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DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Memorandum of Conversation

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DATE: 2 November 1966 ROME, ITALY

SUBJECT:

Vietnam

PARTICIPANTS:

Giovanni d'Orlandi, Italian Ambassador to Vietnam

W. Averell Harriman, Ambassador at Large Chester L. Cooper, Special Assistant S/AH

COPIES TO:

s/s

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DOD/SecDef WH/Rostow

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At the Fanfani lunch today, Sig. d'Orlandi, the Italian Ambassador to Saigon, indicated that he was leaving for Saigon on Friday, November 4, and would arrive on the 8th or 9th (he is stopping for several days in Cairo en route). He expected to see Lewandowsky immediately upon his arrival. Lewandowsky is scheduled to go to Hanoi on the 11th.

D'Orlandi indicated that, although he was unwell, he felt it important to return to Saigon because "the next few months may be critical" for his undertaking. He said that he had implicit trust in Lewandowsky, and that Lewandowsky was undertaking his role with the knowledge and encouragement of Moscow.

Thus far, we have provided Lewandowsky through Lodge and d'Orlandi only a series of questions as to Hanoi's interest and intentions; we have ourselves not given any indication of our own views other than those made in public statements. D'Orlandi felt that it was time now to be more specific. In particular, he said that Washington should come to grips with the problem and find out from Hanoi just what kind of regime they would settle for, what kind of guarantees they expected, and what kind of guarantees they


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would comply with. In short, d'Orlandi felt that we should face up to the kind of ultimate solution we wanted and then worry about moving toward it.

It was evident from d'Orlandi's view, that he had briefed Fanfani very well and that Fanfani in turn in his own conversation with us was incorporating many of d'Orlandi's points.

D'Orlandi indicated that in discussing the kind of government in Saigon that Hanoi would accept, Lewandowsky had told him that in a Cabinet of fourteen Ministers, Hanoi would agree to ten non-Communist middle-of-the-road-types, two of the "extreme right" and two from the Viet Cong. He also said that the latter four Ministers could be the least consequential ones.

Governor Harriman and I told d'Orlandi that we would not be back in Washington until the 9th and that if possible he should try to get Lewandowsky to postpone his departure for Hanoi for several days to provide us with an opportunity to communicate with him through Lodge if we had something meaningful to forward. D'Orlandi agreed to do this and was confident that Lewandowsky would postpone his trip.

CLCooper:hbs

