

DEF 18-3 FIN (HE)

Department of State

TELEGRAM

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53-42:

ACTION: ACDA-06

INFO: OCT-01 S5-20 EUR-12 INR-06 10-04 L-02 PM-03: NSC-14

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R: 281785Z NOV 69: FH AMEMBARSY HELSINKI TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2158 INFO USHISSION NATO: AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

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LIMDIS

SALTO 52

SUBJECT SIXTH SALT MEETING SEMENOV STATEMENT


FOLLOWING IS DUR TRANSLATION OF SEMENOV STATEMENT AT SIXTH

STATEMENT OF MR. SEMENDY 11/28/69

AS: AGREED: AT OUR: LAST MEETING. TODAY WE: INTEND: TO EXAMINE THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC DEFENSEIVE WEAPONS, I.E., ANTI-BALLISTIC: MISSILE: DEFENSE SYSTEMS.

WE NOTED EARLIER THAT THE RANGE OF PROBLEMS WHICH, IN OUR OPINION, SHOULD BE DISCUSSED AT THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS SHOULD INCLUDE QUESTIONS RELATED TO OFFENSIVE, AS WELL AS DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC MEAPONS. THIS HOULD ALSO BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WHICH PRECEDED OUR PRESENT TALKS DURING WHICH IT WAS AGREED TO DISCUSS ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS ALONG WITH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

AS' NE GATHERED FROM YOUR STATEMENTS, MR. SMITH, THE AMERICAN DELEGATION PROCEEDS ON THE SAME PREMISE.



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
IN EARLIER: STATEMENTS: WE EXPRESSED THE VIEW THAT STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE WEAPONS: SHOULD BE CONSIDERED IN THEIR INTERRELATIONSHIP. THE REASON FOR SUCH AN APPROACH IS THAT THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS HAS: ALWAYS: GENERATED CORRESPONDING DEFENSIVE WEAPONS, WHILE THE LATTER, IN THEIR TURN, STIMULATED QUANTITATIVE INCREASES AND IMPROVEMENTS IN OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. THIS IS CONFIRMED BY THE ENTIRE HISTORY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF MILITARY TECHNOLOGY. IT IS ALSO CONFIRMED BY WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT IN THE RECENT PAST.

IN CONTEMPORARY CTROUMSTANCES: AN ESSENTIAL CHARACTERISTIC OF THIS PROCESS IS: THAT THE DEVELOPMENT AND IMPROVEMENT OF ANY TYPE OF STRATEGIC SYSTEM, WHETHER OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE, MAY MUCH MORE QUICKLY AND DEEPLY AFFECT THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION AND REFLECT ON THE SECURITY OF ONE SIDE OR THE OTHER ACCORDINGLY.

IN CONSIDERING ABM DEFENSE QUESTIONS, IT WOULD APPARENTLY BE CORRECT TO PROCEED FROM THE PREBISE THAT DEPLOYMENT OF SUCH SYSTEMS COULD HAVE A CORRESPONDING INFLUENCE UPON THE COMPOSITIONS AS WELL AS THE LEWELS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. WE TAKE THIS TO BE THE MEANING OF THE CONCERN THAT YOU, MR. SMITH, EXPRESSED IN YOUR STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 20 TO THE EFFECT THAT DEPLOYMENT OF DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS BY ONE SIDE COULD MOTIVATE THE OTHER SIDE TO A COMPENSATING INCREASE OR IMPROVEMENT IN ITS OFFENSIVE FORCES.

IT MUST BE ASSUMED THAT IF ONE SIDE DEPLOYED AN ABM DEFENSE SYSTEM, THE OTHER WOULD TAKE STEPS TO ENHANCE THE COMBAT CARABILITIES OF ITS STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. IN DOING SO, IT WOULD EXPHASIZE THOSE TYPES OF WEAPONS WHICH IT CONSIDERS MUST EFFECTIVE IN THE SITUATION THAT HAD EVOLVED AND THIS MIGHT BE ACCOMPLISHED ALONG DIFFERENT LINES. ONE SUCH LINE MIGHT BE ADDITIONAL DEPLOYMENTS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, EQUIPPED, MOREOVER, WITH PENE TRATION AIDS AGAINST ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSES, ANOTHER LINE COULD BE THE DEVELOPMENT OF APPROPRIATE MEANS OF DEFENSE AGAINST NUCLEAR MISSILE ATTACK. A COMBINED APPROACH IS ALSO POSSIBLE.

AS A RESULT. AT THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS WE SHOULD MAKE AN OBJECTIVE EVALUATIONS OF ALL THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE INFLUENCE ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE SYSTEMS HAVE UPON THE OVERALL BRUANCE OF



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STRATEGIC FORCES WITH A VIEW TO DEVELOPING A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE APPROACH TO THE SOLUTION OF THIS IMPORTANT PROBLEM.

FROM THIS VIEWPOINT IT WOULD EVIDENTLY BE USEFUL TO CONSIDER POSSIBLE METHODS OF APPROACHING AN EVALUATION OF THE INFLUENCE OF ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE UPON THE RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN CURBING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE.

I SHALL TAKE THE LIBERTY OF MAKING A FEW GENERAL COMMENTS.

ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT ARE A CLEAR ILLUSTRATION OF THE UNEXPECTED TURNS THAT MAY OCCUR IN STRATEGIC
WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT, GIVEN THE PRESENT LEVEL OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, AND HOW IMPORTANT IT COULD BE TO CURB, HALT, AND,
IN SOME CASES, EVEN REVERSE THEIR DEVELOPMENT IN TIMELY FASHION.

INDEED, AT THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF ANTIMISSILE DEFENSES FOR THE VITALLY IMPORTANT CENTERS OF THE COUNTRY
AND THE POPULATION, THE DESIGN CONCEPT, IT WOULD SEEM, PURSUED
THE EXTREMELY HUMANE GOAL OF PRESERVING THE MANMADE VALUES AND
PROTECTING MAN HIMSELF AGAINST THE DESTRUCTIVE POWER OF MODERN
STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS. IT SEEMED THAT THE PRINCIPAL PROBLEM
LAY ONLY IN OVERCOMING THE ENORMOUS TECHNICAL DIFFICULTIES
INVOLVED IN A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM. SUBSEQUENTLY, MOREVER,
AFTER FEASIBLE MEANS FOR SOLVING THE PROBLEM HAD BEEN FOUND,
IT BECAME CLEAR THAT EVEN IF THE DEFENSIVE WEAPONS THAT HAD
BEEN DEVELOPED HERE NOT TO A CERTAIN EXTEND TRANSFERED INTO
OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, THEY COULD, IN ANY CASE, CONTRIBUTE TO THE
DESTRUCTIVE FORCE OF OFFENSIVE WEAPONS BY CASTING DOUBT ON THE
INEVITABILITY OF RETALIATION. TO SOME EXTEND THIS WAS THE MEANING
OF THAT EXPRESSION AND VICE VERSA ABOUT WHICH YOU INGUINED
MR. SMITH.

DECLASSIFIED

AUCTURY 90900

By EK NARA Date 16

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
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THEREFORE IT WOULD SEEM TO BE IMPORTANT TO MAKE A COMPREHENSIVE AND AS DEEP AS POSSIBLE EXAMINATION OF THE DIRECTIONS
IN WHICH DEFENSIVE WEAPONS MAY BEYELOP IN THE FUTURE, TO UNCOVER
THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO OFFENSIVE WEAPONS
DEVELOPMENT SO AS TO ASCERTAIN WHERE WE SHOULD GO NEXT,
KEEPING IN MIND THE SECURITY INTERESTS OF OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

LET US ASSUME THAT THE SIDES DESIRING TO REACH AGREEMENT ON LIMITING STRATEGIC WEAPONS: WOULD NOT DEPLOY ABM SYSTEMS. SUCH FORMULATION IS POSSIBLE SINCE, IN CONTRAST TO STRATEGIC OFFENS-IVE WEAPONS, WORK ON ABM SYSTEMS! IS IN ITS INITIAL STAGE. IN THIS CASE A POSSIBLE AGREEMENT TO CURB THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE COULD BE BASED ON A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE LIMITATION OF THE CONTRACTING PARTIES. STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS ONLY. IN SO DOING, HOWEVER, IT WOULD ALSO BE NECESSARY TO WEIGH THE PROBLEMS INVOLVED IN PRVIDING A DEFENSE AGAINST POSSIBLE UNAUTHORIZED LAUNCHES OR PROVOCATIONS: FROM THIRD COUNTRIES.

A DIFFERENT VERSION MIGHT ALSO BE! CONSIDERED WHEREIN BOTH SIDES ALONG WITH STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE NEXPONS WOULD ALSO HAVE FOR INSTANCE SOME KIND OF LIMITED ABM SYSTEMS THIS CASE OBVIOUSLY REQUIRES DIFFERENT APPROACHES. IN DETERMINING MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE: LEVELS: OF STRATEGIC





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OFFENSIVE NEAPONS ONE WOULD HAVE TO TKAE INTO ACCOUNT THE SIZES OF THE AVAILABLE ABM SYSTEMS, THEIR NATURE, TARGETS THEY ARE DESIGNED TO DEFEND, THE LOCATION OF THE SYSTEMS! ELEMENTS, ETC.


ONE: COULD ALSO ENVISAGE: A THIRD: VERSION WHEREIN BOTH SIDES WOULD DEPLOY HEAVY AREA ABM SYSTEMS. IN THIS CASE WE WOULD BE DEALING WITH THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF BOTH OFFENSIVE AND DEFENSIVE STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

THE DEPLOYMENT BY ONE SIDE OF AN ABM SYSTEM TO A LEVEL WHICH MIGHT GIVE IT CONFEDENCE IN THE SUFFECIENCY OF ITB INVULNER ABLEITY TO A RETALIATORY STRIKE MIGHT GENERATE A TEMPTATION TO USE STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS AGAINST THE OTHER SIDE. AS WE UNDERSTOOD IT, YOU, MR. SMITH, HAD THIS IN MIND IN YOUR STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 20.

THUS, QUESTIONS RELATED TO ABM DEFENSES COULD INFLUENCE THE SOLUTION OF THE WHOLE PROBLEM OF LEMITING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE THEREFORE IT SEEMS ABVISABLE TO COMPREHENSIVELY DISCUSS THIS QUESTION DURING THE SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF OUR TALKS, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE ACTUAL SITUATION, AND BEARING IN MIND THE ASSURANCE OF EQUAL SECURITY FOR BOTH SIDES THE FOLLOWING QUESTION, IN PARTICULAR, COMES TO MIND WHEN ONE BIDE EMPLOYS ABM'S TO DEFEND ITS STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WERPONS AND GTHER TARGETS: A CONSIDERABLE DISTANCE APART, WOULD NOT THE OTHER SIDE FEEL UNCERTAINTY BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBILITY THAT, IN TIME, SUCH A THIN ASM SYSTEM COULD EVOLVE INTO A SYSTEM FACILITATING A FIRST STRIKE?

IT WOULD BE INTERESTING TO HEAR HOW THE AMERICAN SIDE APPROACHES THIS WHOLE COMPLEX ARM DEFENSE PROBLEM AND ITS VIEWS OF POSSIBLE WAYS TO SOLVE THIS PROBLEM FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF A GENERAL AGREEMENT ON CURBING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE.

FOR OUT PART, AND WITHOUT ANTICEPATING IN ANY WAY THE DUTCOME
OF THE SUBSEQUENT DISCUSSION OF THES PROBLEM, HE WOULD LIKE TO
NOTE THAT IT WOULD BE USEFUL ALSO TO EXAMINE, AMOUND OTHER ASPECTS
OF THIS PROBLEM. THE QUESTION OF PROHIBITING THE REACEMENT OF ABM.
SYSTEMS DUTSIDE NATIONAL! TERRITORIES, TO INCLUDE PLACEMENT G
VESSELS, AND ALSO PROHIBITING THE TRANSFER OF ABM. SYSTEMS
TO THERD COUNTRIES, WHAT WOULD BE THE REBULF OF A SITUATION IN
WICH, FOR EXAMPLE, ONE SIDE SHOULD INSTALL ITS ABM.S. ON VESSELS?





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IN SUCH A CASE, UNDER THE PRETENT OF DEFENSE, IT COULD KEEP SUCH VESSELS CARRYING ABM'S IN THE IMMEDIATE PROXIMITY OF THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER STATE, AND THE POSSIBILITY SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED THAT THESE MISSILES ARMED WITH NUCLEAR WARHEADS COULD BE USED NOT ONLY TO EXECUTE DEFENSIVE BUT ALSO OFFENSIVE MISSIONS IN STRIKES AGAINST TARGETS ON THE TERRITORY OF THE OTHER SIDE. ANALOGOUS CONDITIONS COULD ALSO DEVELOP IF ABM'S NEW INSTALLED ON LAND BEYOND NATIONAL BORDERS OR IN THE EVENT OF THEIR TRANSFER TO THIRD COUNTRIES. WE ALSO HAD THIS IN MIND IN DUR STATEMENT OF NOVEMBER 28. IN CONNECTION WITH WHICH YOU. MR. SMITH, ASKED FOR AMPLIFICATION OF THE SOVIET DELEGATION'S VIEWS ABOUT THE POSSIBILITIES THAT STRATEGIC DEFENSIVE WEAPONS COULD ALSO BE VIEWED AS OFFENSIVE WEAPONS.

IT IS QUITE OBVIOUS THAT IN SUCH CASE THE OTHER SIDE WOULD FIND ITSELF AT A DISADVANTAGE AND THE OVERALL STRATEGIC SITUATION WOULD BE COMPLICATED

AT OUR NEXT SESSION THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO EXAMINE CERTAIN VERIFICATION QUESTIONS AND MEASURES TO LESSEN THE DANGER OF OUTBREAK OF A NUCLEAR WAR BETWEEN THE USSR AND THE USA.

END: TEXT.