



DEF 18-3 FIN (HE)  
Department of State

TELEGRAM

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Helsinki SECRET 749

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SECRET SECTION 1 OF 2 USDELI SALT 825

LINDIS/SALT

SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT ON JULY 23, 1971

FOLLOWING IS THE TRANSLATION OF THE STATEMENT PRESENTED BY MINISTER SEMENOV, FREEDAY, JULY 23, 1971.

AT TODAY'S MEETING THE USSR DELEGATION INTENDS TO CONTINUE PRESENTING ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY ON LIMITING THE DEPLOYMENT OF ABM SYSTEMS OF THE USSR AND USA, SUBMITTED MARCH 19, 1971.

AN EFFECTIVE AGREEMENT ON LIMITING ABM SYSTEMS-- AND IT WOULD SEEM THAT THERE CAN BE NO DIVERGENT VIEWS ON THIS SCORE-- MUST BLOCK THE WAY TO EXPANSION OF THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE. WE ARE CONVINCED THAT THE EFFECTIVENESS OF AN ABM AGREEMENT IS IN DECISIVE MEASURE DETERMINED BY THE EXTENT TO WHICH IT RELIABLY PRECLUDES THE POSSIBILITY OF CREATING AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM.

COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF CREATING AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM CONVINCINGLY SHOWS THE DANGER IT POSES TO THE CAUSE OF PEACE. DEPLOYMENT OF AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM

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BY ANY COUNTRY OBVIOUSLY CANNOT BE VIEWED AS ANYTHING OTHER THAN AN INDICATION OF AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS OR DESIGNS. IN ESSENCE, THE VERY CREATION OF AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM COULD PRESUMABLY BE UNDERTAKEN WITH THE DESIGN OF TRYING AT SOME POINT TO EXECUTE AN ATTACK INVOLVING THE USE OF NUCLEAR MISSILES, WITH THE HOPE OF THEN PROTECTING ONESELF FROM A RETALIATORY STRIKE BY MEANS OF AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM.

OF COURSE, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PRESENT STATE AND PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMAMENTS, THERE CAN BE NO IMPUNITY FOR AN AGGRESSOR EVEN IF HE SHOULD DEPLOY AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM. ONE CANNOT, HOWEVER, EXCLUDE THE POSSIBILITY THAT AN ILLUSION OF SAFETY MIGHT APPEAR AMONG ADVENTURIST CIRCLES, NO MATTER HOW UNREAL THIS ILLUSION MIGHT PROVE TO BE FROM THE VIEWPOINT OF ACTUAL REALITY.

THUS AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM COULD HEIGHTEN THE AGGRESSIVE INTENTIONS OF SUCH CIRCLES AND LEAD TO AN INCREASE IN THE THREAT OF NUCLEAR WAR. IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT DEPLOYMENT OF AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO AN ACCELERATION OF THE ARMS RACE. THIS WOULD IN TURN BE REFLECTED IN THE STABILITY OF THE STRATEGIC SITUATION.

AND IN THIS LIES THE DANGER OF DEPLOYING AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM.

IT SEEMS TO US THAT IN THE COURSE OF THE EXCHANGES AT OUR NEGOTIATIONS THE TWO SIDES HAVE EXPRESSED SIMILAR VIEWS ON THIS SCORE.

AT THE MEETING OF NOVEMBER 28, 1969, THE U.S. DELEGATION STATED THAT ONE CANNOT "RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT A NATION, IF IT HAD DEPLOYED DENSE ABM DEFENSES, MIGHT THEN BE MISLED INTO INCORRECTLY CONCLUDING THAT NUCLEAR WAR WOULD BE LESS THAN CATASTROPHIC TO IT." AT THE PLENARY OF JULY 28, 1970, THE U.S. DELEGATION NOTED THAT "THE DEPLOYMENT OF LARGE ABM SYSTEMS WOULD BE A STIMULUS TO A FURTHER BUILD-UP OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE SYSTEMS AND THEREBY INTENSIFY THE STRATEGIC ARMS

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COMPETITION, EVEN UNDER AN AGREEMENT LIMITING NUMBERS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE WEAPONS, ABM'S COULD STIMULATE INCREASES IN OFFENSIVE CAPABILITIES PERMITTED BY THE AGREEMENT."

IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE U.S. DELEGATION HOLDS TO THIS LINE AT THE PRESENT STAGE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AS WELL. IN ANY CASE, THIS IS HOW WE UNDERSTAND CERTAIN STATEMENTS BY THE U.S. DELEGATION ON JULY 13 AND 20, 1971.

IT APPEARS TO US THAT THE COMMON INTEREST OF THE TWO SIDES IN AN AGREEMENT THAT WOULD REALLY BLOCK DEPLOYMENT OF ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEMS IS WELL STATED IN THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY SUBMITTED BY THE USSR DELEGATION ON MARCH 19, 1971.

ARTICLE III OF THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY PROVIDES THAT THE SIDES UNDERTAKE NOT TO DEPLOY ABM COMPONENTS AT A DISTANCE EXCEEDING 200 KM. FROM THE CENTER OF MOSCOW AND WASHINGTON WITHIN THIS ZONE NO MORE THAN 100 ABM LAUNCHERS SHOULD BE DEPLOYED AND NO MORE THAN 100 INTERCEPTORS DEPLOYED AT SITES. IN OTHER WORDS, THE SOVIET DRAFT ENVISAGES QUITE PRECISE GEOGRAPHIC AND QUANTITATIVE LIMITATIONS ON ABM COMPONENTS. THIS MAKES IT POSSIBLE EFFECTIVELY TO CONSTRAIN ABM SYSTEMS WITHIN PRECISELY THOSE LIMITS THAT MEET THE OBJECTIVE OF PROTECTING NATIONAL CAPITALS FROM ACCIDENTAL AND UNAUTHORIZED LAUNCHES.

AGREEMENT ON THE BASIS OF THE SOVIET DRAFT, I.E. LIMITING ABM SYSTEMS TO THE PROTECTION OF ONLY THE NATIONAL CAPITALS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S., WOULD PROVIDE BOTH SIDES WITH RELIABLE GUARANTEES FOR PRECLUDING THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING OR CREATING PREREQUISITES FOR THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM.

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FM USDEL SALT V  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1112  
INFO USMISSION NATO PRIORITY  
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY

SECRET SECTION 2 OF 2 USDEL SALT 885

LIMDIS/SALT

SUBJECT: SEMENOV STATEMENT ON JULY 23, 1971

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE REALIZATION BY BOTH SIDES OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING AN ABM AREA DEFENSE, WHICH HAS EMERGED IN THE COURSE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, THE MEANING OF THE APPEARANCE OF OTHER ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS, WHICH PROVIDE FOR DEPLOYMENT OF ABM COMPLEXES FOR THE PROTECTION OF A GREATER NUMBER OF TARGETS THAN NATIONAL CAPITALS, IS NOT CLEAR TO THE SOVIET SIDE. DOES THIS NOT CONFLICT WITH THE OBJECTIVE OF BARRING THE CREATION OF AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM? AFTER ALL, THE VERY FACT OF MULTIPLICITY OF TARGETS PROTECTED BY ABM SYSTEMS AND THEIR DISPERSION THROUGHOUT THE COUNTRY, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY CONTRIBUTES TO CREATION OF THE PREREQUISITES FOR AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM. IF IT IS A MATTER OF SEVERAL AREAS PROTECTED BY ABM SYSTEMS, AND IF THE PROTECTED ZONES ENCOMPASS A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE TERRITORY OF A COUNTRY, THEN IT IS OBVIOUS THAT THE AGGREGATE OF SUCH SYSTEMS ALREADY CONSTITUTES A DEFINITE ELEMENT OF AN ABM AREA DEFENSE. BUT, AFTER ALL, THE PURPOSE OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS LIMITATION OF ABM SYSTEMS, AND EFFECTIVE LIMITATION AT

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THAT, NOT ESTABLISHING THEIR LEVELS IN SUCH A WAY AS WOULD LEAD TO CREATING CONDITIONS CONDUCTIVE TO LAYING THE GROUNDWORK FOR AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM. THE REPORT OF THE U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE TO THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE ON MARCH 15, 1971, CITES CERTAIN DATA CONCERNING THE CAPABILITIES OF ABM SYSTEMS, SHOULD THEY BE DEPLOYED AT VARIOUS BASES ON U.S. TERRITORY. THESE DATA PROVIDE SOME ILLUSTRATIVE MATERIAL WHICH SUPPORTS THE POINT OF VIEW WE HAVE PRESENTED. THE REPORT STATES, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE ABM COMPLEX AT WARREN (AIR FORCE) BASE, IN ADDITION TO DEFENDING THE CORRESPONDING ICBM SITES, WILL PROTECT A NUMBER OF TARGETS LOCATED DEEP IN AMERICAN TERRITORY, SPECIFICALLY, COLORADO SPRINGS AND OMAHA. IN OTHER WORDS, JUST ONE ABM COMPLEX AT THE AFOREMENTIONED BASE COULD SPREAD ITS UMBRELLA OVER SEVERAL LARGE AMERICAN STATES.

ONE MAY CONCLUDE FROM THIS THAT IN A SIMILAR WAY ABM SYSTEMS, SHOULD BE LOCATED AT OTHER ICBM SITES. AT THREE, FOR EXAMPLE, COULD OBVIOUSLY PROTECT THE TERRITORY OF OTHER STATES AS WELL. DOES THIS NOT CONCEAL THE NUCLEUS OF AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM?

TAKING INTO ACCOUNT PAST DISCUSSIONS, THE USSR DELEGATION PROCEEDS FROM THE PREMISE THAT, CLEARLY, BOTH SIDES SHOULD SEEK A SOLUTION ON ABM'S WHICH WOULD LEAVE NO DOUBT THAT THE POSSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM IS PRECLUDED. THE SOVIET SIDE BELIEVES THAT THE OBJECTIVE OF BARRING AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM IS MET BY THE PROPOSAL TO LIMIT THE DEPLOYMENT OF ABM SYSTEMS TO THE PROTECTION ONLY OF NATIONAL CAPITALS.

THE USSR DELEGATION IS CONVINCED THAT ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS, BASED ON MULTIPLICITY OF TARGETS PROTECTED BY ABM SYSTEMS, AND CAPABLE OF LEADING IN ONE WAY OR ANOTHER TO THE CREATION OF AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM, WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE SPIRIT OF THE UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE USSR AND THE U.S. OF MAY 20, 1971, AGREEMENT TO SUCH ALTERNATIVES COULD DIVERT THE NEGOTIATIONS FROM FINDING EFFECTIVE

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MEASURES AIMED AT CURBING THE STRATEGIC ARMS RACE.

THE THRUST OF THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY, WHICH COMPLETELY BARS THE CREATION OF AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM, MEETS THE OBJECTIVES OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS AND MAKES THIS DRAFT THE BASIS FOR WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE EFFECTIVE AND MEANINGFUL SOLUTION FOR LIMITING ABM SYSTEMS.

OF COURSE, IN SPEAKING OF THE INADMISSIBILITY OF DEPLOYING ABM SYSTEMS THROUGHOUT THE TERRITORY OF A COUNTRY FOR THE PURPOSE OF CREATING AN ABM AREA DEFENSE SYSTEM, THE USSR DELEGATION IS NOT REFERRING TO SYSTEMS INTENDED FOR DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING FOR ABM PURPOSES. IN THIS CONNECTION, I SHOULD LIKE TO RECALL THAT ARTICLE IV OF THE SOVIET DRAFT TREATY PROVIDES THAT THE TOTAL NUMBERS OF SYSTEMS SUBJECT TO LIMITATION SHALL NOT INCLUDE ABM SYSTEMS INTENDED FOR RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND TESTING. UNDER THIS PROVISION, EACH SIDE COULD HAVE NO MORE THAN 15 FIXED ABM LAUNCHERS WITHIN EXISTING OR AGREED ADDITIONAL TEST RANGES. GP-3SMITH

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