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
-2 - STATE 145329, August 9, 1971

IRWIN MADE THE POLITICAL POINT THAT THIS WAS OUR INITIATIVE AND WE COULD HARDLY WALK AWAY FROM IT WHEN THE SOVIETS FIRST BEGAN TO SHOW INTEREST. I AGREED WITH THIS. AS FOR SUBSEQUENT BARGANING LEVERAGE, I POINTED OUT THAT THE SOVIETS WERE STRONG FOR EQUIVALENCE IN ANY ABM DEAL THIS YEAR; WE WOULD THUS NOT HAVE AN ABM ADVANTAGE IN ANY LIKELY INITIAL AGREEMENT WHICH WOULD GIVE US BARGAINING LEVERAGE IN A SUBSEQUENT STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. IF WE THEN TRIED TO GET THEM TO GIVE UP THEIR MOSCOW SYSTEM, WE WOULD BE TRYING TO BUY BOTH DESTRUCTION OF MOSCOW AND OFFENSIVE REDUCTIONS OR LIMITS IN EXCHANGE FOR WHATEVER WE MIGHT, RETAIN OF SAFEGUARD. I MADE POINTS YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH ABOUT THE INTRINSIC INTEREST OF AN ABM BAN FOR US SECURITY, STRESSING PARTICULARLY THE CONTRIBUTION TO CRISIS STABILITY FROM DESTRUCTION OF MOSCOW ABM DEFENSES, WHICH SEEMED TO ME A MUCH GREATER CONTRIBUTION TO OUR DETERRENT AND TO CRISIS STABILITY THAN WAS PROVIDED BY SAFEGUARD DEFENSE OF MINUTEMAN.

HENRY SAID THERE SEEMED TO BE THREE COURSES: PROPOSING ZERO ABM NOW IN CONJUNCTION WITH TIGHTER LIMITS AND REDUCTIONS IN SOVIET OFFERSIVE SYSTEMS; MAKING A ZERO ABM PROPOSAL AS A SUBSTITUTE OR ALTERNATIVE WITH EQUAL STATUS TO SAFEGUARD/NCA IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE MAY 20 ANNOUNCEMENT; OR TELLING THE SOVIETS THAT WE CONTINUED TO BE INTERESTED IN AN ABM BAN BUT THOUGHT IT MORE APPROPRIATE FOR THE NEXT STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. HE SAID THE FIRST COURSE MEANT REOPENING THE MAY 20 AGREEMENT, WHICH WOULD BE A SERIOUS STEP INDEED; I AGREED AND SAID WE DID NOT RECOMMEND THAT. HE THEN POLLED THE PARTICIPANTS FOR AGENCY POSITIONS. ONLY ACDA FAVORED INTRODUCING THE ABM PROPOSAL IN THE FRAMEWORK OF MAY 20. THE REST (MITCHELL, PACKARD, HELMS, MOORER, IRWIN AND ED DAVID) ALL FAVORED PUTTING OFF EXPLORATION OF AN ABM BAN TO A LATER STAGE (I.E., AFTER THE INITIAL DEFENSIVE AND OFFENSIVE AGREEMENTS). HENRY ASKED ME TO PROVIDE THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE ACDA PREFERRED COURSE TO BE INCLUDED IN HIS MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT AND WE ARE DOING SO: I WILL SEND YOU A COPY.

THE DISCUSSION OF FUTURE SYSTEMS WAS FRAGMENTARY AND NOT VERY ORDERLY. HENRY ASKED WHY WE COULD NOT SIMPLY DEFER THE WHOLE PROBLEM SINCE THESE SYSTEMS WOULD NOT BE AN OPERATIONAL PROBLEM UNTIL AFTER 1980 AND WE COULD WRESTLE WITH THE PROBLEM WHEN IT BECAME REAL. I SAID I THOUGHT THIS WAS FINE PROVIDED WE BANNED THEM IN THE INITIAL AGREEMENT AND WRESTLED WITH THEM AS AMENDMENTS IF THEY BECAME REAL POSSIBILITIES. MOORER MADE THE ARGUMENTS YOU ARE FAMILIAR WITH AS TO WHY WE NEED TO LEAVE THESE AVENUES OPEN AND PURSUE AGGRESSIVELY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT WHICH WOULD NOT BE FUNDED IF DEPLOYMENT WAS BANNED. CIA MADE RATHER CAUTIOUS SOUNDS ABOUT THE DIFFICULT VERIFICATION PROBLEM. PACKARD SAID HE THOUGHT WE OUGHT TO TRY TO CLOSE OFF BEPLOYMENT OF EXCITE SYSTEM, DESPITE VERIFICATION DIFFICULITES, AND THOUGHT WE COULD FUND

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-3- STATE 145329, August 9, 1971

THE NECESSARY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT. SPURGEON AND I ARGUED ALSO FOR BANNING TESTING BUT DID NOT GET MUCH SUPPORT. I RAISED THE MIRV ABM ISSUE, THOUGH WHILE HENRY WAS OUT OF THE ROOM, AND PACKARD THIED TO BRUSH THAT ASIDE AS PERFECTIONISM.

THE OMENS SEEMED TO ME RATHER BAD FOR ZERO ABM. THE PICTURE IS LESS CLEAR REGARDING THE FUTURE SYSTEMS, SINCE PACKARD WAS PRETTY GOOD ABOUT BANNING DEPLOYMENT. HENRY SAID HE THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION ON THE TWO ISSUES BY THURSDAY.

I WOULD BE DERELICT IF I DID NOT STRESS AGAIN THE VERY PERCEPITBLE TENDENCY TO PUT BLAME ON THE DELEGATION FOR THE ISSUES THAT HAVE RISEN AND THE SLOW PACE. WHEN I POINTED OUT IT WAS JCS WHO HAD RAISED THE FUTURE SYSTEMS ISSUE, THIS HARDLY RESISTERED. THERE WERE A LOT OF BARBED COMMENTS ABOUT ACDA'S DEVOTION TO BANS AND TO ACADEMIC PERFECTION IN ARMS CONTROL, PATHER THAN GETTING AHEAD WITH WHAT IS FEASIBLE THIS YEAR. HENRY ALSO REFERRED TO THE BARRAGE OF CALLS FROM YOU. SOME OF THIS MAY HAVE BEEN FOR EFFECT, SINCE HENRY IS CLEARLY UNCOMFORTABLE AT THE PROSPECT OF GETTING THE CHIEFS OVERRULED (PARTICULARLY AT A TIME WHEN THEY ARE BEING PUT THROUGH THE BUDGET WRINGER). THERE WAS ENOUGH, HOWEVER, WHICH SEEMED TO REFLECT A WHITE HOUSE FELLING THAT AFTER THIS WEEK'S DECISIONS THERE WILL HAVE BEEN ENOUGH REVIEW AND CLARIFICATION OF POLICY, SO THAT I THOUGHT YOU OUGHT TO HAVE THE FLAVOR. WE CAN TALK ON THE SECURE LINE TOMORROW ABOUT WHETHER MORE MIGHT BE DONE TO INFLUENCE THE DECISION IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION.

ONE FINAL POINT: THE NSC STAFF AND (LESS CLEARLY) HENRY WERE MUCH INTERESTED IN SEMENDY'S SUGGESTION FOR A NEW ABM TRADEOFF (SALT 902), WHICH THEY SAW AS LEADING TO A PRODUCTIVE NEGOTIATING SEQUENCE. I WAS ASKED BY NSC STAFF TO SUGGEST THAT WHEN SEMENOV TABLES THE IDEA AUGUST 10 THE DELEGATION MIGHT BE NONCOMMITTAL RATHER THAN NEGATIVE. GP-1. IRWIN

Drafted by: ACDA/AD - P J Farley

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