
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Document
8
Cable from Moscow to Secstate, “If Solidarity Takes Charge, What Will
the Soviets Do?,” August 16, 1989. |
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Document
9
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Bronislaw Geremek Explains Next Steps
Toward a Solidarity Government,” August 19, 1989. |
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Documents
10a & 10b
Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, “Request for Instructions,” August 24,
1989; and Cable from Secstate to Warsaw, “Ambassador’s Instructions,” August
24, 1989. |
Notes
1. Source Note: Tom Blanton, director of
the National Security Archive, filed the original Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA) request that the cables referred to in this essay were declassified
in response to, as part of a larger, international study of the end of
the Cold War. These studies culminated in three critical oral history
conferences held in Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw in the summer and fall
of 1999. Context for analyzing these documents comes from the conference
sponsored by the Institute of Political Studies (Warsaw), the National
Security Archive, and the Cold War International History Project, and held
in Miedzezyn-Warsaw, Poland in October 1999. A compendium of documents
compiled for that conference was also essential in the author’s analysis:
Tom Blanton and Malcolm Byrne, ed., Poland 1986-1989: The End of
the System (Washington, D.C.: The National Security Archive, 1999);
hereafter referred to as Compendium.
This electronic briefing book is also part
of a larger Master’s thesis project on U.S. policy toward Poland from 1986-1989.
2. George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed
(New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), p. 117.
3. Robert L. Hutchings, American Diplomacy and
the End of the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center
Press, 1997).
4. Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev,
trans. by Robert English and Elizabeth Tucker (State College, P.A.:
Penn State Press, 2000), pp. 201-232; Jack F. Matlock, Jr., Autopsy of
an Empire (New York: Random House, 1995), pp. 177-200.
5. Author’s interview with John R. Davis, Jr.
(U.S. Charge d’Affaires ad interim to Poland 1983-1987, U.S. Charge d’Affaires
to Poland 1987-1988, U.S. Ambassador to Poland 1988-1990), November 23,
1999.
6. The government in Poland consisted of politicians
from a number of parties including the PZPR, the Democratic Party (SD),
and the United Peasants’ Party (ZSL). These parties worked together
in a PZPR-dominated coalition.
7. Davis interview, November 23, 1999; and author’s
interview with Thomas W. Simons (Assistant Secretary of State for the Soviet
Union, Eastern Europe, and Yugoslavia, 1986-1989), July 7, 2000.
8. See Document No. 8.
9. See Document No. 6.
10. Hutchings, p. 64.
11. The “National List” was a grouping of leading
Party officials who ran unopposed on the ballot. In order to be elected,
these candidates need only receive 50% of the vote.
12. Cable from Warsaw to Secstate, " Politburo
Member Warns that U.S. has been 'Dragged into the War' over Election of
Jaruzelski as President," June 16, 1989. (Not reproduced here.)
13. Compendium, "Chronology," p. 20.
14. Unfortunately, Ambassador Davis does not
recall which legislators these were. Author's interview with Davis,
October 5, 2000.
15. See Document No. 6.
16. Compendium, “Chronology,” p. 21.
17. Unfortunately, the cable traffic from July
1989 has not yet been declassified, so this document offers the best, however
incomplete, analysis of the build-up for the President’s trip. A
FOIA request is pending for these July cables.
18. A World Transformed, p. 117.
19. Author’s interview with Davis, November 23,
1999.
20. See Adam Michnik, “Your President, Our Prime
Minister,” Gazetta Wyborcza, July 5, 1989.
21. See Document No. 5; and cable from Warsaw
to Secstate, “Peasants’ Party Loosening Its Bonds with PZPR,” June 16,
1989. (Not reproduced here.)
22. Author’s interview with Davis, November 23,
1999.
23. It should be noted that on August 12, the
Polish charge in Washington met with Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Curtis W. Kamman to pass on a similar message of impending crisis. Cable
from Secstate to Warsaw, “Polish Charge Krystosik’s 812 Call on EUR Deputy
Assistant Secretary Kamman,” August 12, 1989.
24. In Document 9, it is interesting to note
the emphasis put on the positive role President Jaruzelski played in the
process and the fact that the Mazowiecki government was basically a grand
coalition. The “cooler heads of both sides” did prevail.
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