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16-59 E1561 LOT 580 776
Box 4 MACARTHUR DISMISSAL

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MEMORANDUM

April 27, 1951

To: **L - Mr. Fisher**

PH 5:59

From: **OIR -**

Subject: **Intelligence Estimates on Chinese Communist Intentions to Intervene in Korea.**

This memorandum is forwarded in response to your oral request for information on certain intelligence estimates pertaining to the Far East. The following numbered paragraphs indicate the nature of your inquiries as understood by the R representative with whom you talked and provide certain information in reply.

1. Status of intelligence estimates concerning Chinese Communist intentions prior to the Wake Island conference. Was MacArthur informed of estimates?

On September 12, 1950 the Department of State requested the CIA to initiate work on a coordinated intelligence estimate on Chinese Communist intentions concerning intervention in Korea. Prior to its completion the President's decision to go to Wake Island was made and the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force cooperated in the preparation of a series of estimates on five critical situations in the Far East. On October 12, 1950 the Director of the CIA forwarded to the President these estimates. Excerpts from these estimates together with the full documents are attached as Tab A. The estimates indicated that full-scale Chinese

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Communist intervention in Korea, barring a Soviet decision for global war, was not probable in 1950.

OIR has no information to indicate whether or not these estimates were shown to General MacArthur at Wake Island. Responsibility for informing the Far East Command of such estimates rested and rests with the Department of Defense, which received copies of the estimates.

2. Status of intelligence estimates between the Wake Island conference and the Chinese Communist offensive of late November. Was MacArthur informed of estimates?

On November 8, NIE-2 was published. (An NIE - National Intelligence Estimate - is an estimate coordinated and published by the CIA in which the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Army, Navy and Air Force have concurred.) Excerpts from this estimate and the full document are attached as Tab B. This NIE estimated Chinese Communist strength already in North Korea at from 30,000 to 40,000 troops, noting that they were engaging UN forces as far as 100 miles south of the Manchurian border. It placed Chinese Communist strength in Manchuria at 700,000 troops, of which at least 200,000 were regular field forces and stated these strengths gave the Chinese Communists the capability of halting further UN advances or forcing a UN withdrawal. This estimate stated: "The objective of the Chinese Communist intervention appears to be to halt the advance of UN forces in Korea and to keep a Communist regime on Korean soil."

On November 24, NIE-2/1 was published. Excerpts from this estimate

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and the document are attached as Tab C. This re-estimate of the scale and purpose of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea concluded:

2. "The Chinese Communists will simultaneously:

a. Maintain Chinese-North Korean holding operations in

North Korea.

b. Maintain or increase their military strength in Manchuria.

c. Seek to obtain UN withdrawal from Korea by intimidation and diplomatic means.

3. "In case of failure to obtain UN withdrawal by these means, there will be increasing Chinese intervention in Korea."

On November 27 NIE-2/2 was published. Excerpts from this estimate and the document are attached as Tab D. It contained an estimate on Soviet Air Force reaction to UN air attacks on targets in Manchuria.

Responsibility for informing the Far East Command of these NIEs rested with the Department of Defense whose representatives participated in their preparation and received copies of the document as finally published.

3. Information on whether the Department did (or did not) keep appropriate military authorities informed on information available to it on Chinese Communist capabilities.

General MacArthur was responsible to the Department of Defense.

The Department of State's responsibility to him in regard to intelligence matters lay in keeping the Department of Defense fully advised of in-

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information or estimates available to State which would assist General MacArthur in the discharge of his duties. This was accomplished on a wide variety of levels, the most formal such interchange taking place in the preparation of National Intelligence Estimates.

As indicated previously NIEs represent estimates on subjects of vital significance published by the CIA and concurred in by the intelligence organizations of State, Army, Navy and Air Force. Responsibility for informing appropriate military headquarters of these estimates rests with the Department of Defense.

A number of NIEs were devoted to the question of Chinese Communist intentions and reactions prior to the time the Chinese launched their offensive. CIA coordinated the interdepartmental views on these questions. Within the Department of State, the Special Assistant for Intelligence was responsible for obtaining coordination among all intelligence officers concerned and for formulating State's final contribution. State's participation in the preparation of such studies made it certain that this Department's intelligence estimates were known and checked with the intelligence estimates of other intelligence agencies, including those of the Defense Department.

Constant exchange of information between the Department of State, the Department of Defense and the CIA was and is effected through a number of channels, one of which is the distribution of telegrams and despatches from the field bearing on all phases of intelligence. In this connection, the Department in October and November received a large number of tele-

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grams from field posts on Chinese Communist intentions and capabilities. Such telegrams were distributed to concerned military and CIA authorities. State's evaluations of all information so received were contained in its contributions to the NIEs.

One further example of State-Defense communications on this subject was the Department's mid-October letter to the Department of Defense suggesting that General MacArthur make a statement reassuring the Chinese that UN forces had no intention of interfering with the SUHO hydroelectric complex.

4. Indications in the Telecons between October 1 and December 1 of Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions.

A review of such references is attached as Tab. E.

The first reference in the Telecons during this period to the possibility of Chinese Communist intervention was made on October 4; it stated in part: "It is accepted that Russia would find it both convenient and economical to stay out of the conflict and let the idle millions of Communist China perform the task as part of master plan to drain US resources into the geographic rat holes of the Orient....The build-up of Chinese forces along the border has been reported....the potential exists for Chinese Communist forces to openly intervene in the Korean war if UN forces cross the 38th parallel". Toward the end of October references were made to Chinese prisoners of war. The Far East Command in the Telecon of November 2 referred to its Daily Intelligence Estimates which had given positive indications of possible intervention.

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The FEC stated that Chinese Communist intervention was a "serious proximate threat". On November 15 FEC pointed out that enemy strength had trebled since October 31 and stated that 4 CGP armies were deployed in North Korea. On November 24 Tokyo noted the start of the UN offensive and stated that there were indications the Chinese Communists might stubbornly defend installations along the Yalu River.

On November 26 Tokyo noted the unaggressive attitude of the enemy.

This Telecon was interrupted by a flash that an enemy force of unknown strength was attacking the II ROK corps front, Soviet assistance for

5. Information on the precise nature of intelligence responsibilities in the Far East.

A reply will be provided at a subsequent date.

6. Information on reports that General Willoughby did not permit CIA personnel to operate in certain areas in the Far East.

A reply will be provided at a subsequent date.

It is believed that the Soviet leaders will not question their respective losses in Korea against direct military intervention and a consequent grave risk of war. They will intervene in the Korean peninsula only if they feel that, on the basis of the Korean situation, it is in their best interests to do so at this time.

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Wake Estimate
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Excerpts from Memorandum of October 12, 1950 for the President from the Director, Central Intelligence Agency. (The Intelligence agencies of State, Army, Navy and Air Force concurred in these estimates.)

A. THREAT OF FULL CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA

II. CAPABILITIES

2. The Chinese Communist ground forces, currently lacking requisite air and naval support, are capable of intervening effectively, but not necessarily decisively, in the Korean conflict.

IV. PROBABILITY OF CHINESE COMMUNIST ACTION

6. While full-scale Chinese Communist intervention in Korea must be regarded as a continuing possibility, a consideration of all known factors leads to the conclusion that barring a Soviet decision for global war, such action is not probable in 1950. During this period, intervention will probably be confined to continued covert assistance to the North Koreans.

B. THREAT OF SOVIET INTERVENTION IN KOREA

II. CAPABILITIES

2. Soviet armed forces now in the Far East are capable of intervening overwhelmingly in Korea virtually without warning.

IV. PROBABILITIES OF SOVIET ACTION

6. It is believed that the Soviet leaders will not consider that their prospective losses in Korea warrant direct military intervention and a consequent grave risk of war. They will intervene in the Korean hostilities only if they have decided, not on the basis of the Korean situation alone, but on the basis of over-all considerations, that it is to their interest to precipitate a global war at this time.

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Tab 03

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NIE-2, CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA, published November 8, 1950.

A study of the development of the present situation in Korea is presented in the following sections. **THE PROBLEM** is defined as the problem of determining the scale and purpose of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea and Chinese Communist capabilities and intentions.

The Chinese Communist intervention in Korea, as summarized in Korea, have developed a general plan for the **SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS** of the intervention. They would probably attempt to establish a Communist regime in North Korea.

2. Present Chinese Communist troop strength in North Korea is estimated at 30,000 to 40,000. Chinese Communist ground units are engaging UN forces at various points ranging from 30 to 100 miles south of the Korean-Manchurian border. Recent action has been marked also by the appearance of Soviet-type jet fighters in combat with US aircraft over Korea.

3. Present Chinese Communist troop strength in Manchuria is estimated at 700,000. Of this number, there are at least 200,000 regular field forces. These troop strengths, added to the forces already in Korea, are believed to make the Chinese Communists capable of: (a) halting further UN advance northward, through piecemeal commitment of troops; or (b) forcing UN withdrawal to defensive positions farther south by a powerful assault.

4. The objective of the Chinese Communist intervention appears to be to halt the advance of UN forces in Korea and to keep a Communist regime in being on Korean soil. In accomplishing this purpose, the Chinese Communists would: (a) avert the psychological and political consequences of a disastrous outcome of the Korean venture; (b) keep UN forces away from the actual frontiers of China and the USSR; (c) retain an area in Korea as a base of Communist military and guerrilla operations; (d) prolong indefinitely the containment of UN, especially US, forces in Korea; (e) control the distribution of hydroelectric power generated in North Korea and retain other economic benefits; and (f) create the possibility of a favorable political solution in Korea, despite the military defeat of the North Koreans.

5. The Chinese Communists thus far retain full freedom of action with respect to Korea. They are free to adjust their action in accordance with the development of the situation. If the Chinese Communists were to succeed in destroying the effective strength of UN forces in northern Korea, they would pursue their advantage as far as possible. If the military situation is stabilized, they may well consider that, with advantageous terrain and the onset of winter, their forces now in Korea are sufficient to accomplish their immediate purposes.

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6. A likely and logical development of the present situation is that the opposing sides will build up their combat power in successive increments to checkmate the other until forces of major magnitude are involved. At any point in this development, the danger is present that the situation may get out of control and lead to a general war. 1950

7. The Chinese Communists, in intervening in Korea, have accepted a grave risk of retaliation and general war. They would probably ignore an ultimatum requiring their withdrawal. If Chinese territory were to be attacked, they would probably enter Korea in full force.

8. The fact that both the Chinese Communists and the USSR have accepted an increased risk of a general war indicates either that the Kremlin is ready to face a showdown with the West at an early date or that circumstances have forced them to accept that risk.

a. To gain or increase their military strength in Korea.

b. To force the UN withdrawal from Korea by intimidation and diplomatic means.

9. The fact that the USSR has gained UN withdrawal by these means, and that the increasing UN intervention in Korea, at a minimum, will result in a UN military force, uncoordinated and untrained, against the forces in Korea, to subject them to a UN military attack, and to the possibility of a North Korean withdrawal, is not conclusive as to whether the UN will be able to force a full withdrawal of UN forces from Korea. It is possible that the UN will have the military capability of forcing the UN forces to withdraw, but that they do have the capability of forcing the UN forces to withdraw, possibly for political and tactical reasons, which, the Communist might conclude, would lead to a UN withdrawal from Korea.

10. In the event of a general war, the USSR will continue and possibly increase its support to the Chinese by furnishing equipment, military technical aids, and conceivably, "volunteers" or mercenaries in various forms of military equipment.

11. The risk that a general war will develop already exists. The Soviet policy is to maintain this possibility but they appear to have already done so and to feel prepared to cope with it.

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NIE-2/1, CHINESE COMMUNIST INTERVENTION IN KOREA, published November 24, 1950

THE PROBLEM

1. To re-estimate the scale and purpose of Chinese Communist intervention in North Korea.

CONCLUSIONS

2. The Chinese Communists will simultaneously:

- a. Maintain Chinese-North Korean holding operations in North Korea.
- b. Maintain or increase their military strength in Manchuria.
- c. Seek to obtain UN withdrawal from Korea by intimidation and diplomatic means.

3. In case of failure to obtain UN withdrawal by these means, there will be increasing Chinese intervention in Korea. At a minimum, the Chinese will conduct, on an increasing scale, unacknowledged operations designed to immobilize UN forces in Korea, to subject them to prolonged attrition, and to maintain the semblance of a North Korean state in being. Available evidence is not conclusive as to whether or not the Chinese Communists are as yet committed to a full-scale offensive effort. Eventually they may undertake operations designed to bring about the withdrawal of UN forces from Korea. It is estimated that they do not have the military capability of driving the UN forces from the peninsula, but that they do have the capability of forcing them to withdraw to defensive positions for prolonged and inconclusive operations, which, the Communist might calculate, would lead to eventual UN withdrawal from Korea.

4. So long as Chinese intervention continues, the USSR will continue and possibly increase its support to the Chinese by furnishing equipment, planes, technical advisers, and conceivably, "volunteers" as necessary to man the more intricate equipment.

5. The risk that a general war will develop already exists. The Soviet rulers may underrate this possibility but they appear to have allowed for it and to feel prepared to cope with it.

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NIE-2/2, SOVIET PARTICIPATION IN THE AIR DEFENSE OF MANCHURIA, published November 27, 1950.

THE PROBLEM

1. To estimate whether, in the event of UN air attack on targets in Manchuria, the Soviet Air Force would participate in the defense of such targets.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

2. In the circumstances envisaged in the problem, the USSR would provide aircraft, anti-aircraft artillery, and trained personnel as necessary for the defense of Manchurian targets. Sufficient resources for rendering such aid are available in the Soviet Far East.

3. Soviet participation in the defense of Manchurian targets could take any of the following forms:

- a. Actual participation without identification.
- b. The open participation of ostensibly volunteer units.
- c. The open participation of Soviet units as a limited commitment under the Sino-Soviet treaty.
- d. The open participation of Soviet units as an aspect of a general war forced on the Soviet Union under the Sino-Soviet treaty.

4. At least initially, the most likely form of Soviet participation in the air defense of Manchurian targets would be the first—i.e., actual participation in action without open identification.

5. The open participation of Soviet units would be unlikely unless general war should develop.

6. A substantial risk that the situation may degenerate into a general war already exists. UN air attack on targets in Manchuria, alone, probably would not cause the Soviet rulers to decide to launch a general war, inasmuch as the Kremlin's basic decision for or against war would be based on global considerations. The events likely to follow such attacks, however, would carry with them a greater probability of a general war developing.

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References in FEC Telecons and Related Documents During the Period 1 October 1950 - 30 November 1950 to Chinese Communist Intervention in the Korean Conflict

1. First reference to the possibility of Chinese Communist intervention in the Korean conflict in support of the North Korean forces in FEC Telecons for the period under consideration is found in Telecon DA TT 3848 dated 4 October 1950. In Item FEC (G) Discussion of enemy capabilities a rather lengthy analysis of the possibility of Chinese Communist reinforcement of North Korean forces is made. Quoting previous references to the subject made in FEC Daily Intelligence Summaries Nos. 2855, 2900, 2908, 2919, 2929, and 2937, the report goes on to say in part:

"With the collapse of the North Korean armies, the immediate problem facing the UN forces involves the attitude of the Communist Chinese and the Soviets...Will they intervene openly?... It is accepted that Russia would find it both convenient and economical to stay out of the conflict and let the idle millions of Communist China perform task as part of master plan to drain US resources into the geographic ratholes of the Orient...The interest of all intelligence agencies is focused on the Yalu and the movements of the elusive LIN PIAO....The buildup of Chinese forces along the border has been reported...massing of forces at Antung and other Manchurian crossings appears conclusive.... Involves a possible 9/18 divisions organized into 3/6 armies of a total of 38 divisions and 9 armies now carried in all Manchuria.... Formosan sources sometimes colored but only serious channel of information from within China flatly stated release or transfer of 9 divisions to North Korea....

"In view of these facts the potential exists for Chinese Communist forces to openly intervene in the Korean war if UN forces cross the 38th parallel."

2. No further mention of Chinese Communist intervention possibilities is made in Telecons until 27 October 1950 in DA TT 3926 which reports that a Chinese prisoner in NKPA uniform had been captured at the battle of Unsan. This PW stated that units organized along Chinese Communist lines were in positions south of the Yalu river. Another PW captured in the 6th ROK division zone reported the existence of an enemy regiment containing a large number of Chinese troops. In DA TT 3949 of 28 October 1950 it was reported that 3 Chinese PWs had been captured since October 25, 1950. Interrogation of these PWs revealed that they had been with units which crossed the Yalu on October 19, 1950. FEC concluded that "it appears likely that an unknown number of Chinese were incorporated into North Korean units to assist in the..."

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statements of these not believed further conclusions can be reached at this time. No indication of open intervention of CCF."

In DA TT 3950 of 29 October 1950 the capture of 2 Chinese PWs who claimed they were told additional forces would follow them was reported. The PWs had no instructions to hide their CCF identity.

DA TT 3951 of 30 October 1950 reported the capture of a PW identified as a member of the 3rd Bn, 355th Regt., 119th Div, 40th CCF Army. The PW stated his division crossed the Yalu on or about 20 October 1950. All combat personnel of this division were Chinese. A total of 10 CCF PWs had been captured by this date. None of the units mentioned by PW were accepted as being in Korea.

DA TT 3957 of 31 October 1950 confirmed the identification and accepted the 370th Regt. 124th CCF division as in Korea with a strength of 2500. A PW was captured who stated that elements of the 39th and 40th CCF armies were in Korea. The PW also stated that no part of these units was integrated with North Korean forces and that they had no instruction to appear as volunteers. All information was unconfirmed by FEC.

3. DA TT 3968 of 2 November 1950 in a discussion of enemy capabilities referred to Daily Intelligence Summaries Nos. 2957, 2963, 2965, 2971, 2974, and 2975 as giving positive indication of possible intervention by CCF and adds that such indications were reported as early as 3 October 1950 when it was reported that 20 CCF Divisions had crossed the Yalu. It added that: "A report was included in Intelligence Summary of 19 October that the decision for active intervention had been made and 400,000 troops had been alerted to cross into North Korea between the 18th and 20th of October." FEC felt that Chinese Communist intervention was now a "serious proximate threat". Reports had been made to the effect that 20 divs comprising the 38th, 39th and 40th CCF Armies were in Korea. FEC commented that "although the troop strength and number of Chinese Communist units reported to have crossed into Korea are probably exaggerated, greater credence must be given in the light of PW interrogations and PW identification of units previously reported as having crossed. Indications point to piecemeal commitment of forces for ostensible limited purposes only."

4. Further telecons continued to report capture of Chinese prisoners and began to accept units. Excerpts follow:

3 November DA TT 3971
Indication of increase of CCF in Eighth Army zone.
Possible presence of at least two units.

6 November DA TT 3976
Indication of increase of CCF in Eighth Army zone.

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8th Army front is 27,000 (3 divisions) people psychological

10 November DA TT 3996

Identification was made of the entire 124th CCF Division and of elements of 4 of the 16 CCF Armies carried in Manchuria. FEC commented that it appeared too early to draw definite conclusions concerning actual scope of CCF intervention in Korea.

11 November DA TT ?

Announcement made of planned UN resumption of the offensive. Commented on strange lull in enemy activity for past 4-5 days. A PW claimed the entire 38th CCF Army (112, 113, and 114 divs) in Korea.

12 November DA TT 4001

Noted large build up of CCF south and east of the Fusen reservoir area. Contained discussion of possibility of amphibious operations against UN forces by Chinese Communists. Concluded potentiality existed but no evidence was available to indicate intent. In discussion referred to the northward movement in China of the 3rd CCF Field Army.

15 November DA TT 4016

Noted that enemy strength had trebled since 31 October and stated that 4 CCF Armies were now deployed in North Korea. Pointed out that this greatly strengthened NK defensive capabilities and that UN forces were hampered by severe weather conditions, long supply lines and lack of sufficient manpower to mount effective offensive.

17 November DA TT 4028

Referred to Daily Intelligence Summary 2983 of 9 November which pointed out that the force assembled in the Ghosin Fusen area was capable of launching offensive to south in an effort to cut off UN forces located north and east of the Hamhung Hungnam complex, or to initiate a combined offensive against the X Corps. Commented that there was no indication that the Chinese contemplated any large scale offensive operations in this area, but that PWs reported plans for local attacks in the Hamhung Hungnam complex area. Added that CCF/NK troops retained capacity for launching a major counter offensive at any time.

19 November DA TT 4035

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- Chinese Communist leaders are preparing people psychologically for war." (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100)
- 20 November DA TT 4036 Reported enemy had evolved definite withdrawal-defensive trend during past 10 days. Not known why -- previously such tactics indicated plan to resume offensive, but might indicate high level decision to retire and defend from previously prepared positions.
- 23 November DA TT 4057 Noted that CCF had few supplies (often only 3 days food) and that they were losing a lot of ammunition due to UN air attacks. Commented that it was reasonable to assume that Chinese combat efficiency and morale were lowering.
- 24 November DA TT 4058 Noted start of UN general offensive. Pointed to unconfirmed reports that CCF would withdraw to the Yalu or back to Manchuria due to heavy casualties, the fact that troops lacked will to fight, or even perhaps for political reasons. Noted large number of rumors in Tokyo and elsewhere of peace negotiations by Chinese Communists. Cautioned that CCF still had strength for defense and added that it was still too early to predict course of CCF action. Referred to "many indications" that Chinese Communists had every intention of stubbornly defending the reservoirs and power installations along the Yalu River and its tributaries.
- 25 November DA TT 4062 Stated enemy reaction to 8th Army offensive "practically non-existent" except in I ROK Division area.
- 26 November DA TT ? Noted increasing enemy resistance. (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28) (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34) (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40) (41) (42) (43) (44) (45) (46) (47) (48) (49) (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) (65) (66) (67) (68) (69) (70) (71) (72) (73) (74) (75) (76) (77) (78) (79) (80) (81) (82) (83) (84) (85) (86) (87) (88) (89) (90) (91) (92) (93) (94) (95) (96) (97) (98) (99) (100)

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inforcement or influx of CCF other than the fairly conclusive identification of 9-12 divisions derived from regular Chinese corps (armies) previously stationed along the Yalu, viz. the 40th, 34th, and 42 Corps. (2) Concerning counteroffensive operations in present areas: flank operations along boundary 8th Army - X Corps - Stated: At the time of the 8th Army realignment, the enemy did not exploit initial advantage... When 125th CCF division was picked up on this flank, it suggested strongly a sideslipping of the Chinese forces previously in the Chechin reservoir area combined with sizeable guerrilla movements south of the road Chigyong-Sachang Ni. This potential was not exploited; the mountainous terrain is very complicated and pressure of the current UN offensive showed the enemy willing to withdraw northward to the point of abandoning field guns, tanks and support artillery. Now considered unlikely that enemy will operate extensively on flank of the 8th Army. (3) Concerning defensive operations: Stated the initial deployment of the 8th Army... was not seriously opposed. Evidence of voluntary withdrawal of all opposing units, including the CCF, to considerable depth, pointing to a possible realignment of the enemy and withdrawal into mountainous areas. Expected a defensive axis to be formed with CCF and reconstituted NK units along Huichon-Chongju road. Noted potential for possible enemy delaying action along the road net in the reservoir area.

As regards the UN counteroffensive, noted it was probing the southern end of the enemy defense line, or lines, by the I and IX Corps while the II ROK Corps was expected to force the enemy toward the north and west. Under normal conditions this pivotal press might actually strengthen the enemy defense capabilities in that it would improve and extend the defensive front on the line Unsan-Onjong-Huichon and possibly further north toward Myong-dangjin. From there on, the UN and enemy ensemble would become a frontal push along corps axial roads to the Yalu. Should the enemy persist in his present non-aggressive attitude and withdraw, he might find sanctuary behind the Yalu River, there to re-form at leisure... There was fair evidence that the rear echelon of the North Korean High Command was already on the Manchurian side in the vicinity of Manpojin. Should the enemy elect to fight in the interior valleys, slowing down of the UN offensive might result. (4) Concerning coordinated offensive/defensive air operations: Stated this not a serious threat without large reinforcement made available from Soviets, which is not considered likely. (5)

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tions: Stated serious local threat which might disrupt lines of communication and resumption of civil affairs:

At this point transmission interrupted by a FLASH:

"Enemy of unknown strength is attacking across entire ROK II Corps front. All elements of ROK II Corps last reported withdrawing to south with plans to establish a defense line south of Okchon...An unknown size enemy force last reported to have taken Tokchon."

27 November

Stated enemy beginning heavy attacks on all fronts. In discussion of enemy capabilities; Accepted identification of 2 more CCF armies (20th and 50th) not yet accepted. *3006 Army*
Remarked 20th Army first unit of 3rd Field Army reported in Korea. Stated PFC reluctant to accept all units at full strength, but OB identification of these corps on the Yalu River was unquestioned as concerns the 4th Field Army and there was mounting evidence that units of 3rd Field Army recently entered Manchuria. Adds there was no doubt of CCF capacity to employ any or all of these forces.

Following strength figures set for CCF units in Korea:
Accepted: 38, 29, 40, 42 Armies -- 46,700 -- 70,900
Tentatively Accepted: 66th Army -- 12,600-18,900
Total CCF Strength: 59,300 -- 89,000 but if 20th and 50th Armies become accepted new total becomes: 84,500 -- 127,000

28 November

DA TT 4069: Gave following report of CCF strengths:
Accepted: 119,777
Tentatively Accepted: 157,577
NK Strengths: 21,165

30 November

DA TT 4079: Gave accepted Chinese strength as 190,000 and added that there were indications that CCF were actually drawing on Chinese Communist Units in Manchuria. Pointed out that available potential in Manchuria was 355,000 combat troops and 370,000 line of communication troops.