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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520



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September 26, 1985

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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Secretary Shultz and Mr. Shevardnadze's Meeting  
September 25, 1985

Things to be done as a result of the Secretary Shultz and Mr Shevardnadze meeting on September 25, 1985.

1. Is what I said about the Soviet's proposal for a ban on space/strike weapons correct?

o Did Gromyko's definition of such weapons in January at Geneva differ from what I said in describing it? After the meeting while we were waiting for the two principals to join the rest of us, Korniyenko said that the formulation of that definition included the Russian word, which we interpret as, "create", which implies testing as well as design.

o Is testing of an ICBM's ASAT capability required before either side would have sufficient confidence to consider using it for that purpose?. Korniyenko raised this point as well after the meeting.

o The Soviet position suggested an even more fundamental issue. Is there a commonality of interest between the two sides in preserving satellites against the threat of ASATs or does the US put greater value upon using anti-satellites to develop a space-based ABM capability. The argument which I used at the meeting could be read to imply that we did have a common interest in preventing ASATs if it were possible to work out a reliable and verifiable way of so doing, but that we did not believe it possible. Is this a correct and supportable position or is it not?

2. What is the best way to deal with the issues of interpretation of the ABM treaty raised by Korniyenko?

o What is the best rebuttal to Korniyenko's argument that SDI is in violation of the Article I provision that each party undertakes not to deploy ABM systems for a defense of its country and not to provide a base for such a defense?

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o After the meeting Kornyenko asserted that it was unfortunate that I had quoted Agreed Statement D without reference to the introductory wording of that statement - "In order to insure fulfillment of the obligation not to deploy ABM systems and their components except as provided in Article III of the Treaty . . ."

I pointed out to Kornyenko that Article III deals only with the undertaking not to deploy. I said I had emphasized that the Agreed Statement D prohibits deployment of systems based on components capable of substituting for ABM components unless that was after discussion in accordance with Article 13 and amendment in accordance with Article 14. I said that what I had said was clearly consistent with the introductory phrase of agreed Statement D and with Article III.

3. How should we deal with the Soviet argument repeated by Kornyenko that we refused to discuss their proposal for a SLCM ban? Secretary Shultz said that we knew no way verifiably to limit such weapons. This suggests that we would be willing to limit them were there such a way. This may not be true in view of the fact that other nations possess SLCMs whose numbers and range will undoubtedly increase over time. This was reinforced by the fact that it appears to be inherently impossible to assure that a conventional SLCM cannot be converted to a nuclear SLCM. In any case would it not be wise to work out a detailed logic chain with respect to this issue?

4. How do we best deal with Kornyenko's argument that the NPT Treaty is wholly unverifiable with respect to the obligation of the nuclear powers not to transfer nuclear weapons to non-nuclear powers but is still valuable?

o There is a commonality of interest not to violate these undertakings whether verifiable or not. Is it not true that almost all limitations at the margin of small numbers are very dubious as to verifiability? They may still be worthwhile if any strategically significant violation would raise a significant prospect of detection.

o The question still remains as to the best chain of argument to use in rebuttal of Kornyenko's point.

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