79. Chief, FBM to COS, Karlsruhe, "[Gehlen Organization]," 2 February 1949

-	SECRET	RELEASE L	ı
OF	FICIAL	DISPATCH	
OUCH		DISPATCH NO.	

VIA: ATR POUCH SPECIFY AIR OR SEA POUCH	DISPATCH NO.
TO Chief of Station, Karlarahe FOR:  FROM: Gnist, Foreign Branch E	DATE: 2 February 1919
SUBJECT: GENERAL	

This is a follow-up to the cable we sent you today on the above sub-


Paragraphs 1, 2-1, 2-3, 2-3, 2-6, and 2-11 are self-emplanatory. As regards paragraph 2-1, we must to be sure that our intention is clear, namely that the talescore on [6,0] thall not advancely affect the operations of the I would make no sense at all for us to scrap the labors of the last three and a half years just because we assume control of what is at best a controversial intelligence package. In this commention, we have not yet made any adjustments to take care of the facancies on your staff made by those individuals who go ever to [6,0] we felt it would be more sensible to wait until the takeover actually became official. At that time, we can at least set up a 7/0 for [7] and this staff so that the slots in [7] will be valuated. Incidentally, we will count on you to inform us regularly on additional personnel requirements which [6,0] may make upon us as developments occur. It seems advisable to start out with four staff officers, because the initial pariod will have to be one of intense exploration to find out what factually [6,0] really is in all its manifestations.


With reference to paragraph 2-0, it seems clear that the only may for us to approach (2.4) is to have our staff people investigate it thoroughly from the top down. At this juncture, it would make no seems to attempt to decide at what specific points in the operation staff officers should be placed, because our knowledge of what goes on is not sufficiently detailed in order to make this possible. Further, our commitment to keep the Army and Air Forces furnished with tactical information as herestofore means plainly that we will have to keep the operation at its present strength until we are absolutely sure of our ground in connection with any slicing we may feel it desirable to do. It is ear thought currently that as the investigation progresses and as C. I gets to the point where he will want to make specific recommendations about the future of parts of 1500 it will be

RELEAS, IN	G OFFICER .	COORDINAT	ING OFFICER	AUTHENTILA BTCHAR	ATTING OFFICER
FORM NO. 51-29		SECRETAL O GERMA	ELEASE NY ONE	X	(782

Secret Rel GER

79. (Continued)





essential for you to appoint a unit in your own shop, headed by yourself, to pass on these recommendations, pro and con, so that they may be forwarded to Washington with your considered opinion appended thereto. This is one means of assuring that you are kept completely conversant with what the operation is doing. It also has the merit that lifegives you a veto power if you feel that the LGOO hieftains are running away with the ball game. We all agree that it is going to be extremely difficult fort. I and his staff to maintain a dispassionate view of this operation working as they will be on a day-to-day basis with its members. Many of these men are clearly intelligent, purposeful, and strong willed. They are going to be a monumental bandful regardless of how things develop. Consequently, I and his group have in a sense got to be backed up, given necessary authority, but not permitted to be put in the position of being run by LGOO rather than vice versa.

This operation should be a great intelligence producer. On the other hand, it will be a most delicate mechanism to administer. We are currently giving considerable thought to such remifications as the reaction of various allied intelligence services when the word inevitably gets around that this Agency has taken over. So The longer this can be delayed, the better, but we feel it is fancirue to assume that some German will not give the game away sooner or later. The most ticklish thing of all. obviously, is the threat of further publicity concerning the operation.

The writer, had learned a considerable amount about Do while in Munich. He apparently decided not to do much with the material after talking with General Clay. In any event, all we can do is keep our own lips buttoned, keep the operation away from A and other stations, and in every possible way go as circumspectly as possible.

Some ideas we have concerning the findings in  $\Box$  investigative report will be pouched in a few days.

Richard Helms

TOP SECRET

SECRET/RELEASE C

Segret