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# CINCPAC



## COMMAND HISTORY

1973

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### VOLUME I

**FORMERLY RESTRICTED DATA**

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SECTION II--RECONNAISSANCE ACTIVITIES

PACOM Assumption of Alaskan Command PARPRO Responsibilities

(S) CINC PAC was to assume certain responsibilities in the Peacetime Aerial Reconnaissance Program (PARPRO) that had been the responsibility of the Alaskan Command as a result of changes to the Unified Command Plan that had become effective 1 January 1972. A number of delays had been encountered, however, in communications requirements and CINC PAC had asked CINCAL to retain the PARPRO support functions until adequate communications were established. The development of communications suitable to allow adequate coordination between PARPRO participants in Alaska and the 5th Air Force, the PACOM PARPRO coordinator, were considered fundamental to CINC PAC's capability to assume the ALCOM support functions. Development of a teletype net and an off-hook AUTOVON (automatic voice network) had been requested and approved by the JCS. The secure-teletype net had been completed in August 1972, but high distortion had been encountered. Tests continued, but it was determined that CINC PAC should wait for completion of the back-up off-hook AUTOVON net to assume complete PARPRO responsibilities. At the end of 1972 the completion of the net had been estimated for 1 April 1973.<sup>1</sup> *ok*

(S) Air Force funding problems were encountered, however, and the estimated completion date was postponed. The Air Force Chief of Staff, because of severe cutbacks of funds, had decreed that no new AUTOVON service would be installed prior to 1 July without specific permission from him.<sup>2</sup> *ok*

(S) Meanwhile, CINC PAC drafted a document that detailed responsibilities and coordination procedures for support of PARPRO in the Northern PACOM area. The provisions of the document were concurred in (with their recommended revisions incorporated) by the Strategic Air Command, the National Security Agency Central Security Service, the U.S. Air Force Special Security Service, CINC Alaskan Command, and CINC PACFLT. The document was published and distributed on 1 July.<sup>3</sup>

(U) The CINCAL took a personal interest in expediting completion, according to CINC PAC's Liaison Officer, and was instrumental in cutting through red tape that threatened major additional delays in completing communications channels.<sup>4</sup>

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1. CINC PAC Command History 1972, Vol. I, pp. 36-37.
  2. J621 HistSum Feb 73; Memo, CINC PAC Liaison Officer to CINCAL to CINC PAC Chief of Staff, 8 Mar 73, Items of Interest for February.
  3. J314 HistSum Jul 73, which cited CINC PAC ltr Ser 000167 of 1 Jul 73 (FRINGE BARON).
  4. Memorandums on Items of Interest to the CINC PAC Chief of Staff from CINC PAC Liaison Officer to CINCAL 9 Jul 73 and 9 Aug 73.

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(U) - The AUTOVON network was activated on 1 July. A CINCPAC team went to Alaska to test the FRINGE BARON procedures and communications during the period 2 - 15 July after promulgating the plan for these tests. The systems were viable. In consequence, CINCPAC notified the JCS and CINCAL of his assumption of all PARPRO support functions in the PACOM north of 49° North latitude as of 200001Z Jul 73. CINCPAC at the same time advised CINCAL that he greatly appreciated the outstanding cooperation and support of all concerned during communications installation and testing.<sup>1</sup>

#### Southeast Asia Reconnaissance

(TS) With the cease-fire in Vietnam a number of tactical reconnaissance restrictions were imposed in Southeast Asia. These are discussed by program.

#### BLUE TREE

(TS) The JCS directed that CINCPAC temporarily suspend all offensive operations against North Vietnam effective 151500Z Jan 73. Reconnaissance operations over North Vietnam were restricted to [REDACTED] and GIANT SCALE (SR-71) missions. Effective 272359Z Jan 73 the JCS prohibited all reconnaissance over North Vietnam and its claimed territorial waters.<sup>2</sup>

#### YANKEE TEAM

(TS) Reconnaissance aircraft were authorized to operate in Laos with armed escort and flak suppression as required, except in BARREL ROLL NORTH or within 5 kilometers of known or suspected [REDACTED] positions in BARREL ROLL EAST or WEST, unless approved by the JCS. (A map of the BARREL ROLL operating areas is in the CINCPAC Command History 1970, Volume II, page 167.) SR-71 [REDACTED] aircraft were authorized to operate to within 10 nautical miles of the People's [REDACTED] all other platforms were to maintain a closest-point-of-approach of 25 nautical miles from the [REDACTED] border.<sup>3</sup>

#### FACE VALUE

(TS) Effective 290001Z January the 7th Air Force restricted overflight of Cambodia by all U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. Any exception to this restriction was to be approved by the 7th Air Force.<sup>4</sup>

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1. J6123 HistSum Jul 73; CINCPAC 200010Z Jul 73.
  2. J3B57 HistSum Jan 73, which cited JCS 150356Z Jan 73 and 270657Z Jan 73 (both EX).
  3. Ibid., which cited JCS 270657Z Jan 73 (EX).
  4. Ibid., which cited 7AF 280555Z Jan 73 (BOM).

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OAK TRAIL

(TS) Air reconnaissance operations, [redacted] were authorized throughout the RVN as required. After final withdrawal of U.S. personnel, surveillance operations over the RVN were to be conducted only when appropriately cleared by the Government of the RVN.<sup>1</sup>

ACRP

(TS) The Southeast Asia Airborne Communications Reconnaissance Program (ACRP) schedule remained unchanged following the cease-fire. On 31 January CINCIPAC requested that CINCPACAF reassess the military and political risk to [redacted] Gulf of Tonkin operations. CINCPACAF assessed that political risk was low and military risk moderate, providing that a closest-point-of-approach of 50 nautical miles to North Vietnam and 19 nautical miles from Ile Bac Long (island) was maintained. CINCIPAC also requested that CINCSAC re-evaluate the Barrier Combat Air Patrol (BARCAP) requirement in view of the new risk assessment. CINCSAC concurred and deleted the BARCAP requirement for [redacted] operations in the Gulf. A new [redacted] track was established in the Gulf of Tonkin for daily coverage.<sup>2</sup>

(TS) Subsequently, on 25 February, the VQ-1 Detachment at Danang was relocated to the Naval Air Station at Cubi Point in the Philippines. As a result of this redeployment (and the cease-fire) a revised Southeast Asia ACRP schedule was implemented on 3 March. The revised schedule released VQ-1 from providing daily 4-hour ACRP coverage, reduced [redacted] sorties from 40 to 30 a month, and continued [redacted] and [redacted] missions at 30 and 60 sorties per month respectively. The released VQ-1 assets reverted to Commander, Seventh Fleet for direct support.<sup>3</sup>

(TS) As a result of increased Southeast Asia requirements, however, the ACRP schedule was again revised and implemented on 24 March. The revision increased [redacted] sorties from 30 to 40 a month. [redacted] and [redacted] collection rates remained unchanged at 30 and 60 respectively.<sup>4</sup>

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1. Ibid., which cited JCS 270657Z Jan 73, JCS/NMCC 240456Z Jan 73, and COMUSMACV 250317Z Jan 73 (all EX).
  2. Ibid., which cited CINCIPAC 310409Z Jan 73, CINCIPAC 272150Z Jan 73, CINCPACAF 310230Z Jan 73, and CINCIPAC 312240Z Jan 73 (all BOM).
  3. FAIRRECONRONONE 250730Z Feb 73; J3B510 HistSum Mar 73, which cited CINCIPAC 011702Z Mar 73 (BOM).
  4. J3B510 HistSum Mar 73, which cited CINCIPAC 230305Z Mar 73 (BOM).

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(TS) Gulf of Tonkin reconnaissance operations came under study later in the year. On 17 August CINCPAC was asked to provide the JCS with information concerning the applicability of using guidance concerning the [REDACTED] which was contained in part in SM-700 and SM-701 of 1968. CINCPAC asked his air and naval components, the 5th Air Force (the PACOM coordinator of [REDACTED] operations), and the National Security Agency, Central Security Service Pacific. All agreed that the [REDACTED] rules should be extended to include Gulf of Tonkin operations. CINCPAC's recommendation was forwarded to the JCS on 7 September. He stated that Gulf of Tonkin reconnaissance operations such as [REDACTED] and [REDACTED] programs could be effectively employed under [REDACTED] and therefore should be placed under the purview of the SM 700/701 memorandum guidance. CINCPAC had not been advised of any decision by the end of 1973.<sup>1</sup>

#### Airborne Radio Direction Finding (ARDF)

(TS) Army ARDF assets in the RVN at the cease-fire consisted of 27 RU-8 aircraft located at Can Tho and 14 RU/JU-21 aircraft located at Danang. The RU-8s began their standdown on 28 January for departure from the RVN on 17 February. The RU/JU-21 aircraft were directed by COMUSMACV to continue operations in Military Region I, the Demilitarized Zone, and the Laotian panhandle until 17 February; they were withdrawn from the RVN by 9 March.

(TS) USAF ARDF assets consisted of 17 EC-47s at Nakhon Phanom and 5 at Ubon in Thailand, and 10 at Danang in the RVN. The 10 at Danang were scheduled to be turned over to the Vietnamese Air Force on 1 February, but this transfer was delayed until 18 February to gain maximum intelligence during the first 20 days of the cease-fire.<sup>2</sup>


#### Paracel Islands Surveillance

(S) In 1973 CINCPACFLT and CINCPAC reviewed the situation involving the 12 nautical mile closest-point-of-approach (CPA) restriction applied to airborne surveillance of the Paracel Islands and recommended that it be modified, but this was not accomplished by the end of the year. Some background information on the islands, as it was furnished in CINCPACFLT's recommendation, is included here.

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1. OJCS 172359Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 212205Z Aug 73; CINCPACFLT 252115Z Aug 73; CINCPACAF 280320Z Aug 73; 5th AF 280640Z Aug 73; J314 HistSum Dec 73, which cited NCPAC 310201Z Aug 73 (BOM); and CINCPAC 070230Z Sep 73.
  2. J3B57 HistSum Jan 73, which cited NSACSS 292206Z Jan 73 and DIRNSA 271519Z Jan 73 (both BOM).

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(S) The Geneva Convention of 1958 on the territorial sea and the contiguous zone provided that an island was a naturally-formed area of land, surrounded by water, that was above water at high tide. The Convention further stated that a low-tide elevation was a naturally-formed area of land that was surrounded by and above water at low tide, but that was submerged at high tide, and that where a low-tide elevation was situated wholly or partly at a distance not exceeding the breadth of the territorial sea from the mainland or an island, the low-water line on that elevation might be used as the baseline for measuring the breadth of the territorial sea. While the United States did not formally recognize territorial seas of a breadth greater than 3 miles, the existing 12-mile CPA restriction regarding the Paracels suggested that it was not intended to contest breadths of 12 miles or less. Using 12 miles as the breadth of the territorial seas in the Paracels, several discrete geographic entities could be identified:

(1) The Amphitrite Group, including Lincoln and Woody Islands and Pyramid Rock.

(2) The Crescent Group, including Pattle, Duncan, Robert, Money, and Drummond Islands and extended by low-tide elevations of Discovery Reef, Vuladore Reef, and Passu Keah.

(3) Triton Island.

(4) North Reef.

(5) Bombay Reef.

As conservatively interpreted, a 12-mile CPA envelope surrounding those entities, constructed in accordance with the territorial sea and contiguous zone convention, included over 4,800 square miles (or just over 4,300 square miles if Bombay and North Reefs were excluded).

(S) Over the years there had been some conflicting ownership claims. France had erected a lighthouse and established a garrison on Pattle Island in 1937. Following World War II, claims asserted by the Japanese during the war had been renounced by the 1951 San Francisco Peace Treaty, and France again placed troops on Pattle Island and reestablished its meteorological station. The station, and its small garrison, came under South Vietnamese control in 1956. More recently, the number of Chinese and South Vietnamese on the Paracels had increased and development of the islands had expanded. The following de facto division of the islands had continued since the mid-1960's: Chinese occupation of the Amphitrite Group, Lincoln Island, and North Reef, and South Vietnamese occupation of the Crescent Group.

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(S) In 1973 RVN Armed Forces were stationed on the five main islands of the Crescent Group. These forces had been strengthened in 1970 and 1971. Additionally, South Vietnamese commercial phosphate workers were on Pattle and Robert Islands. (The islands contained important phosphate (guano) deposits.)

(S) Chinese occupation of the northern Paracels began in 1955 when 250 civilians were sent to Woody Island to exploit its guano deposits. In 1958 a fishing fleet of 40 ocean-going vessels, manned by 400 crewmen, began to operate from the island. A dozen buildings, apparently associated with the guano diggings, had been built on the northwest coast of Lincoln Island; garrisons manned by small troop contingents had been established on North Reef and Lincoln Island; and a military command post had been established on Woody Island. A weather station, radar sites, a radio station, a power station, and some (probably) antiaircraft artillery sites had been constructed on Woody Island; an early warning radar system was in situation on Lincoln Island; and communications antennae had been erected on Rocky Island and North Reef.

(S) CINCACFLT noted that a review of Chinese Communist serious warnings issued during 1971 and 1972 tended to confirm the de facto division of the Paracels between the Chinese and the South Vietnamese. He was not aware of any serious warnings issued to protest U.S. surveillance or reconnaissance operations other than in the vicinity of the Amphitrite Group. In view of this, it appeared reasonable to him to recommend that the 12-mile CPA restriction be applied only to the Amphitrite Group and to the North Reef, an area of about 1,700 square miles. He considered that to continue to restrict, unilaterally, surveillance activity in portions of the Paracels other than the Amphitrite Group and North Reef imposed an unnecessary and unreasonable constraint upon freedom of the seas and the operational flexibility required to carry out effective infiltration trawler surveillance and other activities. Further, the restriction--the existence of which was clearly obvious to the Chinese--could be construed as tacit recognition of the validity of Chinese claims to the entire Paracel Archipelago, which might operate to the detriment of claims by the Government of the RVN.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 8 January CINCAC recommended to the JCS that the existing 12-mile restriction applied to air surveillance of the Paracel Islands be modified to include only the Amphitrite Group, including Lincoln Island and Pyramid Rock, and the North Reef. By the end of 1973, however, CINCAC had not been advised of any change to the restriction.<sup>2</sup>

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1. CINCACFLT 280601Z Dec 72.
  2. CINCAC 082131Z Jan 73.

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HULA HOOP

(S) French nuclear testing in the vicinity of the Tuamotu Archipelago had become a regular summer event in the PACOM. The long-range program for U.S. reconnaissance of those tests was called NICE DOG. Each season's tests, however, also had a nickname and in 1973 the surface aspects of the tests were called HULA HOOP. On 20 March the JCS informed CINCPAC that the tests were expected to begin about 20 July, providing an opportunity to accumulate data not otherwise available. The JCS requested that CINCPAC provide administrative support to the Defense Nuclear Agency's (DNA) Joint Project Office (DJPO) established for the HULA HOOP operations, and provide operational control of and support for the surface collection platform, USNS WHEELING (T-AGM-8), which was called POCK MARK. Other data collection platforms assigned to HULA HOOP were a KC-135 and an NC-135, but these were under the operational control of CINCSAC.<sup>1</sup>

(S) In anticipation of the testing, CINCPAC tasked CINCPACFLT with operational control and a support plan for WHEELING, a search and rescue plan for the SAC aircraft utilizing WHEELING, a plan for utilizing WHEELING as a communications relay platform for the SAC aircraft, and a joint communications plan to support all units involved in HULA HOOP. CINCPAC requested that CINCPACAF provide administrative support similar to that provided for the 1972 program (DIAL FLOWER) to the DJPO.<sup>2</sup>

(S) CINCPAC subsequently approved a request by the Commander of the Pacific Missile Range at Point Mugu, California to present a HULA HOOP briefing to the civilian crew of USNS WHEELING. The briefing, which was presented early in June, covered the following thoughts:

...USNS WHEELING has been assigned by the Joint Chiefs of Staff as an essential observation platform to acquire important data from foreign atmospheric nuclear tests to be conducted this spring in the South Pacific Ocean area. WHEELING has been selected for this task due to the modern equipment installed and availability of space for additional instrumentation. A deployment of about 60 days is presently planned with an in-port period at Honolulu included.

...While the presence of WHEELING in the test area will be known by the foreign power conducting the tests, the U.S.

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1. JCS 2723/201821Z Mar 73.
  2. CINCPAC 282220Z Mar 73.

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Government will make no announcement of the ship's position or mission. For this reason, the mission of WHEELING must be considered as classified information, and not be discussed at any time while off ship.

...Positioning of WHEELING to acquire the needed data has been carefully determined with the safety of embarked personnel the primary concern. Blast, heat and radiation were each considered in detail to assure that the safety of personnel will not be jeopardized. Knowledge of each effect has been acquired over many years from U.S. tests of much larger magnitude than WHEELING is expected to observe. At the ship's position, blast effects will be detected as a loud retort accompanied by a slight jolt and followed by a noticeable wind (maximum 18 knots). Thermal output will be detected as a slight warming of the skin by topside personnel. No nuclear radiation will be experienced because of the ship's upwind position.<sup>1</sup>

(S) On 18 May the JCS advised that the Director of the DNA had been informed that fleet ship assets were not available to support augmentation of the basic HULA HOOP program with a radar transmission experiment. The use of USNS CORPUS CHRISTI BAY (T-ARVH-1) was offered as a suitable replacement and the DNA Director determined that it was acceptable to meet surface ship support requirements. The JCS requested that fleet SH-3A helicopter assets and required maintenance support be provided to support the radar transmission experiment. Accordingly, on 19 May CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to provide these helicopters to assure continuous availability of two operational units during the test period.<sup>2</sup>

(S) On 30 June CINCPAC informed the JCS that the HULA HOOP Technical Coordination Plan for 1973 had been reviewed as requested. The technical content and platform positioning graphics contained in the plan were considered operationally feasible and acceptable. The ship's tracks were listed.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 11 July the JCS issued an alert and execute message. They advised that approval had been granted for NICE DOG/HULA HOOP 1973 operations. A series of four nuclear test detonations was expected to be conducted by France on or about 20-25 July and 20-25 August at the Mururoa Atoll South Pacific test site.

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1. CINCPAC 112216Z Apr 72.
  2. JCS 5610/182045Z May 73; CINCPAC 190303Z May 73.
  3. CINCPAC 302021Z Jun 73.

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Data collection tasking was as follows. POCK MARK and USNS CORPUS CHRISTI BAY (nicknamed POT LUCK), with embarked SH-3A helicopters, were to utilize all sectors in the vicinity of the atoll with a closest-point-of-approach of 20 nautical miles to ground zero immediately prior to, during, and immediately after the detonations. The position the ships were to maintain in relationship to one another was outlined. All U.S. monitoring resources were to remain clear of the 12 nautical mile limit of French territorial waters at all times. The SAC aircraft bore the nickname BURNING LIGHT, as they had in previous years. The JCS requested that contingency withdrawal plans be prepared to meet the circumstance in which POCK MARK and/or POT LUCK were ordered out of their operating areas by the French, or in which the ships were asked to stop radiating.<sup>1</sup>

(S) CINCPCAC passed the planning responsibilities to CINCPACFLT; CINCPAC subsequently approved the submitted plans for planning and execution, as appropriate. It was not necessary to execute these withdrawal plans, however.<sup>2</sup>

(S) The first French test was detonated on 21 July, the second on 28 July. All platforms were in position; there were no casualties to personnel or platforms. On 30 July the JCS authorized that the forces could stand down, at the discretion of CINCPAC, until the next series of tests was expected. On 31 July CINCPAC directed a standdown for other operations as required by CINCPACFLT, but all were to assume a 72-hour collection alert status by 16 August.<sup>3</sup>

(S) On 18 August the third test occurred, and another on 24 August. On 28 August they concluded a test of an air-dropped device. In this case POCK MARK was not on the proper heading for data collection because it was not equipped with air surveillance radar.<sup>4</sup>

(S) On 30 August the DNA advised that there were indications that the French planned to continue testing in September, possibly to include a high yield nuclear device, and on 1 September the JCS advised that approval had been granted to continue collection operations. The sixth and last detonation of the season was a safety test detonation on 13 September and CINCPAC directed all HULA HOOP forces to return to normal operations on 15 September. The commander of the task unit (CTU 30.2.6) forwarded his summary report on 23 September. He noted that this was the first time the operations had used two surface vessels and helicopters in close proximity to Mururoa, but that the unit's presence appeared to cause no adverse reactions by the French, possibly

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1. JCS 2314/112241Z Jul 73.
  2. CINCPACFLT 142253Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 162341Z Jul 73.
  3. CTU 30.2.6 211930Z Jul and 290030Z Jul 73; CINCPAC 310135Z Jul 73.
  4. CTU 30.2.6 241925Z Aug and 281945Z Aug 73.


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because of their being advised in advance of U.S. intentions by the Defense Attache. He recommended that this procedure be continued in future operations. He concluded:

...Many elements comprising this task unit were identified and assigned in such late time prior to deployment that no pre-sail opportunity for operational practice was possible although precise positioning and timing were essential. Operational plans and procedures were under continuing change and refinement as the mission progressed. The successes recorded in mission accomplishment are considered primarily the result of the professionalism, skill, imagination, and extreme motivation exhibited by numerous personnel embarked, and in the staffs and supporting commands ashore.<sup>1</sup>


PONY EXPRESS



1. DNA 302036Z Aug 73; JCS 7253/010057Z Sep 73; CTU 30.2.6 131700Z Sep 73; CINCPAC 150035Z Sep 73; CTU 30.2.6 230515Z Sep 73.

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
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1. CINCPAC 272220Z Jan 73.
  2. Ibid; CINCPAC 272230Z Jan 73.


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~~(S)~~ The JCS, however, promulgated additional guidance for the conduct of operations during Mr. Brezhnev's visit. The JCS had placed temporary restric-

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1. CINCPAC 171845Z May 73.
  2. CINCPAC 211842Z May 73.


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tions on reconnaissance operations during the visit and advised that effective 11 June POLAR BEAR operations would not be conducted within 100 nautical miles of Soviet territory in the Northern Pacific from the Bering Strait to Japan, except where this 100-mile limit would fall east of the U.S.-Russian Convention Line of 1867. The revised TSP was 57°-20'N, 167°-00'E, which was approved during the 13-28 June operation. During transit to the TSP and during collection operations POLAR BEAR was directed to "not approach Soviet territory within 100 NM." On 9 June CINCPAC directed CINCPACFLT to comply with this guidance.<sup>1</sup>

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- 1: JCS 4144/082223Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 090255Z Jun 73.
  - 2: JCS 7241/122335Z Jun 73; JCS 1739/280638Z Jun 73; CINCPAC 280815Z Jun 73.
  3. CINCPACAF 220306Z May 73; CINCPAC 120440Z Jun 73.

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CIRCUIT GOLD Employment

(S) On 7 November CINCPACFLT announced the employment of a CIRCUIT GOLD aircraft to monitor units of the Soviet fleet. CIRCUIT GOLD was the nickname for Navy special multi-sensor P-3A aircraft. Two such aircraft were assigned to PACFLT and operated by Patrol Squadron Four (VP-4). During operations on 8 November Soviet naval units fired three white flares at the aircraft. (They had been operating within restrictions prescribed for all PACFLT aircraft, that is they were to maintain a closest-point-of-approach of 500 feet when below an altitude of 500 feet and a minimum overflight altitude of 500 feet.)<sup>3</sup>

(S) Because of this incident and the sensitive nature of the operations, CINCPAC directed that future CIRCUIT GOLD missions would require his approval and would be considered on a case-by-case basis consistent with the political situation and the anticipated intelligence gain. He noted that the existing political situation necessitated close control of such sensitive operations, and that the flare incidents, while not necessarily provocative, indicated a possible concern on the part of the Soviets. "Caution must be exercised by all U.S. Navy ocean surveillance units to avoid what might be considered harassing actions. Approval or denial of each mission would be based on an analysis of the existing political situation compared with the intelligence gain."<sup>4</sup>

1. ADMIN COMTHIRDFLT 301802Z Jul 73; JCS 1191/232045Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 242335Z Aug 73; CINCPAC 281830Z Aug 73.
2. Reports of the test sightings were enclosed with J313 HistSums for Sep-Nov 73; CINCPACFLT 181148Z Oct 73; CINCPAC 181300Z Oct 73; JCS 2315/022117Z Nov 73; CTU 30.2.9 060800Z Nov 73.
3. CINCPACFLT 070757Z Nov 73; CTG 72.3 081010Z Nov 73.
4. CINCPAC 092315Z Nov 73.

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(S) On 22 December CINCPAC determined that his review of individual operations was no longer necessary and he cancelled the requirement.<sup>1</sup>

Air Sampling

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(S) The 1959 emergency landing of an Atsugi-based U-2 on a glider airstrip at Fujisawa had received extensive press coverage and wide-ranging speculation regarding U-2 operations. Ensuing consultations between the Embassy and the Japanese Foreign Office resulted in the following statement released in Washington on 10 May 1960, "The U.S. Government has given GOJ assurances that U-2 aircraft flying from air bases in Japan have and will continue to be utilized only for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight purposes." In view of this informal understanding, there might be no necessity to initially inform the Japanese as to the nature of the U-2 operations, only that future flights, utilizing Japanese airspace, would be conducted in conformance with the 1960 understanding. COMUS Japan anticipated acute Japanese sensitivity in the matter of future U-2 use of Japanese airspace, however. He recommended that the AEDS and U-2 programs and requirements be treated as separate entities during initial discussions with the Japanese. He further recommended that the initial approach be low-key and that unless absolutely necessary no reference be made to U-2 air sampling capability or mission requirements. He recommended that the initial approach simply inform the Japanese that because of the phase down of WB-57 activities at Yokota, future missions would be flown on an infrequent basis by U-2 aircraft operating from U.S. bases in Korea. He recommended that we also give reassurances that in accordance with the 1960 understanding these aircraft would be used for legitimate and normal purposes and not for intelligence overflight missions.

1. CINCPAC 220154Z Dec 73.

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(S) In AEDS discussions with the Japanese, COMUS Japan recommended that the United States announce that it was prepared to provide technical guidance and assistance that would lead to development and improvement of JASDF air sampling techniques, in return for which we would hope that the Japanese would agree to provide the United States with some portion of the material collected. If they agreed to this arrangement, technical assistance could be provided through Mutual Defense Assistance Office channels. He noted that the United States should be prepared to brief the Japanese on U.S. aerial sampling operations and equipment only on a case-by-case basis and with specific Washington-level approval.<sup>1</sup>

*Handwritten:* (S) CINCPAC agreed with COMUS Japan and advised the JCS that he shared concern that the Ambassador in Tokyo had not been notified. He recommended that the JCS take action to apprise the State Department of the need for formally notifying the Ambassador of the air sampling program.<sup>2</sup>

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1. COMUS Japan 300706Z Nov 73.
  2. CINCPAC 042059Z Dec 73.
  3. JCS 3315/070040Z Dec 73.

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